Madeleine Properties (Pty) Ltd v City Of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality and Another (4012/2022) [2023] ZAGPJHC 1306 (7 July 2023)

80 Reportability
Municipal Law

Brief Summary

Contempt of Court — Municipal services — Urgent application for interdict against termination of services — Applicant sought punitive costs against municipality for repeated contempt of court orders — Court granted further interim interdict restraining municipality from terminating services pending resolution of disputes — Municipality ordered to comply with previous court orders and pay applicant's costs on attorney and client scale.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


Introduction


The proceedings concerned an urgent application brought by Madeleine Properties (Pty) Ltd for relief premised on alleged contempt of court by the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality and its Municipal Manager. The application followed repeated prior litigation in which the applicant had obtained interdictory and mandatory orders restraining the respondents from terminating or reducing municipal services to the applicant’s property and directing compliance with earlier orders.


The parties were Madeleine Properties (Pty) Ltd (the applicant), as owner of the relevant immovable properties and operator of a hotel business, and the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality (first respondent) together with its Municipal Manager (second respondent). The dispute arose in the context of municipal billing, valuation, and service-termination measures threatened or implemented by the municipality despite pending disputes and existing court orders.


Procedurally, the urgent contempt application was enrolled for hearing on 16 May 2023. On the morning of the hearing, the parties reached agreement on the substantive relief and presented a draft order to the court. The only outstanding issue was costs, with the applicant seeking a punitive costs order against the first respondent, rather than costs on a party-and-party scale. The court granted an order incorporating the agreed relief and made a punitive costs order. The respondents subsequently requested written reasons for the costs order in terms of Rule 49, and the judgment provides those reasons.


The general subject-matter of the dispute concerned the lawfulness of threatened or actual termination of municipal services, the effect of lodged disputes under the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000, and the respondents’ alleged non-compliance with multiple court orders regulating service termination while disputes and review proceedings were pending. The judgment itself was confined to explaining why the court awarded attorney-and-client costs against the first respondent.


Material Facts


It was common cause that the applicant owned and operated a hotel business at the properties described in the order and was dependent on uninterrupted electricity supply for viable operations. The court accepted that disruptions to electricity supply had significant operational and reputational consequences for a hospitality business, and that reliance on generator power was costly and practically limiting.


The court relied on a largely common-cause litigation history demonstrating repeated municipal threats of disconnection, instances of disconnection, and repeated urgent court interventions. In May 2021, the first respondent served a notice of discontinuation of services. The applicant lodged a formal dispute on 11 May 2021 in terms of the Municipal Systems Act, directed (amongst other issues) at clarification regarding increased rates and taxes and the property valuation.


When the termination threat was not withdrawn, the applicant launched urgent proceedings under case number 23618/2021, brought in two parts, with Part A for interim interdictory relief pending Part B (a review of the decision increasing the property valuation). On 18 May 2021, an interdict was granted preventing termination or lowering of services pending the review (referred to in the reasons as the May Court Order). Notwithstanding that interdict, the municipality disconnected electricity to the property on 24 May 2021, after which supply was restored following correspondence.


Further disputes followed. On 29 June 2021, the applicant lodged a second dispute concerning municipal service billing, specifically electricity billing. On 15 July 2021, the applicant received a final demand in respect of alleged arrears. The applicant sought an undertaking that termination would not occur, but no response was received. This led to a further urgent application under case number 36713/2021, and on 28 July 2021 an order was granted by agreement granting further interdictory relief pending finalisation of the disputes and pending review proceedings. That order also required the respondents to file answering affidavits within 20 days in respect of postponed relief, which (on the facts accepted in the judgment) had not been done by the time of the present matter.


Despite the existing interdicts, the respondents served a notice of termination again on 11 January 2022. The applicant launched a further urgent application (under case number 4012/2022) seeking contempt relief. On 3 February 2022, an order was granted with mandatory relief directing compliance with all court orders and authorising the applicant to approach the court again on the same papers (as supplemented) if further contemptuous conduct occurred. The February order was served by hand on 6 April 2022, and receipt was acknowledged.


The record further reflected that on 29 April 2022 the respondents served a final demand which triggered litigation steps, but the matter was removed from the roll after the respondents’ attorneys indicated the demand would not be acted upon and had been issued by mistake. In December 2022, the applicant launched a further review relating to a further increase in a new valuation roll.


