Firstrand Bank Limited v Salm and Others (41829/2019) [2023] ZAGPJHC 993 (5 September 2023)

80 Reportability
Land and Property Law

Brief Summary

Execution — Sale in execution — Mortgage bond — Plaintiff sought a money judgment and declaration of immovable property executable due to the first defendant's breach of a mortgage bond agreement — Second defendant, as spouse of the first defendant, sought to intervene — Court found that the first defendant had abandoned the property and was aware of proceedings but did not primarily reside there — Rule 46A applicable, requiring inquiry into alternative means of satisfying judgment debt — Court held that the second defendant's proposed business plan was not viable and that the first defendant was hopelessly indebted, thus ordering the immovable property to be declared executable.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


The proceedings were an application in the Gauteng Division, Johannesburg, in which Firstrand Bank Limited sought, first, a money judgment arising from a mortgage loan default and, second, relief under Rule 46A of the Uniform Rules of Court declaring certain residential immovable property specially executable and authorising the issue of a warrant of execution for its sale in execution.


The plaintiff was Firstrand Bank Limited. The cited first defendant was Nigel Timothy Salm (the judgment debtor under the loan agreement and bond). Gregory Bloom-Salm participated in the proceedings and was ultimately granted leave to intervene and joined as second defendant, on the basis of his legal interest arising from the parties’ marriage in community of property and his occupation of the property as a residence. The City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality was reflected as an interested party/third defendant, primarily in the context of municipal indebtedness relevant to the reserve price.


Procedurally, the plaintiff instituted action for payment and execution against the mortgaged property. The matter was initially set down on 6 April 2021, when Mr Bloom-Salm appeared and sought an opportunity to oppose; he was given that opportunity and later delivered an answering affidavit on 15 April 2021. The first defendant did not defend. The matter was ultimately heard on 11 April 2023, and judgment was delivered on 5 September 2023.


The general subject-matter of the dispute concerned the enforcement of a mortgage bond debt, the consequential declaration of executability of the mortgaged property under Rule 46A (given its residential character for an occupant), and the determination of an appropriate reserve price for a judicial auction.


2. Material Facts


On 30 June 2006, the plaintiff and the first defendant concluded a written loan agreement in terms of which the plaintiff lent and advanced R 1 400 000.00 to the first defendant. The loan agreement was subject to the registration of a mortgage bond in favour of the plaintiff over the immovable property described as ERF [...] Melville Township, Registration Division I.R., Province of Gauteng, held under Deed of Transfer T48580/2006.


It was not disputed that the first defendant breached the loan agreement by failing to maintain the agreed monthly instalments. At the time the summons was issued, the first defendant had been in breach for 5.6 months, and arrears had accumulated to R 77 487.24. By the hearing date, the arrears had materially increased. The judgment records that, between December 2020 and April 2023, no significant payments were made by either defendant, and the arrears by the hearing had escalated to R 490 513.00. An updated certificate of balance reflected that, as at 11 April 2023, the accelerated judgment debt was R 1 030 563.72.


The first defendant did not oppose the claim for payment and did not advance a substantive defence in the proceedings. The second defendant likewise raised no defence in law to the plaintiff’s entitlement to a money judgment against the first defendant, and did not dispute the arrears position. The second defendant’s opposition was directed to the Rule 46A execution relief, contending that adverse personal and commercial circumstances prevented performance and that he had developed a business plan intended to rehabilitate a guesthouse operation run from the property and thereby enable repayment.


As to occupation and residential use, it was accepted that the first defendant no longer resided at the property, having immigrated to the United Kingdom, and that the property was therefore not the first defendant’s primary residence. However, the property was jointly owned as part of a marriage in community of property subsisting between the first and second defendants, and the second defendant resided at the property and worked there. On this basis, the court treated Rule 46A as applicable because execution would affect a person occupying the property as a residence.


