Tau Lekoa Gold Mining Company v Nicolar (Pty) Ltd (055281/23) [2023] ZAGPJHC 907 (14 August 2023)

80 Reportability
Commercial Law

Brief Summary

Urgent Applications — Urgency — Commercial interest justifying urgent relief — Applicant sought to compel Respondent to provide reports and account for gold and precious metals under Treatment Agreement — Respondent contended application not urgent and raised disputes of fact — Court found no genuine dispute of fact existed, allowing for determination on papers — Application granted, compelling Respondent to comply with obligations under the Treatment Agreement.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


Introduction


This was an urgent application heard in the Gauteng Division, Johannesburg, in which the applicant sought to compel contractual performance by the respondent in the form of delivery of specified operational and accounting documentation and the rendering of an account capable of debatement. The matter was enrolled in the Urgent Court and decided on motion.


The applicant was Tau Lekoa Gold Mining Company Ltd, a private company and holder of mining rights, operating a gold mine in Orkney, North West Province. The respondent was Nicolar (Pty) Ltd, the owner and operator of an ore processing plant at Buffelsfontein, operating under a precious metals refining licence.


The application was heard on 27 June 2023. The court granted relief on 17 July 2023, and subsequently furnished reasons in a judgment dated 14 August 2023.


The dispute arose from the parties’ Treatment Agreement concluded on 14 March 2023, under which the respondent treated the applicant’s gold-bearing material and was obliged to keep and provide records and statements concerning, among other things, tonnages delivered and treated, grades, moisture content, and allocations of precious metals. The central subject-matter was whether the respondent had properly accounted and made available the documentation and information contemplated by the agreement, and whether the applicant was entitled to urgent court intervention to compel such accounting and disclosure.


Material Facts


It was common cause that on or about 14 March 2023 the parties concluded a Treatment Agreement (agreement number SPS0236). The terms of the agreement were not in dispute. In terms of the agreement, the applicant would deliver gold-bearing material (run-of-mine ore, also described as contractor extract) to the respondent for treatment, with the objective of producing doré bars, which would then be delivered to a refinery for the production of bullion. A further term was that the respondent would procure that the applicant’s metals account at the refinery be credited with gold and/or silver corresponding to the allocation from the applicant’s contractor extract.


The agreement contained express provisions regarding record keeping and reporting. Clause 11 required the respondent to keep reasonable written and electronic records of matters arising from the agreement, including proper records of contractor extract delivered to the plant. The clause further contemplated daily and monthly statements of volumes delivered, and daily (where available) and monthly statements of volumes delivered, average grade, moisture content, and tonnage treated, as well as an obligation to make records available for inspection on request.


It was not disputed that the respondent was contractually obliged to provide documentation to the applicant and to account fully in relation to material processed at the respondent’s plant. The respondent’s position was that it had furnished all relevant information pertaining to contractor extract delivered and treated, and the allocation of precious metals.


The applicant’s complaint, as accepted by the court as the purpose of the proceedings, was not framed as a final determination of under-allocation of precious metals, but rather as the respondent’s alleged failure to provide the agreed accounting and documentation, including the forms and reconciliation contemplated by the agreement and its annexures. The court noted that the respondent had provided weekly interim calculations, but (on the court’s reading of the papers) had not provided the fuller monthly reconciliation for all sources or the allocation breakdown contemplated by the agreement.


On urgency, the applicant alleged that it faced a real prospect of being unable to operate as a going concern if the respondent continued to refuse to account fully under the agreement, and that its financial performance had deteriorated after March 2023 (breaking even in March and suffering an operating loss in April), which it attributed to under-allocation. The court treated these allegations as forming part of the urgency case in a commercial context.


To the extent that disputes of fact were raised, the court recorded that the respondent asserted that there was a “massive factual dispute” on the papers, but failed to identify concretely where and what such dispute was. The court further recorded that the respondent conceded in its answering affidavit that it had information pertaining to the accounting under the Treatment Agreement, while not providing that information to the applicant.


Legal Issues


The court was required to determine whether the application properly warranted urgent enrolment under Uniform Rule 6(12) in a commercial dispute where the applicant alleged severe operational prejudice if disclosure and accounting were withheld.


