ABSA Bank Limited v Mogale City Mall (Pty) Limited and Another (25035/10) [2010] ZAGPPHC 108 (7 September 2010)

80 Reportability
Insolvency Law

Brief Summary

Insolvency Law — Liquidation — Application for winding-up of company — Grounds for liquidation including inability to pay debts and just and equitable grounds — Applicant, Absa Bank Ltd, sought liquidation of first respondent, Mogale City Mall (Pty) Ltd, on basis of substantial indebtedness and operational suspension — First respondent admitted indebtedness but raised counterclaim alleging breach of fiduciary duty by applicant — Court held that first respondent's inability to pay debts was established, and the winding-up was just and equitable given the insolvency of associated companies in the group — Liquidation order granted.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


This judgment concerns an application in the North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria, for the final liquidation (winding-up) of the first respondent, Mogale City Mall (Pty) Limited. The application was brought by Absa Bank Limited as both a creditor and a member (shareholder) of the first respondent. The second respondent, Smokey Mountain Trading 512 (Pty) Ltd, was identified as Absa’s co-shareholder in the first respondent, with Absa holding 30% of the shares.


The application was advanced on several alleged statutory and equitable grounds, namely that the first respondent had suspended its business for more than a year, that 75% of its share capital had become lost, that it was unable to pay its debts (both factually and commercially insolvent), and that it would be just and equitable to wind it up. Although multiple grounds were pleaded, the matter ultimately turned on the ground that the first respondent was unable to pay its debts, which was the ground argued before the court.


Procedurally, the first respondent raised a preliminary issue (in limine) seeking an order compelling Absa to make discovery under the Uniform Rules of Court, contending that it required documents to support a substantial counterclaim which it said extinguished or outweighed Absa’s claim. The judgment also noted a broader context of related litigation involving entities in the same corporate group (the “UPP/Immobili group”), including an earlier extensive judgment by Prinsloo J (in proceedings of a similar nature involving related companies) and a final winding-up order granted by Hartzenberg J on 31 March 2010 against Immobili and other related companies, where overlapping defences were considered.


The general subject-matter of the dispute was whether the first respondent should be placed in liquidation at Absa’s instance, particularly in circumstances where the debt was largely admitted, but the first respondent sought to resist liquidation on the basis of an alleged damages counterclaim founded on an asserted fiduciary duty and alleged collusion by Absa in relation to competing property developments.


2. Material Facts


Absa was a shareholder and creditor of the first respondent, holding 30% of its shares. The second respondent (a company within the same broader group of companies) was Absa’s co-shareholder. The first respondent was the corporate vehicle intended to develop a shopping mall project near Krugersdorp, at the intersection of Hendrik Potgieter Avenue and the R28.


Absa relied on an asserted indebtedness totalling approximately R85 million, composed of R38 938 445.62 in respect of a loan made directly by Absa to the first respondent (originally R32 million) under a written loan agreement dated 13 December 2007, and approximately R47 million said to be due under a loan initially made by Immobili Retail Investment (Pty) Ltd to the first respondent, which Absa alleged had been ceded to it.


The first respondent did not dispute its indebtedness to Absa in respect of the direct Absa loan, nor did it dispute that the balance outstanding was approximately R38 million. The first respondent, however, sought to resist the liquidation application substantially on the basis that it had a counterclaim which it alleged offset Absa’s claim.


The counterclaim was framed as a damages claim (alleged to be in the region of R360 million) arising from the proposition that Absa had breached a fiduciary duty owed to the first respondent. The first respondent contended that there was an “overall partnership agreement” (or, as reformulated in related litigation, at least a joint venture-type relationship) across developments undertaken by companies in the UPP/Immobili group. It alleged that Absa deviously undermined its relationship with the first respondent, colluded with a competitor developer (Retail Africa Wingspan Investments (Pty) Ltd, “Wingspan”), and acted mala fide in enforcing or foreclosing under the loan arrangements, thereby causing the first respondent to lose expected profits.


