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[2010] ZAGPPHC 23
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Moeketsane v S (A472/09) [2010] ZAGPPHC 23 (23 March 2010)
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(NORTH
GAUTENG HIGH COURT, PRETORIA)
Date:
2010-03-23
Case
Number: A472/09
In
the matter between:
DITHATE
SILAS MOEKETSANE
Appellant
and
THE
STATE
Respondent
SOUTHWOOD
J
[1
] On 23 April 2007 the appellant was found guilty on 17 counts of
theft in the Pretoria regional court and on 14 August 2008
the
appellant was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment, all the counts
being taken together for the purpose of sentence. With the
leave of
the court
a
quo
the
appellant appeals against both the convictions and the sentence
imposed.
[2]
The charge sheet alleged that the appellant and his two co-accused,
Kalla Patrick Mamabolo (2
nd
accused) and Jonathan Fana Moyo (3
rd
accused)
were guilty of fraud in that they submitted 19 false motor vehicle
accident (MVA) claims to the Road Accident Fund (RAF)
which the RAF
accepted and paid into the appellant's bank accounts from where the
funds were distributed to the appellant and his
co-accused,
alternatively, that the appellant and his co-accused stole from the
RAF the amounts set out in the annexure to the
charge sheet. The
amounts involved in the theft are the same amounts involved in the
fraud charges. At the commencement of the
trial the state withdrew
all charges against Mamabolo (the 2
nd
accused) and at the close of the state case, Moyo (the 3
rd
accused) successfully applied for his discharge in terms of
section
174
of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
.
[3]
On appeal the appellant's counsel contends -
(1)
With reference to
S
v
Wannenburg
2007
(1) SACR 27
(C)
that
the appellant was wrongly convicted as the charge sheet did not
apprise him of the case against him; and
(2)
That the evidence does not support a conviction of theft: the state
failed to prove directly or inferentially that the appellant
was
guilty of theft.
[4]
The case against the accused was that he and his co-accused and/or
others not known to the state, stole the 17 amounts from
the RAF,
during the period December 1998 to June 2000, by submitting false MVA
claims to the RAF which the RAF accepted and paid
into four bank
accounts controlled by the appellant and in respect of which the
appellant alone had signing powers.
[5]
Throughout the relevant period the appellant practised as an attorney
specialising in MVA claims. It was not disputed that during
the
relevant period 17 false claims were submitted to the RAF, that the
RAF accepted liability for the claims, that the RAF paid
the amounts
into the appellant's bank account and that the appellant did not
repay these amounts to the RAF. The appellant pleaded
not guilty to
all the charges but did not tender an explanation for his plea. The
appellant also did not give evidence and it is
striking that at no
stage during the trial did his counsel proffer an (innocent)
explanation for the appellant's receipt of the
17 amounts. It is also
significant that his own witness, a very experienced forensic
accountant, was not provided with all the
relevant documents and
information so that he could explain what the appellant did with the
17 amounts he received and accordingly
was not able to give
the
court an innocent explanation for the appellant's receipt of the
funds.
[6]
The appellant's reliance on
S
v
Wannenburg
2007
(1) SACR 27
(C)
is
misplaced. In that case the charge sheet alleged that the accused had
made fraudulent misrepresentations and it was not suggested
that he
was guilty only of assisting another person in committing the fraud.
Eventually the accused was found guilty as an accomplice.
In the
present case it was alleged that the appellant and others stole the
amount involved: i.e. the appellant was charged as a
perpetrator.
This did not change during the trial and the court
a
quo
found
the appellant guilty as a perpetrator. It is clear that, if involved,
the appellant acted together with one or more persons
to commit the
crimes and is guilty by virtue of the principles relating to common
purpose. The appellant's counsel concedes that
if the appellant was
involved in the scheme to steal the money from the RAF the appellant
was properly convicted but contends that
the state's evidence did not
prove this. She also contends that the fact that the appellant
received the 17 amounts stolen from
the RAF did not establish a
prima
facie
case
which called for an answer from the appellant.
[7]
Accordingly, the issue is whether the state's evidence justifies the
inference drawn by the court
a
quo
that
the appellant together with others stole the 17 amounts from the RAF.
