Camps Bay Residents and Ratepayers Association and Others v Hartley and Others (2973/10) [2010] ZAWCHC 198 (2 September 2010)

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[2010] ZAWCHC 198
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Camps Bay Residents and Ratepayers Association and Others v Hartley and Others (2973/10) [2010] ZAWCHC 198 (2 September 2010)

IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
WESTERN
CAPE HIGH COURT, CAPE TOWN
CASE
NO: 2973/10
In
the matter between:
THE
CAMPS BAY RESIDENTS' AND
RATEPAYERS'
ASSOCIATION
…............................................
First
Applicant
HENDRIK
STEVEN NEETHLING
….........................................
Second
Applicant
TAKU
INVESTMENTS SA (PTY) LTD
…..................................
Third
Applicant
VERNON
LIONEL CHORN
…...................................................
Fourth
Applicant
and
DAVID
ANTHONY HARTLEY
….............................................
First
Respondent
SUSAN
DENISE HARTLEY
…...............................................
Second
Respondent
THE
CITY OF CAPE TOWN
…...............................................
Third
Respondent
JUDGMENT:
DATED 2
nd
SEPTEMBER
2010
GAMBLE,
J:
INTRODUCTION
[1]
The Atlantic seaboard of the Cape Peninsula is famed for its natural
beauty and breathtaking views of mountain and sea. It
is also said
to host some of the most expensive real estate in the Western Cape.
The combination of these factors has lead to
many landowners in
suburbs
such
as Bantry Bay, Clifton and Camps Bay jealously seeking to protect
their views and privacy as neighbouring property owners
endeavour to
push the limits of permissible land use and buildings under the
Western Cape's idiosyncratic planning legislation
1
.
[2]
Often the simmering tensions between neighbours and civil society
groups have spilled over into litigation, many of which
have spawned
a plethora of decisions of this court relating to reviews,
interdicts and declarations of rights. This is yet another
such
case.
[3]
The First Respondent (Mr Hartley) and the Second Respondent (Mrs
Hartley), to whom I shall collectively refer as "the
Hartleys",
jointly own Erf 530 Camps Bay, also known as 21 The Meadway
(hereinafter "the property"). The property
is located a
block or two away from the main beach in Camps Bay and commands
views of the western aspect of Table Mountain and
the Twelve
Apostels. Its sea view is evidently limited at ground level.
[4]
Early in 2004 the Hartleys instructed an architect, Mr Thomas Geh,
to prepare building plans for the proposed construction
of a
multi-levelled, double dwelling on the property. The building
designed by Mr Geh would be in conflict with the relevant
zoning
scheme regulations for the City of Cape Town ("the scheme
regulations") and certain restrictive title deed conditions.

Accordingly, a public participation process in respect of the
intended use rights of the property was required under various

statutory instruments.
[5]
The Second Applicant ("Mr Neethling") is the owner of the
property on its northern western boundary (i.e. towards
the beach).
In April 2004 Mr Neethling received a statutory notice prepared by
Mr Geh informing him of the proposed construction
and inviting his
comments thereon.
[6]
Mr Neethling filed a letter of objection with the Third Respondent
("the City") on 20 April 2004. In the founding
affidavit
herein he says that -
"I
was opposed to the proposed development as it was conveyed to me in
Mr Greh's notification because I felt that it would
have a
deleterious effect on the amenities I enjoy from my property and
that it would lead to a derogation both of my enjoyment
and of the
market value of my property".
[7]
Mr Neethling's wife is an architect and, with her assistance, he
compiled a detailed objection document comprising an architect's

assessment, drawings and photographs. The principle complaints which
Mr Neethling raised regarding the proposed building were

overshadowing, overlooking and loss of amenities and a view in
respect of his home.
[8]
Mr Geh's notification elicited a further sixteen letters of
objection, including all of the other neighbours to the property
and
the First Applicant ("the CBRRA"). The CBRRA is a
voluntary association which represents the interests of property

owners and residents in the suburbs of Camps Bay, Clifton and
Bakhoven. The CBRRA's objections allegedly include the safeguarding

of the interests of its more than six hundred members through
monitoring the enforcement of, and departures from, zoning scheme