The first respondent accepted that its case for this counterclaim was to a considerable extent based on inferences, and on that basis sought discovery in limine to obtain documentation from Absa to support those inferences.


Certain issues were expressly identified as disputed in the liquidation application beyond the admitted R38 million loan debt, including the validity/effect of the alleged cession of the Immobili loan to Absa, and whether 75% of the first respondent’s share capital had been lost. However, the court recorded that it would focus on the ground that was argued before it, namely the first respondent’s inability to pay its debts.


3. Legal Issues


The court was required to determine, first, whether the first respondent had demonstrated exceptional circumstances justifying an order compelling discovery in motion proceedings, particularly in a liquidation application where the respondent sought to investigate documents to support a defence framed as a counterclaim.


Second, on the merits of liquidation, the central question was whether the first respondent’s asserted counterclaim (based on alleged breach of fiduciary duty, collusion, and wrongful withdrawal of support) could constitute a cognisable basis to resist liquidation notwithstanding the admitted indebtedness to Absa of approximately R38 million. This required the court to address whether the alleged fiduciary duty and its breach were legally sustainable in light of prior findings in related proceedings, and whether doctrines such as issue estoppel or res judicata precluded re-litigation of those issues.


The dispute accordingly involved a combination of law (the availability and scope of discovery in motion proceedings; the effect of issue estoppel/res judicata; the legal foundation for a fiduciary duty in the asserted relationship), and the application of law to fact (whether the respondent’s pleaded counterclaim and inferences could, on the papers, constitute a bona fide defence sufficient to prevent liquidation on the “inability to pay debts” ground).


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court dealt first with the discovery application. It applied the principle that a court’s power to order discovery in motion proceedings is exercised only in exceptional circumstances, referencing authority to that effect. The court emphasised that motion proceedings require parties to place their evidence before the court in affidavit form, and that where a party refers to documents in affidavits, the opposing party has a procedural mechanism under Rule 35(12) to obtain inspection of those documents.


In evaluating the first respondent’s request, the court considered the context that the principal defence was a purported counterclaim, and stated that it was not directly concerned with that counterclaim in the liquidation application in the way a trial court would be. The court characterised the first respondent’s discovery attempt as essentially an effort to trawl through Absa’s documentation to find support for its inferential case. On that basis, it concluded that the first respondent had failed to show the exceptional circumstances required for broader discovery in motion proceedings, and refused the request that the further discovery regime be made applicable.


Turning to the winding-up application, the court recorded that there was no dispute about the Absa loan and the outstanding balance of approximately R38 million. The court noted other disputes (including the Immobili cession and the alleged loss of share capital), and also observed that a “just and equitable” winding-up could potentially be implicated given that many associated companies in the group had already been wound up, including Immobili, to which (on the first respondent’s version) the first respondent owed substantial sums. However, the court confined its decision to the basis argued, namely inability to pay debts.


On that ground, the court evaluated the first respondent’s reliance on a counterclaim alleging breach of fiduciary duty. It accepted that counsel for the first respondent conceded that the first respondent was bound, on the basis of issue estoppel, by the judgment of Hartzenberg J (31 March 2010) in related winding-up proceedings involving Immobili and other companies, in which the alleged fiduciary duty and its breach had been considered extensively and rejected. The court reasoned that Hartzenberg J’s findings left no room for a different conclusion in the present matter on the existence or breach of such a duty.


The court further addressed whether the appropriate legal framing was issue estoppel or res judicata, and contemplated whether the “same parties” requirement arose. It considered that the first respondent could be treated as being in privy with the entities involved before Hartzenberg J, because they were directed by the same governing minds. In any event, the court held that even if estoppel doctrines did not strictly apply, Hartzenberg J’s judgment operated as a highly persuasive precedent, and the court accepted its reasoning.