In April 2023, contractors of the first respondent arrived at the property, served a termination notice, and municipal services were disconnected. Although services were restored on 12 April 2023 during the day, a further disconnection occurred later that same day, with restoration only later that evening. Against this background, on 2 May 2023 the applicant served the current contempt application for adjudication in the normal course, reserving the right to enrol it urgently if further threats were made. Thereafter, final demands were delivered on 8 and 9 May 2023, and a disconnection notice was served on 10 May 2023 (described in the reasons as being served notwithstanding that the demands allowed a 14-day period before such a notice was warranted). The applicant amended its notice of motion to expedite the contempt application to the urgent roll of 16 May 2023.


The facts material to the determination of costs included that, on the morning of the hearing, the parties reached agreement on the operative interdict and compliance provisions, leaving only costs in dispute; and that the court regarded the opposition to the application (in the circumstances described) as unnecessary and abusive, particularly in light of the repeated history of non-compliance and delay attributed to the respondents.


Legal Issues


The central legal question the court was required to determine in the reasons judgment was whether, in the exercise of the court’s discretion on costs, the first respondent’s conduct warranted an award of punitive costs on the attorney-and-client scale, rather than costs on the ordinary party-and-party scale (or a tender on that scale).


This was not a determination of the merits of contempt (the contempt application itself was postponed sine die by agreement). Instead, the dispute concerned the application of established costs principles to the facts of the litigation history and the respondents’ conduct, including compliance with court orders, delay, and the appropriateness of opposition. It also entailed an evaluative judgment as to whether the conduct justified the court marking its displeasure by way of a punitive costs order, and whether such an order was fair in all the circumstances.


Court’s Reasoning


The court approached the costs issue on the basis that costs awards are discretionary and must be exercised judicially after considering all the circumstances, with a view to reaching a fair outcome. The court treated the question as one requiring consideration of what led to the urgent application, the conduct of the parties, and any other factor bearing on fairness.


In setting out the applicable legal framework, the court relied on authority that punitive costs serve as a mark of the court’s displeasure where an unsuccessful litigant’s conduct makes it unfair for the successful party to be left out of pocket for attorney-and-client costs. The judgment referred to the principle that vexatious, unscrupulous, dilatory, or mendacious conduct may justify attorney-and-client costs, and that a punitive order may be justified where a party adopts an “unconscionable stance”.


A further strand of the court’s reasoning was constitutional. The court emphasised the importance of section 165(5) of the Constitution, namely that court orders bind all persons and organs of state to which they apply, and that compliance with court orders is foundational to the rule of law and constitutional democracy. The court adopted the stance (supported by the cited authority) that disobedience of court orders undermines constitutional governance and cannot be treated lightly, particularly where the litigant is an organ of state.


The court also drew on authority emphasising the heightened standards applicable to public officials and organs of state in litigation, including duties of accountability, candour, and proper conduct. The reasoning treated this as relevant because the first respondent was a municipality and the second respondent its municipal manager, and because the litigation history reflected repeated instances where the municipality threatened or implemented service terminations in the face of existing interdicts and ongoing disputes.


Applying these principles to the facts, the court viewed the chronological record as demonstrating repeated and ongoing disregard of court orders and a failure to resolve the underlying disputes despite their having been pending since May 2021. The court characterised the respondents’ manner of conducting the litigation as lackadaisical, cavalier, and repeatedly contemptuous of various court orders. It held that the respondents unnecessarily dragged out the dispute for approximately two years, thereby causing undue expense to the applicant and diverting judicial resources.


The court also accepted the practical and commercial prejudice to the applicant’s hotel business from interruptions to electricity supply, including increased costs, reputational harm, and operational impacts. While these business impacts were not treated as independent legal grounds, they formed part of the broader context in which the court evaluated the fairness of an adverse punitive costs order, particularly in circumstances where the dispute could have been narrowed or resolved earlier through active participation by the respondents in dispute-resolution processes.