and title deed restrictions on properties in those suburbs. It is a
proverbial neighbourhood watchdog whose
locus
standi
has
been recognised by this Court in certain of the cases referred to
above. In any event, its standing in this matter is not
in issue in
the light of certain developments to which I shall refer shortly.
[9]
Evidently, the City regarded Mr Geh's April 2004 notification as
defective and instructed him to send out fresh notices. Mr
Neethling
says he received a second notification on 14 December 2004 and
thereafter lodged an objection similar to the first.
A total of
twenty four letters of objection were lodged in respect of the
second notification, including from the CBRRA and the
other
neighbours to the property.
[10]
The relevant committee of the City was scheduled to near objections
on 17 August 2005. However, this meeting never took place.
Mr Chirs
Willemse, the chairman of the CBRRA's planning committee,
facilitated a meeting of the interested and affected parties
in an
attempt
to
reach an amicable solution. This endeavour was successful and on 12
August 2005 a written agreement was concluded between the
Hartleys,
Mr Neethling, the CBRRA and twenty other objecting parties.
[11]
For the purposes of this application it is not necessary to recite
the terms of the agreement in any great detail. Suffice
it to say
that it covered a broad range of issues from the dimension of the
proposed building to overlooking features, landscaping
and hours of
construction work. A number of agreed plans were annexed to the
agreement and it is the applicant's case that the
building was to be
conducted strictly in accordance therewith.
[12]
The upshot of the agreement was that the twenty one affected parties
withdrew their objections to the proposed development
which could
then progress to the next preliminary stage.
[13]
On 16 January 2007 the City granted its consent to a departure from
the scheme regulations under Section 15 of LUPO and paved
the way
(from a land use and planning point of view) for the construction of
a double dwelling
2
on the property. This consent incorporated various conditions to
which I shall revert hereunder.
[14]
The offending title deed restrictions on the property (which
precluded a double dwelling) were duly removed under the Removal
of
Restrictions Act, 84 of 1967 and the conditions stipulated in the
agreement of 12 August 2005 were incorporated in a new title
deed
dated 28 February 2008.
[15]
The Hartleys were also required to obtain approval of the revised
building plans finalised by Mr Geh, but this step was apparently

regarded as no more than a formality.
[16]
In about April or May 2009 Mr Neethling received a phone call from
Mr Paul Righini who told him that he had been appointed
as the
Hartley's new architect. Mr Neethling declined Mr Righini's request
for a meeting to discuss proposed changes to Mr Geh's
plans and says
that he referred Mr Righini to Mr Willemse because there were a
number of other interested parties. It does not
seem as if Mr
Righini contacted Mr Willemse.
[17]
On 20 August 2009 Mr Neethling noticed that demolition of the
existing building on the Hartleys' property had commenced.
The
following day he went to the City's offices to establish whether the
building plans had been approved. He says that he ascertained
that
building plans had been submitted by the Hartleys on 4 June 2009,
that these plans had been approved on 12 August 2009 and
that in his
view they differed substantially from the agreed plans which were
annexed to the agreement of 12 August 2005. ("the
old plans")
[18]
Mr Neethling says that he was of the view that the Righini plans
("the new plans") were in contravention of:
18.1.
the agreement of 12 August 2005 ("the written agreement");
18.2.
the amended title deed conditions endorsed pursuant to the written
agreement; and
18.3.
the conditions imposed by the City when it consented to the
construction of a double dwelling on the property.
[19]
Mr Neethling then proceeded to engage with the relevant City
officials in an endeavour to persuade them that the new plans
were
indeed in contravention as alleged but he was unable to do so.
[20]
Mr Neethling says that during this process of discussion, City
officials showed him a copy of the title deeds which had allegedly

been submitted together with the new plans. He then formed the view
that the City's officials had been mislead regarding the
appropriate
title deed restrictions/conditions. I will deal in more detail later
with some of the alleged contraventions as contended
for by the
applicants.
[21]
During the period 21 August to 30 November 2009, Mr and Mrs
Neethling were involved in on-going discussions with City officials