The court then considered the attempted distinctions advanced by the first respondent to avoid Hartzenberg J’s findings. The first distinction—relating to the land and the competitive development near Mogale—was found not to assist, because the very point that Absa would be unlikely to jeopardise a development in which it had an interest had already been addressed by Hartzenberg J. The second distinction, based on an affidavit by Absa’s deponent (Mr Loubser) in opposition to a petition for leave to appeal, was rejected on the basis that the statement relied upon was properly construed as referring to an intention to exit the debt relationship by rationalising the group’s affairs through the sale of two shopping centres, rather than an intention to abandon the Mogale project in the manner alleged. The court accepted the contextual explanation offered for that statement, supported by references in the affidavits and minutes of meetings.


The court also dealt with a further contention that Absa had falsely held out that the Heritage Village project did not form part of Wingspan’s portfolio. It accepted Absa’s explanation that Wingspan was a fund holding completed projects and that Heritage Village, being undeveloped at the time, had been excluded until development was complete. The court regarded that explanation as satisfactorily dispelling the suspicions raised.


Finally, the court considered the respondent’s reliance on authority relating to partnership analogy in the context of a company used as the vehicle for a joint understanding, but held that the decisive factual and legal position remained that Hartzenberg J had found no fiduciary duty and no breach. The court also referred to the shareholders’ agreement, noting that it excluded obligations other than those recorded in the agreement (by reference to the relevant clause).


On this reasoning, the court concluded that the respondents had failed to show any breach by Absa capable of giving rise to the asserted damages claim. The counterclaim therefore did not provide a sustainable basis to resist liquidation, and the admitted indebtedness supported the granting of a winding-up order. The court held that, in the circumstances, the appropriate order was a final winding-up order.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court granted a final winding-up order against the first respondent.


The order was granted in terms of prayer 1 of the notice of motion. The judgment did not set out the wording of that prayer in the text reproduced, and it did not expressly record a distinct costs order in the portion of the judgment provided.


Cases Cited


Moulded Components and Rotomoulding South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Coucourakis and Another 1979 (2) SA 457 (W).


Bellairs v Hodnett and Another 1978 (1) SA 1109 (AD).


The judgment also referred to an extensive prior judgment by Prinsloo J in related liquidation proceedings (further particulars not provided in the text), and to an earlier judgment by Hartzenberg J delivered on 31 March 2010 granting final winding-up orders against Immobili and related companies (further particulars not provided in the text).


Legislation Cited


No legislation was expressly cited in the text provided.


Rules of Court Cited


Uniform Rules of Court, Rule 35(12).


Uniform Rules of Court, Rule 35(13).


Uniform Rules of Court, Rule 35(14).


Held


The court held that the first respondent failed to establish exceptional circumstances justifying an order for discovery in motion proceedings, particularly where the discovery request functioned as an attempt to search for documentary support for a defence based on inference.


The court further held that the first respondent’s reliance on a substantial counterclaim founded on an alleged fiduciary duty and its breach could not succeed, because the relevant issues had effectively been determined against the UPP/Immobili group in prior proceedings before Hartzenberg J, and the first respondent was bound by those findings through issue estoppel (or, alternatively, the reasoning was accepted as compelling precedent). As a result, the first respondent failed to show a sustainable defence to Absa’s claim on the basis argued.


On the basis of the admitted indebtedness and the failure of the counterclaim-based defence, the court held that a final winding-up order should be granted.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


A court’s power to order discovery in motion proceedings is exercised only in exceptional circumstances. Motion proceedings proceed on affidavit evidence, and parties are generally expected to place their evidence before the court without resorting to wide-ranging discovery. Where documents are referred to in affidavits, the appropriate procedural mechanism is ordinarily Rule 35(12), which permits inspection of documents so referenced.