An additional, distinct factor in the court’s assessment was the nature of the litigation posture adopted by the respondents. The court considered it significant that the matter ultimately settled by agreement on the morning of the hearing, with only costs remaining in issue. On that basis, and given the background of repeated non-compliance and delay described in the reasons, the court concluded that the opposition to the urgent application was unnecessary and amounted to an abuse of process. This conclusion supported the court’s view that it was justifiable to award attorney-and-client costs as a punitive measure.


On the whole, the court held that the circumstances justified marking the court’s disapproval of the first respondent’s conduct through a punitive costs order, and that fairness required that the applicant should not bear any portion of the costs occasioned by the urgent proceedings.


Outcome and Relief


The court issued an order by agreement granting a further consolidated interim interdict restraining the respondents from terminating and/or lowering municipal services to the identified properties pending the outcome and final adjudication of the applicant’s disputes lodged with the municipality under section 95(f) read with section 102(2) of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000.


The court directed the respondents to comply with the prior court orders granted on 19 May 2021 and 28 July 2021, and ordered that the applicant’s municipal accounts be secured with a “dunning lock” until 11 August 2023, with provision for extension if the issues remained unresolved.


The contempt application under the present case number was postponed sine die, with the respondents directed to file answering affidavits within 20 days.


On costs, the court ordered that the first respondent pay all the applicant’s costs in respect of the urgent application of 16 May 2023 on the attorney-and-client scale. The present judgment provided written reasons for that punitive costs order following a request made in terms of Rule 49.


Cases Cited


Geerdts v Multichoice Africa (Pty) Ltd [1998] ZALAC 10 (29 June 1998).


Du Toit NO v Thomas NO and Others (635/15) [2016] ZASCA 94 (1 June 2016).


Moodley v Kenmont School and Others [2019] ZACC 37; 2020 (1) SA 410 (CC); 2020 BCLR 74 (CC).


Ndabeni v Municipal Manager: OR Tambo District Municipality and Another (Case no 1066/19) [2021] ZASCA 08 (21 January 2021).


Merafong City v Anglogold Ashanti Ltd [2016] ZACC 35; 2017 (2) BCLR 182 (CC); 2017 (2) SA 211 (CC).


Public Protector v South African Reserve Bank [2019] ZACC 29; 2019 (9) BCLR 1113 (CC); 2019 (6) SA 253 (CC).


Minister of Police v Sheriff, Mthatha and Another 2022 (1) SA 229 (ECM).


Orr v Solomon 1907 TS 281.


Plastic Converters Association of South Africa on behalf of Members v National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (2016) 37 ILJ 2815 (LAC) ([2016] ZALAC 39).


Legislation Cited


Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, section 165(5).


Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000, sections 95(f) and 102(2), and section 54A.


Local Government: Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998.


Rules of Court Cited


Uniform Rules of Court, Rule 49.


Held


The court held that a punitive costs order on the attorney-and-client scale was warranted against the first respondent because the respondents’ conduct, viewed against the history of repeated interdicts, repeated threats or implementation of disconnections, and prolonged failure to resolve the disputes, justified the court marking its displeasure. The court considered the respondents’ approach to the litigation to have been dilatory and contemptuous of court orders, and it regarded the opposition to the urgent proceedings as unnecessary and abusive, particularly given that the substantive relief was resolved by agreement on the morning of the hearing.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The judgment applied the principle that costs are within the discretion of the court, which must be exercised judicially with reference to fairness in all the circumstances, including the conduct of the parties and the events giving rise to the litigation.


It applied the principle that punitive costs on the attorney-and-client scale may be awarded to mark a court’s disapproval where a litigant’s conduct is vexatious, unscrupulous, dilatory, dishonest, in bad faith, or otherwise amounts to an abuse of process, and where it would be unfair to expect the successful party to bear any of the costs occasioned by the litigation.


It applied the constitutional principle in section 165(5) of the Constitution that court orders bind organs of state and must be obeyed, and that non-compliance undermines the rule of law. In this context, the judgment proceeded on the basis that organs of state and public officials are expected to adhere to heightened standards of accountability and proper conduct in litigation, including not obstructing proceedings through dilatory tactics and ensuring candid, proper engagement with disputes and court processes.

