UMMI Properties (Pty) Ltd v ABSA Bank Limited (71053/2016) [2023] ZAGPPHC 38 (23 January 2023)

80 Reportability
Banking and Finance

Brief Summary

Summary Judgment — Application for summary judgment — Applicant sought payment of R1 016 066.29 from respondent following mortgage loan agreements — Respondent resisted summary judgment on grounds of prescription, estoppel, and existence of bona fide defences — Court held that respondent raised triable issues and had a bona fide defence, thus warranting leave to defend the claim.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


The matter concerned an application for summary judgment brought in terms of Rule 32 of the Uniform Rules of Court. The applicant, UMMI Properties (Pty) Ltd, sought judgment against the respondent, ABSA Bank Limited, for repayment of amounts deducted from its bank account after the expiry of a mortgage loan term, together with interest and costs.


The proceedings arose within an action under case number 71053/2016, in which UMMI (as plaintiff in the action) claimed repayment of R1 016 066.29 allegedly collected by ABSA after the relevant loan period ended. The application for summary judgment was opposed by ABSA (as defendant in the action), which contended that it had raised defences giving rise to triable issues.


The general subject-matter of the dispute was whether ABSA was entitled to continue debiting monthly instalments after the loan term had ended, and whether ABSA’s stated defences (including lis pendens, prescription, and estoppel) were sufficient to defeat summary judgment.


2. Material Facts


UMMI and ABSA concluded two mortgage loan agreements relating to properties described in the summons. The first agreement was a bond finance facility of R10.5 million, commencing on 20 December 2002, with terms accepted on 4 February 2004. The material terms included that interest would be 1.5% below the prime overdraft interest rate quoted by ABSA from time to time; ABSA reserved rights to increase the rate if the account fell into arrears; and ABSA could review the interest rate after 24 months (on written notification). Repayment was over ten years in equal monthly instalments.


A year later, following a substantial once-off payment, the parties restructured the facility into a second loan agreement for R3 966 384.00, for a ten-year period commencing on 26 January 2004, accepted by UMMI’s representative. The second agreement similarly provided for interest at 1.5% below prime, contained provisions dealing with interest-rate review and increases in defined circumstances, and authorised ABSA to collect monthly instalments by debit order from UMMI’s bank account. It also included a variation permitting ABSA, on 30 days’ written notice, to vary the rate to align with what it regarded as the ruling mortgage rate, subject to a restriction that this would not be exercised before the expiry of 24 months from registration of the bond.


The first repayment under the restructured loan commenced on 1 April 2004, and the ten-year period terminated on 1 April 2014. After April 2014, ABSA nevertheless continued to deduct monthly instalments by debit order from UMMI’s bank account until summons was issued, collecting a total of R1 016 066.29 during that post-term period.


UMMI demanded that ABSA cease making the deductions and previously launched a separate application under case number 54941/2015. In the present action and summary judgment proceedings, UMMI’s claim (as characterised by the court) was that the loan term was ten years, the agreement expired on 1 April 2014, and ABSA had no contractual basis to extend the loan term unilaterally by continuing debits beyond that date.


In opposition, ABSA asserted various defences, including that there were disputes of fact requiring trial; that claims framed as overpayment (including by reference to condictio indebiti) had prescribed; and that UMMI’s conduct and documents (including audited financial statements) supported an estoppel and demonstrated continuing indebtedness. The court also took into account ABSA’s position in its own papers that the debt had been extinguished on 8 June 2016, which the court regarded as materially undermining ABSA’s assertion that UMMI remained indebted.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal question was whether ABSA had disclosed a bona fide defence (or triable issues) sufficient to defeat UMMI’s application for summary judgment under Rule 32. This was primarily an inquiry into the application of law to the pleaded and admitted facts in the summary judgment context, and whether ABSA’s opposing affidavit set out material facts which, if proved at trial, would constitute a valid defence.


Within that overarching enquiry, specific subsidiary questions arose from ABSA’s opposition, including whether the matter was lis pendens by reason of the earlier proceedings under case number 54941/2015, and whether the claim (to the extent characterised as an overpayment or restitutionary claim) was defeated by prescription. The court also had to evaluate whether ABSA’s reliance on estoppel-type contentions and alleged acknowledgments of indebtedness raised genuine, trial-worthy disputes in response to UMMI’s pleaded cause of action.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court began by restating the summary judgment framework under Rule 32, including that the applicant must identify the point of law and facts relied upon, and that summary judgment is an extraordinary and stringent remedy requiring strict compliance with the rule’s prerequisites. The court referred to authority to the effect that the plaintiff bears the onus of showing that the defendant does not have a defence on the merits, and that a defendant resisting summary judgment must at least disclose a defence and the material facts upon which it rests, sufficient to enable the court to determine whether it is bona fide.