regarding their concerns about the Hartleys' proposed development.
They also sought legal advice. The City officials, in turn,
engaged
with Mr Righini.
[22]
On 30 November 2009 Mr Neethling went next door and discussed the
matter with the building contractor on site. The latter
informed him
of Mr Righini's instructions to him in
respect
of certain of the design features and parameters of the proposed
dwelling. Mr Neethling requested sight of any updated
plans prepared
by Mr Righini subsequent to approval of the new plans but these were
not forthcoming. Upon enquiry to City officials
Mr Neethling
established that no such plans (which he termed "rider plans")
existed.
[23]
On 5 December 2009 there was an informal meeting at the property
between Mr Neethling, Mr Righini, Mr Willemse and MrTheron,
the
section head of the City's Building Development Management for the
area in question. At this meeting Mr Willemse told Mr
Righini in no
uncertain terms that his view was that the new plans were in breach
of the written agreement and the title deed
conditions and asked Mr
Righini to prepare a full set of plans which were in compliance with
the written agreement and the title
deeds.
[24]
Mr Righini undertook to take instructions from the Hartleys and
revert by 15 January 2010. On 12 December 2009 Mr Willemse
sent a
letter to Mr Righini and the Hartleys confirming the substance of
the discussions and recording Mr Righini's undertaking.
The Hartleys
were advised that the CBRRA would resort to litigation if necessary
but that the CBRRA remained available for further
discussion if
necessary.
[25]
Mr Hartley wrote a terse reply on 17 December 2009 denying any
non-compliance with the written agreement. He reserved his
rights
and undertook to revert by mid January 2010.
[26]
Building work continued on the property until 21 December 2009 in
contravention of the condition in the written agreement
that it
would not take place during the annual builders' shutdown and only
ceased when Mr Neethling threatened to lay criminal
charges.
[27]
There was no response from the Hartleys as promised in mid January
2010. All the while building work continued apace.
[28]
On 15 February 2010 the present urgent application was launched by
the CBRRA (as first applicant). Mr Neethling (as second
applicant),
Taku Investments SA (Pty) Ltd, the owner of the neighbouring
property immediately behind the property (as third applicant)
and Mr
Vernon Chorn, the owner of the neighbouring property to the south
east of the property (as fourth applicant). Mr and Mrs
Hartley were
cited as the first and second respondents respectively with the City
as the third respondent. The City filed a notice
to abide the
decision of the Court on 23 February 2010.
[29]
When the matter first came before Court on 24 February 2010 it was
postponed by agreement between the parties by Acting Justice
Samela
to 20 April 2010 for hearing, with an agreed timetable for the
filing of further papers. The Hartleys undertook to cease
all
building operations pending the hearing on that date.
[30]
By 22 April 2010 the Hartleys' answering affidavits had still not
been filed and by further agreement between the parties
the matter
was postponed by the Judge President to 9 June 2010. The Hartleys'
undertaking to cease building was extended accordingly.
[31]
On Wednesday 9 June 2010 and thereafter, the matter was argued over
a period of three days, whereafter judgment was reserved.
[32]
The applicants were represented by
Mr
Irish SC
and
Mr
Baqulev
while
the Hartleys were represented by
Mr
Dickerson SC
and
Mr
Leslie
.
The Court is indebted to the legal representatives for the most
helpful heads of argument filed and the thorough addresses which

have facilitated the preparation of this judgment.
[33]
On 14 July 2010 (at a stage when preparation of this judgment had
commenced) I was informed by the applicants' attorneys
that there
has been certain material developments since the conclusion of the
hearing and that the applicants sought leave to
file a further
affidavit. This application was opposed by the Hartleys and the
applicants launched a formal application to re-open
their case and
submit a further affidavit by Mr Neethling.
[34]
The parties were informed that my
prima
facie
view
was that the affidavit was relevant and the parties were offered an
opportunity to argue its admissibility. I was then informed
that the
Hartleys had abandoned their opposition to the admission of the
further affidavit and that the parties had agreed on
a timetable for
the filing of further papers. The Hartleys filed their answering
affidavit on 17 August 2010 and the applicants'
reply was filed on
27 August 2010.
[35]
In the course of the filing of the latest set of affidavits the
Hartleys complained that the applicants had not yet applied
for an
early date in the review application which they had launched on 17
February 2010 and in which the Rule 53 record had been
filed by the
City on 10 March 2010. The applicants replied that they had not
filed a supplementary affidavit under Rule 53(4)
and that the
Hartleys' answering affidavit was therefore some four months
overdue. The Hartleys' response is that once the applicants
have
filed the record in terms of Rule 53(3) they will need thirty days
to file their affidavits.
[36]
At the commencement of the hearing
Mr
Irish
informed
me that the applicants envisaged that the review papers could be
finalised by August 2010 in anticipation of an early
hearing of the
matter. It would seem that the delay in the filing of papers both in
this application and the main matter has
been attributable in part
to the peripatetic lifestyle of the Hartleys who spend long periods
of time abroad.
ISSUES
TO BE DECIDED IN THE REVIEW
[37]
The applicants argue that the City passed the approved plans:
37.1.
contrary to the terms of the written agreement;
37.2.
contrary to the terms of the amended title deed conditions;
37.3.
contrary to conditions imposed by the City in terms of Section 42 of
LUPO when it granted its consent for the erection of
a double
dwelling; and
37.4.
contrary to the provisions of the scheme regulations.
[38]
The applicants go on to argue that, ex
facie
r
the
opposing papers herein, the Hartleys admit that the approved plans
are in contravention of the written agreement, the amended
title
deed restrictions and the scheme regulations. Their case is
therefore that they have established a clear right entitling
them to
temporary interdictory relief.
[39]
Mr
Dickerson SC
argued
that the relief sought in this application had to be carefully
considered so as to establish the true extent thereof. He
maintained
that the relief fell into two distinct categories, each with its own
individual characteristics.
[40]
In the first place, it was said there was an application to enforce
a contractual right. This, it was said, was in the nature
of an
order for specific performance encompassing permanent prohibitory
relief
3
and the order which the Court was being requested to make was final
in nature rather than
pendente
lite.
As
an application for final interdictory relief in motion proceedings
this meant that the approach in
Plascon
Evans
4
was
applicable.
[41]
Secondly,
Mr
Dickerson, SC
argued
that the application for the temporary interdict had to be
considered in the light of the fact that the Hartleys had commenced