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[2023] ZAGPJHC 1306
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Madeleine Properties (Pty) Ltd v City Of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality and Another (4012/2022) [2023] ZAGPJHC 1306 (7 July 2023)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA
CASE NUMBER
:
4012/2022
In the matter between:
MADELEINE
PROPERTIES (PTY) LTD
Applicant
AND
THE
CITY OF TSHWANE METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY
First
Respondent
THE
MUNICIPAL MANAGER OF THE CITY OF TSHWANE METROPOLITAN
MUNICIPALITY
Second
Respondent
JUDGMENT
OOSTHUIZEN-SENEKAL AJ:
[1]
On 16 May 2013 the
applicant brought an urgent application on the grounds that the
respondents are in contempt of the court orders
granted on 19 May
2021; 29 July 2021 and 3 February 2022 under case number(s)
2361/2021, 4012/2022 and 36713/2021.
[2]
On the morning of the
hearing the parties informed me that they had reached an agreement in
the matter whereafter a draft order
was presented to me.  The
only issue which the parties failed to agree upon was that of costs.
The
applicant declined to accept the respondents tender of costs on a
party and party scale and sought a punitive cost order against
the
first respondent.
After
hearing oral arguments from both sides regarding costs I granted the
following order:
Having
read the papers filed on record and having heard the representatives
of the parties, by agreement between the parties, it
is ordered:
1.
A further
consolidated interim interdict is granted restraining the first and
second respondents from terminating and/or lowering
(or threatening
to do so) the municipal services to Portion
0
of Erf 80 Arcadia, Registration Division J.R Province of Gauteng,
held by Deed of Transfer T8967/2003, and Portion 0 of Erf 1119

Arcadia, Registration Division J.R., Province of Gauteng, held by
Deed of Transfer T24844/1965, situated at 230 Hamilton Street
// 562
Pretorius Street, Pretoria, also known as the Pretoria Hotel (herein
“the properties”), pending the outcome
and final
adjudication of:
1.1
the disputes lodged by the applicant with the first respondent on 11
May 2021 and 29 June 2021 in terms of the provisions of
Section 95(f)
read together with Section 102(2) of the Municipal Systems Act, No.
32 of 200 (herein ‘the Systems Act”)
in respect of
municipal accounts with numbers 2016494312 and 2047270170 (herein
“the applicant’s accounts)
2.
The first and second
respondents are directed and ordered to comply with the Court Orders
granted by this Court on 19 May 2021 (under
case numbers 23618/2021:
“the Court Order”), and 28 July 2021 (under case number
36713/2021: “the second Court
Order”);
3.
The first and second
respondents shall ensure that pending the operation of this interdict
and the previous interdicts, the applicant’s
accounts are
secured with a “dunning lock” which shall be in place
until 11 August 2023, whereafter, and if the issues
between the
parties as set out in order 1 above have not been resolved, the first
and second respondents shall ensure that the
secured “dunning
locks”, shall be extended.
4.
The contempt
application with this case number is postponed
sine
die
and
the respondents shall file their answering affidavits within 20
(twenty) days from the date of this order.
5.
The first respondent
shall pay all the applicant’s costs in respect of the urgent
application of 16 May 2023 on the scale
as between attorney and
client.
[3]
Consequently, on 17
May 2023 the respondents requested written reasons in terms of Rule
49 regarding prayer 5, the cost order.
Due to internal
communication challenges, I only received the said request on 26 June
2023.
[4]
The applicant is
Madeleine Properties (Pty) Ltd, (“the applicant”), a
company with limited liability, duly established
and incorporated in
terms of the Company Laws of the Republic of South Africa and the
registered owner of Portion 0 of Erf 80,
Arcadia, Registration
Division JR Province of Gauteng, held by deed of transfer T8967/2003.
The applicant conducts a business as
a hotel which accommodates
hundreds of guests, which also consists of a conference and function
venue.  The applicant is dependent
on electricity supply to be
sustainable.  Although the applicant has access to a backup
generator, it cannot continually rely
on generator-power, due to the
enormous costs thereof and the limitation generator-power imposes.
In addition, the tranquillity
of the
hotel environment is
negatively impacted and the increased costs will mean the downfall of
the hotel.  It is furthermore important
to emphasize that any
termination and/or interruption of municipal utilities to the
property causes reputational damage to the
applicant who can
permanently lose clientele if the situation carries on indefinitely.
[5]
The first respondent
is the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality (“the
municipality”), a municipality duly established
in terms of the
Local Government Municipal Structures Act, Act 117 of 1998.
[6]
The second respondent
is the Municipal Manager of the City of Tshwane Metropolitan
Municipality (“the municipal manager”).
The
municipal manager is the head of the municipality's administration
appointed in terms of section 54A of the Local Government:
Municipal
Systems Act, Act 32 of 2000 (“the Systems Act”).
[7]
These are my reason
for granting a punitive cost order against the first respondent.
[8]
The
history of this litigation is replete with facts that are common
course between the parties.
[9]
It
is necessary to comprehensively traverse the history and background
facts of the matter, and in particular to highlight what
was no less
than egregious conduct on the part of the first respondent in the
application, which led to the punitive order of costs
being granted.
[10]
For
sake of convenience the relevant chronological history of the matter
will be set out in table form as follows:
DATE
EVENT
5
May 2021
First
respondent served a notice of discontinuation of services on the
applicant.
11
May 2021
Applicant
lodged a formal dispute with the first respondent in terms of the
relevant provisions of the Systems Act, which
dispute was directed
at,
inter
alia
,
seeking clarification on the increase of the applicant’s
rates and taxes account and valuation of the property.
13
May 2021
Due
to the fact that the notice of termination of municipal services
not being withdrawn and remained a threat, the applicant
launched
an application against the first respondent under case number
23618/2021 which was heard on 18 May 2021.  The
said
application was brought in two parts - Part A being for
interdictory relief pending Part B, the latter of which was
a
review application to set aside the decision by the Municipal
Valuer increasing the property value.
18
May 2021
Mbongwe
AJ heard the said Interdict application under case number
23618/2021 and granted an order interdicting the first respondent