[8]
The state called a number of witnesses whose evidence was not
disputed by any evidence by the appellant. The appellant's counsel
put a number of propositions to these witnesses but called no witness
to support these propositions. There were therefore no factual
disputes before the court
a
quo
which
correctly accepted the evidence given by the witnesses. In addition,
the state relied on formal admissions made by the appellant
in terms
of
section 220
of Act 51 of 1977. A number of these admissions are
contained in exhibit 'A' and a number were formally placed on record
by the
appellant's counsel (see p338).
[9]
The evidence establishes the following:
(1)
During the period June 1998 to June 2000 the appellant practised as
an attorney in partnership with one Gadeja Abba under the
name Abba
Moeketsane Attorneys. The appellant specialised in MVA claims and
Abba did primarily criminal work as well as a few civil
cases, but no
MVA claims;
(2)
Before they entered into the partnership Abba had a Standard Bank
trust and a Standard Bank cheque account. After she and the
appellant
entered into the partnership they used the Standard Bank trust
account as a partnership trust account but it was now
designated Abba
Moeketsane. In addition they had a trust account with Absa Bank which
the appellant used for MVA matters. The RAF
paid money into that
account for the appellant's clients;
(3)
During the period June 1998 to June 2000 the appellant conducted the
following additional bank accounts which were not known
to Abba and
in respect of which she had no signing powers:
(i)
a
Standard Bank trust account number 030927676 designated attorney D.S.
Moeketsane, from May 1998 to March 1999. (This account will
be
referred to as 'AF');
(ii)
a
Standard Bank current account number 231028806 designated D.S.
Moeketsane Attorneys, from January 1999 to September 1999. (This
account will be referred
to
as 'AG');
(iii)
a
Standard Bank current account number 231029845 designated Dithate
Moeketsane until February 1999 and thereafter Abba & Moeketsane
Inc Attorney, from June
1998 to September 2000. (This account will
be referred to as 'AH').
(4)
During the period March 1999 to April 2001 the appellant (and
possibly the partnership) conducted an Absa trust account number
4049252397 designated Abba and Moeketsane Trust Attorneys. (This
account will be referred to as 'AJ'.);
(5)
The RAF was established to compensate persons who suffer damage as a
result of death or bodily injuries caused by motor vehicle
collisions. During the relevant period the RAF conducted its
activities at offices throughout South Africa, with its head office
in Pretoria. The RAF Randburg office processed and authorised all the
amounts paid to the appellant which form the subject of the
counts.
The RAF had 120 days in which to consider whether to pay or reject a
claim. It was very unusual for a claim to be paid
within 30 days of
it being received. It was unheard of for a claim to be paid the day
after it was received. The 17 payments were
discovered during an
audit of all claims paid within 30 days of receipt;
(6)
MVA claims were presented to the RAF in a prescribed form. Claims
submitted to the Randburg RAF office were first registered
on
computer and then manually in a register (by a member of the staff
Ms. Motchichi) and then distributed to the claims handlers
for
assessment. Each claims handler had an assistant whose function was
to attend to the administration and obtain all the necessary
documentation for the purpose of assessing the claim. In assessing
the claim the claims handler was required to confirm that there
had
been a collision; that the claimant or the deceased was injured or
killed in the collision; that the RAF was liable because
of the
negligence of the driver concerned and determine the amount of the
damages payable. A claims handler had authority to
pay claims up to
R25 000. For claims in excess of that figure a senior claims handler
was required to authorise payment. After
a claimant accepted the
RAF's offer, it was necessary for an Expenditure Authorisation to be
completed before payment would be
effected. An expenditure
authorisation had to be signed by the assistant claims handler, the
claims handler and the senior claims
handler. When the three
signatures had been obtained the Randburg RAF office would compile a
report for expenditure authorisation
(a 'batch report') containing
all the relevant details of the claim and the amount to be paid to
the claimant and would send
it to the Pretoria head office which
would effect payment to the claimants' attorneys. Before signing the
Expenditure Authorisation
the claims handler would have to be
satisfied that the claim was legitimate and was supported by all the
relevant documents.
(7)
During the period December 1998 to June 2000 17 false claims were
processed by the staff at the Randburg RAF office; expenditure
authorisations were signed by the assistant claims handlers, claims
handlers and senior claims handlers, and payments were effected
by
the Pretoria head office into the appellant's bank accounts (i.e.
'AF', 'AG', 'AH' and 'AJ'). The claims were false because
the
claimant or the deceased did not exist and the claimant or the
deceased was not involved in the collision. The staff at the
Randburg RAF registered the details of each claim on the computer
but the details were not found in the register kept by Ms.