A further question was whether the matter was incapable of decision on affidavit due to a real, genuine, or bona fide dispute of fact, and if so, whether the court should dismiss the application or adopt a different procedural course under Uniform Rule 6(5)(g). This issue required an assessment of whether the respondent’s denials were sufficient to create a genuine factual conflict, which is primarily an application-of-law-to-fact enquiry in motion proceedings.


The court also had to decide several preliminary objections, including whether non-compliance with Uniform Rule 41A(2)(a) (mediation notice) was fatal, whether the court lacked jurisdiction despite a contractual jurisdiction clause, and whether an arbitration clause rendered the applicant non-suited or otherwise barred the urgent application. These issues largely concerned the application of procedural rules and contractual provisions, including the interplay between an arbitration agreement and an express contractual carve-out permitting urgent court relief.


On the merits, the central legal question was whether, on the facts set out on affidavit, the respondent had complied with its contractual accounting and disclosure obligations, and if not, whether the applicant was entitled to an order compelling provision of specified records, delivery of an account for debatement, and a debatement process.


Court’s Reasoning


On urgency, the court accepted that the matter was urgent for the reasons advanced in the applicant’s founding affidavit and heads of argument, and characterised the dispute as a commercial matter implicating the livelihood of a large number of workers. In approaching urgency, the court relied on authority recognising that commercial interests may justify the invocation of Rule 6(12), and treated the alleged operational and financial jeopardy described by the applicant as sufficient to justify urgent intervention. The court also indicated that it permitted argument on both the preliminary issues and the merits because, on its view, the merits overlapped with points in limine.


On the alleged dispute of fact, the court reasoned that while the respondent asserted that there was a “massive factual dispute”, it failed to identify the nature and location of such dispute in a manner that would demonstrate that the application could not be decided on the papers. The court emphasised that the respondent did not dispute the existence of the contractual duty to account and provide documentation, and treated the respondent’s denials, in context, as not raising a genuine dispute. In reaching this conclusion, the court applied the approach to factual disputes in motion proceedings described in Wightman t/a JW Construction v Headfour (Pty) Ltd, and referred to Ripoll-Dausa v Middleton N.O. and Others for the proposition that denials may, in appropriate cases, fail to create a real or bona fide dispute. The court concluded that the matter was capable of being decided on affidavit.


Regarding Uniform Rule 41A(2)(a), the court noted that the applicant served the mediation notice with its replying affidavit rather than with the founding papers. The court framed the question as whether this omission nullified the proceedings from the outset or whether condonation was available. It held that the respondent had to show prejudice arising from the non-compliance and, in reliance on authority cited to it, accepted that failure to serve the Rule 41A notice with the founding papers was not an absolute bar to the hearing of the application. The point in limine was accordingly dismissed.


On jurisdiction, the court treated the objection as untenable in light of the contractual term (clause 26.2) by which the parties consented to the jurisdiction of the Gauteng Division, Johannesburg. The court rejected the respondent’s contention that the consent contradicted geographical considerations related to where the cause of dispute arose or to the respondent’s chosen domicilium. The court reasoned that the respondent knew its domicilium when contracting and willingly waived reliance on it, and there was no allegation of misrepresentation. The jurisdiction objection was dismissed.


On the arbitration clause, the respondent relied on clause 22.1 (arbitration of disputes), but the court held that clause 22.5 expressly preserved the parties’ right to approach a court for urgent relief or judgment on a liquidated claim. Having already found urgency, the court held that the applicant was entitled to seek urgent court relief. The court also relied on authority to the effect that an arbitration agreement is not an automatic bar to legal proceedings in respect of covered disputes. This point in limine was also dismissed.


On the merits, the court identified the true issue as the respondent’s alleged failure to account and furnish documents in accordance with its contractual obligations, rather than the ultimate correctness of allocation figures as such. The court regarded the respondent’s response to the applicant’s allegations as amounting to bare denial, and found that the respondent had not provided an adequate explanation for not complying with the relevant provisions of the agreement and its annexures dealing with allocation and reconciliation. The court placed weight on the respondent’s concession that it had information pertaining to accounting under the Treatment Agreement, coupled with its failure to provide that information.


