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[2010] ZAGPPHC 35
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Oelofsen NO v Gwebu and Others (10499/2004) [2010] ZAGPPHC 35; 2010 (5) SA 241 (GNP) (22 April 2010)
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(NORTH
GAUTENG HIGH COURT. PRETORIA
)
CASE
NO:
10499/2004
DATE:
22/04/2010
IN
THE MATTER BETWEEN
JACOBUS
MARTHINUS OELOFSEN N.O. APPLICANT
AND
EMILY
BHACILE GWEBU 1
st
RESPONDENT
WALTER
SENOKO 2
nd
RESPONDENT
MASTER
OF THE HIGH COURT 3
rd
RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
POSWA.
J
BACKGROUND
[1]
The applicant is a trustee of the insolvent estate of the first
respondent, who is married, by customary law, to the second
respondent. The first and second respondents are business people. The
applicant seeks to evict the first and second respondents
and all
parties occupying through them out of the property situated in
Nelspruit. it being pan of the first respondent's insolvent
estate.
It is common cause that the first and second respondents, their
children and another family member occupied the premises.
[2]
In opposing the application, the respondents aver that the property
is still registered in the name of the first respondent
and that,
accordingly, the respondents are entitled to continue in occupation
thereof. They also aver that the second respondent
is unable to
provide suitable alternative accommodation for himself, the first
respondent and the others mentioned, due to his
unhealthy financial
situation.
[3]
The applicant submits that it is just and equitable that an eviction
order be granted, the respondents' contentions notwithstanding.
In
paragraph 13, more pertinently subparagraphs 13.1 to 13.17, the
applicant details reasons for his submissions. It is, in my
view, not
necessary to restate these reasons in this judgment. Suffice it to
say that, for those reasons, the applicant prays that
an order be
granted in terms of the notice of motion.
[4]
The application is based on the provisions of the Prevention of
Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act, No
19 of
1998 ("PIE"), to which I shall return shortly in the
judgment.
[5]
It is common cause that the respondents have resided on the property
far in excess of a period of six months. That, therefore,
qualifies
the application to be dealt with in terms of the provisions of s
4(7), which reads as follows;
n4.
Eviction of unlawful occupiers. -
(1)
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law or the
common law, the provisions of this section apply to proceedings
by an
owner or person in charge of land for the eviction of an unlawful
occupier. ...
(7)
If an unlawful occupier has occupied the land in question for more
than six months at the time when the proceedings are initiated,
a
Court may grant an order for eviction if it is of the opinion that it
is just and equitable to do so. after considering all the
relevant
circumstances, including, except where the land is sold in a sale of
(sic)
execution
pursuant to a mortgage, whether land has been made available or can
reasonably be made available by a municipality or
other organ of
state or another land owner for the relocation of the
unlawful
occupier, and including the rights and needs of the elderly,
children, disabled persons and households headed by women."
[6]
This
matter has an unfortunate history of delays. Some of the delays were
due to the usual mistake made by legal representatives
when
estimating the duration of their matters, which often results in
inadequate time being allocated. Mr M P van der Merwe, who
initially
represented the applicant, spent the entire allocated time for
addresses for the respective parties arguing, on the applicant's
behalf. He addressed the Court for the entire day, from morning to
close of day. Costs for that day were specifically reserved,
in view
of the fact that the applicant, through Mr Van der Merwe, had
introduced, for the first time, the transcript of some
ex
parte
proceedings
between the parties submitting that they were of crucial relevance to
the making of a decision in the present matter.
Ms Omar did not
object to the introduction of that transcript in evidence.
[7]
Other delays were in consequence of misunderstanding or disagreement
as to what the next step would be when the matter resumed
after a
postponement and, which is part of the same question, what precisely
had been achieved at the previous hearing. The Court,
although
unavoidably so, also contributed towards these regrettable delays. It
is not advisable, for purposes of this judgment
and in the light of
the need to produce it as expeditiously as possible, to dwell on the
causes of these regrettable delays. It
must also pertinently be
mentioned that the fact that a different legal representative, on
behalf of the respondents, took over
from another, of the same firm
of attorneys, who had initially conducted the proceedings on behalf
of the respondents, added substantially
to the delay during the
proceedings. I refer to Mr Omar, who took over from Ms Y Omar. It
became evident that Mr Omar had not had
ample time to acquaint
himself with all that Ms Omar had done during the initial cession of
the hearing of the application. Consequently,
he brought up new
submissions which could not. in the interest of justice, be dismissed
on the basis that they had not initially
been raised by Ms Omar. They
were foreshadowed in, or were not inconsistent with, the respondents'
answering affidavit.