In addressing the applicable approach, the court referred to the principle that courts have a discretion to be exercised judicially when considering summary judgment, and that summary judgment is appropriate where a plaintiff has made out an unanswerable case and the defendant’s opposition amounts to delaying tactics. The court noted that, in exercising that discretion, it is required to consider the matter together with the documents properly before it.


Turning to the facts and pleaded defences, the court held that UMMI’s cause of action remained undisputed. The court characterised UMMI’s case as straightforward: the parties concluded a ten-year loan, it expired on 1 April 2014, and ABSA continued debiting UMMI’s account for more than two years thereafter, collecting R1 016 066.29, without advancing a justification in the opposing papers that answered this claim. The court accepted UMMI’s contention that the loan term was fixed and that, while interest could vary, ABSA did not thereby acquire a right unilaterally to extend the contract term so as to generate additional repayments and interest beyond the agreed ten years.


The court rejected ABSA’s lis pendens defence on the basis that the other proceedings involved different causes of action and different relief, and accordingly did not bar the present claim. The court further found that ABSA’s assertions that UMMI was aware it remained indebted were untenable in light of ABSA’s own averment that the debt had been extinguished on 8 June 2016; on the court’s reasoning this made the alleged continuing indebtedness defence “non-sensical” and factually incorrect.


On prescription, the court stated a general principle that prescription begins to run only when the creditor is in a position to enforce the right in law, and not necessarily when the right arises. The court referred in this context to academic commentary cited in the judgment. This formed part of the court’s broader conclusion that the defences advanced did not constitute bona fide defences capable of being sustained at trial, as they did not provide a substantive answer to the pleaded claim relating to post-term debits.


Having considered the pleaded basis of the claim and the opposing affidavit, the court concluded that ABSA had not raised bona fide defences or triable issues warranting leave to defend, and that summary judgment should therefore be granted.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court granted summary judgment in favour of UMMI Properties (Pty) Ltd against ABSA Bank Limited. The order recorded that summary judgment was granted with costs.


The summary judgment application sought payment of R1 016 066.29, interest at 10.25% per annum a tempore morae from 29 September 2016 to date of payment, and costs on the attorney-and-client scale, together with further or alternative relief. The operative order, as framed in the judgment, granted summary judgment and awarded costs.


Cases Cited


Breitenbach v Fiat SA (Edms) BPK 1976 (2) SA 226 (T)


Gull Steel (Pty) Ltd v Rack Hire BOP (Pty) Ltd 1998 (1) SA 679 (O)


Maharaj v Barclays Ltd 1976 (1) SA 418 (A)


Legislation Cited


Prescription Act 68 of 1969


Rules of Court Cited


Uniform Rules of Court, Rule 32


Held


The court held that the respondent had not disclosed a bona fide defence or triable issues sufficient to resist summary judgment. The applicant’s cause of action—premised on the ten-year loan term having ended on 1 April 2014 and the respondent continuing to debit the applicant’s account thereafter—was treated as unanswered on the respondent’s papers.


The court further held that the defence of lis pendens failed because the other proceedings relied upon involved different causes of action. The court also regarded the respondent’s stance that the applicant remained indebted as incompatible with the respondent’s own averment that the debt was extinguished on 8 June 2016. In relation to prescription, the court applied the principle that prescription begins to run when a creditor is in a position to enforce the right in law.


On these bases, summary judgment was granted with costs.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The judgment applied the principle that summary judgment is a stringent and exceptional remedy and requires strict compliance with Rule 32. In that context, the plaintiff bears an onus to demonstrate that the defendant has no defence on the merits, while a defendant opposing summary judgment must disclose a defence and set out the material facts relied upon so that the court can assess whether the defence is bona fide and trial-worthy.


The judgment further applied the principle that a court has a judicial discretion in summary judgment proceedings and must consider the matter and all documents properly before it, granting summary judgment where the plaintiff has made out an unanswerable case and the defence appears to be raised to delay.