Motchichi. Whatever documents there were were dealt with by the
assistant claims handler, claims handler and senior claims handler.
It was the duty of the assistant claims handler to prepare each
expenditure authorisation which reflected the claim registration
number, the name of the claimant, the name of the attorney to whom
payment was to be effected (i.e. the appellant) and the particulars
of the bank account into which payment was to be made. The police
investigators could not find any files pertaining to the claims
in
the Randburg RAF office.
(8)
The processing of the claims involved in each count, the payment of
the funds to the appellant and the movement on the relevant
account
after payment was as follows (the letters and numbers in parenthesis
refer to the relevant exhibit and the page in the
record) -
(i)
Count
1 (Radebe).
The claim was registered on 10 December 1998. The expenditure
authorisation for R49 950 was signed on 18 December 1998 ('N' 628).
Payment was to be effected to the appellant, account number 030927676
('AF'). The batch report was prepared ('B' 583) and on 21
December
1998 R49 950 was paid into the appellant's account ('AF' 655). On 18
December 1998 the account balance was R24 043,73.
After
receipt of the payment the account balance was R73 993,57. On 22, 23,
24, 28 and 30 December 1998 cheques numbers 569, 570,
572, 573, 574,
575, 576 and 577, totalling approximately R45 000 were paid by the
bank;
(ii)
Count
2 (Msiza).
The claim was registered on 28 July1999. The expenditure
authorisation for R48 362 was signed on 13 August 1999 ('P' 629).
Payment
was to be effected to the appellant (designated Abba &
Moeketsane), account number 231029845 ('AH'). The batch report was
prepared
('D' 591) and on 16 August 1999 R48 362 was paid into the
appellant's account ('AH'
786). On 14 August 1999 the account
balance was R12 001,86. After receipt of the payment the account
balance was R60 343,80. On
20 August 1999 a cheque for R48 000 and a
cheque for R14 000 were paid by the bank
leaving a balance of R2
785,48;
(iii)
Count
3 (Khumalo)
.
The claim was registered on 8 January 1999. The expenditure
authorisation for R47 650,30 was signed on 8 January 1999 ('O' 627).
Payment was to be effected to the appellant, account number 231028806
('AG'). The batch report was prepared ('C' 586) and on 11
January
1999 R47 650,30 was paid into the appellant's account ('AG' 670). On
9 January 1999, immediately before the payment was
received, the
account balance was R22 922,48. After receipt of the payment the
account balance was R78 572,78. On 12 January 1999
the bank paid
cheques of
R7
000, R300, R36 000 and R6 300 (total R49 600)
leaving
a balance of R28 976,78 on 12 January 1999;
(iv)
Count
4 (Ngidi)
.
The claim was registered on 12 February 1999. The expenditure
authorisation for R48 544 was signed on 12 February 1999 ('R' 630).
Payment was to be effected to the appellant, account number
231028806
('AG'). The batch report was prepared ('E' 595) and on 15 February
1999 R48 544 was paid into the appellant's account
('AG' 675). On 10
February 1999, immediately before the payment was received,
the
account was overdrawn in the amount of R2 044,29. After
receipt of the payment the balance was R46 499,71. On 16 February
1999 the
bank paid a cheque for R38 000 leaving a balance of R13
499,71;
(v)
Count
5 (Nogwaza)
.
The claim was registered on 21 May 1999. The expenditure
authorisation for R126 400 was signed on 21 May 1999 ('T' 632).
Payment
was to be effected to the appellant, account number 231028806
('AG').
The batch report was prepared ('F' 601) and on 24 May 1999 R126 400
was paid into the appellant's account ('AG' 689). On
19 May 1999,
just before this amount and the amount of R126 500 (the subject of
count 6) were paid into the account the account
balance was R23
629,40 ('AG' 689). After payment of the two amounts the balance was
R276 529,40. On 24, 25, 26 and 27 May 1999
the bank paid cheques for
R2 000, R28 000, R4 000, R350, R508,17, R60 000, R60 000, R70
000
and R1 500 (total R226 358,17);
(vi)
Count
6 (Banda)
.
The claim was registered on 21 May 1999. The expenditure
authorisation for R126 500 wassigned on 21 May 1999 ('T' 631).
