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[2013] ZASCA 17
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Master Currency (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for South African Revenue Services (155/2012) [2013] ZASCA 17; [2013] 3 All SA 135 (SCA); 2014 (6) SA 66 (SCA); 75 SATC 113 (20 March 2013)
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THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF
SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT
Reportable
Case
No: 155/2012
In
the matter between:
MASTER CURRENCY (PTY) LIMITED
...........................................................
Appellant
and
THE COMMISSIONER FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN
REVENUE SERVICES
.................................................................................
Respondent
Neutral
citation:
Master Currency v CSARS
(155/2012)
[2013] ZASCA
17
(20 March 2013)
Coram:
Malan, Leach JJA and Southwood, Schoeman
and Van der Merwe AJJA
Heard:
1 March 2013
Delivered: 20 March 2013
Summary: Value-Added Tax – supply of services –
bureaux de change – duty free areas at international airport –
whether services should be zero rated – s 11(2)(
l
) of
Value-Added Tax Act 89 of 1991.
_________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
On appeal from:
the Tax Court, Johannesburg
(Victor J sitting as President):
The appeal is dismissed with costs.
___________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
Malan JA (Leach JA, Southwood, Schoeman and Van der
Merwe AJJA concurring):
[1] The appellant, Master Currency (Pty) Ltd, appeals
against the dismissal by the Johannesburg Tax Court (Victor J) of its
appeal
against the revised value-added tax assessments in respect of
the October 2003 to January 2005 tax period on the basis, as it was
expressed in respondent’s assessment of 8 August 2007, that –
‘
the commission and transaction fees
received by the 2 branches operating in the duty free area of the
then Johannesburg International
Airport should be standard rated in
terms of section 7(1)(a) of the Value-Added Tax No. 89 of 1991 .…’.
It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that the
services rendered by the appellant in the duty free area of the
airport were
not subject to VAT at the standard rate in terms of s
7(1)(
a
) of the
Value-Added Tax Act 89 of 1991 but that,
on a
proper construction of s 11(2)(
l
),
they should have been zero rated.
[2] In 1999 the appellant was awarded the tender to
operate two bureaux de change in the duty free area of the then
Johannesburg
International Airport. There were numerous ‘duty
free shops’ in this area where departing passengers were able
to purchase
goods free of taxes and duties. There was also a VAT
refund administrator stationed in the area where departing
non-residents could
collect cheques for the VAT they claimed back on
purchases they had made in South Africa.
[3] The services rendered by the appellant at the two
bureaux were mostly cash transactions concluded with departing
non-resident
passengers in possession of a boarding pass and a
passport. These passengers would present South African rand to the
appellant
either in cash, travellers’ cheques or cheques
received from the VAT refund administrator. The appellant would then
convert
the rand into foreign currency, calculate the exchange rate
margin and the commission and transaction fee and present the
departing
passengers with an invoice. The latter would then pay over
a rand amount to the appellant in exchange for the equivalent in
foreign
currency less commission and a fee. The two bureaux dealt
with non-residents only in accordance with an instruction by the
Reserve
Bank that residents were not allowed to purchase foreign
currency as part of their travel allowance once they had passed
through
passport control and emigration. The appellant made a margin
on the foreign exchange based on the difference between the rate at
which it bought and at which it sold. It also charged a commission on
the transaction as a percentage of its value, and levied
a fee per
transaction. The services rendered by the appellant are ‘financial
services’ as defined in s 2(1) consisting
of the exchange of
currency.
[4] According to the evidence of Mr Mark Frankel, who
was at one time its general manager of finance and later its finance
director,
the appellant was established in 1995 with the assistance
of Rennies Foreign Exchange. It was licensed in 1997 by the Reserve
Bank
as a foreign exchange dealer with limited authority to deal in
foreign exchange for travelling purposes with non-residents visiting
and residents leaving South Africa. It had branches throughout South
Africa and until 2003 used Rennies’ point of sale computer
system at all its branches. Rennies did not conduct foreign exchange
business in duty-free areas and its software automatically
calculated
VAT at the standard rate on fees charged for foreign exchanges
services. The appellant used the Rennies software in
the duty free
areas. This functionality, calculating VAT at the standard rate,
could not be turned off. In October 2003 the appellant
implemented
its own point of sale system which included a functionality that
allowed a branch to charge or not charge VAT. The
appellant assumed
that no VAT had to be charged in the duty free areas and in 2003
turned off the VAT functionality in branches
in those areas. The
basis for that assumption was the perception that no VAT was
chargeable in a duty free area, a perception aided
by complaints of
non-resident customers. The previous concessionaire of the two
bureaux was ABSA Bank Ltd and the appellant had
taken over a number
of its employees, including its manager, who informed it that goods
sold and services supplied in the departure
area were deemed to be
sold or supplied in international territory. The result of this was
that between 1999, when the appellant
commenced operations at the two
bureaux de change, and 2003, VAT was charged on its fees and
commissions at the standard rate,
but this was not done after October
2003 when the appellant’s own point of sale system was
introduced.
