Adidas AG and Another v Pepkor Retail Ltd (187/12) [2013] ZASCA 3 (28 February 2013)

80 Reportability
Intellectual Property

Brief Summary

Trade mark — Infringement and passing off — Appellants, owners of well-known three stripe trademarks, alleged that respondent's use of two and four stripes on footwear infringed their trademarks and constituted passing off — High Court dismissed application — On appeal, held that respondent's use of stripes constituted trademark infringement and passing off, as it was likely to deceive or cause confusion among consumers — Appeal upheld, interdict granted against respondent's use of infringing marks.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


Introduction


The proceedings were an appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal against a judgment of the Western Cape High Court, Cape Town, in application proceedings concerning trade mark infringement and passing off in relation to sporting footwear.


The appellants were Adidas AG (the proprietor of four registered three-stripe trade marks) and Adidas International Marketing BV (which held rights in the get-up of certain Adidas footwear relied upon for the passing-off claims). The respondent was Pepkor Retail Limited, which conducted retail business through divisions including Ackermans and Pep Stores.


In the High Court, Adidas brought an application seeking interdictory and ancillary relief, alleging that Pepkor’s sale of shoes bearing two and four parallel stripes infringed Adidas’s registered trade marks and amounted to passing off. Pepkor opposed the application and brought a counter-application seeking the entry of disclaimers under section 15 of the Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993, aimed at limiting Adidas’s exclusivity in respect of parallel stripes. The High Court (Allie J) dismissed Adidas’s application and also dismissed Pepkor’s counter-application. Adidas appealed with the leave of the High Court. Pepkor did not cross-appeal against the dismissal of the counter-application.


The general subject matter of the dispute was whether Pepkor’s stripe motifs on certain trainers and a soccer boot constituted unauthorised trade mark use likely to cause deception or confusion under the Trade Marks Act, and whether the overall get-up of certain Pepkor products would likely mislead consumers into believing an association with Adidas (passing off).


Material Facts


It was undisputed that Adidas’s business and its three-stripe branding were long-established and highly reputable internationally and in South Africa, and that the three-stripe mark was used prominently as a badge of origin. It was also not in dispute that Adidas’s three-stripe mark had been used on footwear since 1949, was emphasised in Adidas’s marketing, and had become highly distinctive and well-known.


It was common cause that Pepkor is a major South African retailer operating, inter alia, Ackermans and Pep Stores, serving mass-market and lower-to-middle market consumers and selling clothing and footwear at comparatively low prices. It was also accepted that, in the South African market, consumers are exposed to sporting footwear from various manufacturers bearing stripe motifs of differing numbers and configurations.


Adidas was the registered proprietor of four trade marks, each consisting of three parallel stripes (in defined configurations and placements, generally contrasting with the shoe material) registered in Class 25 for, broadly, footwear and clothing including footwear (with two registrations specifically for “sporting footwear of all kinds”). Adidas discovered around October 2007 that Pepkor’s divisions were selling trainers and soccer boots with prominent two-stripe and four-stripe motifs. Adidas demanded that Pepkor desist; Pepkor refused, denying infringement and passing off and indicating it would continue unless restrained.


Pepkor initially alleged it was no longer selling the goods by the time proceedings were instituted and contended that interdictory relief should not be granted. After Adidas showed the contention to be factually unfounded, Pepkor did not persist with the point. The court accepted that Pepkor’s stance that it saw nothing wrong in the conduct provided a basis for Adidas to apprehend continuation.


The infringement claim concerned Pepkor’s use of stripes on six items of footwear. The court ultimately differentiated between the items for purposes of likelihood of confusion. On the infringement analysis, the court found that the four-stripe marks on two particular shoes—identified in the judgment by reference to annexures TB8 (the “LDS Sports shoe”) and TB9 (the “Mens’ ATH Leisure shoe”)—created the relevant similarity for infringement. The court did not find infringement in relation to the other contested items, including certain shoes/boots with four stripes and those with two stripes, because they were found not sufficiently similar to the registered marks in the manner required.


For passing off, the court assessed the overall get-ups and concluded that Pepkor’s get-up incorporating four stripes in relation to certain products (including those depicted in annexures TB9, TB10, and TB11) was likely to mislead the notional purchaser, whereas the two-stripe products (associated with annexures TB12 and TB13) were not.


Legal Issues


The central legal questions were whether Pepkor’s use of two and four parallel stripes on sporting footwear constituted:


A likelihood of deception or confusion amounting to trade mark infringement under section 34(1)(a) of the Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993, requiring comparison of the registered marks with the allegedly offending marks as used in the course of trade on goods for which the marks were registered.


Passing off, requiring proof that Adidas’s get-up (including but not limited to striping) had become distinctive of Adidas’s goods and that Pepkor’s adoption of similar get-up involved an implied misrepresentation likely to deceive or confuse a substantial portion of the public.


A preliminary and materially important issue on infringement was whether Pepkor’s stripe motifs were used as trade marks (i.e., as source indicators), or merely as decoration/embellishment. This was treated as a factual question assessed objectively by consumer perception.