[8]
It is common cause that the first respondent and the other occupants
mentioned above, excluding the second respondent, have
resided at the
property, 18 Von Braun Street, Nelspruit, since about 1997. It is
also common cause that, on or about 4 November,
2002, the applicant
attempted to sell the property. According to the applicant, the sale
was intended to raise funds for the benefit
of the insolvent estate's
creditors. The applicant submits that he gave the first respondent
notice, on 26 September, 2002, to
vacate the premises by 31 October,
2002. He noticed, on about 29 October, 2002, that the first
respondent and the other occupants
were making no efforts to vacate
the premises as notified.
[9]
In paragraph 10 of his founding affidavit, the applicant details the
various steps he took thereafter, through his legal representatives,
to see to it that the first respondent and the other occupants of the
premises
left by 31 October, 2002. It should be pointed out that, according to
the applicant, the second respondent was also resident
on the
property. Although he has not given his place of residence (in
paragraph 3 of the respondents' answering affidavit), the
second
respondent, speaking as deponent to the first and second respondents'
answering affidavit, denies that he was residing on
the property.
That notwithstanding, the second respondent admits having resided on
the property at some stage prior to the commencement
of the
application. In subparagraph 8(4) of the answering affidavit the
following is stated:
"Several
days after the 26
th
September 2002. First Respondent and I approached members of our
family and friends and enquired whether they were able to provide
us
with accommodation. None of our family members or friends were able
to provide accommodation that will house First Respondent
Mrs Mirriam
Nkwane, our minor children
and
I as a family.
The
alternative would be for my family and I
to
be separated from each other
which
should be harmful especially as my minor children are of tender age.
I have recently enquired from members of my family whether
they have
suitable alternative accommodation to accommodate me. Members of my
family have been unable to do so"
(emphasis
added).
[10]
It makes no difference, in my view, whether the second respondent
also resided on the premises or not, for purposes of this
judgment.
What is clear from the answering affidavit is that it is alleged that
the respondents could not obtain alternative accommodation,
an
allegation that is strongly disputed by the applicant. Presently, I
am of the view that it is not necessary for me to resolve
that
dispute, for purposes of this judgment. The gravamen of the case is
that the respondents, whether they include or exclude
the second
respondent, did not vacate the premises as required by the applicant.
They, thus, ostensibly, became illegal occupants
of the property,
hence the applicant's current application.
[11]
When the application resumed, more than two years later, Mr Omar, as
I have already stated, replaced Ms Omar as the respondents'
legal
representative.
[12]
Mr Omar raised two points
in
limine,
on
the respondents' behalf. The first point
in
limine
was
the applicant's alleged non-compliance with s 4(2) of PIE. which
reads thus:
"(2)
At least 14 days before the hearing of the proceedings contemplated
in subsection (1) [an application for the eviction
of an unlawful
occupier], the
Court
must
serve written and
effective
notice
of
the proceedings on the unlawful occupier and the municipality having
jurisdiction"
(emphasis
added).
It
transpired, during the hearing that the applicant had already
obtained permission, from this Court, during an
ex
parte
application
by him, in terms of s4(l) of PIE. for the eviction of the
respondents. Neither party had annexed papers in respect of
such
application, not even as much as the order made therein. It was
whilst Mr Omar was on his feet, addressing the Court on the
first
point
in
limine,
that
he was handed a copy of that order, by Mr Van der Merwe.
[13]
Nothing turns on the handing of such copy to Mr Omar only at that
stage, in my view. He, after all, should have obtained a
copy thereof
prior to addressing the Court on an aspect that would necessitate
reference to it. That order was made by SALDUKA,
AJ, as she then was,
on 18 December, 2004. It was on the basis of that order that the
applicant commenced the current eviction
proceedings against
the respondents. The order in question was made under case no
33015/2004. whereas the current proceedings are under case no
10499/2004.
From the citations, it is quite evident that the parties
concerned in the two applications, whilst under two different case
numbers,
are the very parties before this Court in the present
application. The substance of the order is also in respect of the
issue before
this Court.