[5] During their 2004 audit KPMG noticed that the two
bureaux de change were not charging VAT. The matter was referred to
the South
African Revenue Service for clarification resulting in the
ruling and eventual assessment.
Application of the Act
[6] It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that
judicial notice could be taken of the ‘clear and
well-established fact’
that there are duty free areas at many
airports where commercial transactions by passengers boarding
international flights are
free from government duties. In addition,
the appellant submitted that, although the long title of the Act was
intended to be of
general application throughout the Republic, there
was no indication of an intention to levy VAT in duty free areas. The
Act, it
was furthermore submitted, was understood and applied by the
revenue and other authorities in this manner.
[7] The appellant’s argument
that the Act does not apply to the supply of goods and services in
the duty free area is not
based on any particular provision. Section
7(1)(
a
)
clearly applies to the whole of the Republic. It imposes value-added
tax:
‘
(1) Subject to the exemptions,
exceptions, deductions and adjustments provided for in this Act,
there shall be levied
and paid for the benefit of the National
Revenue Fund a tax, to be known as the value-added tax—
(
a
) on the supply by any vendor of goods or services supplied
by him on or after the commencement date in the course or furtherance
of any enterprise carried on by him;
(
b
) on the importation of any goods into the Republic by any
person on or after the commencement date; and
(
c
) on the supply of any imported services by any person on or
after the commencement date,
calculated at the rate of 14 per cent on the value of the supply
concerned or the importation, as the case may be.’
The Republic is defined in s 1, ‘in the
geographical sense’, as –
‘
the territory of the Republic of South
Africa and includes the territorial waters, the contiguous zone and
the continental shelf
referred to respectively in sections 4, 5 and 8
of the Maritime Zones Act, 1944 (Act 15 of 1994).’
‘
Duty free areas’ at
international airports
[8] For the appellant to escape
liability for VAT it must bring itself within one of the ‘exemptions,
exceptions, deductions
and adjustments’ provided for in the Act
(see also s 37). The Act as it read during the period of assessment
contained no
reference to a ‘duty free area’ or a ‘tax
free area’ and did not use a similar expression.
1
The appellant did not bring itself
within the confines of the Act but, as I have said, instead,
suggested that a court could take
judicial notice of a so-called
‘well-established fact’ that there are duty free areas at
airports. Courts will generally
take judicial notice of facts which
are either so notorious as not to be the subject of reasonable
dispute or which are capable
of immediate and accurate
demonstration.
2
The suggestion that judicial notice
may be taken of the fact that many airports have areas where
commercial transactions can be
concluded free from government duties
can obviously not be accepted. It is an excessively broad
proposition, full of uncertainty
as to the nature of the ‘duties’
and ‘transactions’. No reliable evidence was presented to
support this
proposition, particularly in so far as services are
concerned. The documentation supplied by the appellant forms no basis
for a
proper comparative law inquiry into the issue involved, nor
does it provide any useful approach to the construction of s
12(2)(
l
).
[9] The appellant invoked two rules
of construction,
contemporanea
expositio
and
subsecuta
observatio
,
contending that VAT was not payable
in the duty free areas and was in fact not paid (except by the
appellant during 1999 to 2003).
This, it was suggested, supported the
contention that the relevant authorities construed the Act in the
manner it contended. The
appellant made reference to the canon of
construction that a court may look ‘not only upon the language
of the enactment,
but … “at the surrounding
circumstances, and may consider its objects, its mischiefs and its
consequences.”’