The dispute primarily concerned the application of legal standards to facts: the evaluation of resemblance, the global appreciation of likely consumer impressions, and whether confusion or deception was likely. It also involved evaluative judgment (for example, assessing the impact of Adidas’s reputation on confusion, and the effect of market circumstances such as pricing and retail channels).


Court’s Reasoning


Trade mark infringement: governing principles and “trade mark use”


The court approached infringement through the wording of section 34(1)(a), emphasising that the protection extends beyond identical marks to those “so nearly resembling” the registered mark as to be likely to deceive or cause confusion. It accepted that principles developed under the predecessor provision, section 44(1)(a) of the Trade Marks Act 62 of 1963, remained applicable.


On Pepkor’s contention that the stripes were mere embellishment and not trade mark use, the court treated the question as one of fact, determined objectively by how consumers would perceive the mark. It considered that, in the context of sporting footwear, stripes are commonly used by manufacturers as identifiers, and that it would be difficult to persuade a court that ornamentation placed on such goods is not used for distinguishing purposes. The court endorsed the principle that use of another brand name on the product does not preclude the stripe motif from also functioning as a trade mark, drawing support from authority recognising that multiple trade marks can appear on the same goods.


Scope of rights and the “impermissible extension” argument


Pepkor argued that Adidas was attempting to expand its monopoly beyond three stripes and to claim generic features. The court rejected the characterisation, reasoning that the statutory enquiry under section 34(1)(a) is whether the allegedly offending mark nearly resembles the registered mark to the extent that deception or confusion is likely. The court stressed that it is the registered mark as it appears on the register that is protected, and each allegedly infringing mark must be compared with the registered marks as recorded. The attempt to limit protection by informal argument (rather than via mechanisms in the Act) was not accepted as affecting the infringement enquiry, particularly given that Pepkor’s disclaimer counter-application had failed and was not pursued on appeal.


The comparison test and the relevance of reputation


The court applied the established comparison methodology, emphasising that the likelihood of deception or confusion is assessed by considering the overall impression in the marketplace, from the perspective of a notional purchaser of average intelligence with proper eyesight buying with ordinary caution. It reiterated that the comparison is not a meticulous side-by-side exercise, and allowance must be made for imperfect recollection and real-world consumer circumstances. It highlighted that confusion need not extend to all consumers; it suffices if a substantial number would probably be confused as to origin or a material connection.


A significant point of reasoning concerned Pepkor’s argument that the fame of Adidas’s three-stripe mark made confusion unlikely because consumers would immediately detect the difference between three stripes and two or four. The court rejected this, reasoning that greater distinctiveness and reputation generally increase, rather than diminish, the risk that a similar sign on competing goods will be taken as indicating a connection with the trade mark owner, particularly given imperfect perception and recollection.


Application to the particular footwear: infringement findings


The court accepted that Pepkor’s use was unauthorised, in the course of trade, and on goods within the relevant registration scope. The decisive enquiry became resemblance and likely confusion.


In applying the comparison, the court considered it permissible to refer to how the Adidas trade marks were applied to Adidas footwear to appreciate the impression produced. It concluded that several of Pepkor’s contested products did not create sufficient similarity for infringement. However, the four-stripe configuration on the products depicted in annexures TB8 and TB9 was found to share the essential configuration and general impression of the registered marks: grouped parallel stripes running from fastening to sole, slanting toward the heel, equal width, equidistant spacing, and contrasting colour/material. The court considered that the difference in number of stripes did not, in those instances, avoid the likelihood of deception or confusion, particularly when allowance was made for imperfect recollection. In reaching this conclusion, the court regarded the reasoning in earlier litigation involving Adidas and a four-stripe mark as still applicable to the present configuration-based comparison.


The court also addressed Pepkor’s reliance on the absence of evidence of actual confusion, stating that deception or confusion is for the court to decide and that little weight should be attached to the absence of such evidence given evidentiary difficulties. It similarly rejected the argument that different retail markets and price points eliminated confusion, reasoning that the evidence did not establish watertight separation of consumer markets; consumers may shop across outlets, and at least momentary confusion at the point of selection from displayed goods remained plausible.


Passing off: principles and application to get-up


Turning to passing off, the court set out the established requirements for an implied misrepresentation: Adidas had to show that its get-up (or relevant features) had become distinctive of its goods, and that Pepkor’s use of a similar get-up would likely deceive or confuse a substantial section of the public into thinking Pepkor’s goods were Adidas’s or connected with Adidas.


The court accepted that the distinctiveness and reputation of Adidas’s trade marks were undisputed, and that the distinctiveness of the broader get-ups relied upon could be inferred from the manner and scale of use. In assessing deception, the court used the notional average purchaser standard, taking account of marketplace realities such as imperfect recall, lack of side-by-side comparison, and the fact that some consumers may be unable to read simple words. It also reiterated that passing off does not grant a monopoly in a successful get-up, but copying creates risk and the copier must make it perfectly clear that the goods are its own to avoid deception.