[14]
Although the application in respect whereof SALDUKA, AJ made her
order directing service of the notice to the respondents and
the
local municipality is under a different case number, the former
application is specifically mentioned in the current application,
with the order therein being attached to the current notice of
motion. In my view, the applicant complied with the requirements
of s
4(1), (2) and (3) of PIE, with regard to the need to first obtain
authorisation from the Court before proceeding to have the
notice
served to the respondents and the local municipality. The first point
in
limine
is,
therefore, dismissed.
[15]
The second point
in
limine
related
to the notice, as per SALDUKA. AJ's order being only in Afrikaans. Mr
Omar submitted that it was imperative that the notice
be in Afrikaans
and English. He was unable to furnish authority for that submission
and eventually abandoned it.
[16]
After both parties had addressed me. I raised with them the question
as to whether the applicant should not have cited the
local
municipality, apart from the s 4(2)
notice served on it. The Court's request for such submissions was
based on the
provisions
of s 7 of PIE. It reads thus:
"7.
Mediation.
~
(1)
If the municipality in whose area ofjurisdiction the land in question
is situated is not the owner of the land the municipality
may,
on
the conditions that it may determine, appoint one or more persons
with expertise in
dispute
resolution
to
facilitate meetings of interested parties and
to
attempt to mediate and settle any dispute
in
terms of this Act: Provided that the parties may at any time, by
agreement, appoint another person to facilitate meetings or
mediate a
dispute, on the conditions that the municipality may determine.
(2) If
the municipality in whose area of jurisdiction the land in question
is situated is the owner of the land in question, the
member of the
Executive
Council designated by the Premier of the province
concerned, or his or her nominee,
may,
on
the conditions that he or she may determine, appoint one or more
persons with expertise in
dispute
resolution
to
facilitate meetings of interested parties and
to
attempt to mediate and settle any dispute
in
terms of this Act: Provided that the parties may at any time, by
agreement, appoint another person to facilitate meetings or
mediate a
dispute, on the conditions that the said member of the Executive
Council may determine.
(3) Any
party may request the municipality to appoint one or more persons in
terms of subsections (J) and (2), for the purposes
of those
subsections.
(4)
A person appointed in terms of subsection (1) or (2) who is not in
the full-time service of the State may be paid the remuneration
and
allowances that may be determined by the body or official who
appointed that person for services performed by him or her.
(5)
All discussions, disclosures and submissions which take place or are
made during the mediation process shall be privileged,
unless the
parties agree to the contrary."
(Emphasis
added.)
It
is s
7(1)
that
is applicable in the present application, because the local
municipality is not the owner of the land in question. It is evident
from the heading of s
7
that
the legislature introduced
"mediation"
as
an option for settling disputes in cases of eviction of unlawful
occupiers.
In
his heads of argument, Mr Omar submitted that the local municipality
should have been joined as
"a
necessary party"
in
the manner contemplated in,
inter
alia.
Amalgamated
Engineering v Minister of Labour
1949
(3) SA 637
(A).
FAGAN,
AJA.
stated
the position as follows, at
659:
"Indeed
it seems clear to me that the Court has consistently refrained from
dealing with issues in which a third party may
have a direct and
substantial interest without either having that party joined in the
suit or, if the circumstances of the case
admit of such a course,
taking other adequate steps to ensure that its judgment will not
prejudicially affect that party's interests."
Mr
Omar did not deal, pertinently, with s 7 of PIE. He submitted that a
local municipality, as an organ of State, has a constitutional
obligation to give proper content to the foundational values of the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 ("the
Constitution") and the Bill of Rights contained therein, more
specifically s 26(3) of the Constitution. (See
Ritama
Investments and Three Others
v
Unlawful
Occupiers of Erf 62 Wynberg and Four Others -
TPD,
case No 2005/30782. an unreported judgment, at page 8.)
[18]
In his heads of argument, Mr Leathern responded to this submission
as follows:
"5.1,2
It is denied that the municipality has a direct and substantial
interest in the order made by the Court. Absolutely
nothing is set
out to indicate what such substantial interest would be or why the
granting of such an order would effect
(sic)
any
rights of the municipality."
Mr
Leathern went further to submit as follows in paragraphs 5.2.2 and
5.2.3 of his heads of argument:
"5.2.2
The fact that the PIE Act and in particular sections 4(6) and 4(7)
enjoin the Court to consider all the relevant circumstances
before
granting an order of eviction does not place any obligation on the
municipality to be a party to the application or any
obligation on
the Applicant to make the municipality a party to the application.