3
[10] The appellant submitted that a
cardinal consideration in determining the intention of the
legislature is to consider the fact
that the legislation had been
uniformly understood in a certain sense by those entrusted with its
administration. But one should
read
R
v Detody
,
4
on which reliance was placed for this
proposition, more carefully. Innes CJ there said:
‘
It will be proper also to pay some regard
to the manner in which the Ordinance in question and the laws which
preceded it upon the
subject of native passes have been administered
by successive Governments and succeeding sets of officials. Custom,
of course,
cannot prevail over the plain and unambiguous meaning of a
statute, but where language is open to two constructions, then the
fact
that it has been uniformly read in one sense by those entrusted
with the administration of the measure cannot be ignored. The Civil
Law attached great importance to prior custom as a factor in the
interpretation of statutes … But the tendency of modern
decisions is greatly to restrict the weight to be attached to
contemporaneous exposition. … “No usage can control
the
unambiguous language of the law ….
”’
Indeed in
Nissan
SA (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for Inland Revenue
5
it was remarked with regard to both
canons of construction:
‘
Those doctrines rest upon two foundations.
One is that there must at least be room for the interpretation in the
language of the
provision. The other is that the interpretation must
have been accorded it for sufficiently long without it being gainsaid
that
it provides good reason for concluding that that is what it was
intended to mean.’
The appellant could not identify the
provisions of the Act which were understood by the authorities in the
way suggested. Failing
that,
there
is no room for the application of the two canons of construction and
for a reliance on circumstances surrounding the legislation.
The
canons are canons of construction applicable to the language that
must be construed. Absent a text they have no function.
[11] The appellant also relied upon the respondent’s
s 72 ruling of 21 May 2003 in support of its contention that there
are
numerous duty free shops in the duty free areas where goods can
be obtained without the payment of VAT. The full text of the ruling
could not be found but it is referred to in a letter by the
respondent to KPMG. The relevant passage read as follows:
‘
The section 72 ruling … provides
that the duty free shops in South African International Airports may,
subject to limitations
set out in the said letter, supply movable
goods at the zero rate to persons, who have already been cleared by
immigration and
who are in possession of a valid boarding pass for an
international flight to an “export country” as defined in
section
1 of the Act. It should be noted that the ruling was not
granted because the duty free shops are outside the Republic but
because
the “qualifying purchasers” as defined in the VAT
Export Incentive Scheme would be entitled to a refund of the VAT that
is levied under section 7(1)(a) of the Act. For VAT to be levied in
terms of section 7(1)(a) of the Act, the enterprise or activity
must
be carried on continuously or regularly in the Republic or partly in
the Republic in terms of paragraph (a) of the definition
of
“enterprise” in section 1 of the Act.’
The ruling does not support the
argument that
services
rendered by ‘duty free shops’
are free of VAT. The ruling concerns ‘goods’ only. And
the ruling is not an
understanding of the application of the Act but
the exercise of a power in terms of s 72 which allows the respondent
to make arrangements
or give directions to overcome ‘difficulties,
anomalies or incongruities’ in the application of the Act.
Section 72
provides:
‘
If in any case the Commissioner is
satisfied that in consequence of the manner in which any vendor or
class of vendors conducts
his or their business, trade or occupation,
difficulties, anomalies or incongruities have arisen or may arise in
regard to the
application of any of the provisions of this Act, the
Commissioner may make an arrangement or give a direction as to—
(
a
) the manner in which such provisions shall be applied; or
(
b
) the calculation or payment of tax or the application of
any rate of zero per cent or any exemption from tax provided in this
Act,
in the case of such vendor or class of vendors or any person
transacting with such vendor or class of vendors as appears to
overcome
such difficulties, anomalies or incongruities: Provided that
such direction or arrangement shall not have the effect of
substantially
reducing or increasing the ultimate liability for tax
levied under this Act.’
The purpose of the ruling is to deal
with the situation where suppliers in duty free shops sell goods to
departing passengers and
charge VAT on these purchases,
only for the customers to immediately
go to the VAT refund administrator to claim a refund under the export
incentive scheme. It
therefore alleviates the administrative burden
of vendors in cases where VAT is going to be refunded. It is thus not
correct to
suggest that the respondent regarded duty free shops as
not being subject to VAT. On the contrary, it did; however, because
the
VAT payable is bound to be refunded,
the
ruling was made to ‘overcome such difficulties, anomalies or
incongruities’. Since the VAT was both chargeable (s
7(1)(
a
))
and refundable (s 44(9)) the ruling did not have the effect of
substantially reducing or increasing the ultimate liability for
VAT
under the Act. There was therefore no question of an official
remitting any portion of a tax or of absolving someone from the
payment of tax.
