Volvo Financial Services Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v Adamas Tkolose Trading CC (2023/067290) [2023] ZAGPJHC 846 (1 August 2023)

80 Reportability
Civil Procedure

Brief Summary

Civil Procedure — Urgency — Inherent urgency — No category of claim enjoys inherent urgency — Urgency determined by circumstances of application — Rei vindicatio not inherently urgent — Application to recover leased tractors struck from urgent roll. Applicant, Volvo Financial Services, sought urgent possession of tractors leased to respondent, Adamas Tkolose Trading CC, after the latter fell into arrears. Court held that urgency is not determined by the nature of the claim but by specific circumstances, and that the rei vindicatio does not qualify as inherently urgent. Application dismissed with costs.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


This was an urgent motion application in the High Court in which the applicant sought immediate relief in the form of the return of specific movable property. The proceeding was framed as vindicatory relief, in substance a rei vindicatio, following the cancellation of a lease agreement.


The parties were Volvo Financial Services Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd (the applicant), a financial services company, and Adamas Tkolose Trading CC (the respondent), which had leased two tractors from the applicant.


The procedural history was central to the decision. The matter was enrolled on the urgent roll and argued on 25 July 2023. On that date, the court struck the application from the urgent roll and made an adverse costs order against the applicant in respect of the urgent hearing. The judgment delivered on 1 August 2023 set out the court’s reasons for striking the application.


The general subject-matter of the dispute concerned whether the applicant was entitled to urgent repossession of leased tractors after the respondent allegedly fell into arrears, and—more particularly—whether such vindicatory relief is “inherently urgent” or otherwise urgent on the facts placed before the court.


2. Material Facts


It was common cause (or treated as uncontroversial for purposes of the urgency enquiry) that the applicant leased two tractors to the respondent. The respondent fell into arrears on payments due under the lease, after which the applicant cancelled the lease.


Following cancellation, the applicant sought to take possession of the tractors and approached the court on an urgent basis for that relief.


The court distinguished between (a) the existence of a vindicatory claim in principle and (b) whether there were facts establishing urgency in the sense required by the rules. The applicant advanced urgency primarily on the footing that vindicatory claims are inherently urgent, and secondarily on asserted risks associated with delayed recovery. However, the court recorded that counsel for the applicant accepted that there were no facts on the papers supporting an apprehension that the tractors would become unrecoverable if the matter proceeded in the ordinary course.


The applicant further suggested that continued use of the tractors would cause wear and tear and thereby prejudice it as owner. The court treated this as insufficient to establish urgency because wear and tear is a foreseeable incident of leasing and, on the applicant’s own papers, there was no allegation that any deterioration exceeded fair wear and tear, nor any substantiated basis to conclude that later relief (including damages) would be inadequate.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal questions were whether the application satisfied the requirements for enrolment as an urgent matter, and, in particular, whether the court should accept the proposition that a vindicatory claim (a rei vindicatio) is “inherently urgent” such that it enjoys preferred access to the urgent roll.


Closely connected to that was the question of how urgency is to be determined in motion proceedings: whether by reference to the category of claim asserted, or by reference to the circumstances and the nature of the prejudice, including whether the applicant would be unable to obtain substantial redress in due course.


The dispute primarily concerned legal principle (the meaning and proper approach to urgency under the rules, and whether “inherent urgency” exists outside statutory contexts), together with the application of that principle to the facts (whether the applicant’s papers disclosed circumstances justifying urgent relief).


4. Court’s Reasoning


Urgency as a procedural concept


The court approached urgency as a procedural mechanism governed principally by Uniform Rule 6(12). It emphasised that, except where a statute prescribes urgency for defined classes of matters, urgency is not determined by the nature of the right asserted but by the circumstances in which the applicant seeks relief and whether the applicant will be unable to obtain “substantial redress at a hearing in due course” without urgent intervention.


The court accepted that Parliament sometimes creates statutory urgency by specifying circumstances requiring urgent determination, referring by example to section 18(4)(iii) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 and section 5 of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from, and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998. Outside such instances, the court held that there is no general category of claims that are inherently urgent.


In explaining the practical operation of Rule 6(12), the court reasoned that urgency requires a demonstrated basis for concluding that later relief will not adequately protect the applicant’s interests. In many cases, urgent proceedings are justified because an applicant needs temporary protection against imminent harm pending final determination. In other cases, urgency may require a final determination because waiting would render the right practically ineffective. However, in all cases, the focus remains on the imminence and depth of harm if relief is withheld now, not on the formal classification of the cause of action.


Rejection of “inherent urgency” as a general idea


The court stated that legal representatives should discard the notion of “inherent urgency” as a general procedural shortcut to the urgent roll. It acknowledged that certain kinds of disputes are more likely to be urgent because the prejudice they typically entail is time-sensitive, giving spoliation as an example where matters often are urgent if brought promptly. The court’s point, however, was that even in such instances urgency derives from the factual context (the need to restore the status quo after an unlawful dispossession), not from an automatic preference attaching to the category of proceeding.


The court also addressed statements made in other matters suggesting that contempt proceedings may be inherently urgent. While accepting that enforcement of court orders can be urgent when time is truly of the essence, it expressed the view that contempt proceedings often involve serious coercive consequences requiring careful consideration, and therefore cannot soundly be treated as urgent merely because they are contempt proceedings. The court framed this as supporting the broader principle that urgency must be fact-driven, not category-driven.


Vindicatory proceedings and the urgent roll


Even if “inherent urgency” were conceptually possible, the court held that the rei vindicatio would not qualify. The court reasoned that property transactions (including leasing) routinely go wrong, and if each failed transaction justified urgent vindicatory proceedings, the urgent roll would be overwhelmed by repossession claims. The court considered that vindicatory disputes are ordinarily capable of being dealt with effectively through the ordinary motion and trial rolls, and indeed are commonly handled that way.


At the same time, the court did not exclude the possibility that a vindicatory claim may be urgent on particular facts, identifying as examples circumstances where there is an imminent threat that the property will be destroyed, lost, hidden, or placed permanently beyond reach. The key point remained that urgency would flow from demonstrated factual risk, not from the vindicatory character of the remedy.


Treatment of Jacobs v Mostert


The applicant relied on Jacobs v Mostert (16942/2021) [2021] ZAWCHC 213 (25 October 2021), where the Western Cape High Court had stated that inherent urgency underlies vindication claims and that vindicatory proceedings always have an element of inherent urgency. The court in the present matter scrutinised that reasoning and concluded that Jacobs did not identify supporting authority for those broad statements and appeared to have fashioned the concept without foundation in the cited sources.


The court also noted an internal tension in Jacobs, where it later suggested that inherent urgency did not absolve compliance with general principles of urgency, which the present court found difficult to reconcile with the earlier, more expansive propositions. For the reasons already given regarding the nature of urgency, the court held that Jacobs v Mostert was clearly wrong and declined to follow it.


Application to the applicant’s factual case


Having rejected inherent urgency, the court considered whether the applicant nevertheless established urgency on the facts. The applicant argued it had no guarantee it could recover the tractors if forced to proceed in the ordinary course, but the court recorded that the applicant accepted there were no facts on the papers supporting that apprehension.


The applicant also relied on continued wear and tear. The court treated this as inadequate because wear and tear is intrinsic to leasing and reflected in the contractual bargain, including the rent the lessor is entitled to claim. The applicant did not allege that deterioration exceeded fair wear and tear, and even if it did, the court found no basis to conclude the applicant’s rights could not be addressed later, including by a damages claim. Accordingly, the applicant had not shown that it would lack substantial redress in due course.


On these bases, the court held that the matter did not justify urgent enrolment and should be removed from the urgent roll.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court struck the application from the urgent roll.


The court ordered that Volvo Financial Services Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd pay the costs of the urgent hearing (i.e., the costs occasioned by the urgent proceedings).


No final determination on the merits of the underlying vindicatory claim was made in this judgment; the decision addressed urgency and the appropriateness of the matter proceeding on the urgent roll.


Cases Cited


Jacobs v Mostert (16942/2021) [2021] ZAWCHC 213 (25 October 2021).


Rustenburg Platinum Mines Limited v Lesojane (UM44/2022) [2022] ZANWHC 36 (21 June 2022).


Gauteng Boxing Promotors Association v Wysoke (22/6726) [2022] ZAGPJHC 18 (28 April 2022).


Legislation Cited


Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013, section 18(4)(iii).


Prevention of Illegal Eviction from, and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998, section 5.


Rules of Court Cited


Uniform Rule 6(12).


Held


The court held that, except where urgency is prescribed by statute, there is no category of claim that is “inherently urgent”; urgency must be determined from the circumstances showing that the applicant cannot obtain substantial redress in due course.


The court held further that a rei vindicatio is not inherently urgent, and that the proposition to the contrary in Jacobs v Mostert (16942/2021) [2021] ZAWCHC 213 (25 October 2021) was wrong and was not followed.


On the facts, the applicant failed to establish urgency because there was no evidential basis that the tractors would become irrecoverable if the matter proceeded in the ordinary course, and alleged prejudice from continued use amounted at most to ordinary wear and tear typical of leasing arrangements and remediable through later proceedings, including a claim for damages if warranted.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


Urgency in High Court motion proceedings is governed by Uniform Rule 6(12) and turns on whether an applicant will be unable to obtain substantial redress at a hearing in due course without urgent relief; it is not determined by the formal classification of the cause of action.


Save where a statute expressly provides otherwise, no class of proceedings enjoys inherent urgency or automatic preferential access to the urgent roll; urgency is a fact-sensitive enquiry directed at the imminence and seriousness of harm if relief is delayed.


A vindicatory claim (including a rei vindicatio) may be urgent only where the facts show a real and imminent risk that the property will be destroyed, lost, concealed, or placed beyond reach; the remedy’s vindicatory nature alone does not justify urgency.


Allegations of prejudice based merely on ordinary wear and tear associated with leased property do not, without more, establish urgency where the applicant’s rights can be vindicated in due course through ordinary proceedings, including contractual remedies and damages where appropriate.

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Volvo Financial Services Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v Adamas Tkolose Trading CC (2023/067290) [2023] ZAGPJHC 846 (1 August 2023)

F
LYNOTES:
CIVIL
PROCEDURE – Urgency –
Rei
vindicatio

Save
where a statute says so there is no particular kind of matter that
enjoys “inherent urgency” – Urgency
is
determined by the circumstances in which an application is
brought, not the kind of right being enforced – Even
if
there were such a thing as inherent urgency, the rei vindicatio is
not the sort of proceeding that would enjoy it –
The
contrary decision
Jacobs
v Mostert
[2021]
ZAWCHC 213
is wrong and not followed.
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG)
Case No.
2023/067290
REPORTABLE
OF INTEREST TO OTHER
JUDGES
REVISED
1/08/23
In
the matter between:
VOLVO
FINANCIAL SERVICES
SOUTHERN
AFRICA (PTY) LTD
Applicant
and
ADAMAS
TKOLOSE TRADING CC
Respondent
Summary
Practice - Urgency - Save
where a statute says so, there is no particular kind of matter that
enjoys “inherent urgency”
– Urgency is determined
by the circumstances in which an application is brought, not the kind
of right being enforced –
It follows that the
rei vindicatio
is not an inherently urgent proceeding – Even if there were
such a thing as inherent urgency, the
rei vindicatio
is not
the sort of proceeding that would enjoy it – The contrary
decision
Jacobs v Mostert
(16942/2021)
[2021] ZAWCHC 213
(25
October 2021) is clearly wrong.
JUDGMENT
WILSON
J:
1
The applicant, Volvo, is a financial
services company. It leased two tractors to the respondent, Adamas.
Adamas fell into arrears
on the payments due under the lease. Volvo
cancelled the lease and applied urgently to me to take possession of
the tractors.
2
On 25 July 2023, I struck Volvo’s
application from my urgent roll. I ordered Volvo to pay the costs of
the urgent hearing.
I indicated that I would give my reasons for
doing so in due course. These are my reasons.
3
Ms. Vergano, who appeared for Volvo,
contended that the application, being vindicatory in nature, was
inherently urgent. This was
incorrect for at least two reasons. The
first is that, save where prescribed by statute, there is no such
thing as an inherently
urgent claim. The second is that, even if
there were such a category of claim, a vindicatory proceeding of this
nature could never
be part of it. I will deal first with the nature
of urgency. I will then explain why vindicatory proceedings do not,
in any event,
enjoy privileged status in urgent court.
The nature of urgency
4
Sometimes, Parliament sets out the
circumstances in which a court ought to determine a specific type of
matter urgently (see, for
example,
section 18
(4) (iii) of the
Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013
and
section 5
of the Prevention of
Illegal Eviction from, and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of
1998). In all other cases, urgency is determined
not by the nature of
the claim brought, but by the circumstances in which the applicant
seeks its adjudication. Uniform Rule 6
(12) says that a matter is
urgent if the applicant will not be able to obtain “substantial
redress at a hearing in due course”
without at least some
urgent relief.
5
It follows that, whatever the nature of the
claim, there must be some reason why the applicant will not be able
to protect or advance
their legal rights later, unless they are given
specific relief now. Most of the time, the applicant requires no more
than temporary
protection from harm while the process of finally
determining their rights progresses. Sometimes, though, a final
determination
of rights is necessary on an urgent basis because those
rights will have little or no practical effect if the applicant has
to
wait weeks or months to vindicate them in the ordinary course.
6
There is, accordingly, no class of
proceeding that enjoys inherent preference. Counsel appearing in
urgent court would, in my view,
do well to put the concept of
“inherent urgency” out of their minds. There are, of
course, some types of case that
are more likely to be urgent than
others. The nature of the prejudice an applicant will suffer if they
are not afforded an urgent
hearing is often linked to the kind of
right being pursued. Spoliation is a classic example of this type of
claim. Provided that
the person spoliated acts promptly, the matter
will nearly always be urgent. The urgency does not, though, arise
from the nature
of the case itself, but from the need to put right a
recent and unlawful dispossession. The applicant comes to court
because they
wish to restore the ordinary state of affairs while a
dispute about the right to possess a thing works itself out. Cases
involving
possible deprivations of life and liberty, threats to
health, the loss of one’s home or some other basic essential of
daily
life, such as water or electricity, destruction of property, or
even crippling commercial loss, are also likely to be urgent.
7
It is sometimes said that contempt of court
proceedings are inherently urgent (see, for example,
Rustenburg
Platinum Mines Limited v Lesojane
(UM44/2022)
[2022] ZANWHC 36
(21 June 2022) at paragraph 7 and
Gauteng
Boxing Promotors Association v Wysoke
(22/6726)
[2022] ZAGPJHC 18 (28 April 2022) paragraph 14). I do not think that
can be true as a general proposition. I accept that
the enforcement
of a court order may well qualify as urgent, in situations where time
is of the essence, but it seems to me that
contempt proceedings
entail the exercise of powers which often demand the kind of careful
and lengthy consideration which is generally
incompatible with urgent
proceedings. For example, it cannot be sound judicial policy to
commit someone to prison, even where the
committal is suspended, or
to impose a fine, on an urgent basis, simply because that might be
the only way to enforce a court order.
There must, in addition, be
some other feature of the case that renders it essential that the
court order be instantly enforced,
such that the penalties associated
with contempt require immediate imposition.
8
The fundamental point is that a matter is
urgent because of the imminence and depth of harm that the applicant
will suffer if relief
is not given, not because of the category of
right the applicant asserts.
Vindicatory
proceedings
9
Even if there were special classes of
urgent claims, I do not think that the
rei
vindicatio
would be one of them. Every
day people buy, sell, lease and use each other’s property. If
an urgent application were justified
every time one of these
transactions went awry to the detriment of an owner who then sought
to retake the property concerned, High
Court Judges would seldom do
anything other than handle urgent vindicatory claims. Anyone familiar
with the daily work of the High
Court knows that vindicatory claims
are generally and effectively dealt with on the ordinary motion and
trial rolls, often in very
high volumes.
10
This is, of course, not the same as saying
that a vindicatory claim could never be urgent. Where there is an
imminent threat that
property will be destroyed, lost, hidden or
otherwise placed permanently beyond the reach of the owner, then a
case of urgency
may well be made out. But that depends on the
circumstances in which the claim arises, not the vindicatory nature
of the claim
itself.
11
All of this may seem self-evident, but for
Ms. Vergano’s reliance upon the decision of the Western Cape
High Court in
Jacobs v Mostert
(16942/2021)
[2021] ZAWCHC 213
(25 October 2021).
In that case, the court held that “inherent urgency underlies a
claim for the return of property (a vindication
claim)”. Such
urgency “is inferred from the importance our law attributes to
this remedy” (paragraph 14). In
addition, the court expressed
the view that “our law supports an approach that in respect of
a claim where a litigant pursues
vindication then the proceedings
always have an element of inherent urgency to it” (paragraph
15).
12
It is not clear to me where the court in
Jacobs
found
support for such far-reaching statements. None of the authorities
cited in the decision support the view that vindicatory
claims are
inherently urgent, and it appears to me that the concept of the
inherent urgency of vindicatory claims was something
the court
fashioned on its own. The
Jacobs
court itself appeared to appreciate the
extraordinary nature of its pronouncements when it suggested, later
on in the decision,
that the inherent urgency of vindication did not
mean absolving a litigant “from complying with the general
accepted principles
of urgency” (paragraph 16). I cannot say
how that remark is to be reconciled with the court’s earlier,
bolder pronouncements
on the inherent urgency of vindicatory
proceedings.
13
In any event, for the reasons I have given,
there can be no such inherent urgency.
Jacobs
is clearly wrong, and I declined to follow it.
Volvo’s claim to
urgency
14
Aside from the stillborn proposition that
vindicatory claims are inherently urgent, Ms. Vergano pressed the
argument that Volvo
had no guarantee that it would be able to recover
its property if it had to pursue a
rei
vindicatio
in the ordinary course.
However, Ms. Vergano was constrained to accept that there were no
facts on the papers to support such an
apprehension.
15
Ms. Vergano did, though, suggest that the
wear and tear to which the tractors will continue to be subjected
while the claim is heard
in the ordinary course will prejudice Volvo
as the owner of the vehicles. However, it is in the nature of
contracts of lease that
the thing let out will be worn and torn. That
is taken into the bargain when the parties agree on the rent payable,
which Volvo
is entitled to recover in an action on the contract.
Volvo did not allege that the damage to the tractors goes beyond fair
wear
and tear. Even if it does, there was no indication that Volvo’s
rights cannot be fully vindicated by an action for damages
brought at
a later stage.
16
It was for all these reasons that I struck
the application from the roll, and directed Volvo to pay Adamas’
costs.
S D J WILSON
Judge of the High Court
This judgment was
prepared by Judge Wilson. It is handed down electronically by
circulation to the parties or their legal representatives
by email,
by uploading it to the electronic file of this matter on Caselines,
and by publication of the judgment to the South African
Legal
Information Institute. The date for hand-down is deemed to be 1
August 2023.
HEARD ON:
25 July 2023
DECIDED ON:
25 July 2023
REASONS:
1 August 2023
For
the Applicant:
V
Vergano
Instructed
by
Sennekal
Simmonds Inc
For
the Respondent:
J
Magayi
Instructed
by
Magayi
Attorneys Inc