5.2.3
It is significant that the legislature chose not to place any
obligation on the municipality to either report where the provisions
of Section 4(7) of the Act are applicable or at all."
Mr
Leathern submitted that no obligation exists, in PIE, on a
municipality to report anything whatsoever to the Court.
[19]
Mr Leathern pertinently dealt with the provisions of s 7 of PIE. He
discussed, in detail, the case of
Cashhuild
(SA) (Pty) Ltd v Scott and Others
2007(1)
SA 332 (T). It is my judgment. He submitted that
Cashbuild
is
distinguishable on the basis that,
inter
alia:
"In
the present instance it is quite clear that there is a dispute
between the parties which dispute could not be resolved
by the
municipality, such dispute only having been fully ventilated in an
application which has run since 2004 but which was previously
ventilated in an application launched in 2002;"
He
further submitted that, in any event,
Cashbuild
is
incorrect. Firstly, he disagrees with what is stated in paragraphs
[24] and
[25],
at 339C-F. Those paragraphs read thus:
"[24]
Section 7(1) clearly contemplates the existence of a 'dispute' which
a municipality
must
attempt
to
mediate and settle. In the manner in which the subsection is worded,
it might appear as though the municipality has an option
whether or
not 'to attempt to mediate and settle any dispute' that it finds to
he in existence. The relevant portion reads:
'(T)he
municipality then
...
may,
on
the conditions that it may determine, appoint one or more persons
with expertise in dispute resolution to facilitate meetings
of
interested parties and attempt to mediate and settle any dispute in
terms of this Act.' (Emphasis added.) [25]
It
appear to me unlikely that the legislature would have intended to
give a municipality in whose area of jurisdiction there is
a dispute
between the owner of land and the occupants thereof an option whether
to resolve such dispute or otherwise.
Even
if however, the municipality is given that option there is no doubt
in my mind that s 7(1) contemplates the municipality's
being given
the opportunity to make a decision whether in the first place a
dispute exists, and if it does, whether or not to mediate
and settle
if
(emphasis
added).
[20]
With the benefit of hindsight and further reflection, I tend to agree
with Mr Leathern that the first sentence in para [25]
is incorrect.
There is no doubt that the municipality is given an option whether or
not to take steps to have an identified dispute
mediated and settled.
That option, however, arises, in my view, only after the municipality
has gone into the exercise of determining
whether or not there is a
dispute between the owner of land and the occupant thereof. The
municipality simply must make that determination. Such dispute may
include, for instance, the occupant's insistence that he or
she is
not occupying the land unlawfully or that there was an agreement
between him or her and the applicant, which agreement entitles
him or
her to remain on the property for a given period.
[21]
MrLeathern's submissions in paragraphs 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 of his heads
of argument, which I quote in full hereafter, indicate
that he has
lost sight of what I consider to be the import of s 7 of PIE and the
basis on which
Cashbuild
was
decided, viz., that local municipalities must always be joined. His
submissions read as follows:
"4.3
It is significant that nowhere in the Act does it prescribe that any
application must be served on the municipality or
that the
municipality must be a party thereto and only Section 4(2) refers to
service of the Notice of the proceedings on the municipality
having
jurisdiction.
4.4
It can only be assumed [in the present case] with respect that a
municipality having been served with a Notice in terms of Section
4(2) and the papers in an application for an eviction clearly
relating to land situated within its jurisdiction has chosen not
to
intervene in such application and in particular chosen not to appoint
a mediator in terms of Section 7(1) of the Act.
4.5
The municipality having been properly served with all the papers is
in precisely the same position as it would have been had
it been
joined as a party in the application and, as would in any event he
the case in the application, no relief was sought against it.
It
would not be any under
(sic)
obligation
whatsoever to file any papers or even report to the Honourable Court
as there is no statutory provision obliging it to
do so nor would it
be obliged to do so in terms of the Rules of Court."
[22]
From
my personal experience, from my own research and from what various
counsel have submitted in matters before me, there is no
known case
in which, before
Cashbuild,
a
municipality ever acted in terms of the provisions of s
7.
by
appointing an expert or experts to consider whether or not to mediate
between an owner of land and an
"unlawful"
occupant
thereof. That is, precisely, because municipalities feel that they
are, as Mr Leathern submitted. "
under
[no] obligation whatsoever to file any papers or even to report to
the ... Court as there is [according to them] no statutory
provision
obliging [them] to do so nor would [they] be obliged to do so in
terms of the Rules of Court".