In a liquidation application, a respondent who relies on a counterclaim to resist winding-up must still show that the defence is legally sustainable on the papers. A counterclaim founded on speculative inferences, and advanced through an attempt to obtain broad discovery to search for support, will not readily justify delaying or defeating liquidation where material indebtedness is admitted.


Where substantially the same issues have been determined in prior proceedings involving closely related entities, principles such as issue estoppel (and potentially res judicata) may preclude re-litigation. Even where strict requirements may be debated, a prior judgment on point may be treated as highly persuasive precedent, particularly where the reasoning is compelling and the entities involved are directed by the same controlling minds.


Contractual instruments such as a shareholders’ agreement may exclude obligations beyond those expressly recorded, undermining attempts to source additional obligations (such as fiduciary duties) from asserted informal “overall partnership” or joint venture understandings that are not substantiated in the contractual documentation.

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[2010] ZAGPPHC 108
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ABSA Bank Limited v Mogale City Mall (Pty) Limited and Another (25035/10) [2010] ZAGPPHC 108 (7 September 2010)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
(NORTH GAUTENG HIGH
COURT, PRETORIA)
DATE: 7
SEPTEMBER 2010
CASE NO:
25035/10
In the matter
between:
ABSA BANK LIMITED
APPLICANT
vs
MOGALE CITY MALL
(PTY) LIMITED FIRST RESPONDENT
SMOKEY MOUNTAIN
TRADING 512 (PTY) LTD SECOND RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
BOTHA. J
This is an
application for the liquidation of the first respondent.
The applicant, Absa
Bank Ltd, brings the application as a member and as a creditor of the
first respondent.
The second
respondent is the applicant's co-share holder in the first
respondent. The applicant holds 30% of his shares in the first