On prescription, the judgment applied the general proposition that prescription runs from the point at which the creditor is able to enforce the right in law, rather than necessarily from the moment the right arises.

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[2023] ZAGPPHC 38
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UMMI Properties (Pty) Ltd v ABSA Bank Limited (71053/2016) [2023] ZAGPPHC 38 (23 January 2023)

IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
PROVINCAL DIVISION
Case
No: 71053/2016
(1)
REPORTABLE: YES
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES
(3)
REVISED: Yes
Date:
23 January 2023
In
the matter between:
UMMI
PROPERTIES (PTY) LTD
Applicant
(Registration
number: 1993/001976/07)
and
ABSA
BANK LIMITED
Respondent
JUDGMENT
SARDIWALLA
J
[1]
This is an application for summary judgment in terms of Rule 32 of
the Uniform Rules of Court. The relief
sought is as follows:
1.1
Payment in the amount of R1 016 066.29
1.2
Interest on the sum of R1 016 066.29
at the rate of 10,25% per annum a
tempore
morae
, to wit, 29 September 2016, to
date of payment in full, both days inclusive.
1.3
Costs of suit between attorney and Client;
1.4
Further and/or alternative relief.
[2]
The summary judgment is resisted on the following basis:
2.1   There is a dispute of
fact relating to the Plaintiff’s claim which dispute can only
be resolved at trial.
2.2   The Plaintiff’s
claim had prescribed or, at the very least, a substantial portion
thereof. The basis for this
contention in so far as the Plaintiff
alleges that the incorrect interest rate was charged such claims
would have prescribed on
the dates on which the interest was charged,
if found to be incorrect.
2.3   The Plaintiff is
estopped from claiming any amount on the basis of its conduct, inter
alia, relating to the correspondence
between the parties:
2.4   The Plaintiff signed
documents, emanating from itself, such as audited financial
statements, in terms of which the
interest rate charged by the
Defendant, and the Plaintiff’s debt towards the Defendant, is
stated.
2.5   The Plaintiff is still
indebted towards the Defendant.
2.6   The Plaintiff was,
during March 2013, still indebted to the Defendant, the Plaintiff was
aware of such indebtedness
and the remaining period of the loan.
2.7   The Plaintiff
represented to the Defendant that the amount indebted, the remaining
period of the loan, is accepted
by the plaintiff and consequently,
the Plaintiff would be estopped from relying on the claim as pleaded
in its particulars of claim.
2.8   The Plaintiff bound
itself as surety and co-principal debtor for the other debts of its
director, Kevin Denton and
Denton is still substantially indebted to
the Defendant.
2.9   It is further
illustrated by the Defendant that the Plaintiff has been aware that
the Defendant relies on contentions
which would justify leave to
defend and, notwithstanding this knowledge, proceeded to apply for
summary judgment.
Factual
Background
[3]
The applicant and respondent entered into two mortgage loan
agreements for ten years over the property described
in the summons.
The first contract (the “first loan agreement”) one of
bond finance in the amount of R10, 5 million
commenced on 20 December
2002, which agreement terms and conditions were accepted on 4
February 2004 by Jonathan Connellan representing
the applicant.
[4]
The express terms and conditions of the first agreement read with the
bond were
inter alia
the following:
4.1
A covering bond in respect of the
properties was granted against the loan amount of R10, 5 million.
4.2
The properties were described as Erven 703,
1781, 1783 and 1786 Warmer, Remainder of Erven 273, 274 and 1787,
Warmer, Erven 5645
and 2629, Central, Remainder of Erven 2543 and
2544, Port Elizabeth Central and Erf 2818 Kabega Park.
4.3
The interest payable on the loan was agreed
to be 1,5 % below prime overdraft interest rate (as quoted by the
Defendant) from time
to time.
4.4
It was agreed that should the loan fall
into arrears by two months or more, the Defendant reserved the right
to increase the rate
by up to 2% per annum.
4.5
The Defendant also reserved the right to
review the interest rate offered at the discretion after the period
of 24 months from date
of registration of the bond and to make the
necessary adjustments subject to a suitable written notification of
such adjustment
to the applicant.
4.6
The repayment period was ten years in equal
monthly instalments including capital and interest.
[5]
A year later the contract was restructured through a substantial
once-off payment which resulted in a new
loan agreement (the “second
loan agreement”) of R3, 966 million for ten years commencing on
26 January 2004. KJ Denton
representing the Plaintiff accepted the
terms and conditions of the restructured second loan agreement. The
material express, tacit
or implied terms of the second loan agreement
were inter alia:
5.1
a covering mortgage bond in respect of the
properties was granted as against a loan amount of R3 966 384.00.
5.2
The properties were described as Erven 703,
1781, 1783 and 1786 Warmer, Remainder of Erven 273, 274 and 1787,
Warmer, Erven 5645
and 2629, Central, Remainder of Erven 2543 and
2544, Port Elizabeth Central and Erf 2818 Kabega Park.
5.3
The interest payable on the loan was agreed
to be 1,5 % below prime overdraft interest rate (as quoted by the
Defendant) from time
to time.
5.4
It was agreed that should the loan fall
into arrears by two months or more, the Defendant reserved the right
to increase the rate
by up to 2% per annum.
5.5
The Defendant also reserved the right to
review the interest rate offered at the discretion after the period
of 24 months from date
of registration of the bond and to make the
necessary adjustments subject to a suitable written notification of
such adjustment
to the applicant.
5.6
The repayment period was ten years in equal
monthly instalments including capital and interest.
5.7
The Defendant was authorised to
deduct monthly instalments from the Plaintiff’s bank account by
debit order.
5.8
A further variation was included in
this agreement in that the Defendant provided that it may vary the
rate at any time on 30 days
written notice so as to bring the rate in
line with what it regarded as the ruling mortgage rate which is
generally applicable
to first mortgage bonds being granted at such
time and with a similar risk profile.
5.9
The Defendant agreed that it would
not exercise this right prior to the expiry of 24 months from date of
registration of the mortgage
bond. Should any breach be committed,
the Defendant reserved the right to increase the rate by up to 2% per
annum and prior to
such additional rate being charged Plaintiff would
be advised in writing.
5.10
The Defendant would calculate the monthly
payments, as adjusted for interest variations from time to time, so
as to amortise the
loan agreement over 10 years.
[6]
The first repayment on the revised agreement (the “second loan
agreement”) commenced on 1 April
2004 and terminated on 1 April
2014. The Defendant since April 2014 to date of the summons continued
to deduct the monthly instalment
through debit order from the
applicant’s bank account and a total amount of R 1 016 066.29
was collected.
[7]
The applicant demanded that the respondent cease deducting the
payments and launched an application under
case number 54941/2015.
ISSUES
FOR DETERMINATION’
[8]
Whether the respondent has a
bona fide
defence.
[9]
Whether there are triable and mitigating issues raised by the
respondent.
Legal
Principles
[10]
In terms of Rule 32(2) (b) the applicant has to identify a point in
law and facts relied upon which his claim is based.
The applicant has
the onus to prove why the defence pleaded does not raise any issues
for trial. It is not enough to merely state
that the respondent did
not have a
bona fide
defence. To the contrary the respondent
has to prove that he at the very least has a defence and state the
material facts upon which
his defence is based. This then enables the
court to decide as to whether he has a
bona fide
defence or
not.
[11]
The onus rests with the plaintiff to show that the defendant does not
have a defence on the merits of the case. See
Breitenbach v
Fiat SA (Edms) BPK
1976 (2) SA 226
T at 227F.
[12]
The contentious issue for determination is whether the respondent has
raised
bona fide
defences. The applicant submitted that the
respondent has not succeeded in disclosing triable issues and
therefore issues raised
by the respondent, do not constitute
bona
fide
defence.
[13]
It is contended by the respondent that the matter is
lis pendens
and therefore the summary judgment should be dismissed. Secondly a
claim for over-payment of interest is based on
condictio indebiti
which it claims has already prescribed as prescription began to run
as soon as the debt was due. Further that the applicant was
aware
that it was indebted to the respondent as evidenced by bank
statements sent to the applicant which the applicant has not