6
Section 11(2)(
l
)
[12] This appeal is essentially
concerned with the construction of s 11(2)(
l
).
Section 11 provides as follows:
‘
(2) Where, but for this section,
a supply of services would be charged with tax at the rate referred
to in section 7
(1), such supply of services shall, subject to
compliance with subsection (3) of this section, be charged with tax
at the rate
of zero per cent where—
(
l
) the services are supplied to a person who is not a
resident of the Republic, not being services which are supplied
directly—
(i) in connection with land or any improvement thereto situated
inside the Republic; or
(ii) in connection with movable property (excluding debt securities,
equity securities or participatory securities) situated inside
the
Republic at the time the services are rendered, except movable
property which—
(
aa
) is exported to the said person subsequent to the supply
of such services; or
(
bb
) forms part of a supply by the said person to a registered
vendor and such services are supplied to the said person for purposes
of such supply to the registered vendor; or
(iii) to the said person or any other person, other than in
circumstances contemplated in subparagraph (ii) (
bb
), if the
said person or such other person is in the Republic at the time the
services are rendered ....’
[13] The appellant contended that the rendering of its
services were zero rated in terms of s 11(2)(
l
)(ii)(
aa
)
because they were supplied in connection with movable property that
was being ‘exported’.
This, it was
submitted, is sufficient to secure a zero rating and s 11(2)(
l
)(iii)
cannot be applied independently to disqualify the zero
rating
unders
11(2)(
l
)(ii)
because
sub-paragraphs
(i)
to
(iii)
must
be
read
disjunctive-
ly.
[14] The respondent, on the other hand, argued that s
11(2)(
l
)(iii) was
dispositive of the matter. If the services were rendered to persons
who were present in the Republic at the time the
services were
rendered that is the end of the matter and no zero rating under s
11(2)(
l
)(ii) is
possible.
[15] The appellant suggested that the word ‘or’
where it appears after subparagraph (ii) in s 11(2)(
l
)
be read disjunctively. The word ‘or’ means, as was
remarked,
7
‘
to differentiate clearly between two [or, as in
this case, three] situations’. The word ‘or’
separates the different
subparagraphs providing for three different,
self-standing situations. In each of these situations services to
non-residents will
not be zero, but standard, rated. The word ‘or’
cannot be read conjuctively in the same manner as ‘and’
because this would mean that all three subparagraphs must apply for a
service to be standard rated. This is not possible because
subparagraphs (i) and (ii) are mutually exclusive (one dealing with
land and the other with movable property). Moreover, there
is no
basis for the submission that subparagraph (iii) applies to services,
unrelated to movable and immovable property, such as
services of a
personal or advisory nature, or relating to incorporeal property.
Section 11(2)(
l
)(ii)(
aa
)
[16] The appellant argued that it is entitled to a zero
rating by virtue of s 11(2)(
l
)(ii)(
aa
). This not
correct. Section 11(2)(
l
) defines services to non-residents
which are zero rated. Subparagraphs (i) to (iii) are exceptions to
the zero rated services,
and are in effect services that are standard
rated. Subparagraph (i) deals with services to non-residents in
connection with land
situated in the Republic. Subparagraph (ii)
deals with services in connection with movable property situated
inside the Republic;
they are zero rated but not where the services
fall under subparagraphs (
aa
) or (
bb
). It is not so
that a status is conferred on the services referred to in
subparagraphs (
aa
) or (
bb
). These subparagraphs help to
define the services referred to in the main body of paragraph (ii).
This means that the fact that
a service may fall under sub paragraph
(ii)(
aa
) does not mean that it cannot be covered by
subparagraph (iii). This follows from the reference in subparagraph
(iii) to subparagraph
(ii)(
bb
): if the appellant were correct
the words in subparagraph (iii) ‘other than in circumstances
contemplated in subparagraph
(ii)(
bb
)’ would have been
unnecessary because the ‘secured’ zero rating under
subparagraph (
bb
) would not be ‘lost’ by virtue of
subparagraph (iii).