respondent.
The application is
brought on four grounds: that the first respondent has suspended its
business for more that a year, that 75%
of the first respondent's
share capital has become lost, that the first respondent is unable to
pay its debts, being factually
and commercially insolvent, and that
it would be just and equitable to wind it up.
The applicant claims
that the first respondent owes it an amount of R85 million, R38 938
445.62 being in respect of a loan (originally
R32 million) and R47
million in respect of a loan made by Immobili Retail Investment (Pty)
Ltd (Immobili) to the first respondent
of which loan the applicant is
the cessionary.
Immobili is a
company that, like the first respondent, can be described as
belonging to the UPP (Universal Property Professionals)
or Immobili
group, a number of companies controlled by the Theodosiou brothers.
Other companies in that group are Bel Air Mall
(Pty) Ltd (Bel Air),
Mall on 14th Avenue (Pty) Ltd (Mall on 14th). All these companies
were involved in property development, mainly
shopping centres and
malls. At this stage most of these companies have been wound up,
certainly Immobili, Mall on 14th and Bel
Air.
The first
respondent, as it name betrays, was destined as the vehicle for the
development of a shopping mall near Krugersdorp, at
the intersection
of Hendrik Potgieter Avenue and the R28. The applicant acquired its
30% shareholding in the first respondent from
the second respondent,
another company in the UPP group. There is a written shareholders'
agreement regulating the relationship
between the applicant and the
second respondent.
The loan of R32
000.00 was granted in terms of a written loan agreement dated 13
December 2007.
The applicant also
supplied loan capital to the companies in the UPP group in terms of
loan agreements.
The first respondent
does not dispute its indebtness in respect of the loan agreement, but
relies on a counterclaim that it contends
offsets its indebtedness.
It alleges that it
and the applicant had an overall partnership agreement in respect of
the various developments by companies in
the UPP group. Although it
accepted that the relationship between the applicant and it came to
an end in mid 2008, it contends
that the applicant breached the
fiduciary duty it had towards it, that it deviously undermined its
relationship with it, that it
colluded with a competitor, Retail
Africa Wingspan Investments (Pty) (Wingspan) and that it was mala
fide in foreclosing on the
loan agreement. It alleges that it had a
counterclaim some R360 million, being profits it would have made if
the applicant had
not withdrawn its support of the Mogale
development.
The first respondent
admits that its case is to a great extent based on inferences.
Therefore it asked the court in limine to order
the applicant in
terms of Rule 35(13) to make discovery in respect of various
categories of demands.
It is to be noted
that a substantive application of the same nature was brought in
respect of Immobili, Bell Air and Mall on 14th,
amongst others. That
application was dismissed by Prinsloo J. The court gave reasons in a
judgment of 199 pages, the first half
of which dealt with the issued
of discovery.
Logically I must
first deal with the issue of discovery.
As stated in Moulded
Components and Rotomoulding South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Coucourakis and
Another 1979(2) SA 457 (W) at 470 D-F
the power of a court to order
discovery in motion proceedings is one that will only be exercised in
exceptional circumstances.
One must remember that in application
proceedings parties are obliged to produce their evidence. If a party
refers to a document
in his affidavit the opposite party may in terms
of Rule 35(12) deliver a notice to be allowed to inspect the
document.
What is also
relevant in this case, which mainly concerns a defence that the first
respondent has a counterclaim, is that this court
is not directly
concerned with the counterclaim.
The first respondent
is in essence attempting to trawl through the applicant's documents
to see whether it can find support for
its inferences.
In all the
circumstances I am of the view that the first respondent has not
proved exceptional circumstances justifying an order
that Rule 35(14)
should apply to this application.
In respect of the
application for the winding-up of the first respondent there is no
dispute about the loan to the first respondent