building work in accordance with plans duly approved in terms of
Section 7 of the National Building Regulations and Building

Standards Act, 103 of 1977 ("the Building Act"). It was
contended that any contraventions of the scheme regulations

occasioned by the inconsistency of the approved plans therewith was
not of such a magnitude that it warranted the setting aside
of the
plans in their
minimis.
The
point is, however, that the Hartleys implicitly accept that the
approved plans do not comply with the necessary statutory

requirements.
[42]
The panacea to the applicants' problems, it was said, was the
submission of so-called "rider plans" to the City
which
would cure the contraventions. Both Mr Righini and Mr Turner, the
Hartleys' town planning consultant, confidently proclaimed
in their
affidavits in support of their principals that they had little doubt
that these plans would be passed by the City.
[43]
Neither of the parties' legal representatives were able to refer the
Court to any statutory basis for the drawing up and
submission of
such "rider plans". It seems to me that a "rider
plan" is just a convenient phrase employed
locally to address
any variation to, or non-compliance with an approved plan. This much
appears, for instance, from Mr
Dickerson's
submission
that all of the alleged offending zoning scheme contraventions would
be rectified by the "rider plan" which
the Hartleys had
submitted to the City on the advice of Mr Righini.
[44]
During the course of argument, the Hartleys' counsel handed up a
note dealing with various of the contraventions as alleged
by the
applicants. This note accepted that there were clear contraventions
of the scheme regulations and that the approved plans
were not in
accordance therewith.
[45]
In the latest exchange of affidavits the applicants say that they
have been vindicated: they point out that the City has
refused to
approve the "rider plan". They go on to point out the
position is somewhat more sinister than would appear
at first blush.
The applicants allege that the refusal of the rider plans was
something which had already taken place some months
ago, was known
to at least Mr Righini at the time the matter was being argued in
open Court, and was something which the Hartleys'
agents withheld
from the Court.
[46]
Consideration of the latest set of affidavits and in particular the
annexures thereto show that -
46.1.
the "rider plan" was submitted to the City on 28 May 2010;
46.2.
no application has been made to the City by the Hartleys for the
removal or amendment of any of the conditions imposed by
it under
Section 42(1) of LUPO when it approved the old plans;
46.3.
the Hartleys were informed telephonically by the City on Friday 11
June 2010 that they should collect a letter from the
City (which had
been prepared the previous day) in which they were informed of the
City's refusal to pass the "rider plan".
46.4.
The conditions imposed under Section 42 of LUPO are those set out in
the written agreement.
[47]
In its letter to the Hartleys of 10 June 2010 the City says the
following:
"[The
"rider plan"] cannot be considered at this stage. The Land
Use Management Branch has cancelled the clearance
originally
granted. The amendments indicated on the aforementioned plan is
(sic) must be read in conjunction with building plan
0847/2009 [i.e.
the approved plans]. The aforementioned plan contains deviations in
contravention of the conditions of approval
associated with a land
use application (for the removal of Restriction, Consent and
Departures) approved in December 2006. Building
plan 0847/2009 was
approved erroneously by the City of Cape Town as it deviated from
the permissible developable (sic) envelope
as per the 2006 approval.
The building plan now under consideration [i.e. the "rider
plan"], perpetuates the aforementioned
deviations in the
absence of a further land use application to amend conditions of
approval.
In
light thereof, this department cannot consider [the "rider
plan"] as
tt
must
be accompanied by an application for the amendment of conditions of
approval associated with the land use application mentioned
above."
[48]
This development was not brought to the attention of the Court by
the Hartleys on Friday 11 June 2010 (the last day of the
hearing) or
thereafter. Furthermore, the Hartleys initially resisted it being
placed before the Court by way of the application