Municipal indebtedness to the City of Johannesburg was placed before the court as relevant to the setting of a reserve price. The City’s claim was recorded as R 894 177.89. The plaintiff’s valuation material reflected a market value of R 1 600 000.00, and the municipal valuation was R 2 032 000.00. The court calculated the median between these values as R 1 816 000.00.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal questions the court was required to determine were whether, in the circumstances, the mortgaged property ought to be declared specially and immediately executable under Rule 46A, and, if execution was warranted, what reserve price should be set for the sale in execution.


A further issue arose concerning procedural compliance with Rule 46A, particularly whether there had been adequate service given that the first defendant was not personally served with the summons and subsequent process in the manner contended for by the opposing party, and whether the requirements of Rule 46A were met in substance.


The dispute primarily concerned the application of legal standards to facts. The money judgment component was effectively uncontentious on the papers (no defence at law being advanced). The execution component required the court to conduct the Rule 46A enquiry, including an evaluative determination as to alternative means of satisfying the judgment debt, the proportionality of execution, and an appropriate reserve price in light of valuations and municipal debt.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court treated the matter as turning largely on the Rule 46A enquiry, because the defendants did not raise a legal defence to the underlying indebtedness or to the plaintiff’s entitlement to judgment for payment. The court framed the “real issue” as whether the immovable property should be declared executable and, if so, what reserve price should be fixed.


On Rule 46A’s applicability, the court accepted that although the first defendant no longer resided at the property (and thus it was not his primary residence), Rule 46A still applied because the property was residential immovable property in use by an occupant who would be affected by execution, namely the second defendant. In this context, the court relied on the approach articulated in Bestbier and Others v Nedbank Limited - 2022 JDR 1636 (SCA), which emphasised a preceding enquiry in cases where immovable property is used as residential property and whether the occupants are of the “Jaftha kind”. The plaintiff accepted that the second defendant fell within that category, and the court proceeded on that basis.


Before reaching the merits of execution, the court addressed service. It was common cause that the first defendant was not personally served with the summons and particulars of claim, and that later process included service by affixing and service by email for set-down notices. The court considered an email response by the first defendant dated 25 July 2020 (sent to the plaintiff’s attorneys) as evidence that the first defendant was aware of the proceedings and had elected not to oppose them. The court also reasoned that where execution is sought and the immovable property is not the judgment debtor’s primary residence, personal service is not a requirement. Having regard to the first defendant’s knowledge, and the fact that the second defendant (the person at risk of losing his primary residence) had in fact opposed and fully placed his case before the court, the court concluded there had been substantial compliance and that service was adequate for purposes of the application.


Turning to the substantive Rule 46A enquiry, the court considered whether there were alternative means to satisfy the debt other than execution against residential property, and whether execution was warranted in all the circumstances. The second defendant’s explanation centred on the guesthouse business operated from the property, the impact of COVID-19 restrictions, electricity disconnection linked to municipal arrears, and a proposed business plan involving investment to move the property “off the grid” and restore profitability. The court identified multiple difficulties with this proposal on the evidence before it, including that funding was not shown to be probable, that investors were not prepared to commit while related litigation remained unresolved, and that there was no objectively achievable payment plan or fixed timeframe for curing the arrears.


The court placed weight on the payment history, noting the absence of meaningful payments since March 2021 (with a nominal payment of R450.00), and that even during periods when the guesthouse appeared operational and earning income in 2021 and 2022, proceeds were not used to reduce the plaintiff’s arrears. The court further considered that the action had been instituted before COVID-19, supporting the inference that the guesthouse proceeds were insufficient to service the bond even prior to the pandemic-related difficulties relied upon.


In addition, the court assessed the broader indebtedness position. It took account of the substantial arrears on the bond, the sizeable municipal debt to the City of Johannesburg, and the second defendant’s confirmation that the debt on an adjacent property (also used in connection with the guesthouse) had likewise not been serviced, exposing that property to similar execution risk. On this combined factual picture, the court found that the defendants had no alternative means to satisfy the judgment debt and had not made significant efforts to reduce it.