from terminating or lowering the
municipal
services to the property pending Part B of the application. (“the
May Court Order)
24
May 2021
First
respondent, notwithstanding the existing interdict preventing it
from doing so, disconnected the electricity supply
to the
property.  Following various correspondence addressed to the
first respondent the electrical supply was restored.
29
June 2021
Applicant
issued a second dispute with and to the first respondent
pertaining to the billing of its municipal services, specifically

electricity billing.
15
July 2021
Applicant
received a final demand in respect of alleged arrears on its
municipal accounts.
Considering
the
May
2021 order, the subsequent termination of the applicant’s
municipal services and the reconnection, following the
applicant’s
demand, the applicant again, through its attorneys, demanded an
undertaking that termination of the municipal
services shall not
be effected.  No response was forthcoming in the regard from
the first respondent.
23
July 2021
Applicant
again approached the Court on an urgent basis for interdictory
relief against the respondents under case number
36713/2021, which
application was set down for 28 July 2021.
27
July 2021
Respondents
delivered a notice to oppose the urgent application set down for
28 July 2021.
28
July 2021
After
engagement with the respondents, Mbongwe J granted an order by
agreement between the parties.  In terms of the
order,
further interdictory relief was granted against the respondents
pending finalisation of the disputes lodged with the
first
respondent, pending the review and pending the outcome of the
remainder of the relief sought in that application (since
some of
the relief was postponed
sine
die
).
The respondents were also ordered to file their answering
affidavit in the application under case number 36713/2021

pertaining to the postponed relief, within 20 days from date of
the order.  To date, no answering affidavit has been

delivered. (“the July Court Order”)
11
January 2022
Respondents
in disregard of the existing interdicts again served a notice of
termination of services on the applicant.
24
January 2022
In
response the applicant launched an application under this case
number on an urgent basis for relief holding the respondents
in
contempt of court and compelling compliance with the two court
orders granted.
3
February 2022
Janse
van Nieuwenhuizen J granted an order which contained mandatory
relief ordering the respondents to comply with all court
orders
and also authorised the applicant to approach this Court on the
same papers, as supplemented, in the event of further
contemptuous
behaviour on the part of the respondents.  (“February
Court Order)
6
April 2022
A
copy of the court order dated 3 February 2022 was served on the
respondents by hand, which the respondents have acknowledged