The court further reasoned that weekly interim calculations were inadequate and did not constitute a full and proper accounting as contemplated by the agreement, and that the documentation furnished referred only to the applicant’s ore rather than providing the broader plant allocation breakdown contemplated by the contract. On that basis, the court concluded that the respondent had not satisfied the court that it had complied with its contractual obligations, and that the applicant was entitled to coercive relief compelling production of records, delivery of an account, and a debatement process.


Outcome and Relief


The court granted the application and directed the respondent to provide the applicant, within stipulated time periods, extensive operational and accounting documentation for March, April, and May 2023, and thereafter within defined periods following demand. The court also directed the respondent to render an account supported by necessary books, records, and documents in respect of all sources of metals for the entire plant, to make supporting records available for inspection and copying upon demand for purposes of accounting, and to debate the account with the applicant within a defined period after compliance, including the formulation of a list of disputed items if any.


The court ordered the respondent to pay the costs of the application on the attorney-and-client scale.


Cases Cited


Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp v Auto Black Films (Pty) Ltd 1982 (3) SA 582 (W)


Ripoll-Dausa v Middleton N.O. and Others 2005 (3) SA 141 (C)


Wightman t/a JW Construction v Headfour (Pty) Ltd [2008] ZASCA 6; 2008 (3) SA 371 (SCA)


Nomandela and Another v Nyandeni Local Municipality and Others 2021 (5) SA 619 (ECM)


Growth Point Properties v Africa Master Blackchain Company (Pty) Ltd (unreported; further citation details not provided in the judgment)


Delfante v Delta Electrical Industries 1992 (2) SA 221 (C)


Legislation Cited


No specific statute was expressly cited in the judgment.


Rules of Court Cited


Uniform Rule 6(12)


Uniform Rule 6(5)(g)


Uniform Rule 6(5)(a)


Uniform Rule 41A(2)(a)


Held


The court held that the application was properly enrolled as urgent and that the respondent’s objections on urgency could not succeed on the papers as presented. It further held that no real, genuine, or bona fide dispute of fact was established that would preclude determination on affidavit.


The court held that the applicant’s failure to serve the Uniform Rule 41A mediation notice with the founding papers did not, in the circumstances described, bar the application from being heard, particularly absent demonstrated prejudice. It held that the court had jurisdiction in light of the parties’ contractual submission to that jurisdiction, and that the arbitration clause did not bar urgent court relief given an express contractual carve-out and the general principle that arbitration agreements are not automatic bars to litigation.


On the merits, the court held that the respondent had not complied with its contractual obligations to provide the required records and to account fully in accordance with the Treatment Agreement. It therefore compelled production of specified records, directed the rendering of an account supported by documentation, ordered a debatement process, and awarded attorney-and-client costs against the respondent.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The judgment applied the principle that commercial urgency may justify invocation of Uniform Rule 6(12), and that urgency must be assessed on the circumstances of the case as presented on affidavit.


In addressing factual disputes in motion proceedings, the court applied the approach that a respondent must do more than raise bare or unsubstantiated denials to establish a genuine dispute of fact, and that not every denial gives rise to a real, genuine, or bona fide dispute requiring oral evidence or referral to trial. The court treated the sufficiency of the respondent’s engagement with the allegations as central to whether Rule 6(5)(g) procedures were warranted.


The court applied the principle that non-compliance with Uniform Rule 41A(2)(a) is not necessarily fatal to proceedings, particularly where the omission does not cause demonstrated prejudice and where authority recognises that the failure does not automatically bar adjudication.


The judgment applied the principle that parties may submit to a court’s jurisdiction by agreement, and that such a jurisdiction clause can defeat an objection grounded in geography or domicilium considerations where there is no basis to impugn the consent.


Finally, the court applied the principle that an arbitration agreement does not automatically bar litigation, particularly where the contract itself preserves access to court for urgent relief, and where the applicant seeks coercive performance consistent with that carve-out.