The court then made an evaluative finding on proportionality and abuse of process. It held that there was no disproportionality between execution and the legitimate purpose of debt satisfaction in the circumstances. It also accepted that the plaintiff had not abused the process, noting that the plaintiff had made efforts to afford the first defendant an opportunity to repay arrears before litigating, and that the litigation had been pending since 2019 without meaningful debt reduction.


Having found execution warranted, the court addressed the reserve price. It accepted the market value and municipal valuation figures placed before it and calculated the median value. It referred to a standard approach of calculating 70% of the median value and deducting municipal indebtedness, which on these numbers yielded a reserve price of R 377 022.11. The court expressed concern that this figure was too low and would not serve the interests of any party. It therefore adopted the plaintiff’s suggested reserve price of R 591 572.68.


On costs, the court applied the ordinary approach that costs follow the result and noted that the agreement provided for attorney and client costs, which it awarded.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court granted leave for Mr Gregory Bloom-Salm to intervene and joined him as the second defendant.


Judgment was granted against the first defendant for payment of R 943 945.82, together with interest at 8.3% per annum, calculated daily and compounded monthly in arrears from 30 October 2019 to date of payment.


The property described as ERF [...] Melville Township, Registration Division I.R., Province of Gauteng, measuring 743 square metres, held by Deed of Transfer T48580/2006 was declared specially and immediately executable. The Registrar was directed to issue a warrant of execution enabling the Sheriff to attach and sell the property in execution in satisfaction of the judgment debt, interest, and costs.


A reserve price of R 591 572.68 was set for the sale in execution. The plaintiff was authorised to approach the court on the same papers (duly supplemented) to vary the reserve price if relevant factors changed.


The order recorded advice to the defendants concerning the potential applicability of section 129(3)(a) and (4) of the National Credit Act 34 of 2004, and recorded that the defendants could prevent the sale by paying arrear amounts, permitted default charges, and reasonable enforcement costs up to reinstatement before the sale. The order further directed that a copy be served on both defendants before any sale, and granted leave for service on the first defendant via email.


The first and second defendants were ordered to pay the costs of the application on an attorney and client scale, jointly and severally, the one paying the other to be absolved.


Cases Cited


Bestbier and Others v Nedbank Limited - 2022 JDR 1636 (SCA)


Legislation Cited


National Credit Act 34 of 2004, section 129(3)(a) and section 129(4)


Rules of Court Cited


Uniform Rules of Court, Rule 46A


Held


The court held that, although the judgment debtor (the first defendant) no longer occupied the property as a primary residence, Rule 46A applied because the property was residential immovable property occupied by the second defendant, who had a direct legal interest arising from a subsisting marriage in community of property and who faced the loss of his home if execution proceeded.


The court held that there was substantial compliance with the service requirements in the circumstances, given the first defendant’s knowledge of the proceedings and the second defendant’s full participation and opposition.


On the Rule 46A enquiry, the court held that the defendants had no realistic alternative means to satisfy the debt, that proposed business-based alternatives were not shown on the papers to be objectively achievable within a concrete timeframe, and that execution was not disproportionate and involved no abuse of process. The mortgaged property was therefore properly declared specially and immediately executable, with a reserve price fixed at R 591 572.68.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


Rule 46A requires a court, when asked to permit execution against residential immovable property, to conduct a preceding judicial enquiry directed at whether execution is warranted in light of the circumstances of the occupants and the availability of alternative means to satisfy the debt, and to consider relevant factors bearing on proportionality.


Even where the judgment debtor does not occupy the property as a primary residence, Rule 46A may be engaged where the property is residentially occupied by another person with a legally cognisable interest (including an interest arising from a marriage in community of property), requiring the court to treat the execution as implicating the protections associated with residential property.