[17] Subparagraph (ii)(
aa
) does not require the
recipient to be in the Republic when the services are rendered. This
reflects the principle that services
consumed in the Republic attract
VAT at the standard rate. The historical amendments to s 11(2)(
l
)
demonstrate this principle. Originally, s 11(2)(
l
) provided
that services were zero rated if supplied ‘for and to a person
who is not a resident ...
and who is outside the Republic ... at
the time the services are rendered
....’. The amendments
brought about by
s 89
of the
Taxation Laws Amendment Act 30 of 1998
deleted the italicised words in
s 11(2)
and introduced paragraph
(
l
)(iii) as a self-standing exception. Further amendments to
s
11(2)
and specifically 11(2)(
l
) were made by the
Taxation Laws
Amendment Act 27 of 1997
followed by the amendments made by the
Taxation Laws Amendment Act 30 of 1998
and the
Revenue Laws Amendment
Act 53 of 1999
. The Explanatory Memorandum on the 1998 Taxation Laws
Amendment Bill stated (clause 89):
‘
When VAT was introduced, the intention was
to levy VAT on consumption in the Republic. To achieve this, those
suppplies where consumption
does not take place in the Republic and
the benefit of services is not enjoyed in the Republic, are subjected
to VAT at a rate
of zero per cent ...
The amendment to
section 11(2)(
l
) is aimed at eliminating any
doubt as to the scope of this subsection. The supply of the services
must be made to a recipient who
is not a resident, and neither the
recipient nor any other person to whom the services are rendered may
be in the Republic at the
time the services are rendered, for the
zero rate for VAT to apply.’
The Explanatory Memorandum in respect of the 1999
amendment stated (clause 85):
‘
This amendment is aimed at putting it
beyond doubt that the presence in the Republic of the recipient of a
service, or of any other
person to whom the service is rendered, at
the time the service is physically rendered ... will prohibit the
zero-rating provided
for in this subsection from being applied.’
[18] The decision of the court below on
s
11(2)(
l
)(ii)(
aa
)
was based on the finding that foreign currency was not proved to have
been ’exported’ as defined in the Act. The appellant,
however, did not rely on the defined meaning of ‘exported’
but on its common-law meaning.
[19] I will assume, as was submitted by the appellant,
that the definition of ‘exported’ has no application to
the facts
of this case. The appellant argued that ‘export’
means both the carrying out of something out of a country (cf s 1
‘export’ (
a
),
(
b
) and (
c
))
as well as the sending of goods out of a country (cf s 1 ‘export’
(
d
)). See also s
11(2)(
a
)(i) and (ii)).
In s 11(2)(
l
)(ii)(
aa
)
the phrase used is ‘exported
to
the said person’. The most common meaning of
‘export’ is the sending of goods out of the country. To
call the
non-resident recipient the ‘exporter’ in the
circumstances of this case unduly strains the meaning of the word.
The
property is rather ‘exported’ by the supplier ‘to
the person’ to whom the services are supplied. The use
of the
words ‘exported
to
the
said person’ leaves no doubt that the ‘said person’,
the non-resident, is not the exporter but that the property
is
exported to him. When the wording of subparagraph (
aa
)
was introduced the opening words of s 11(2) required that the
recipient had to be outside the Republic. This made it clear that
the
type of export then envisaged by subparagraph (
aa
)
was direct.
[20] The appellant also relies on two rulings on
taxidermists (that is, 165 VAT Legislation at 71 (Issue 25) and 423
at 203 (Issue
28)) suggesting, by implication, that the hunters were
in the Republic at the time the services were rendered, and that
those rulings
supported its suggested construction of s
11(2)(
l
)(ii)(
aa
). Such a conclusion, however, cannot be
drawn from the wording of the two rulings. On the contrary, the
opposite seems more likely.
Section 11(2)(
l)
(
g
)
[21] The appellant finally submitted that its services
should be zero rated by virtue of the provisions of s 11(2)(
g
).
The supply of services is zero rated, where –
‘
the services are supplied directly in
respect of –
movable property situated in any export country at the time the
services are rendered....’
I will assume that the appellant is entitled to raise
this point even though it is raised only in reply and contrary to the
provisions
of Rule 12.
