Berry and Another v SPE Security Patrol Experts and Another (2011 (4) SA 520 (GNP)) [2010] ZAGPPHC 260; 3211/10 (6 August 2010)

78 Reportability

Personal Injury Law - Road Accident Fund

Brief Summary

Motor Vehicle — Definition — Collision involving a golf cart — Plaintiffs injured in a collision with a petrol-driven personnel carrier — First Defendant contending that the claim lies solely against the Road Accident Fund, while Second Defendant asserting that the vehicle is not a motor vehicle as defined in the Road Accident Fund Act — Court tasked with determining whether the vehicle qualifies as a "motor vehicle" under the Act — Holding that the vehicle in question is indeed a motor vehicle, thereby dismissing the Second Defendant's special plea and upholding the First Defendant's special plea.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment

1. Introduction

The proceedings concerned the adjudication of special pleas arising from a delictual damages claim following a collision. The matter was heard in the North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria, with Goodey AJ delivering judgment on 6 August 2010.

The parties were Daphne Carol Berry and Theunis Gerhardus Berry as the plaintiffs, and SPE Security Patrol Experts as the first defendant (first respondent) together with the Road Accident Fund as the second defendant (second respondent).

Procedurally, the parties agreed at a pre-trial conference that the trial would be confined to a single separated issue, namely the determination of whether the vehicle involved in the collision qualified as a “motor vehicle” as defined in the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996. The resolution of that issue would determine whether the plaintiffs’ claim lay only against the Road Accident Fund (thereby excluding the first defendant), or whether the Road Accident Fund bore no liability because the vehicle fell outside the Act’s definition.

The general subject-matter of the dispute was the statutory scope of the Road Accident Fund’s liability where injuries are caused by a petrol-driven personnel carrier commonly associated with “golf car” technology, used within a hospital environment.

2. Material Facts

It was common cause that a collision occurred on 1 March 2001 involving the plaintiffs and a six-caddy petrol-driven personnel carrier, also referred to as “the shuttle”. The claim against the defendants arose from injuries allegedly sustained by the plaintiffs in that collision.

The parties made several material concessions directed at narrowing factual disputes. It was common cause that the vehicle inspected by the expert witness, Mr Seiwyn Johnson, was the vehicle involved in the collision, and that photographs in the evidenti bundle depicted the main entrance area for vehicles at Unitas Hospital. It was also common cause that the plaintiffs were injured by a vehicle similar to the shuttle depicted in a photograph identified in the record.

As regards the locus of the collision, the court treated it as either clear or effectively common cause that the relevant hospital area was used by vehicles and pedestrians, and the court ultimately found that the incident occurred on a “road” for purposes of the statutory definition relied upon.

The shuttle was rented in February 2001 in terms of a written lease agreement. The vehicle’s described characteristics included a petrol-driven engine, a steering wheel, a horn, a combined braking system (parking and normal brakes), forward and reverse gears, and heavy-duty suspension (leaf springs and hydraulic shocks). It did not have side or rear mirrors, and certain further features (such as headlights and rear lights) were described as optional.

The evidence accepted by the court included Mr Johnson’s testimony that the model was widely used as a people mover at locations such as holiday resorts, shopping complexes, factories, residential estates, airports, hospitals, and hotels. Under cross-examination he conceded that the vehicle lacked certain safety features (including rear mirrors and safety belts) and that it could be unsafe to a degree, while denying that it was inherently unsafe.

To the extent that a dispute existed, it centred on whether these design features and the manner and environment of use meant that the shuttle was designed or adapted for propulsion on a road as contemplated by the statutory definition. The Road Accident Fund’s position was that the vehicle did not qualify as a “motor vehicle” under the Act.

3. Legal Issues

The central legal questions concerned the interpretation and application of the definition of “motor vehicle” in section 1 of the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996, and the consequences of that classification for the competing special pleas.

The court was required to determine, first, whether the shuttle was a “vehicle designed or adapted for propulsion or haulage on a road by means of fuel, gas or electricity” within the statutory definition. Secondly, because the definition depends on propulsion “on a road”, the court had to decide whether the hospital parking/entrance area where the collision occurred constituted a “road” for purposes of the Act.

The dispute was primarily one of application of legal standards to largely common-cause facts, informed by an interpretive choice about the appropriate test. The parties asked the court to apply an objective test and accepted that licensing considerations were irrelevant to the statutory enquiry.

4. Court’s Reasoning

The court approached the definition of “motor vehicle” in section 1 of the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996 by emphasising that it must be read as a whole and given an objective, common-sense meaning, consistent with the approach articulated in the cited authorities. The court isolated the critical components of the definition as involving “any vehicle”, “designed or adapted”, “propulsion or haulage”, and “a road”, and treated the enquiry as one focused on whether the vehicle objectively fell within these elements.

On the “road” requirement, the court noted that the Act does not define “road” and contrasted this with the predecessor legislation’s reference to a “public road or street” or other places to which the public has access. The court accepted, on the basis of authority and statutory context, that the reference to “road” in the current Act is not necessarily confined to a public road, and it endorsed the idea that a road connotes a prepared surface with a determined path leading from one place to another, with access by multiple people and vehicles. Applying that understanding, and taking account of the concessions and the photographic evidence, the court found that the hospital entrance/parking area was used by pedestrians and cars and therefore constituted a “road” for purposes of the definition.