receipt thereof.
29
April 2022
Respondents
served a final demand on the applicant, which triggered this
application.  After the exchange of correspondence
between
the parties’ legal teams, the matter was removed from the
roll since the first respondent attorneys advised
that the final
demand will not be acted upon and was issued by mistake.
13
December 2022
Applicant
launches a second review under case number 061018/2022, reviewing
a further increase in new valuation roll.
6
April 2023
Contractors
of the first respondent arrived at the property and served a
termination notice of electricity supply to the property
on the
applicant.  The municipal services were disconnected by the
contractors.
11
April 2023
The
applicant’s attorneys of record addressed a letter to the
respondents and their attorneys of record advising of
the
unlawfulness of the termination of the applicant’s municipal
services and requesting an undertaking to restore
the electricity
supply to the property.
12
April 2023
At
approximately 11h20, the applicant’s municipal services were
restored.  Applicant did not proceed with the envisaged

urgent application being prepared.
At
approximately 13h35, a contractor of the first respondent again
arrived at the property and advised the applicant that
he was
there to disconnect municipal services of the applicant.
At
about 15h30 the disconnection of the applicant’s electricity
supply was effected by the contractor.
At
23h00 the electricity supply to the applicant was restored by the
first respondent.
2
May 2023
Applicant
served the current contempt of court application on the
respondents’ attorney of record to be adjudicated
in the
normal course with reservation to bring it on urgent basis should
further threats of termination be issued by the
respondents of
services to the property.
8
May 2023
The
respondents’ attorneys of record confirmed receipt of the
contempt application.
Respondents
delivered a final demand to discontinue services under account
number 2016494312 to the applicant.
9
May 2023
Respondents
delivered a final demand to discontinue services under account
number 2047270170 to the applicant.
10
May 2023
Respondents
served a disconnection notice upon the applicant, notwithstanding
the demands allowing a period of 14 days before
such notice was
warranted.
Applicant
amended its notice of motion to expediate the contempt application
to be heard on urgent court roll- 16 May 2023.
11
May 2023
Notice
to oppose filed by the respondents.
[11]
It
is known to the parties that in awarding costs this court has a
discretion which should be exercised judicially upon the
consideration
of the facts in the matter and that, in essence, a
decision be made where fairness to both sides should be considered.
This
requires me to consider the circumstances that has led to
the urgent application, the conduct of the parties and any other
factor
which may have a bearing on the issues of costs and
accordingly make an order which is fair.
[1]
[12]
In
considering an appropriate order as to costs, a court must exercise
its discretion judicially to bring about a fair result.  Punitive

costs serve as a mark of a court’s displeasure with one or more
facets of the unsuccessful litigant’s conduct. In
Geerdts
v Multichoice Africa (Pty) Ltd
[2]
,
Myburgh JP held that:

Vexatious,
unscrupulous, dilatory or mendacious conduct on the part of an
unsuccessful litigant may render it unfair for his opponent
to be out
of pocket in the matter of his own attorney and client costs”.
[13]
The
Supreme Court of Appeal in
Du
Toit NO v Thomas NO and Others
[3]
held
that a punitive costs order is also justified where a party displayed
an “unconscionable stance”.
[14]
It
is of the utmost importance to be alive to the provisions of section
165(5) of the Constitution that an order or decision issued
by a
court binds all persons to whom and organs of state to which it
applies.  There is no doubt that court orders, once issued,
are
binding and must therefore be complied with.
[4]
In
Moodley
v Kenmont School and Others
[5]
Madlanga
J said:

I
cannot but again refer to section 165(5) of the Constitution which
provides that ‘[a]n order or decision issued by a court
binds
all persons to whom and organs of state to which it applies’.
This is of singular importance under our constitutional

dispensation, which is founded on, amongst others, the rule of law.
The judicial authority of the Republic vests in the courts.