8
The argument is rather ingenious but, as I will
demonstrate, clearly wrong. Banknotes, being ‘currency’
as defined in
s 2(2), are ‘movable property’ as referred
to in s 11(2)(
g
)(i)
and the exchange of currency is a ‘financial service’ as
defined in s 2(1). Banknotes, it was submitted, used to
contain a
promise whereby the issuing bank undertook to pay the face value of
the note to bearer.
9
Although modern bank notes no longer all contain such a
promise they nevertheless embody personal rights which are situated
at their
place of issue, that is the place where the debtor resides.
10
It follows, so the argument went, that the incorporeal
rights attaching to banknotes are situated in the country where they
are
issued and where the issuing bank resides. The banknotes
exchanged by the appellant are therefore ‘movable property’
situated in ‘export countries’ at the time the services
(that is, the exchange of currencies) are rendered.
[22] The appellant produced no evidence as to the nature
of the bank notes exchanged at its bureaux de change. Assuming again
that
notice of the nature of foreign banknotes can be taken, the
argument ignores entirely the history of money and central banking.
11
The promises to pay to bearer that were contained in
some banknotes cannot today be regarded as promissory notes embodying
an incorporeal
right against the issuing bank. In
The
Bank of Canada v The Bank of Montreal et al
12
Laskin CJC said:
‘
What is said to be an unconditional promise
to pay a sum certain in money is itself money. The words on the face
of the paper money,
“I will pay to the bearer on demand”,
cannot alter its character as money and turn it into a different
document which
calls for the payment of money.’
It follows that banknotes, with or without a promise to
pay its face value on demand, cannot be regarded as documents that
embody
incorporeal rights that are situated, in the case of foreign
notes, elsewhere.
[23] The appellant has failed to show that the
Johannesburg Tax Court reached the incorrect conclusion. The
appellants’ services
rendered in the duty free area are subject
to VAT at the standard rate and were correctly assessed as being so
by the respondent.
[24] In the result the appeal is dismissed with costs.
_____________
F R Malan
Judge of Appeal
APPEARANCES:
For Appellant: E M du Toit SC
Instructed by:
Edward Nathan Sonnenbergs
Sandton
Naudes Attorneys
Bloemfontein
For Respondent: M W Janisch
Instructed by:
The State Attorney
Cape Town
The State Attorney
Bloemfontein
1
See
now eg s 11(1)(
u
)
and (
v
)
inserted by the
Revenue Laws Amendment Act 60 of 2008
and the
definition of ‘inbound duty and tax free shop’ inserted
by the same Act. There is also a reference to a ‘customs
controlled area’ as defined in s 21A of the Customs and Excise
Act 91 of 1964.
2
D
T Zeffertt, A P Paizes and A St Q Skeen
The
South African Law of Evidence
5 ed
(2003) at 715 ff.
3
South
African Railways and Harbours v Smith’s Coasters (Prop) Ltd
1931 AD 113
at 127.
4
Rex
v Detody
1926 AD 198
at 202-3 and see S I E
van Tonder in cooperation with N P Badenhorst, C H Volschenk and J N
Wepener
L C Steyn Die Uitleg van Wette
(1981) at 157 ff.
5
Nissan
SA (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for Inland Revenue
[1998] ZASCA 59
;
1998
(4) SA 860
(SCA) at 870E-F.
6
Commissioner
for Inland Revenue v J Gluckman
[1926]
1 SATC 1
at 2.
7
MV
Iran Dastghayb Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines v
Terra-Marine SA
2010 (6) SA 493
(SCA)
para 22.
8
Rule
12 of the Rules Promulgated under Section 107A of the Income Tax
Act, 1962 (Act 58 of 1962), Prescribing the Procedures to
be
Observed in Lodging Objections and Noting Appeals against
Assessments, Procedures for Alternative Dispute Resolution and the
Conduct and Hearing of Appeals before a Tax Court R 467
GG
24639 of 1 April 2003.
9
See
Woodhead Plant & Co v Gunn
(1894) 11 SC 4
at 9.
10
See
Stellenbosch Farmers’ Winery
Limited v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service
2012
(5) SA 363
(SCA) para 56.
11
See
eg A N Oelofse ‘The Nature of Bank-Notes Issued by the South
African Reserve Bank’ 1982
Modern
Business Law
90.
12
The
Bank of Canada v The Bank of Montreal et al
1978
(1) SCR 1148
at 1154; 76 (3d) 385 at 388.