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[2023] ZAGPJHC 907
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Tau Lekoa Gold Mining Company v Nicolar (Pty) Ltd (055281/23) [2023] ZAGPJHC 907 (14 August 2023)

SAFLII
Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
redacted from this document in compliance with the law
and
SAFLII
Policy
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG
CASE NO:
055281/23
(1)
REPORTABLE: YES / NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES/NO
(3)
REVISED.
In the matter between:
TAU
LEKOA GOLD MINING COMPANY
Applicant
And
NICOLAR
(PTY) LTD
Respondent
JUDGMENT
MAKUME,
J
:
[1]
This matter served before me in the Urgent Court on the 27 June 2023
in which the
Applicant sought an order that the Respondent be
directed to provide the Applicant with certain reports and
information detailed
in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the notice of motion.
Secondly directing the Respondent to deliver within 5 days an account
for
debatement.
[2]
The Respondent maintained that the Application was not Urgent
secondly that there
are serious dispute of fact not capable of being
resolved on motion.
[3]
On the 17
th
July 2023.  I granted the order as prayed
for by the Applicant.  What follows hereunder are my reasons for
the judgement
and order.
THE
PARTIES
[4]
The Applicant Tau Lekoa Gold Mining Company Ltd is a private company
with limited
liability duly incorporated and registered in accordance
with the Company Laws of the Republic of South Africa with its
principal
place of business situated in Johannesburg within the
jurisdiction of this Court.
[5]
The Applicant is the holder of Mining rights granted by the
Department of Mineral
Resources and Energy under references number
NW20/5/1/2/2/17 MR and FS 30/5/1/2/2/03 MR.  It operates and
owns a goldmine
situated at Portion 1[..] Goedgenoeg 4[...] IP in
Orkney Northwest Province.
[6]
The Respondent owns and operates an ore processing plant at
Buffelsfontein in terms
of its precious metals refining licence
number AP17994.
THE
AGREEMENT
[7]
It is common cause that on or about the 14
th
March 2023
the parties concluded a Treatment Agreement being agreement number
SPS0236.  The terms and conditions of that Agreement
are not in
dispute.
[8]
In terms of clause 5.1 of the Agreement the Applicant would deliver
to the Respondent
its gold bearing material consisting of run of mine
ore also known as contractor extract for purposes of treatment in
order to
produce doré bars where after the Respondent would
then deliver the dore bars to the Refinery so that gold and/or silver

bullion could be produced.
[9]
It was a further term of the Treatment Agreement that the Respondent
should procure
that the Applicant’s metals account at the
refinery be credited with gold and/or silver to the value of the gold
and/or silver
allocated from the contractor extract.
[10]
Besides treating extract delivered to it by the Applicant the
Respondent also was entitled to
treat its own and other third parties
extract or other unprocessed metal or mineral.
[11]
Clause 11 of the Treatment Agreement has the heading “Record
Keeping” and read as
follows:
11.1
The Company (meaning Nicolar the Respondent) shall keep reasonable
written and electronic
records with regards to all matters arising out of this Agreement and
without limitation of the foregoing,
shall keep proper records with
regard to all contractor extract delivered by the contractor to the
Nicolar Plant.
11.3
The Company shall render to the contractor on a daily basis and each
month a statement of the volumes measured
in tonnages of the
contractor extract delivered to the Nicolar Plant.
11.4
The Company shall render to the contractor on a daily basis (only if
and when the information is available)
and at the end of each month a
statement of the volumes in tonnages of the contractor extract
delivered to the Nicolar Plant, the
average grade and the moisture
content of the contractor extract and the tonnage treated.
11.5
The Company shall at all reasonable times make the records kept by it
in terms of clause 11.1 available for
inspection at the request of
the duly authorised representative of the contractor.  The
contractor shall likewise keep reasonable
records with regard to all
matters arising out of this Agreement and shall at all reasonable
times make such records available
for inspection by the duly
authorised representative of the Company.
[12]
It was a term of the agreement that the Applicant will make payment
of treatment fees levied
by the Respondent as consideration for the
services rendered for the treatment of the contractor extract.
[13]
It is not in dispute that the Respondent has the obligation in terms
of the Treatment Agreement
to provide documentation to the Applicant
and to account fully for all material processed at the Respondent’s
ore processing
plant.  What the Respondent says is that all
relevant information pertaining to the contractor extract brought and
treated
and the allocation of precious metals was furnished to the
Applicant.
URGENCY
[14]
Besides its response to the merits the Respondent has raised a number
of points in
limine
amongst them that the application is not
urgent and falls to be struck off the roll.  I allowed the
parties to address me
on the merits as well besides the point in
limine
.  My reasoning for that being that it is one of
those matters where merits overlap into the points in
limine
raised.  Having heard the parties, I reserved judgement and
later granted an order upholding all the prayers of the Applicant.
[15]
This matter is urgent for the reasons set out in the Applicant’s
Founding Affidavit as
well as in the Applicant’s Heads of
Argument.  This is a Commercial matter in which amongst others
the livelihood of
about 2000 unskilled labourers is dependent on.
The Court in
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp v Auto Black Films
(Pty) Ltd
1982 (3) SA 582
(W)
held as follows:

In my opinion the
urgency of Commercial interest may justify the invocation of Uniform
Rule 6(12) no less than any other interests.
Each case must
depend upon its own circumstances.  For the purpose of deciding
upon the urgency of this matter I assumed as
I have to do, that the
Applicants case was a good one and that the Respondent was unlawfully
infringing the Applicant’s copy
right in the films in
question.  Having regard to the obvious substantial value of the
rights in question, I formed the view
that an unlawful infringer, if
the Respondent is one should not be entitled to a Windfall only
because the Court happened to be
in recess for a period of two
months.”
[16]
In paragraph 15.4 of its Founding Affidavit the Applicant says the
following amongst others

The Applicant
faces a real prospect of not being able to operate as a going concern
in the near future if the Respondent continues
to refuse to account
fully to the Applicant in accordance with the terms of the Treatment
Agreement (which is already stated above
renders the Applicant unable
to take any steps to protect its interest) while the Applicant
broke-even in March 2023, it made an
operating loss in April 2023 and
this as a consequence of the Respondent’s under-allocation of
gold and silver.”
IS
THERE IN REALITY A GENUINE DISPUTE OF FACT
[17]
It is common cause that the purpose of this application is to compel
the Respondent to account
to the Applicant for the gold and other
precious metals and to provide the necessary documentation to
Applicant in terms of the
Treatment Agreement.  The Respondent
in its Answering Affidavit and the heads maintains that “there
exists a massive
factual dispute, which is evident from the papers
before the Court.”
[18]
What the Respondent fails to do is to point out where and what the
dispute is.  The Respondent
firstly does not dispute that under
the Treatment Agreement it has or bears the obligation and
responsibility to provide documentation
and account fully to the
Applicant’s regarding all the materials processed at the
Respondent ore processing plant.
[19]
Rule 6(5) (g) provides that where an application cannot properly be
decided on affidavit presumably
because of a dispute of fact the
Court may dismiss such application or make such order as it seems
meet with a view to ensuring
a just and expeditious decision.
[20]
In
Ripoll-Dausa vs Middleton N.O. and Others 2005(3) SA 141 (C)
the question was whether there was a real genuine or
bona fide
dispute of fact on the affidavits Davis J held that the Court may in
certain circumstances proceed on the basis of the correctness
of
alleged facts where the Respondent has not availed himself of his
right to apply for the deponents concerned to be called for

cross-examination under Rule 6(5) (a).  In particular, at
paragraph 151 the Court said the following: “In certain
instances
the denial by Respondent of a fact alleged by the Applicant
may not be such as to raise a real genuine or
bona fide
dispute of fact.”
[21]
Applying the approach to factual disputes as narrated in
Wightman
t/a JW Construction v Headfour (Pty) Ltd
[2008] ZASCA 6
;
2008 (3) SA 371
(SCA)
.
I have come to the conclusion that no real and genuine dispute of
facts exist.  This matter is capable of being decided
on the
papers before me.
THE
ALLEGED NON-COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 41A
[22]
Uniform Rule 41A (2) (a) states as follows:

In every new
action or application proceedings the Plaintiff on application shall
together with the summons or combined summons
or notice of motion
serve on each Defendant or Respondent a notice indicating whether
such Plaintiff or Applicant agrees to or
opposes referral of the
dispute to mediation.”
[23]
The Applicant subsequently did serve such a notice on the Respondent
with its Replying Affidavit.
The question is whether this
nullifies the process
ab initio
or whether this Court can
condone such failure.  The Respondent in order to succeed with
this point in
limine
must indicate how such failure has
prejudiced it in its defence.  The Applicant has referred this
court to two decisions in
their heads of argument being matter of
Nomandela and Another v Nyandeni Local Municipality and Others
2021 (5) SA 619
(ECM)
as well as the unreported decision of
Growth Point Properties vs Africa Master Blackchain Company (Pty)
Ltd
.  The long and short of those decision is to the effect
that failure to serve the Rules 41A notice with the Founding papers

does not a bar to the application being heard.  This point in
limine
is likewise dismissed.
ALLEGED
LACK OF JURISDICTION
[24]
This point in
limine
is a non-starter.  The Respondent
has avoided to deal with the contents of clause 26.2 of the Treatment
Agreement in which
the parties specifically agreed to subject
themselves to the jurisdiction of this Court.  I do not
understand what the Respondent
means when it says that “Although
the parties consented to the jurisdiction the aforesaid consent is in
direct contradiction
with the geographical area in which the sole
cause of the dispute as alleged by the Applicant arose including the
Respondent’s
chosen
domicilium citandi et executandi
.
[25]
The fact of the matter is that when the Respondent concluded the
Treatment Agreement it knows
where its
domicilium
was and
waived that right willingly.  The Respondent does not allege any
misrepresentation.  I accordingly also dismiss
this point in
limine
.
NON-COMPLIANCE
WITH THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE
[26]
The Respondent relies on clause 22.1 of the Treatment Agreement which
provides that in the event
of any dispute arising between the parties
such dispute should be referred to arbitration and that failure to
refer such a dispute
to arbitration makes the Applicant non-suited to
proceed with this application.  The Respondent fails to take
cognisance of
clause 22.5 which reads that “nothing herein
contained shall be deemed to prevent or prohibit either party from
applying
to the appropriate Court for urgent relief or for judgement
in relation to a liquidated claim.
[27]
The Applicant seeks urgent relief in this matter and has accordingly
acted properly.  In
any event I have already made a finding that
this application is urgent.  In
Delfante v Delta Electrical
Industries
1992 (2) SA 221
(C)
the Court held that an arbitration
agreement is no automatic bar to legal proceedings in respect of
disputes covered by the agreement.
This point in
limine
also must fail and it is accordingly dismissed.
THE
MERITS OF THE APPLICATION
[28]
The Applicant’s case on the merits is set out in paragraph 13
of the Founding Affidavit
and in particular at paragraph 13.1.2 the
Applicant sets out the quantity gold of submitted to the Respondent
and what the shortfall
was.  In reply the Respondent makes a
bare denial.  It is clear that the Respondent has up to now
failed to understand
what the issue is it is not the under allocation
of gold and silver by the Respondent to the Applicant but rather the
issue relates
to the failure by the Respondent to account and furnish
documents to the Applicant in contravention of its contractual
obligation.
[29]
The Respondent has failed to give reason why it should not abide by
the provisions of clause
2.3 of Annexure B to the Treatment Agreement
or the detailed calculation of Reconciled Amount as envisaged in
clause 2.4.1.2 of
Annexure B.
[30]
The Respondent has in paragraph 9.3 of its Answering Affidavit
conceded that it has information pertaining
to the accounting under
the Treatment Agreement and fails to provide such information to the
Applicant in contravention of the
Agreement.
[31]
It is rather surprising that at paragraph 9.8 of their answer the
Respondent say that it is common
cause between the parties that from
the onset there will be certain teething problems due to
implementation of new procedures by
Nicolar.  The Respondent
does not say what teething problems are those that it is referring to
and how that should be an excuse
not to comply with their contractual
obligation.
[32]
It is clear that to date hereof the Respondent has only provided
weekly interim calculation and
not the monthly reconciliation for all
sources.  The provisions of weekly interim reports are
inadequate and do not amount
to a full and proper accounting as
envisaged in the Treatment Agreement.
[33]
The Respondent makes the point further that the documentation
furnished only refers to the Applicant
ore.  It is not a gold
plant allocation sheet containing the breakdown of the complete
allocation of gold and silver from
all sources as envisaged in clause
2.3.2.1 of annexure B.
[34]
I am satisfied that the Respondent has failed to satisfy this Court
that it has complied with
its obligation in terms of the Agreement.
In the result I make the following order:
ORDER
1
The
Respondent is directed to provide to the Applicant, in accordance
with the Treatment Agreement concluded between them on 14
March 2023
(
Treatment
Agreement
),
within 5 (five) calendar days of the date of this order for the
months of March, April and May 2023, and within 5 (five) calendar

days of demand in respect of any period thereafter:
1.1Daily total plant
production files for all ore sources (Metallurgical Accounting
files);
1.2Daily total plant
Assay File reports;
1.3 Weekly total plant
gold and tonnage forecasts per source;
1.4 Monthly total plant
Excel-based gold allocation for all sources, which includes
information on the grade, recovery, preg-robbing,
tons and final gold
allocated;
1.5 Month-end total plant
gold-in-process or Work-In-Progress;
1.6 Monthly total plant
production files for all sources;
1.7 Monthly total plant
silver allocations;
1.8 Dispatch notes issued
for each month.
2
The
Respondent is directed, within 5 (five) calendar days of this order,
and for the months of March, April and May 2023 to:
2.1
render
an account to the Applicant under the Treatment Agreement in respect
of all sources of metals for the entire plant, fully
supported by the
necessary books, records and documents, including, without
limitation:
2.1.1
daily
production rates;
2.1.2
monthly
production as well as the month-end gold in process;
2.1.3
daily
and monthly statement of the volumes in tonnages of the Contractor
Extract, the average grade and the moisture content of
the Contractor
Extract and tonnage treated;
2.1.4
weekly
calculation of Weekly Produced Gold;
2.1.5
monthly
calculation of the Actual Dispatched Gold per source and a
reconciliation with the Produced Gold;
2.1.6
breakdown
of the complete allocation of gold accounted for from all sources,
including but not limited to volumes, grades, moisture
content and
tonnages treated per source;
2.1.7
a
detailed calculation of the Reconciled Amount;
2.1.8
the
volumes and specifications of the Contractor Product delivered to the
refinery and satisfaction of the Applicant that HGSA’s
Account
has been credited in accordance with the Treatment Agreement
;
and
2.2
make
available for inspection and copying any books of accounts, records,
documents and vouchers relating to its activities, as
may be demanded
by the Applicant for purposes of giving effect to prayer 3.1;
(collectively, an
Account
).
3
The
Respondent is directed, within 5 (five) calendar days of any demand
by the Applicant in
respect of periods after May 2023 to provide an Account.
4
The
Respondent is directed to debate the Account with the Applicant,
pursuant to the Respondent complying with prayer 3 and/or 4,
within
10 (ten) business days of such compliance, at the Respondent’s
business premises situated at Portion 8, H[...] 4[...]
IP, off the
R502 section west of Vermaasdrift Road, Buffelsfontein and within
such period to formulate a list of disputed items,
if any.
5
The
Respondent is directed to pay the costs of this application on an
attorney-client-scale.
Dated at Johannesburg on
this
day of August 2023
________________________________________
M
A MAKUME
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG
Appearances:
DATE OF HEARING

:           27 JUNE
2023
DATE OF JUDGMENT

:
AUGUST
2023
FOR
APPLICANT

:           ADV HC
BOTHMA
INSTRUCTED
BY

:           MESSRS
VAN COLLER BLOM INC
FOR 1
ST
TO 8
TH
RESPONDENTS:
ADV AM VIVIERS
INSTRUCTED BY

:           DLA
PIPER SOUTH AFRICA (RF) INC