disputed. Therefore, the applicant should have been aware that the
interest rate had changed and that it was still indebted to
the
respondent. It is the respondent’s contention that it has
raised or set out sufficient facts in its affidavit, which
if proved
will constitute and answer to the applicant’s claim and or is a
bona fide
defence therefore the court should not grant the
summary judgment.
[14]
The respondent contends that it has a
bona fide
defence and
has raised triable issues entitling it to leave to defend applicant’s
claim. The respondent will avoid summary
judgment should he advance
facts which can reasonably be argued in a trial. The respondent’s
argument that a court is to
be satisfied that the respondent has a
bona fide
defence and he need not prove his defence.
[15]
Summary judgment is an extraordinary, stringent and drastic remedy,
it calls for strict compliance with the prerequisites
as provided for
in Rule 32 (2) (b). See
Gull Steel (Pty) Ltd v Rack Hire BOP
(Pty) Ltd
1998 (1) SA 679
(O)
at 683 H.
[16]
The applicant averred that the debt has been paid and that this is
admitted in the respondent’s answering affidavit.
Therefore,
there is no defence. Secondly the respondent has taken issue with the
interest rate which is not the applicant’s
cause of action. The
applicant’s case is simple in that it had a ten-year
contractual loan with the respondent which expired
on 1 April 2014
and the respondent continued to debit the applicant’s account
for more than two years in the sum of R 1 016 066.29.
It
was the applicant’s contention that the term of the loan was
fixed it was only the amount that could be adjusted by the
respondent
on written notification of same to the applicant. Further that the
bank controlled the amount it deducted and therefore
the onus was on
the respondent to ensure it collected the correct repayments over the
ten-year period and not unilaterally increase
the term of the
contract which attracted further interest which the applicant should
not be liable for. It further stated that
the respondent did not even
allege that there had been any non-payment by the applicant
justifying the extension of the term. Therefore,
there is no
explanation from the respondent why it proceeded to deduct a further
R1 016 066.29 from the applicant and
the applicant’s
claim remains unanswered.
[17]
In respect of the respondents second defence relating to the interest
rate, the applicant averred that there is no dispute
about the
interest rate as the respondent in its answering affidavit states
that the interest rate was correct, which the applicant
has accepted
and on that basis was able to quantify its claim against the
respondent based on the respondent’s schedule.
Lastly
that the defence of
lis pendens
was not a
bona fide
defence as the causes of action are entirely separate and so were the
orders prayed for. It submitted that the other application
related to
ceasing the respondent from debit the applicant’s account
further, related to the interest rate calculated and
sureties.
Therefore, the applicant submitted that the summons and particulars
of claim were undisputed and the applicant was entitled
to summary
judgment.
[18]
In
Maharaj v Barclays Ltd
1976 (1) SA 418
(A)
Maharaj v Barclays Ltd
1976
(1) SA 418
(A)
Maharaj v Barclays Ltd
1976 (1) SA 418
(A)
the courts are vested with an
unfettered discretion which has to be exercised judicially when
considering summary judgment
applications. Summary judgment will be
granted in the event where the plaintiff has made out an unanswerable
case against the defendant
who simply wants to unnecessarily delay
the plaintiff’s case. In
Maharaj
supra,
the court held that in deciding whether or not to grant summary
judgment, the principle is that the court has to look at the matter

and all the documents that are properly before it.
[19]
The applicant’s cause of action which constitutes its
foundation in this application remains undisputed. In my
view the
defences raised do not provide an explanation to the claim and the
claim therefore remains unanswered by the respondent.
In respect of
the first defence that the matter is
lis
pendens
I am satisfied that this
application relates to different causes of action against the
respondent. In respect of the second defence
raised the respondent
has in its own papers averred that the debt was extinguished on 8
June 2016, therefore the defence that the
applicant is aware that it
is indebted to the respondent is non-sensical and must be factually
incorrect. In respect of its third
defence a fundamental principle of
prescription, which is much clearer under the current Prescription
Act, is that it will begin
to run only when the creditor is in a
position to enforce his right in law, not necessarily when that right
arises.
See Lubbe “Die Aanvang
van Verjaring waar die Skuldeiser oor die Opeisbaarheid van die Skuld
kan Beskik”
(1988) 51 THRHR 135
.
[20]
I am satisfied that the defences raised by the respondent to the
applicant’s case are not
bona fide
defences of being
sustained by the respondent at the subsequent trial.
[21]
I therefore make the following order:
21.1   Summary judgment
is granted with costs.
C
SARDIWALLA
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
Appearances
:
For
the Applicant:                                      CD

ROUX
Instructed
by:                                            D

Paleologu Attorneys
For
the First to Third Respondents:          R
Raubenheimer
Instructed
by:                                            Tim

Du Toit & Co Inc