Payment
was to be effected to the appellant, account number 231028806
('AG'). The batch report was prepared ('F' 601) and on 24 May 1999
R126 500 was paid into the appellant's account together with the R126
400 (the subject of count
5). The same comments relating to count
5 apply to the appellant's account;
(vii)
Count
7 (Mdlandlana)
.
The claim was registered on 23 November 1999. The expenditure
authorisation for R49300 was signed on 1 December 1999 ('X' 637).
Payment was to be effected to the appellant, account number
4049252397
('AJ'). The batch report was prepared ('H'
607)
and on 2 December 1999 R49 300 was paid into the appellant's account
('AJ' 932) together with R45 482,27 (the subject of count
9) and R43
182,93 (the subject of count 8). On 2 December 1999, immediately
before these payments were received, the account balance
was R284
344,92. On 2 December 1999, immediately after these payments were
received, the account balance was R422 310,12. On
4 December 1999
the bank paid a
cheque
for R94 782,27. This is the total of R45 482,27
(involved
in count 9) and R49 300 (involved in count 7);
(viii)
Count
8 (Ndhlela).
The claim was registered on 23 November 1999. The expenditure
authorisation for R43 182,93 was signed on 2 December 1999 ('X' 636).
Payment was to be effected to the appellant, account number
4049252397 ('AJ'). The batch report was prepared ('H' 607) and on 2
December 1999 R43 182,93 was paid into the appellant's account ('AJ'
932) together with the amounts which are the subject of Counts
7 and
9;
(ix)
Count
9 (Rula).
The claim was registered on 23 November 1999. The expenditure
authorisation for R45 482,27 was signed on 1 December 1999 ('W 635).
Payment was to be effected to the appellant, account number
4049252397 ('AJ'). The batch report was prepared ('H' 607) and on 2
December 1999 R45 482,27 was paid into the appellant's account ('AJ'
932) together with the amounts which are the subject of Counts
7 and
8;
(x)
Count
10 (Lene).
The claim was registered on 4 May 1999. The expenditure authorisation
for R51 600 was prepared but not signed ('V' 634). The failure
to
sign is not explained. Payment was to be effected to the appellant,
account number 231028806 ('AG'). The batch report was prepared
('G'
604) and on 6 May 1999 R51 600 was paid into the appellant's account
('AG' 688) together with the R51 800 (the subject of
count 11). On 4
May 1999, immediately before the receipt of these two amounts, the
account was overdrawn in the amount of R8 908,20.
After receipt of
the two amounts the account balance was R94 491,80. On 7 May 1999 the
bank paid a cheque (it was cashed) for R70
000;
(xi)
Count
11 (Matthews).
The claim was registered on 4 May 1999. The expenditure authorisation
for R51 800 was prepared but not signed ('U' 633). The failure
to
sign is not explained. Payment was to be effected to the appellant,
account number 231028806 ('AG'). The batch report was
prepared ('G'
604) and on 6 May 1999 R51 800 was paid into the appellant's account
('AG' 688) together with R51 600 (the subject
of count 10). The same
comments regarding the account before and after payment as were made
in respect of count 10, apply;
(xii)
Count
12 (Mulder).
The claim was registered on 10 June 1999. The expenditure
authorisation for R98 500 was signed on 21 June 1999 ('Z' 638).
Payment
was to be effected to the appellant, account number
4049252397
('AJ'). The batch report was prepared ('J' 610) and on
22 June 1999 R98 500 was paid into the appellant's account ('AJ' 906)
together
with R211 000 (the subject of count 13). On 22 June 1999,
immediately before these
payments were received, the account
balance was R242 839,22. Immediately after the payments were received
the account balance was
R552 339,22. On 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27 and 28
June 1999 the bank paid cheques to the value of approximately R270
000, including
a cheque for R90 000, on 26 June 1999, and a cheque
for R120 000, on 28 June 1999;
(xiii)
Count
13 (Van Wyk).
The claim was registered on 10 June 1999. The expenditure
authorisation for R211 000 was signed on 21 June 1999 ('AA' 639).
Payment
was to be effected to the appellant, account number
4049252397 ('AJ'). The batch report was prepared ('J' 610) and on 22
June 1999
R211 000 was paid into the appellant's account ('AJ' 906)
together with R98 500 (the subject of count 12). The same comments
regarding
the account before and after payment, as were made in
respect of count 12, apply;
(xiv)
Count
14 (Nqgolo).