In determining a reserve price for a sale in execution under Rule 46A, the court may consider valuation evidence and municipal indebtedness and may depart from a mechanical calculation where the resulting figure appears unduly low and not aligned with the interests implicated by the Rule 46A process, provided the determination remains grounded in the factual material before the court.

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[2023] ZAGPJHC 993
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Firstrand Bank Limited v Salm and Others (41829/2019) [2023] ZAGPJHC 993 (5 September 2023)

SAFLII
Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
redacted from this document in compliance with the law
and
SAFLII
Policy
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA,
GAUTENG DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG
CASE NUMBER: 41829/2019
NOT REPORTABLE
NOT OF INTEREST TO OTHER
JUDGES
REVISED
05/09/23
In
the matter between:
FIRSTRAND
BANK LIMITED
Plaintiff
and
SALM:
NIGEL TIMOTHY
First
Defendant
BLOOM-SALM,
GREGORY
Second
Defendant
THE CITY OF
JOHANNESBURG
METROPOLITAN
MUNICIPALITY
Interested
Party/Third Defendant
JUDGMENT
T
LIPSHITZ AJ
The
matter was heard on 11 April 2023
Judgment
Delivered on 05 September 2023
1.
The plaintiff is seeking both a money
judgment in the amount of R 943 945, 82 together with interests
and costs arising out
of the first defendant’s breach under a
mortgage bond agreement and an order in terms of Rule 46A of the
Uniform Rules of
Court declaring the first defendant’s
Immovable Property situated at ERF [...] Melville Township,
Registration I R, Province
of Gauteng, held by deed of transfer no
T48580/3006 (“
immovable property
”)
specially executable and authorising the Register of this Court to
issue a warrant of execution against the Immovable Property.
2.
Mr Gregory Bloom-Salm arrived at Court on
06 April 2021, when this application was initially set down and
sought an opportunity
to oppose the application. He was provided this
opportunity, and he was placed on terms to file his answering
affidavit. Mr. Bloom-Salm
filed an answering affidavit on 15 April
2021. Mr Bloom-Salm, from there on out, conducted himself as if he
were a party to the
litigation, filed the requisite heads of
argument, and appeared on the day this matter was argued before me to
present his defence.
The plaintiff further treated him as if he
were a party to the litigation by replying to his answering
affidavit, giving credence
to his defence in its heads of argument
and serving a set-down of the application on him. While Mr Bloom-Salm
did not formally
seek to intervene as a party, it was clear that this
was his intention.
3.
He has a legal interest in this matter as
he married the first defendant in community of property on 27 October
2007 in community
of property which marriage subsists. Moreover, he
primarily resides and works at the immovable property. The
plaintiff’s
counsel informed me that the plaintiff consented to
Mr. Bloom-Salm intervening as a party to the action. Accordingly, an
order
is made that Mr. Bloom-Salm is given leave to intervene and be
joined to these proceedings as the second defendant.
4.
The first defendant has not defended the
action.
5.
The second defendant does not dispute that
the mortgage bond is in arrears and to the extent as contended by the
plaintiff. The
nub of his defence is that due to a litany of
unfortunate events in his life, he has been unable to meet the
obligations of the
joint estate, especially without the assistance of
the first defendant, who has abandoned him and the immovable
property, immigrated
to the United Kingdom and has no interest in
maintaining the immovable property. He further contends that he has
designed a business
plan that, if implemented, will turn around the
guesthouse, which he runs from the immovable property, to render it
profitable
and place him in a financial position to repay the arrears
and current instalments.
Factual Matrix
6.
The plaintiff and the first defendant
concluded a written loan agreement on 30 June 2006, where the
plaintiff lent and advanced
an amount of R 1 400 000, 00 to
the first defendant. The loan agreement was subject to the
registration of a mortgage
bond in favour of the plaintiff. The first
defendant breached the terms of the loan agreement by failing to
maintain his monthly
instalments as contemplated by the agreement. At
the time the summons was launched, the first defendant had been in
breach for
5.6 months, and the arrears had accumulated to an amount
of R 77 487, 24
7.
Between December 2020 and April 2023, no
significant payments were made by either the first or second
defendant to repay the loan.
The arrears on the date that the matter
was argued had escalated to an amount of
R
490 513, 00.
The second
defendant raises no defence at law to the plaintiff’s claim
regarding the money judgment.
8.
The updated certificate of balance reveals
that on 11 April 2023, the total accelerated amount of the judgment
debt was R 1 030 563,
72.
9.
In the premise, the only real issue for the
Court to consider is whether the immovable property should be
declared executable and,
if so, what the reserve price for the
immovable property should be.
10.
The second defendant confirms in his
affidavit and during argument that the first defendant no longer
resides at the immovable property
as he has immigrated to the United
Kingdom. It appears as if the first defendant has lost all interest
in the immovable property.
Thus, the immovable property is not
the primary residence of the first defendant.
11.
That
being said, Rule 46A of the Uniform Rules of Court still finds
application in this action due to the immovable property being