Mr
Leathern makes a very liberal assumption that the municipality, in
the present case,
"has
chosen not to intervene",
as
if it has bothered to consider that aspect, in the first place.
[23]
As already pointed out in this judgment and in
Cashbuild,
indications
are that local municipalities totally ignore the notices sent to them
in eviction proceedings. Indeed, Mr Leathern submits
that such
municipalities are under no obligation to take heed of such notices.
The question then arises why, quite apart from the
requirements of s
7. it is necessary for these notices to be forwarded to local
municipalities. What are they expected to do about
the notices if
they are under no obligation to take heed of them? The further
question is why it was necessary for the legislature
to enact s 7,
which applies in respect of both short term and long term
"illegal"
occupiers.
If, as it is in my view the case, the introduction of s 7 of PIE was
not ornamental, the question then arises as to how
a local
municipality will be called upon to heed the provisions of the
section if it is not a party to the action or application.
Furthermore, how is the legislature to know that the provisions of s
7 are being implemented by the statutory bodies to whom they
are
addressed, i.e., the municipalities?
[24]
As it is a local municipality's obligation, and not that of the
Court, to exercise the discretion contained in s 7, it would
be
inappropriate, in my view, for the Court to suggest what aspects may
be in dispute in this matter. The joinder of a local municipality
should not depend upon identification, by a court or the parties, of
possible disputes between the parties. It should, in my view,
be
based entirely upon the legislature's intention, when enacting s 7 of
PIE. As earlier stated herein, the legislature introduced
the element
of mediation which was, hitherto, non-existent as part of the
eviction process. That new concept should not be permitted
to
atrophy, simply because municipalities have ignored it.
[25]
It appears that Mr Leathern has overlooked another important aspect
in this regard, viz., that procedural aspects contained
in the Rules
of both the High Court and the Magistrates Court have not been ousted
by PIE. For instance, in subsection 4(3),
"the
serving of notices and filing of papers is as prescribed by the rules
of the Court in question".
Joinder
of parties is a procedural aspect. It would not have been expected of
the legislature to prescribe, in PIE, that certain
parties should be
joined and when that should be done. I agree with Mr Omar that a
local municipality has an interest where the
obligations of s 4(7)
are applicable. It has already been stated, in this judgment, that s
4(7) places an obligation on a court
hearing an application in which
unlawful occupation exceeds six months - where other specified
conditions permit - to grant an
order for eviction, if satisfied,
inter
alia,
that
"land
has been made available or can reasonably be made available by a
municipality or other organ of state
or
another land owner for the relocation of the unlawful occupier, and
including the rights and needs of the elderly, children,
disabled
persons and households headed by women",
(emphasis
added).
The
emphasised portion indicates clearly, in my view, why a local
municipality.
in
such circumstances, has an interest in the outcome of an eviction
application.
As
stated in
Amalgamated
Engineering,
at
660,
"Mere
non-intervention by an interested party who has knowledge of the
proceedings does not make the judgment finding on him
..."
[26]
In my view, even in the case of an eviction governed by the
provisions of section 4(b) of PIE, the local municipality is
under
some obligation, in terms of the provisions of s 7. Section 4(6)
refers to the position of an occupier who has been on the
land for
less than six months, in respect of whom there is no obligation on
the municipality, such as there is under s 4(7), to
provide
alternative
"land"
for
the
"unlawful
occupier"
who
is about to be evicted. Even in respect of the s 4(b) situation,
however, the municipality is under an obligation to determine,
in
terms of s 7(1) of PIE, whether
"any
dispute in terms of this Act"
exists
and, if it
does
exist, to exercise its mind as to whether or not to
"appoint
one or more persons with expertise in dispute resolution to
facilitate meetings of interested parties and to attempt
to mediate
and settle any [such] dispute".
The
obligation on the local municipality, in terms of s 7(1) is. as
earlier pointed out, not only in respect of short term unlawful
occupiers. The only condition stated in the subsection, upon which
the municipality may not appoint a person or persons described
is if,
as earlier stated, the local municipality is the owner of the land
from which an alleged unlawful occupier is to be evicted
(s 7(2)) or
where, although it is not the owner, there is no dispute requiring
settlement (s7(l)). If the local municipality is
not the owner of
such land, the provisions of s 7 apply, regardless of whether the
occupier has been on the land for less or longer
than six months. The
municipality cannot, in such circumstances, merely assume that there
is no dispute requiring mediation. It
is obliged, in my view, to take
steps to determine whether or not such a dispute exists.