The claim was registered on 29 September 1999. The authorisation for
R66 371,99 was signed on 4 October 1999 ('AC' 641). Payment
was to be
effected to the appellant, account number 231028806 (designated Abba
& Moeketsane)('AG'). The batch report was prepared
('K' 613) and
on 5 October 1999 R66 371,99 was paid into the appellant's account
('AG' 703) together with R57 831,24 (the subject
of count 15). On 4
October 1999, immediately before the two amounts were received, the
account was overdrawn in the sum of R16
645,44. Immediately after
receipt of the payments the balance was R107 567,45. On 4, 7 and 8
October 1999 the bank paid cheques
of R80 000, R7 000, R3 000 and R3
000 leaving a balance of R14 567,45;
(xv)
Count
15 (Gunguluza).
The claim was registered on 29 September 1999. The expenditure
authority for R57 831,24 was signed on 4 October 1999 ('AB' 640).
Payment was to be effected to the appellant, account number 231028806
(designated Abba & Moeketsane) ('AG'). The batch report
was
prepared ('K' 613) and on 5 October 1999 R57 831,24 was paid into the
appellant's account ('AG' 703). The same comments regarding
the
account before and after payment, as were made in respect of
count 14, apply;
(xvi)
Count
18 (Makholwa).
The claim was registered on 9 March 2000. The expenditure
authorisation for R127 000 was signed on 17 March 2000 ('AD' 642).
Payment
was to be effected to the appellant, account number
231029845
(designated Abba & Moeketsane) ('AH'). The
batch
report was prepared ('L' 619) and on 22 March 2000 R127 000 was paid
into the appellant's account
('AH'
809);
(xvii)
Count
19 (Weduwedu).
The claim was registered on 29 March 2000. The expenditure
authorisation for R152 000 was signed on 12 June 2000 ('AE' 645).
Payment
was to be effected to the appellant, account
number
4049252397 ('AJ'). The batch report was prepared ('M'622)
and on 13 June 2000 R152 000 was paid into the appellant's account
('AJ'
953). On 13 June 2000, immediately before the payment was
received, the account balance was R110 709,17. After receipt of the
payment
the account balance was R262 709,17. From 14 June 2000 until
23 June 2000 the bank paid a number of cheques, including a cheque
for R152 000 on 22 June
2000.
(9)
The payments into the appellant's accounts took place without the
knowledge of Abba who maintained that the appellant used these
accounts to keep her in ignorance of the payments;
(10)
The police unsuccessfully attempted to find the appellant's cashbook,
journal and ledger to show how the appellant dealt with
the 17
amounts he received. Not one of the bookkeepers/auditors who worked
with the appellant's books of account was able to produce
them for
the investigators;
(11)
The appellant did not furnish his expert witness, Mr. Deleeu Swart,
with his cashbook, journal and ledger or the paid cheques
drawn
against the accounts to enable Mr. Swart to explain what happened to
the funds which the appellant received;
(12)
The appellant did not open an unknown deposits account for the
payments he received;
(13)
The appellant did not attempt to find out whose money he had
received. He also made no enquiries from the RAF and he did not
repay
the money to the RAF;
(14)
In terms of section 78(1) of the Attorneys Act 57 of 1997 every
practising attorney is obliged to open and keep a separate
trust
banking account at a banking institution in the Republic and must
deposit therein the money held or received by him on account
of any
person. The attorney is not entitled to the money in the trust
account. The attorney may only pay himself from the trust
account if
there are fees due to him. Every three months an attorney is obliged
to reconcile his trust account by comparing the
total of the trust
creditors' claims against him with the amount available in the trust
account;
(15)
If an attorney receives funds into his trust account from an unknown
source he must open an 'unknown deposits account' for
these funds and
establish where they come from. Until he has done so the funds must
remain in the unknown deposits account;
(16)
Every trust account operated by an attorney must be audited once in a
year in compliance with Rule 70 of the Law Society.
(17)
If the attorney keeps proper records he will be able to account for
all money he receives. The records would provide a full
explanation
for what happened to the money. This would be the best and easiest
way of explaining what had happened and that the
money had been paid
to him by mistake.
(18)
An attorney would scrutinise his bank statements regularly to ensure
that he can attend to clients whose money it is. Money
received from
the RAF is easy to identify because of the information which appears
on the bank statement.