Thus, courts are [the] final arbiters on all legal disputes,
including constitutional disputes.  If their orders were
to be
disobeyed at will, that would not only be ‘a recipe for a
constitutional crisis of great magnitude’, '[i]t [would]
strike
at the very foundations of the rule of law and of our constitutional
democracy.”
[15]
In
line with a notable trend by our courts in recent times to hand down
punitive orders, particularly against malfeasant state officials,
the
Supreme Court of Appeal in the matter of
Ndabeni
v Municipal Manager: OR Tambo District Municipality and Another
[6]
granted
a punitive costs order against respondents to mark its displeasure at
the manner in which they conducted the litigation.
In doing so,
the Supreme Court of Appeal reinforced the principle that organs of
state are duty bound to conduct themselves
in an exemplary manner,
remarking that:

The
lackadaisical manner in which the respondents conducted this
litigation warrants a punitive costs order against them.  They

dragged the litigation unnecessarily to the detriment of the
appellant.  Almost all their responses to the appellant were

preceded by an application for condonation for the late filing of
their documents.  They were not candid with the court and

provided information scantily.  They did nothing for at least
nine months until the appellant launched the contempt application.

This must be frowned upon by this Court in line with what was
said by Cameron J in Merafong.”
[16]
The majority judgment
is important for a number of reasons.  Most obviously, because
it reaffirms the pertinent provisions
of section 165 (5) of the
Constitution that speak to the important constitutional role of
courts of law, their independence, and
the sanctity of their orders,
and reaffirms the rule of law, a foundational value that underpins
our constitutional democracy.
Perhaps, however, its real
significance lies in the fact that the judgment signals that the
majority were not prepared to
let obstructive and dilatory legal
tactics by a state litigant win the day.
[17]
As
was recently emphasised by the Constitutional Court in
Public
Protector v South African Reserve Bank
[7]
:

The
Constitution requires public officials to be accountable and observe
heightened standards in litigation.  They must not
mislead or
obfuscate.  They must do right and they must do it properly.
They are required to be candid and place a full
and fair
account of the facts before a court.”
[18]
In my view, by parity
of reasoning the above statements apply with equal force in the
circumstances of this case.  The history
and background facts
set out above clearly speaks for itself and I need not discuss the
respondents’ inexcusable approach
to the applicant’s
predicament.  The respondents’ conduct has been repeatedly
contemptuous of various court orders.
[19]
Therefore, the
lackadaisical and cavalier manner in which the respondents conducted
this litigation warrants a punitive costs order
against them.  They
dragged out the litigation unnecessarily and without justifiable
cause to the detriment of the appellant.
They did nothing,
since May 2021, to resolve the disputes until the appellant launched
the contempt application.  This
must be frowned upon by this
Court in line with what was said by Cameron J in
Merafong
supra.
[20]
The
applicant conducts a business in the hospitality industry, and it
make a contribution to the economy of the country.  The
food
hospitality industry relies on uninterrupted electricity to ensure
their product maintains up to standard.  Sustaining
constant
refrigeration of food produce is crucial, and unlawful termination of
electricity supply compromises this, which could
result in losses
from having to dispose of food and increasing the risk of
contamination.  Furthermore, such businesses lose
clientele,
because of not being able to provide guaranteed services during
functions and or conferences.  Companies, as the
applicant, are
forced to explore alternative methods to sustain their businesses.
All this could be prevented if the respondents’
actively and
expeditiously participate in disputes that arise similar to the
dispute in the present matter.  It is unacceptable
that a
dispute of this nature dragged on for two years.
[21]
As
already indicated costs have been awarded on a punitive scale against
the respondents in this matter.  The conduct of the
respondents,
in particular, has demonstrated the necessity for such an order.  The
respondents displayed a complete disdain
for the applicant in the way
they treated the applicant.  The respondents have been
dismissive of the applicants’ pleas
for the matter to be dealt
with expeditiously since May 2021, two years ago.  The principal
contributors to the unnecessary
prolonging of this dispute and
processes after May 2021 are the respondents.  This has not only
diverted judicial resources,
but also caused undue expense to be
incurred and effort to be expended by the applicant.
[22]
In
so far as the punitive costs were concerned, I am of the view that,
it unnecessary for the applicant’s application to have
been met
with any opposition, as I find that such opposition was simply an
abuse of process and misguided.  In fact, on the
morning of the
hearing the parties reached an agreement and an order was granted to
that effect.  On that basis alone a cost
order on attorney and
client scale was justifiable.
[8]
[23]
In
Minister
of Police v Sheriff, Mthatha and Another
[9]
reiterated
the test  regarding punitive cost orders as follows:

[57]
The following remarks relating to an award of punitive costs on an
attorney and client scale in
Public
Protector
[10]
are
helpful:

[221].
. . An award of punitive costs on an attorney and client scale may be
warranted in circumstances where it would be unfair
to expect a party
to bear any of the costs occasioned by litigation.
[222]
The question whether a party should bear the full brunt of a costs
order on an attorney and own client scale must be answered
with
reference to what would be just and equitable in the circumstances of
a particular case.  A court is bound to secure
a just and fair
outcome.
[223]
More than 100 years ago, Innes CJ stated the principle that costs on
an attorney and client scale are awarded when a court
wishes to mark
its disapproval of the conduct of a litigant.
[11]
Since then this principle has been endorsed and applied in a
long line of cases and remains applicable.  Over the years,

courts have awarded costs on an attorney and client scale to mark
their disapproval of fraudulent, dishonest or
mala
fides
(bad
faith) conduct; vexatious conduct; and conduct that amounts to an
abuse of the process of court.”
[12]
[24]
For
all the above reasons a punitive order of costs against the
respondents was warranted in this matter.
CSP OOSTHUIZEN-SENEKAL
ACTING JUDGE OF THE
HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA
This
judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties’ representatives by email, by being uploaded to
Case
Lines
and by release to SAFLII.  The date and time for
hand-down is deemed to be 16h00 on 7 July 2023.
DATE OF HEARING: 16
May 2023
DATE JUDGMENT
DELIVERED:  7 July 2023
APPEARANCES
:
Counsel for the
Applicant:
ADVOCATE D VAN DEN BOGERT
Chambers, Menlyn Maine
Tshwane Society of
Advocates
Cell: 083 556 7397
Email:
dingenus@counseltsa.co.za
Attorney for the
Applicant:
JACQUES CLASSEN
INCORPORATED ATTORNEYS
Lynnwood Office Park,
Suite 5
474 Lynnwood Road
Lynnwood, Pretoria
Tel: (012) 942 9478
Email:
ansie@propdevlaw.co.za
leslie@propdevlaw.co.za
Counsel for the First
and Second Respondent:
Adv KT Mogatla
Attorney for the First
and Second Respondent:
Lawtons Africa
Tel.: 011 286 6900
Email:
sj.thema@lawtonsafrica.com
Email:
sipho.mtsweni@lawtonsafrica.com
Email:
andile.mphale@lawtonsafrica.com
[1]
Erasmus
Superior Court Practice 2
nd
Edition,
Vol 2, pages D5-5 – D5-26
[2]
[1998]
ZALAC 10
(29 June 1998) at para [48].
[3]
(635/15)
[2016] ZASCA 94
(1 June 2016).
[4]
Ndabeni
v Municipal Manager: OR Tambo District Municipality and Another
(Case
no 1066/19)
[2021]
ZASCA 08
(21
January 2021).
[5]
[2019]
ZACC 37
;
2020 (1) SA 410
(CC);
2020 BCLR 74
(CC) at para 36.
[6]
Case
no 1066/19)
[2021] ZASCA 08
(21 January 2021) Also see
Merafong
City v Anglogold Ashanti Ltd
[2016]
ZACC 35
,
2017 (2) BCLR 182
(CC);
2017 (2) SA 211
CC.
[7]
2019
(6) 253 (CC) at para [152]
[8]
Minister
of Police v Sheriff, Mthatha and Another
2022
(1) SA 229 (ECM)
[9]
2022
(1) SA 229
(ECM) para [57}.
[10]
Public
Protector v South African Reserve Bank
[2019]
ZACC 29;
2019
(9) BCLR 1113
(CC)2019
(6) SA 253
(CC),
at para 220.
[11]
Orr
v Solomon
1907
TS 281
[12]
Also
see
Plastic Converters Association of South Africa on behalf of Members
v National Union of Metalworkers of SA (2016) 37 ILJ 2815
(LAC)
([2016] ZALAC (39), where the Labour Appeal Court held, in the
context of non-constitutional matters, that —

(t)he
scale of attorney and client is an extraordinary one which should be
reserved for cases where it can be found that a litigant
conducted
itself in a clear and indubitably vexatious and reprehensible
conduct. Such an award is exertional and is intended
to be very
punitive and indicative of extreme opprobrium.”