[27]
Concerning the assertion by Mr Leathern that the local
municipality -
"would
not be any under
(sic)
obligation
whatsoever to file any papers or even report to the ... Court as
there is no statutory provision obliging it to do so",
I
repeat, without quoting, the sentiments expressed at paras [26] to
[32], at 339H-340I-J, in
Cashbuild,
where
a similar submission by counsel for the applicant in that case was
being dealt with.
[28]
On further reflection, especially in the light of submissions made by
Mr Leathern in para 4.5 of his heads of argument - cited
above - an
appropriate order to a joined local municipality, where the
provisions of s 7
(1)
apply,
should include an instruction that it reports to the Court that it
applied its mind to the facts of the case in respect whereof
it is
joined as a respondent and has taken a deliberate decision either to
appoint or not to appoint a person or persons of the
expertise
described in s 7 of the Act. Where the municipality has decided not
to appoint such person or persons, it must report
to the court that
no dispute calling for settlement exists, according to its
investigation.
[29]
Although it is not strictly necessary to mention this in this case. I
think it will do no harm for me to round up my view of
the
implications of s 7 of PIE. Section 7(2) deals with the scenario in
which the local municipality is the owner of the land in
respect
whereof the eviction proceedings are brought. Nothing is demanded of
the municipality in such circumstances. The task to
determine whether
there is a dispute that calls for an attempt to settle it, falls on a
Member of the Executive Committee ("MEC")
designated by the
Premier of the Province concerned. For the same reasons for which the
local municipality must be joined where
it is not the owner (s 7(1)),
the Premier must, in my view, be joined where the local municipality
is the owner of the land (s
7(2)).
[30]
As must, by now, be obvious, I have arrived at the conclusion that
this application cannot proceed without the local municipality
being
joined. In the circumstances, it is not necessary, in my view, to
deal with many other submissions made by the parties' legal
representatives. Such submissions will be relevant only after the
local municipality has been joined. I am in agreement with Mr
Leathern that the proper course is not to dismiss the application.
[31]
In the circumstances I make the following order:
1.
The local municipality of Nelspruit is hereby joined as the fourth
respondent for the purpose of enabling it to exercise its
discretion
in terms of s 7(1) of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and
Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 ("PIE").
2.
Service of this order and any consequential amendments to the
applicant's papers shall be effected on the local municipality
of
Nelspruit.
3.
Service of the notice of motion, founding affidavit and annexures
thereto upon the local municipality of Nelspruit is not necessary.
4.
The local municipality of Nelspruit shall file a report with the
Registrar of this Court and serve copies thereof on the first
and
second respondents, in which report it will:
(a)
state whether it has established whether or not a dispute or disputes
requiring attempted settlement exists or exist between
the applicant
and the respondents;
(b)
if such a dispute or disputes exists or exist, give details of a
person or persons contemplated in s 7(1) of PIE and appointed
by it
to attempt mediation; and
(c)
if it has appointed a person or persons contemplated in s 7(1) of
PIE. simultaneously file a report on the outcome of mediation
proceedings conducted by such persons, if finalised, or, if such
mediation proceedings are still in process, a report on the expected
duration thereof.
5.
The report alluded to in paragraph 4 hereof should be filed and
served within two months from the date of service of this order
upon
the local municipality of Nelspruit.
6.
The application is postponed
sine
die.
7.
The applicant is hereby authorised to approach the Court on these
papers or supplemented papers after the filing and service
of the
local municipality of Nelspruit's report.
8.
The applicant is ordered to pay costs occasioned by its opposition to
the joinder of the local municipality of Nelspruit.
J
N M POSWA
JUDGE
OF THE NORTH GAUTENG HIGH COURT
10499-2004
HEARD
ON: 03 DECEMBER 2007
FOR
THE APPLICANT: ADV LEATHERN
INSTRUCTED
BY: RUDMAN ATTORNEYS
FOR
THE 1
st
& 2
nd
RESPONDENTS: MR OMAR
INSTRUCTED
BY: ZAHIR OMAR ATTORNEYS
FOR
THE 3
RD
RESPONDENT: UNREPRESENTED