[10]
The admissions in exhibit 'A' and the other formal admissions clearly
establish that persons within the RAF fabricated claims
to justify
payments. It is not disputed that this was theft. The question is
whether the established facts justify the inference
that the
appellant acted in common purpose with these persons to steal the
funds.
[11]
Where there is clearly a carefully thought out scheme to steal from
the RAF which requires that there be an attorney's bank
account to
receive the stolen funds, the receipt of the stolen funds by an
attorney on its own creates a
prima
facie
case
requiring an answer. The improbability of the guilty parties
arranging for payment to be made to an innocent attorney is so
great
that the possibility of a mistake can be ignored. The movement on the
accounts after the funds were received also indicates
that the
appellant had knowledge of the payments and was taking steps to
remove the funds from the accounts under his control.
It is clear
that the appellant had the means of proving that he innocently
received the payments. He could have shown how he dealt
with the
funds as an innocent attorney would: by opening an unknown deposits
account, reflecting the payments in the cashbook as
unknown deposits
and obviously by making the necessary enquiries. The appellant chose
to remain silent.
[12]
In
S
v
Boesak
[2000] ZACC 25
;
2001
(1) SA 912
(CC)
in
para 24 the court said:
'The
right to remain silent has application at different stages of a
criminal prosecution. An arrested person is entitled to remain
silent
and may not be compelled to make any confession or admission that
could be used in evidence against that person. It arises
again at the
trial stage where an accused has the right to be presumed innocent,
to remain silent and not to testify during the
proceedings. The fact
that an accused person is under no obligation to testify does not
mean that there are no consequences attaching
to a decision to remain
silent during the trial. If there is evidence calling for an answer,
and an accused person chooses to remain
silent in the face of such
evidence, a court may well be entitled to conclude that the evidence
is sufficient in the absence of
an explanation to prove the guilt of
the accused. Whether such a conclusion is justified will depend on
the weight of the evidence.
What is stated above is consistent with
the remarks of Madala J, writing for the Court, in
Osman
and Another v Attorney-General, Transvaal
(1998
(4) SA 1224
(CC))
when
he said the following:
"Our
legal system is an adversarial one. Once the prosecution has produced
evidence sufficient to establish a
prima
facie
case,
an accused who fails to produce evidence to rebut that case is at
risk. The failure to testify does not relieve the prosecution
of its
duty to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. An accused, however,
always runs the risk, absent any rebuttal, the prosecution's
case may
be sufficient to prove the elements of the offence. The fact that an
accused has to make such an election is not a breach
of the right to
silence. If the right to silence were to be so interpreted, it would
destroy the fundamental nature of our adversarial
system of criminal
justice."'
[13]
In my view there was a very strong
prima
facie
case
against the appellant and his silence justifies the conclusion that
he was a party to the scheme and guilty of theft. The appeal
against
the convictions therefore cannot be upheld.
[14]
With regard to sentence it is not contended that the sentence is
vitiated by irregularity or misdirection. It is contended
that the
sentence imposed is startlingly inappropriate - see
S
v
Pillay
1977
(4) SA 531
(A)
at
535E-G;
S
v
Kibido
1998
(2) SACR 213
(SCA)
at
216g-j;
S
v
Rabie
1975
(1) SA 855
(A)
at
857D-F. I do not agree. As pointed out by counsel for the respondent
there are a number of very aggravating features in the case.
The
appellant was an attorney; he dealt exclusively w
ith
claims against the RAF; more than R1,4 million is involved in the
thefts; the thefts were committed over a lengthy period, 18
months;
the appellant frustrated the investigation of the case by
consistently refusing to provide the documentation which
would
demonstrate
his guilt or innocence and there is no sign of remorse on the part of
the appellant. In my view the sentence imposed
was appropriate and
this court cannot interfere with it on appeal.
Order
[14]
The appellant's appeal against the convictions and sentence is
dismissed.
B.R.
SOUTHWOOD
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
I
agree
V
P.
EBERSOHN
ACTINGTUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
CASE
NO: A472/09
HEARD
ON: 15 March 2010
FOR
THE APPELLANT: ADV. E. KILIAN
INSTRUCTED
BY: Mr. W. Clark of Shaban Clark Coetzee
FOR
THE RESPONDENT: ADV. R.S. DU TOIT
INSTRUCTED
BY: Director of Public Prosecutions
DATE
OF JUDGMENT: 23 March 2010