On whether the shuttle was “designed or adapted” for propulsion on a road, the court considered the brochure description referring to the Shuttle 6 as a manoeuvrable golf-car-like vehicle intended for environments such as resorts, hotels, parks, and shopping malls. The court reasoned that, if one adopted a narrow approach that confined the enquiry exclusively to the brochure (as urged by the Road Accident Fund), the inference might be that the vehicle was not designed or adapted for use at hospitals or on public roads. The court did not, however, accept that the enquiry should be confined in that way.

Instead, the court treated Mr Johnson’s evidence regarding actual use across multiple environments, including hospitals, as supporting the conclusion that the vehicle had at least been adapted for use at hospitals and thus for operation on roads in such environments, even if not necessarily on ordinary public roads. The court then reinforced this conclusion by applying an objective common-sense assessment to the vehicle’s form and function. It considered that vehicles of this kind, used in parking areas and similar locations, fall within the statutory notion of a motor vehicle, particularly given their propulsion by fuel and their operation in areas where pedestrians and vehicles interact.

In its evaluative reasoning, the court also stressed a policy-inflected common-sense consideration aligned with protecting the public: it considered the practical reality that “motor vehicles” in the ordinary sense operate in parking areas of hospitals, resorts, airports, and shopping malls, and that pedestrians and shuttles move around in increasing numbers in those places. The court reasoned that if such shuttles were not classified as motor vehicles, injured third parties might be left without effective recourse against the Road Accident Fund, and that reliance on recovery from individual drivers or owners (or on uncertain indemnity insurance) could be unrealistic. This was framed as a reality-based consideration supporting the classification of such shuttles as motor vehicles within the Act’s protective scheme.

Having applied the objective test and considered both the design/adaptation evidence and the nature of the “road” in question, the court concluded that the shuttle involved in the collision was a “motor vehicle” for purposes of the Act.

5. Outcome and Relief

The court held that the shuttle was a motor vehicle as defined in section 1 of the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996 and that the collision occurred on a “road” for purposes of that definition.

Consequently, the court made the order agreed to by the parties for the event that the shuttle was found to be a motor vehicle. The first defendant’s special plea (that any claim lay only against the Road Accident Fund in terms of section 21 read with section 17(1)(a)) was upheld, and the Road Accident Fund’s special plea (that the vehicle was not a motor vehicle and thus the Fund incurred no liability) was dismissed.

The Road Accident Fund was ordered to pay the costs of the plaintiffs and the first defendant, including the costs of senior counsel and the preparation fees of Mr Van Onselen.

Cases Cited

Mathie v Yorkshire Insurance Company Limited 1954 (4) SA 731 (A)

Prinsloo v Santam Insurance Ltd 1996 (3) SA 220 (A)

Chauke v Santam Ltd [1996] ZASCA 120; 1997 (1) SA 178 (A)

Road Accident Fund v Vogel 2004 (5) SA 1 (SCA)

Road Accident Fund v Mbendera and Others [2004] 4 All SA 25 (SCA)

Road Accident Fund v Mbendera and Others 2004 (4) All SA 255 (SCA)

Bell v Road Accident Fund 2007 (6) SA 48 (SCA)

Road Accident Fund v Van den Berg 2006 (2) SA 250 (SCA)

Legislation Cited

Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996 (sections 1, 17, 21)

Act 56 of 1972 (section 2(1), as referenced as predecessor legislation)

Rules of Court Cited

No rules of court were cited in the judgment.

Held

The court found that the petrol-driven six-seater personnel carrier (“shuttle”), used in the hospital environment and involved in the collision, qualified as a “motor vehicle” under section 1 of the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996. The court also found that the hospital entrance/parking area where the collision occurred constituted a “road” for purposes of the definition.

On that basis, the plaintiffs’ claim was held to lie against the Road Accident Fund rather than the first defendant, with the result that the first defendant’s statutory special plea succeeded and the Road Accident Fund’s special plea failed. The Road Accident Fund was ordered to bear the costs of both the plaintiffs and the first defendant, including specified senior counsel and preparation costs.

LEGAL PRINCIPLES

The definition of “motor vehicle” in section 1 of the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996 must be considered as a whole and interpreted using an objective, common-sense approach, rather than through a narrow or purely formalistic reading of individual descriptive materials.

In determining whether a vehicle is “designed or adapted” for propulsion on a road, the enquiry is not confined to the manufacturer’s stated purpose. While the designer’s intention may be relevant, it is not conclusive; the ultimate touchstone is the vehicle’s objective suitability for propulsion on a road in the manner contemplated by the Act.

The statutory term “road” in the Road Accident Fund Act is not necessarily limited to a public road in the sense used in road-traffic regulatory instruments. A “road” may include prepared surfaces and determined routes used by vehicles and pedestrians in environments such as hospital premises, provided the characteristics align with the ordinary meaning adopted in the authorities.

A vehicle’s alleged lack of safety features, or an argument that it is unsafe for use on a public road, is not in itself determinative of whether it is a “motor vehicle” under the Act; the classification depends on the objective assessment of its design/adaptation and suitability for road propulsion within the statutory context.