jointly owned by the first and second defendant by virtue of their
marriage in community of property and on the basis that the
second
defendant resides at the immovable property. The applicability of
Rule 46A to this factual matrix is apparent from the findings
in the
matter of
Bestbier
and Others v Nedbank Limited - 2022 JDR 1636 (SCA),
where
the Supreme Court of Appeal found that “
It
is important to have a preceding enquiry in all cases where the
immovable property of the judgement debtor is used as residential

immovable property. This preceding enquiry should be directed at
establishing whether the persons occupying the immovable property
in
question are of the “Jaftha Kind”.
The
plaintiff’s counsel has correctly conceded that the second
defendant is a person occupying the property of the “Jatha

Kind”.
12.
Rule 46A deals with the procedural rules
for executing a judgment debt against a residential immovable
property. It sets out that
once a Court has established that Rule 46A
is applicable, the Court must inquire whether there are alternative
means by the judgment
debtor of satisfying the judgment debt and also
consider all factors to determine whether the execution against the
immovable property
is warranted.
13.
Before considering the relevant
considerations that the second defendant requests the Court to
consider, it would be apposite to
consider whether there has been
compliance with the procedural requirements as required by Rule 46A
and specifically with personal
service on the judgment debtor.
Personal
Service
14.
In terms of Section 46A(3)(d), it is
incumbent on a plaintiff to serve the judgment debtor personally. It
is common cause that in
this matter, the first defendant, who is the
judgment debtor, has not been served personally in that:-
14.1.
the summons and particulars of claim
were served on the first defendant on 29 November 2019 by way of the
sheriff serving same on
the second defendant at the chosen
domicilium
citandi et executandi;
14.2.
on 04 February 2021, the sheriff served
the default judgment application on the first defendant by affixing
it to the immovable
property; and
14.3.
the various notices of set downs have
been served via the respective defendants’ e-mail addresses on
the first and second
defendants.
15.
On 25 July 2020, the first defendant
responded to an e-mail from the plaintiff’s attorney of record,
using the same e-mail
address on which the plaintiff served the
notice of set downs,  stating that he believed there had been a
material non-joinder
of his husband, the second defendant, to the
plaintiff’s action. He believed the plaintiff needed to
withdraw its action
and commence
de
novo.
16.
I am satisfied that the e-mail of 25 July
2020 evidence that the first defendant is aware of the proceedings
and, therefore, with
this knowledge, elected not to oppose the
application.
17.
Moreover, I am mindful that where execution
is being sought, and the immovable property is not the primary
residence of the judgment
debtor, personal service is not a
requirement.
18.
In
casu
,
it is common cause that the first defendant, the judgment debtor,
does not primarily reside in the immovable property. He is aware
of
the proceedings; thus, there has been substantial compliance. The
second defendant, the party at the peril of losing his primary