and the fact that the
balance amounts to R38 million.
There is a dispute
about the cession of the loan of Immobili to the applicant. There is
also a dispute about whether 75% of the
first respondent's share
capital has been lost.
In respect of the
contention that it would be just and equitable that the applicant be
wound up, it would seem that justice may
require the winding-up of
the first respondent in a situation where so many of its associated
companies have been wound up, especially
Immobili to which it, on its
version, owes R42 million.
I will, however,
focus on the ground of the first respondents inability to pay its
debts, which was the ground that was argued before
me.
In essence the first
respondent did not dispute the indebtedness of R38 million, but
relied on a counterclaim for damages suffered
as a result of the
applicant's breach of a fiduciary duty towards it.
Mr Cook, SC, who
appeared for the first respondent accepted that the first respondent
was bound on the basis of issue estoppel by
a judgment of Hartzenberg
J, delivered on 31 March 2010 when he granted a final winding up
order against Immobili and a number
of related companies. The learned
judge dealt extensively with the issue of the alleged breach of a
fiduciary duty. I quote:
"The Breach of
its Fiduciary Duty by ABSA. The real defence of the respondents is a
hybrid approach consisting of allegation
of unconscionable behaviour
by ABSA by failing to allow the respondents a proper opportunity to
realize their full potential and
by fraudulently conniving with
Retail Africa Wingspan to the detriment of the respondents under
circumstances where it had a duty
to inform the respondents of its
relationship with that concern. There is also a defence that the last
Amended and Restated Loan
Agreement did not reflect the common
intention of the parties in that the respondent required of the
applicant to insert a provision
in the agreement stipulating that in
the event of excussion the applicant first had to excuss against the
assets of the shopping
centres before turning to the other companies
in the UPP group.
Before dealing with
these defences it is necessary to give a general overview of the
nature of all the agreements between the parties
to be able to
evaluate the defence that there existed a general partnership between
ABSA and the respondents, which partnership
agreement was breached by
ABSA. There are umpteen loan agreements between the lender and the
various borrowers. There is not the
slightest indication in any one
of those agreements of an overall partnership agreement. The
agreements arrange security for the
loans, interest, the repayment of
the loans and the usual provisions to be found in loan agreements.
There are specific agreements
in two instances where ABSA took up
shares in two of the companies that are not involved in these
proceedings. The agreements provide
for the advance of loans to and
of the investing of equity in the particular companies. The
relationship between the shareholders
is regulated by shareholder
agreements. What I find particularly difficult to understand is what
exactly the partnership agreement
was. Was it a situation where the
parties had agreed that ABSA would bring money into the partnership
and the UPP group expertise?
In such a case was ABSA entitled to
repayment of the loans as was stipulated in the agreements and to
receive interest on their
investment? Was the idea that ABSA had to
be repaid from the sale of the assets. What was to happen to the
profit after the sale
and repayment of the loans and interest? The
respondent did not indicate a single document or discussion in which
that most important
issue was discussed. Were the parties to share
fifty-fifty in the profit, or what were the partners' share in the
partnership?
Was a value to be put on the UPP expertise, and if so,
what value. There are a few e-mails in which representatives of ABSA
loosely
made use of the word partnership but as I have indicated
there is not the slightest indication of the rights and obligations
of
the parties to such an agreement. If there really was a
partnership I have no doubt that these aspects would have been
discussed.
If one looks at the length to which the parties went to
reduce the loan agreements to writing it is highly unlikely that if
there
was a partnership agreement that the terms would not have been
reduced to writing. I accept ABSA's version that although there may