to re-open.
[49]
Prima
facie,
the
City supports the Applicants' interpretation of the conditional
basis upon which the old plans were approved. But, as the
letter
indicates the City's stance is that the Hartleys do not currently
have the requisite approval under LUPO. The effect of
this is that
prima
facie
the
structure on the property has not been built according to law and is
accordingly unlawful.
[50]
In an affidavit deposed to in London on 17 August 2010, Mr Hartley
bemoans the fact that the City has rejected the "rider
plan",
points out that this seems to be for inexplicable reasons and notes
that he and his wife have lodged an appeal under
Section 62 of the
Local Government: Municipal System Act, 32 of 2000.
[51]
I have little doubt that, given the history of this matter, the
latest developments will spawn further litigation. Be that
as it
may, it is clear that the Hartleys' prospects of completing their
summer home soon have been dealt a serious blow.
REQUIRE
ME
NT
FOR
P
END
ENTE
LITE
RELIEF
- BUILDING INTERDICT
[52]
The approach to be adopted by a Court in a matter such as this is
well-known and the principles were recently re-stated by
my
colleague Justice Dlodlo in
Camps
Bay Residents and Ratepayers Association
and
Others
v Auqoustides and Others
5
.
They are -
52.1
a
prima
facie
right;
52.1.
a well-grounded apprehension of irreparable harm if the interim
relief is not granted and the ultimate relief is eventually
granted.
52.3.
the balance of convenience being in favour of the granting of
interim relief; and
52.4.
the absence of any other satisfactory remedy.
[53]
The purpose of such an interdict is not to mete out punishment for
past wrongs but rather to "provide breathing-space
to enable
solutions to be found". It is said to be aimed at "promoting
restorative justice" cf. S v Ba
lovi
(Minister of Justice Intervening
)
6
.
[54]
In this Division, the approach to building interdicts pending review
proceedings has been laid down in a series of decisions
over more
than a decade
7
.
That approach is as follows:
54.1
The prospects of success in the pending review proceedings equate to
the strength of the right which the applicant must establish
prima
facie.
The
stronger the prospects of success in the review the lesser
prejudice occasioned by the suspension of building operations,
i.e.
the principle of legality operates decisively in the context.
It
is preferable that building work should be stopped sooner rather
later if the application is likely to succeed in the review.
The
building owner should not be permitted to build him/herself into
"an impregnable position" by the time the review
is heard
so as to create a situation of bias towards an unauthorised
building - the so-called
fait
accompli
approach.
[55]
In the instant case it is argued that the Hartley's concession that
there is non-compliance with the scheme regulations (albeit

allegedly minor) puts the matter beyond the pale: the applicants say
that the right is clear and that interim relief should follow

accordingly. I believe that the preferable approach is rather to
have regard also to the most recent developments (the withdrawal
of
the land use approvals) and to say that the
prima
facie
right
originally relied upon by the applicants is now sufficiently
persuasive so as to subordinate the prejudice which the Hartleys
may
suffer.
[56]
In light of my findings on the strength of the review right, it is
not strictly necessary to go into any detail on the contractual

point. Certainly, it would not be necessary nor preferable to
consider the question of final relief at this stage since this
saga
has many instalments yet to follow. Without wanting to influence the
Court ultimately seized with this matter in any way,
I would merely
wish to say that the applicants have advanced a persuasive argument
for the enforcement of their contractual right
to demand that the
Hartleys adhere to the "spacial parameters" contemplated
in the Geh plans and agreed upon in the
written agreement. Precisely
what the nature and extent of those parameters are is a matter for
decision by another Court.
[57]
In considering the balance of convenience I have not lost sight of
the fact that the Hartleys have been endeavouring to develop
their
property for the past six years or more. The nature of that
development has changed materially since the emergence of the