residence, has opposed the application and placed his defence before
the Court. Accordingly, I am satisfied that there has been
proper
service of the action and application to declare the immovable
property executable on the first and second defendants.
RULE
46A CONSIDERATIONS
19.
Rule 46(2)(1)(ii) requires a Court to
consider alternative means by the judgment debtor of satisfying the
judgment debt other than
the execution against the judgment debtor’s
primary residence.
20.
The second defendant explained that he
operates a guesthouse from the immovable property. Due to the
COVID-19 travel restrictions
and the legislated lockdown, business
was negatively impacted. The first defendant fell into arrears with
the City of Johannesburg
(“COJ”), resulting in the
electricity to the immovable property being disconnected. This
exasperated the difficulties
facing the guesthouse. He further
complained about the manner in which COJ treated him. He contends the
conduct of COJ has prevented
him from resolving this issue. He
alleges he has formulated a business plan that involves obtaining
investment to place the immovable
property off the grid, resolving
the electricity issue. He projects that this will result in the guest
house again becoming profitable,
putting him in a position to repay
the arrears. There are several difficulties with the second
defendant’s proposal, including:-
20.1.
On the second defendant’s version,
funding for this business plan is not guaranteed or probable. This
can be found as the
party he is seeking funding is aware of this
court action and other court actions involving a second property
adjacent to the immovable
property. The guesthouse is being run from
both these properties. This second property is also at risk of being
declared executable
due to non-payment of the mortgage bond thereto.
The investors have indicated that they will only consider funding the
second defendant
after the court actions have been resolved. The
second defendant has not provided a fixed date when he would be able
to repay the
arrears, and his plan does not appear objectively
achievable.
20.2.
The plaintiff has received no payments
since March 2021, when a payment was made in the nominal amount of
R450.00.
20.3.
Notably, even during 2021 and 2022, when
the bookings report uploaded by the second defendant disclosed that
the guesthouse was
in operation and earning an income, the first and
second defendants failed to use any of the proceeds earned to reduce
the arrears
owing to the plaintiff.
20.4.
The second defendant has no concrete plans
regarding a date as to when he will be in a position to pay the
arrears or even a concrete
payment plan that would be objectively
achievable.
20.5.
Notably, the action was instituted before
COVID-19. Accordingly, it is evident that the proceeds from the
guesthouse were insufficient
to cover the mortgage bond instalments,
even before the challenges that the second defendant relies on to
explain the first defendant’s
default.
20.6.
The first defendant appears hopelessly
indebted to the plaintiff with no objective ability to repay the
arrears in that:-
20.6.1.
The arrears on the immovable property are
R490 513, 00;
20.6.2.
According to the COJ statement uploaded by
the second defendant, the first and second defendants are liable to
the City of Johannesburg
in the amount of R 894 177, 89.
20.6.3.
The second defendant confirmed that he and
the first defendant have not serviced the debt of the first
defendant's immovable property,
which is adjacent to the immovable
property in question. As a result, that property is also at risk of
being declared executable.
21.
In the premise, and after considering all
the relevant circumstances, it is apparent that the first and second
defendants have no
alternative means to satisfy the judgment debt.
Moreover, the first and second defendants have not made significant
efforts to
pay off the debt.
22.
The only available option for the plaintiff
to obtain payment of the judgment debt is by executing against the
immovable property.
23.
I find that there is no disproportionality
between the means used in the execution process to exact payment of
the judgment debt
compared to available means to attain the same
purpose. There has been no abuse of the court process by the
plaintiff in instituting
these proceedings, in that the plaintiff has
set out in its Affidavit in Support of Default Judgment that it made
efforts to provide
the first defendant with an opportunity to repay
the arrears before action was instituted. Moreover, considering the
action was
launched in 2019, the first and second defendants have had
more than ample opportunity to make payments of the arrears, and they