have been talks about a partnership in respect of particular projects
that there definitely was no overall partnership agreement.
The respondents were
aware of the difficulty to sell the idea of a partnership to the
court. In the latest application (for the
postponement and the
referral to evidence) the reliance on a partnership was abandoned and
substituted with an argument that the
relationship was not a
partnership but that ABSA and the UPP companies had a joint venture.
ABSA, according to the argument, had
an ideal to accumulate a massive
fund consisting of investments in properties and more in particular
in properties that can accommodate
retail businesses. Mall on 14 is
an example of such an investment in the envisaged overall fund. ABSA
obtained a 30% shareholding
and the UPP group got 70%. As in the case
of the argument for the existence a partnership there is absolutely
no indication of
what each party could expect from the other party. I
may just indicate that an important point of departure for the joint
venture
argument is the latest affidavit of Clinton. His initial
affidavit was to the effect that the relationship was a banker client
relationship but that ABSA indicated a willingness to enter into a
specific joint venture agreements with the UPP group in instances

where it regarded the specific project as a sound investment. He
emphatically denied that there was an overall relationship other
than
that between a banker and a client. In his latest affidavit he again
denies the existence of a partnership. He does not retract
his denial
of an overall partnership but says that there was a joint venture. As
I have indicated, he does not give any detail
about the rights and
obligations of the parties to the agreement in this very vague
affidavit. I am satisfied that there is no
reason to find, at this
belated moment, that the relationship between ABSA and the UPP group
was anything else that a banker client
relationship. In the light of
that finding the result is that the respondent contention that ABSA
owed if a fiduciary duty of good
faith, and was not entitled to enter
into a loan agreements with other developers, and in particular
Retail Africa Wingspan, is
without foundation.
It is necessary to
look at the alleged breach of the fiduciary duty. ABSA entered into a
joint venture with the UPP group for the
development of a shopping
centre in Krugersdorp, the Mogale project. It also entered into a
joint venture with Retail Africa Wingspan
for the development of a
shopping centre in the very close vicinity of the Mogale project,
literally across the street. The respondents
contended that ABSA
entered into the joint venture with Retail Africa Wingspan with the
intention to harm them and the UPP group.
The problem with the
argument is that ABSA has shares in both developments and if the
intention was to harm the Mogale project
Absa would also harm itself
in that its own shares would be negatively affected. The same holds
true for the argument that although
ABSA would impair the value of
its own shares in Mogale, it knew that it was about to bring an
application for the liquidation
of the respondent, and that it
planned to take over the properties of the respondent. The flaw of
the argument still remains that
it had shares in both developments
and that if ABSA did foresee a negative impact it had to lose money
by investing in both projects.
I fail to see the devious plot alleged
by the respondents."
In my view that
finding leaves no room for a finding by me that there was a fiduciary
duty and that it was breached. As I said Mr
Cook accepted that the
first respondent was bound by the judgment through the operation of
issue estoppel. It may be that res iudicata
is the appropriate legal
concept. Then one may ask whether the judgment related to the same
parties, in particular the same respondents.
It seems to me that one
can say that the first respondent was in privy with the respondents
liquidated by Hartzenberg J in the
sense that they were directed by
the same governing minds. In any event, if estoppel or res iudicata
are not applicable, the judgment
of Hartzenberg J is precedent as
much in point as a precedent can ever be. Its reasoning is compelling
and I accept it.
Mr Cook attempted to
circumvent the judgment of Hartzenberg J by referring to two factors
that, he argued, distinguished this case
from the case before
Hartzenberg J.
Firstly he referred
to the fact that in the case before Hartzenberg J the land in which
the Mogale Centre was to be built was not
an issue. In this case the
complaint is that the applicants involvement with Wingspan was
inimical to its involvement in the Mogale
project. That very issue
was addressed by Hartzenberg J and he made the point that it was
unlikely that Absa would jeopardise a
development in which he had an
interest.
The second
distinguishing feature on which he relied was a statement made by the
applicant's deponent, Mr Loubser, in an affidavit
resisting a
petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of Hartzenberg J.
It reads as follows:
"It has always
been common cause that by August/September 2007 and once the
indebtedness of the UPP Group was under the control
of Business
Support Services the intention was to exit the relationship and that
Absa insisted that the shopping centres belonging
to Bel Air and
Immobili be sold to make payment of the indebtedness. There was no
pretence in this regard".
He argued that it
showed that the applicant had already decided in August/September
2007 to withdraw from the Mogale project. I
agree with Mr Leathern
SC, who, with Ms Naude, appeared for the applicant, that the
statement must be seen in the context of a
plan at the time to
rationalize the affairs of the UPP group by selling two shopping
centres, pay its debt and continue with the
remaining projects, one
of which would be Mogale.
In paragraph 33.3 of
his affidavit Mr Loubser said the following:
"By September
2007 the accounts were in "intensive care" and under the
control of Absa's Business Support Division
whose expressed
intention, as the Theodosious were well aware, was exiting the Debt
relationship and in particular by moving the
UPP Group so far as to
comply with their undertakings to sell the Immobili and Bel Air
shopping centres".
This makes it clear
that Mr Loubser referred to the debt relationships.
The general scheme
of the plan to sell two shopping centres and pay off debt was also
confirmed in paragraphs 93.5 of the
answering
affidavit (p404) and the minutes of a meeting held on 13 August 2008
(p1102).
Mr
Cook also contended that it was falsely held out that the Heritage
Village project did not form part of the portfolio of Wingspan.
The
applicant explained that Wingspan was a fund that only held completed
projects and that Heritage Village was taken out of it
because it was
undeveloped. Only once it had been developed could it have been
submitted to Wingspan for consideration. See paragraphs
113.3 - 5 on
p721. That is a satisfactory explanation that should allay all the
suspicions voiced by the first respondent.
Mr
Cook referred me to
Bellairs
v Hodnett and Another 1978(1) SA 1109 (AD) at 1130 E-G
for
the proposition that the analogy of a partnership is apt where a
company is used as the vehicle of a joint understanding.
The fact
is that in this case
Hartzenberg
J found that there was no fiduciary duty and no breach of a fiduciary
duty. The shareholders agreement also excludes
any obligations other
than those recorded in the agreement. See Clause 29 (p150).
For
all these reasons I am of the view that the respondents have failed
to show that there was a breach by the applicant that could
give rise
to a claim for damages. It follows that a winding-up order should be
granted. In the circumstances of this case it should
be a final
winding-up order.
An
order is granted in terms of prayer 1 of the notice of motion/
C.
BOTHA
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT