Le Roux Van Niekerk Konstruksie (Pty) Ltd v Tshitangano and Another (2023-075234) [2023] ZAGPJHC 912 (11 August 2023)

80 Reportability
Land and Property Law

Brief Summary

Possession — Mandament van spolie — Restoration of possession of immovable property — Applicant sought urgent restoration of possession of property following alleged unlawful dispossession by respondents — Respondents contested urgency and validity of spoliation claim, asserting that the applicant had vacated the property post-contract termination — Court found applicant had been in peaceful possession and unlawfully ousted by respondents, meeting requirements for spoliatory relief — Respondents’ reliance on contractual provisions deemed irrelevant to spoliation claim — Application granted, with respondents ordered to restore possession to applicant.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


Introduction


The matter concerned an urgent application in the Gauteng Division, Johannesburg, in which the applicant sought an order restoring its possession of an immovable property situated in the Serengeti Golf and Wildlife Estate. The relief was sought on the basis of the mandament van spolie, a possessory remedy aimed at restoring the status quo ante where a party has been unlawfully deprived of possession.


The applicant was Le Roux Van Niekerk Konstruksie (Pty) Ltd, a construction contractor. The respondents were Lufuno Abel Tshitangano and Maite Bridget Tshitangano, the owners of the property on which construction was being undertaken.


The proceedings were instituted after an alleged incident on 26 July 2023, following which the applicant demanded restoration of possession and, when that demand was not met, launched the urgent application on 28 July 2023. The matter was heard on 9 August 2023 and judgment was delivered electronically on 11 August 2023.


The general subject matter of the dispute arose in the context of contractual difficulties under a JBCC construction contract, but the court emphasised that the application itself was directed at the narrow question of possession and unlawful dispossession, rather than the underlying merits of the parties’ contractual disagreements.


Material Facts


It was common cause that the parties concluded a JBCC construction contract in terms of which the applicant performed construction work for the respondents relating to the building of a residence on the respondents’ property. It was also not in dispute that the applicant established itself on site during June 2020 and remained in peaceful and undisturbed possession of the site for a substantial period thereafter.


It was further accepted as part of the common-cause background that contractual disputes arose between the parties, and that the respondents contended the contract ended on 5 July 2023, after which (on their version) the applicant should have vacated the property.


The applicant’s case on dispossession was that on 26 July 2023 the first respondent attended the property, removed the applicant’s keys, caused the applicant’s representatives to be locked out, ordered them to leave immediately, and required them to remove enclosures and noticeboards at the perimeter of the site. The applicant alleged that prior to this it exercised possession through complete access to the site and by retaining keys to the newly constructed house and surrounding enclosures.


The respondents denied the applicant’s version of what occurred on 26 July 2023, but the court found that the denial was bald and not accompanied by meaningful engagement with the applicant’s version or countervailing evidence. The court noted that the applicant’s version was supported by confirmatory affidavits, and the respondents’ criticism that photographs or other corroboration had not been provided did not, on the court’s assessment, undermine the applicant’s case.


Legal Issues


The court was required to determine, first, whether the matter was properly enrolled and heard as an urgent application under the applicable procedural framework for urgent relief.


The central substantive question was whether the applicant had established the requirements for the mandament van spolie, namely whether the applicant had been in peaceful and undisturbed possession and whether it had been unlawfully deprived of that possession without consent or due legal process.


In addition, the court had to address whether spoliation relief was precluded or inappropriate on the respondents’ contention that the property was not in the respondents’ possession but rather in the possession of a third party (the principal agent) under the JBCC contractual arrangement, and whether the principal agent and quantity surveyor ought to have been joined on the basis of an alleged direct and substantial interest.


The dispute primarily concerned the application of established legal principles to the facts (urgency, possession, unlawful dispossession, and the competency and effectiveness of a restoration order), together with a limited evaluative assessment of whether the respondents’ denial gave rise to a bona fide factual dispute.


Court’s Reasoning


On urgency, the court rejected the respondents’ contention that urgency was self-created by reference to the contract’s termination on 5 July 2023. The court accepted that the relevant trigger for urgency was the alleged spoliation event on 26 July 2023, after which the applicant acted with speed by demanding an undertaking on 27 July 2023 and launching the application on 28 July 2023. The court considered that the applicant would not obtain substantial redress in due course, and reiterated that the mandament van spolie is a robust and speedy remedy by nature.


In dealing with the respondents’ denial of the events of 26 July 2023, the court held that a bald denial of the applicant’s detailed account did not create a bona fide dispute of fact. The court accepted that the applicant’s evidence was corroborated by confirmatory affidavits and found no basis to reject it on the papers.


Turning to the requirements for spoliation, the court restated that the mandament is not concerned with the underlying rights to possession and operates to restore the status quo ante, reflecting the principle that the rule of law does not permit self-help. On this basis, the court held that the respondents’ extensive reliance on the contents of the JBCC contract and the broader contractual dispute was misconceived for purposes of determining spoliation relief.


The court found the first requirement satisfied because it was undisputed that the applicant had been in peaceful and undisturbed possession of the site since June 2020, exercising possession through its site manager and employees.


On the second requirement—unlawful deprivation—the respondents relied on Monteiro and another v Diedericks 2021 (3) SA 482 (SCA) to argue that the property was not presently in the respondents’ possession but in the possession of a bona fide third party, the principal agent, allegedly reflecting the practical position under the JBCC contract. The court held that this reliance did not assist the respondents. It reasoned that Monteiro was distinguishable on the facts and further noted that, even on the academic and judicial discussion referenced in Monteiro, it was not clear that spoliation relief is necessarily incompetent where a third party holds the property. The court emphasised that, on the facts before it, it could not be concluded that an order restoring possession would be ineffective, unenforceable, or incapable of immediate implementation.


The court further held that the respondents had not made out a proper factual case that restoration was impossible, and observed that the principal agent would not have been ignorant of the relevant facts and the underlying disputes. The court was also not persuaded that possession had in fact passed to the principal agent or that the respondents were not in possession. It reasoned that the respondents, as owners, had free and unfettered access and ultimately control of the property, and the fact that the first respondent ordered the applicant off the property supported the conclusion that the respondents exercised possession and control, even if not exclusively.


The court accepted that possession of the construction site was not exclusive to any single party over time, given the involvement of the applicant, the respondents, and other professionals and contractors (including the quantity surveyor and principal agent) in a representative capacity. This factual conclusion also informed the court’s rejection of the joinder point, as the court held that the principal agent and quantity surveyor did not have the requisite direct and substantial interest requiring their joinder.


Finally, the court held that the respondents did not contend that their conduct was sanctioned by a court order and it could not be concluded that the applicant consented to vacate. The court thus concluded that the applicant established unlawful deprivation and met both requirements for the mandament van spolie.


On costs, while the applicant sought attorney-and-client costs based on the alleged unlawfulness of the respondents’ conduct, the court was not persuaded that a punitive costs order was warranted and applied the ordinary principle that costs follow the result.


Outcome and Relief


The court granted urgent relief. It dispensed with the ordinary forms and service under the Rules of Court and heard the application as urgent in terms of Rule 6(12).


The respondents were ordered to forthwith restore to the applicant undisturbed, free, vacant possession and access to the property described in the order as ERF [...] WITFONTEIN EXT 43, Township, Province of Gauteng, held under Deed of Transfer No T64947/2021, situated within the Serengeti Golf and Wildlife Estate.


The court further authorised the Sheriff and the South African Police Services to take all steps necessary to provide the applicant with possession and access should the respondents fail to comply.


The respondents were ordered to pay the costs of the application, jointly and severally, the one paying the other to be absolved.


Cases Cited


J W Wightman (Pty) Ltd v Headfour (Pty) Ltd [2008] ZASCA 6; 2008 (3) SA 371 (SCA).


East Rock Trading 7 (Pty) Ltd and another v Eagle Valley Granite (Pty) Ltd and others (11/33767) [2011] ZAGPJHC 196 (23 September 2011).


Microsure (Pty) Ltd and Others v Net 1 Applied Technologies South Africa Ltd 2010 (2) SA 59 (N).


Monteiro and another v Diedericks 2021 (3) SA 482 (SCA).


Yeko v Qana 1973 (4) SA 735 (A).


Npai v Vereeniging Town Council 1953 (4) SA 579 (A).


George Municipality v Vena 1989 (2) SA 263 (A).


Legislation Cited


No legislation was cited in the judgment.


Rules of Court Cited


Rule 6(12) of the Uniform Rules of Court.


Held


The court held that the applicant established the jurisdictional requirements for the mandament van spolie, namely that it had been in peaceful and undisturbed possession of the site and was unlawfully deprived of such possession without consent or legal process when the first respondent removed the keys, locked the applicant out, and ordered the applicant’s representatives to leave on 26 July 2023.


The court held that the respondents’ opposition relied impermissibly on underlying contractual rights and disputes under the JBCC agreement, which were not relevant to the spoliation enquiry. It further held that the respondents failed to show that restoration was impossible or that a third party’s alleged involvement rendered spoliation relief incompetent, and that the joinder of the principal agent and quantity surveyor was not required.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The judgment applied the principle that the mandament van spolie is a speedy and robust possessory remedy concerned with restoring the status quo ante and is not directed at determining the parties’ underlying rights to possession. In this framework, reliance on contractual merits and disputes is generally irrelevant to whether spoliation relief should be granted.


It applied the settled requirements that an applicant for spoliation relief must prove (i) peaceful and undisturbed possession at the time of dispossession and (ii) unlawful deprivation of possession, meaning deprivation without consent or without due legal process.


The judgment applied the principle that a bald denial which does not meaningfully engage with an opponent’s factual version may fail to raise a bona fide dispute of fact on motion proceedings, particularly where the applicant’s version is supported by confirmatory evidence.


It further applied the approach that, when assessing the competency and practicality of spoliation relief (including where third parties are mentioned), the court must consider whether an order would be effective, enforceable, and capable of immediate implementation on the facts, and whether restoration is shown to be impossible.


Finally, the judgment applied the principle that joinder is required only where a party has a direct and substantial interest in the relief sought, and held on the facts that the principal agent and quantity surveyor did not meet this threshold in the spoliation application.

About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
>>
2023
>>
[2023] ZAGPJHC 912
|

|

Le Roux Van Niekerk Konstruksie (Pty) Ltd v Tshitangano and Another (2023-075234) [2023] ZAGPJHC 912 (11 August 2023)

SAFLII
Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
redacted from this document in compliance with the law
and
SAFLII
Policy
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG
CASE NUMBER:
2023-075234
NOT REPORTABLE
NOT OF INTEREST TO
OTHER JUDGES
NOT REVISED
In
the matter between:
LE
ROUX VAN NIEKERK KONSTRUKSIE (PTY) LTD
APPLICANT
And
LUFUNO
ABEL TSHITANGANO
FIRST
RESPONDENT
MAITE
BRIDGET TSHITANGANO
SECOND
RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
Delivered:
This
judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties’ legal representatives by e-mail. The date and
time for
hand-down is deemed to be 10h00 on the11
th
of AUGUST 2023.
DIPPENAAR J
:
[1]
This
is an urgent application in which the applicant sought restoration of
its possession of an immovable property situated in the
Serengeti
Golf and Wildlife Estate, owned by the respondents. The applicant’s
case is squarely predicated on the
mandament van spolie.
[2]
The background facts are not contentious and were common
cause. The parties concluded a JBCC construction contract in terms of
which
the applicant performed construction work for the respondents
pertaining to the building of a house on the property. The applicant

established itself on site during June 2020 and remained in
undisturbed possession thereof until the events which triggered the

application occurred. Contractual disputes have arisen between the
parties.
[3]
The respondents opposed the application on various grounds.
They disputed the urgency of the application on the basis that any
urgency
was self-created, given that the trigger event was the expiry
of the contract on 5 July 2023, after which the applicant should have

vacated the property.
[4]
The respondents argued that the applicant failed to satisfy
the elements of spoliation as the unlawfulness and factual
dispossession
aspects were lacking. Reliance was extensively placed
on the contents of the JBCC contract in opposing the application. The
respondents
contended that there was no dispossession as they had
terminated the contract and never took possession of the property. It
was
further argued that the principal agent in terms of the JBCC
agreement was in possession of the property rather than the
respondents
and that the application should thus be dismissed with
costs. The respondents further argued that the principal agent and
the quantity
surveyor should have been joined to the application.
Urgency
[5]
According
to the applicant, o
n 26 July 2023, the first respondent
attended the property to inspect the building progress. He spoliated
the applicant by removing
the applicant’s keys and locking the
applicant’s representatives off site, ordering them to leave
immediately and to
remove all enclosures and noticeboards to the
perimeter of the site. The applicant had been exercising possession
of the property
by exercising complete and unfettered access and
possession of the site and retaining keys to the newly constructed
house and surrounding
enclosures.
[6]  The respondents
baldly denied the applicant’s version but did not meaningfully
grapple with the applicant’s
version or present any
countervailing evidence. Instead, it was contended that the
applicants did not present corroborating evidence
such as photographs
of the events which occurred and that there was no evidence who
forcefully removed the applicant. That argument
does not pass muster.
[7]
The
respondents’ bald denial does not create any
bona
fide
dispute
[1]
regarding the
applicant’s version of the events which transpired. The
applicant’s evidence was corroborated by confirmatory

affidavits and there is no reason to reject that evidence.
[8]  The
respondents’ contention that urgency was triggered when the
contract came to an end, also does not bear scrutiny,
given the
undisputed version of the facts.
[9]
On a
conspectus of the facts, I am persuaded that the applicant has
illustrated that the application is urgent and that it will
not
obtain substantial redress at a hearing in due course
[2]
.
Moreover, the
mandament
van spolie
is an extraordinary and robust possessory remedy of a speedy
nature.
[3]
The applicant
acted with due speed in launching the application on 28 July 2023,
after its demand for an undertaking by the
respondents to restore its
possession on 27 July 2023 was not acceded to and complied with the
relevant practice directives pertaining
to urgent applications.
Has the applicant met
the requirements for spoliatory relief?
[10]
It is trite
that the
mandament
of spolie
is
not concerned with the underlying rights to claim possession of the
property concerned, but seeks only to restore the
status
quo ante.
It
does so by mandatory order, irrespective of the merits of any
underlying dispute regarding the rights of the parties. The
essential
rationale for the remedy is that the rule of law does not countenance
a resort to self-help
[4]
.
[11] Inasmuch as the
respondents rely on the underlying contractual provisions and issues
between the parties, such reliance is
thus misconceived.
[12]
The
applicant is required to show peaceful and undisturbed possession
which has been unlawfully ousted.
[5]
There are two requirements that must be met. First, the party seeking
the remedy must at the time of the dispossession have been
in
possession of the property. Second, the dispossessor must have
unlawfully deprived it of possession without its consent. Unlawful
in
this context pertains to possession without the applicant’s
consent or without due legal process.
[6]
[13]
The
assumption underpinning the granting of the remedy is that the
property exists and is capable of being restored to the possession
of
the party that establishes entitlement thereto.
[7]
[14]
It was undisputed that the applicant has been in peaceful and
undisturbed possession of the property since June 2020, when the
applicant
established itself on site in terms of the contract. It
exercised possession through its site manager and employees. It was
undisputed
that the first requirement has thus been met.
[15]
Regarding
the second requirement, the respondents relied on
Monteiro
[8]
in arguing that the property is not presently in the possession of
the respondents but in the possession of a bona fide third party,
the
principal agent, being the practical position in terms of the JBCC
contract.
[16]
The
reliance on
Monteiro
does
not avail the respondents for various reasons. Considering the
present factual matrix,
Monteiro
is distinguishable on the facts. Moreover, as explained in
Monteiro
[9]
,
our courts have from an academic perspective held different views as
to whether the remedy may be granted in circumstances where
the
property is no longer in possession of the spoliator but is held by a
third party. It is thus by no means clear that even if
possession has
been given to a third party, the remedy is not competent. On the
present facts, it cannot be concluded that the
order, if granted,
would not be effective, enforceable and immediately capable of
enforcement.
[10]
[17]
The
respondents further did not make out any proper case that as a fact,
restoration of possession was impossible.
[11]
The undisputed facts point to the contrary position. In addition, the
principal agent would not have been ignorant of the relevant
facts
and the contractual disputes between the parties.
[18] It can moreover not
be concluded that possession of the property has passed to the
principal agent or that the respondents
are not in possession of the
property. The respondents as owners of the property, have free and
unfettered access thereto and ultimately
control the property. The
fact that the first respondent ordered the applicant off the
property, renders credence to the contention
that the respondents
were indeed in possession and control of the property, albeit not on
an exclusive basis. It was not contended
by the respondents that the
principal agent was in exclusive control and possession of the
property. The respondents rather relied
on a theoretical construct of
the terms of the JBCC contract, which ignores the relevant facts and
delves into the underpinning
contractual rights and obligations of
the parties.
[19] The undisputed
evidence established that the possession of the site was not
exclusive to any one party, including the respondents
as owners, the
applicant as contractor, the specialist team involved in the
construction, including the quantity surveyor and principal
agent,
and the various contractors performing work on the property,
throughout the period of the applicant’s possession.
The
various contractors and professionals involved in the construction of
the respondents’ residence were acting in a representative

capacity.
[20] That is also
dispositive of the joinder issue raised by the respondents. The point
lacks merit and the principal agent and
quantity surveyor do not have
a direct and substantial interest in the application, requiring their
joinder to the application.
[21]
In
addition, it was not contended by the respondents that it was
impossible for possession to be restored to the applicant. On the

facts, it cannot be concluded that the order cannot be carried into
effect, if granted
[12]
. The
converse is true.
[22] It cannot on the
facts be concluded that the first respondent did not unlawfully
deprive the applicant of possession of the
property. The applicant’s
version is destructive of the proposition that it elected to vacate
the property based on the termination
of the JBCC agreement. It was
undisputed that the applicant remained in possession well after the
termination date and until the
events which occurred on 26 July 2023.
[23] It was not the
respondent’s case that its conduct was sanctioned by a court
order and it cannot be concluded that the
applicant agreed to vacate
the property. On the respondents’ version, it was simply
disputed that the events of 26 July 2023
described by the applicant,
took place.
[24] The contents of the
JBCC contract as to what the theoretical contractual position would
have been does not override the actual
factual position and does not
avail the respondents. As stated, it is trite that the underpinning
merits of a party’s possession
is irrelevant to determining
spoliatory relief and the contents of the JBCC contract as to
possessory rights are irrelevant to
the present enquiry.
[25] The defences raised
by the respondent in essence relate to the merits of the disputes
between the parties and the contractual
rights and obligations in
terms of the JBCC agreement. The approach adopted by the respondent
is in my view misconceived as the
underlying disputes are not
relevant to the relief sought.
[26] For the reasons
advanced, I conclude that the applicant has met the second
requirement of the
mandament of spolie
. Considering all the
facts, I further conclude that the applicant has made out a proper
case for relief.
[27] There is no reason
to deviate from the normal principle that costs follow the result.
The applicant sought costs on the scale
as between attorney and
client on the basis that the conduct of the respondents was unlawful.
I am however not persuaded that such
an order is warranted.
[28] I grant the
following order:
1.  The forms and
service provided for in the Rules of Court are dispensed with and
this application is to be heard as one
of urgency in terms of Rule
6(12);
2.  The respondents
are directed to forthwith restore to the applicant undisturbed, free,
vacant possession and access to the
property described as:-
ERF [...] WITFONTEIN EXT
43, TOWNSHIP, PROVINCE OF GAUTENG, MEASURING 1226 SQUARE METRES IN
EXTENT, HELD UNDER DEED OF TRANSFER
NO T64947/2021 situated within
the Serengeti Golf and Wildlife Estate (“the property”).
3.  Should the
respondents fail to comply with the order in 2 above, then the
Sheriff of the Court and the South African Police
Services are
authorised to take all steps and measures necessary to provide the
applicant with possession and access to the property.
4.The Respondents are
directed to pay the costs of the application, jointly and severally,
the one paying, the other to be absolved.
EF DIPPENAAR
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT JOHANNESBURG
APPEARANCES
DATE
OF HEARING
: 9 August 2023
DATE
OF JUDGMENT
: 11 August 2023
APPLICANT’S
COUNSEL
:
Adv
J C Viljoen
APPLICANT’S
ATTORNEYS
:
Cronje
Attorneys Inc
RESPONDENT’S
COUNSEL
:
Adv
O Mokgotho
RESPONDENT’S
ATTORNEYS
:
Lekgwhati
Attorneys
[1]
J
W Wightman (Pty) Ltd v Headfour (Pty) Ltd
[2008] ZASCA 6
;
2008 (3) SA 371(SCA)
para
[12]
[2]
East Rock Trading 7 (Pty) Ltd and another v Eagle Valley Granite
(Pty) Ltd and others (11/33767) [2011] ZAGPJHC 196 (23 September

2011)
[3]
Microsure (Pty) Ltd and Others v Net 1 Applied Technologies South
Africa Ltd
2010 (2) SA 59
(N) para 13
[4]
Monteiro and another v Diedericks
2021 (3) SA 482
SCA paras
[14]-[17] and the authorities cited therein.
[5]
Yeko v Qana
1973 (4) SA 735
A at 739 G
[6]
Npai v Vereeniging Town Council
1953 (4) SA 579
(A); George
Municipality v Vena 1989 (2) SA 263 (A)
[7]
Monteiro para [17]
[8]
Fn5
supra
[9]
Paras [19]-[21]
[10]
Monteiro paras [23]-[24]
[11]
Monteiro para [85]
[12]
Monteiro para [21]