have been unable to do so.
24.
Accordingly, I find that an order declaring
the immovable property specially executable is warranted.
RESERVE PRICE
25.
According to the FNB property valuations,
the market value of the immovable property is R 1 600 000, 00, 00.
The municipal
valuation of the property is R 2 032 000,00.
26.
Accordingly, the median between the market
and municipal values is R 1 816 000. 00.
27.
The amount owing to the City of
Johannesburg is R 894 177, 89.
28.
The standard approach to calculating the
reserve price is calculating 70% of the median value of the property
and then deducting
the amounts owing to the City of Johannesburg.
This would yield a reserve price in the amount of R 377 022, 11.
I am concerned
that this amount is too low and will not serve the
interests of any of the parties. Therefore, I find that the reserve
price should
be the amount suggested by the plaintiff, being in the
amount of
R 591 572, 68.
29.
I find no reason to deviate from the
ordinary rule that costs follow the result. The agreement provides
attorney and client costs,
which I will award in favour of the
plaintiff.
30.
Consequently, I make the following order:
Order
1.  Mr. Bloom-Salm
is granted leave to intervene and is joined to these proceedings as
the Second Defendant.
2.  Judgement is
granted against the First Defendant
for:-
2.1.
Payment
of the amount of R 943 945, 82  plus interest on the amount
of R 943 945, 82 at the rate of 8.3% per annum,
calculated daily
and compounded monthly in arrears from 30 October 2019 to the date of
payment, both dates inclusive.
3.
The
immovable property more fully described hereunder is declared
specially and immediately executable, namely,
ERF [...] MELVILLE
TOWNSHIP
REGISTRATION DIVISION
I.R., PROVINCE GAUTENG
MEASURING 743 SQUARE
METRES
HELD BY DEED OF TRANSFER
T48580/2006
SUBJECT TO THE CONDITIONS
CONTAINED THEREIN
(“The Mortgaged
property”)
4.
The
Registrar of the Court is directed to issue a warrant of execution to
enable the Sheriff of the Court to attach and execute
upon the
Mortgaged Property described in paragraph 2 above and to sell the
property in execution, in satisfaction of the judgment
debt, interest
and costs.
5.  A reserve price
be set for the sale of the Mortgaged Property by the Sheriff on
auction in the amount of R 591 572,
68.
6.  The Plaintiff is
authorised to approach this Court on the same papers (duly
supplemented) for a variation of the reserve
price if a change in the
factors influencing the reserve price necessitates a change of the
reserve price.
7.  The First and
Second Defendants are advised that the provisions of Section
129(3)(a) and (4) of the National Credit Act
34 of 2004 (“NCA”)
may apply to the judgment granted in favour of the Plaintiff.
8.  The First
and
Second Defendants may prevent the sale of the Mortgaged Property if
the First and Second Defendants pay to the plaintiff all
of the
arrear amounts owing to the Plaintiff, together with the Plaintiff’s
permitted default charges and reasonable costs
of enforcing the
agreement up to the time of reinstatement before the property being
sold in execution.
9.
The
arrear amount, enforcement costs and default charges referred to
above may be obtained from the Plaintiff.
10. The First and Second
Defendants are
advised that the amount is not the
full amount of the judgment debt but the amount the First and Second
Defendants owe to the Plaintiff
without reference to the accelerated
amount
.
11.
A
Copy of this order is to be served on the First and Second Defendants
as soon as practicable after the order is granted but before
any sale
in execution.
11.1.
The
Plaintiff is granted leave to serve the order on the First Defendant
via e-mail at his e-mail address [...]
12.
The First and Second Defendants are to pay
the costs of this application on an attorney and client scale,
jointly and severally,
the one paying the other to be absolved.
T
Lipshitz AJ
Acting
Judge: Gauteng Division     Johannesburg
(electronic
signature appended)
05
September 2023
Attorneys for the
Plaintiff
Lowndes Dlamini Attorneys
Counsel for the Plaintiff
M Msomi
Second Defendant
representing himself.