Righini plans and the applicants are fully within their rights to
fall back on the time honoured principle of
pacta
sunt servanda -
a
principle which is as enforceable in a constitutional state as it
was under many centuries of common law
8
.
It was the Hartleys who decided to change tack without properly
consulting their fellow contractants in advance and who casually

fobbed them off when concerns were raised about the extent of the
construction then taking place.
[58]
I agree with
Mr
Dickerson
that
the relief now sought by the applicants could be spun out
interminably to the detriment of the Hartleys if the applicants
were
permitted to approach this Court on a piecemeal
basis
for final interdictory relief and a demolition order in due course.
The order which I intend to make will ensure that the
associated
issues relating to the development of the property are dealt with in
one composite hearing. The contemplated date
for that hearing is
some ten weeks hence. If the relief contemplated in prayer 2.2 of
the notice of motion is initiated speedily
(whether by action or
application) the parties will have sufficient time to file the
necessary pleadings/affidavits to enable
issues between them arising
from prayers 2.1 and 2.2 to be dealt with in a cost-efficient manner
with the least utilization of
court time.
[59]
During the hearing the Hartleys tendered to demolish whatever part
of the building the Court ultimately ordered and undertook
not to
raise the
fait
accompli
argument
in response to any attempt by the applicants to secure such relief.
Demolition of the building (or part thereof) is still
some way down
the track and I would prefer not to have to consider that at this
stage. Given the latest developments, I am satisfied
that the
balance of convenience favours the granting of interim relief at
this stage.
[60]
Finally, I believe that it is indisputable that there is no
reasonable alternative remedy available to the applicants at
this
stage.
ORDER
[61]
In the result I make the following order:
A.
The
First and Second Respondents are interdicted from carrying out (or
allowing to be carried out) any construction work on Erf
530 Camps
Bay, otherwise known as 21 The Meadway, Camps Bay, pending the final
determination of the application for review launched
by the
applicants in this Court under case no. 3430/10 ("the review
matter").
B.
In
the event that they intend to proceed therewith, the
applicants
are to commence the proceedings contemplated in
prayer 2.2 of the
notice of motion herein by 13 September 2010,
whereafter the
relevant time periods contemplated in the
Uniform Rules of Court
will apply.
C.
The
Registrar of this Court is directed to set down the review matter
and any proceedings commenced under para B above for hearing
before
a single judge of this Division on 9 November 2010.
D.
The
First and Second Respondents are to file their answering affidavits
in the review matter by Thursday 23 September 2010.
E.
The
Applicants are to file their replying affidavits (if any) in the
review matter by Friday 15 October 2010.
F.
Heads
of argument in the review matter are to be filed in
accordance
with Consolidated Practice Note 50.
G.
All
costs, which shall include the costs of two counsel, are
reserved
for determination by the Court hearing the review
matter.
H.
The parties are at liberty to approach this Court for any adjustment
that they may wish to request in respect of the time
P.A.L. GAMBLE
1
'
Cf. The Land Use Planning Ordinance, 15 of 1985 CLUPO") and fcs
attendant zoning scheme regulations.
2
'
Counsel Informed me
that the phrase "double dwelling" essentially permits the
construction of
building
with two kitchens on a properly, thereby facilitating the
incorporation of a separate self-catering apartment or so-called

"granny flat" Into the main house.
3
Cf.
Christie, The Low of Contract
in
SA,
5* ed o 532; V & A Waterfront Properties (Pty) Ltd v Helicopter
and
Marine
Services
(Ptv)
Ltd
and Others
2006
(1)
SA
252
(SCA) at p 258. 625.
4
-
Plascon=Evans
Paints Ltd v Van Riebeck Paints (Pty) Ltd
1984
(3) SA 6
23
(A)
5
2009
(6) SA 190
(WCC) at 195 6 paras 7 and 8
6
[1999] ZACC 19
;
2000
(2) SA 425
(CC) at 436 D517
7
1
Cf.
Beck
and Others v The
Premier
of
me Western- Cape
(CPD
case 12596/06; 11 October 1996); Camps Bay
Residents
and Ratepayers Asso
ciation
and A
nother
y
Avadon
23
(Pty
Ltd (CPD case 1/364/DS), 18 March 2006), PS Booksellers (
Ptv)
Ltd and Another v Ha
risson
and
Others
2008 (3) SA 633
(C); Van der Westhiuizen and Others
v Butler and Others
2009 (6) SA 174
(C)
and
Searle
v Mossel Bay Municipality and Others
'CPD
Case 1237/09; 12 February 2009).
8
Barkhuizen
v Napier
[2007] ZACC 5
;
2007
(5) SA 323
(CC) at 348 I para 87