Applying these principles, the court rejected passing off in respect of the two-stripe shoes compared to Adidas’s Superstar shoe, emphasising that the two widely spaced stripes were clearly different and that Pepkor’s shoes prominently bore other identifying trade marks (such as “Hang Ten” and “actif”) on visible locations (heel, tongue, insole), reducing the likelihood of deception.


For other products, the court found passing off established. In particular, for the men’s leisure shoe compared with Adidas’s Adi-Racer/Tuscany style, the court emphasised the strong resemblance in the prominent stripe presentation (four bold serrated black stripes on white), similar black-and-white colouring, a distinctive black heel, identical stitching patterns, and the absence of distinctive exterior branding on Pepkor’s shoe. It concluded that the notional purchaser would likely be confused, at least momentarily, as to connection with Adidas.


For the soccer boot and boys’ shoe compared with Adidas’s Predator boots, the court accepted that the Adidas products did not display the classic registered stripe configuration, but nevertheless found that the overall get-ups of Pepkor’s products were sufficiently misleading, given the prominence and distinctiveness of Adidas’s footwear and the absence of clear external distinguishing marks on Pepkor’s competing items (beyond an insole mark). In the court’s assessment, these similarities were likely to cause consumers to think Pepkor’s products were or were connected with Adidas.


Outcome and Relief


The Supreme Court of Appeal upheld the appeal and set aside the High Court’s dismissal of Adidas’s application. It substituted the High Court’s order with an order granting interdictory and ancillary relief.


On trade mark infringement, Pepkor was interdicted and restrained from infringing Adidas AG’s rights in registered trade marks 1957/01959, 1995/12283, 1980/06446 and 2000/18582 by using a four-parallel-stripe mark of contrasting colour/material on the outside uppers of footwear, as represented in annexures TB8 and TB9, or any mark so nearly resembling the registered marks as to be likely to deceive or cause confusion under section 34(1)(a).


Pepkor was directed to remove the infringing marks from its footwear, and where removal was not possible, to deliver such footwear to Adidas AG as contemplated in section 34(3)(b). The court further directed an enquiry to determine damages or a reasonable royalty under sections 34(3)(c), 34(3)(d), and 34(4), with Pepkor to pay the amount found due.


On passing off, Pepkor was interdicted and restrained from passing off its footwear as Adidas’s or as connected with Adidas by using get-ups depicted in annexures TB9, TB10 and TB11, or any closely resembling get-up likely to deceive or confuse. An enquiry was directed to determine damages arising from the passing off, with procedural directions available from the court if needed.


Pepkor was ordered to pay the costs of the application, including the costs of two counsel. The appeal itself was upheld with costs, including the costs of two counsel.


Cases Cited


Adidas Sportschuhfabriken Adi Dassler KG v Harry Walt & Co (Pty) Ltd 1976 (1) SA 530 (T).


PPI Makelaars and another v Professional Provident Society of South Africa 1998 (1) SA 595 (SCA).


Puma AG Rudolf Dassler Sport v Rampar Trading (Pty) Ltd 2011 (2) SA 463 (SCA).


Verimark (Pty) Ltd v BMW AG; BMW AG v Verimark (Pty) Ltd 2007 (6) SA 263 (SCA).


Puma AG Rudolf Dassler Sport v Global Warming (Pty) Ltd 2010 (6) SA 600 (SCA).


Luster Products Inc v Magic Styles Sale CC 1997 (3) SA 13 (A).


Cointreau et Cie SA v Pagan International [1991] ZASCA 89; 1991 (4) SA 706 (A).


Weltevrede Nursery v Keith Kirstens (Pty) Ltd & another 2004 (4) SA 110 (SCA); [2004] 1 All SA 181 (SCA).


Adidas Aktiengesellschaft and another v Woolworths (Pty) Ltd 1999 BIP 433 (C).


International Power Marketing (Pty) Ltd v Searles Industrials (Pty) Ltd 1983 (4) SA 163 (T).


Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd [1984] ZASCA 51; 1984 (3) SA 623 (A).


Bata Ltd v Face Fashions CC 2001 (1) SA 844 (SCA).


Laboratoire Lachartre SA v Armour-Dial Inc. 1976 (2) SA 744 (T).


John Craig (Pty) Ltd v Dupa Clothing Industries (Pty) Ltd 1977 (3) SA 144 (T).


Reckitt & Colman SA (Pty) Ltd v SC Johnson & Son SA (Pty) Ltd 1993 (2) SA 307 (A).


Brian Boswell Circus (Pty) Ltd & another v Boswell-Wilkie Circus (Pty) Ltd 1985 (4) SA 466 (A).


Williams t/a Jenifer Williams & Associates & another v Life Line Southern Transvaal [1996] ZASCA 46; 1996 (3) SA 408 (A).


Pasquali Cigarette Co. Ltd v Diaconicolas & Capsopolus 1905 TS 472.


Capital Estate and General Agencies (Pty) Ltd & others v Holliday Inns Inc. & others 1977 (2) SA 916 (A).


Blue Lion Manufacturing (Pty) Ltd v National Brands Ltd 2001 (3) SA 884 (SCA).


Hollywood Curl (Pty) Ltd v Twins Products (Pty) Ltd 1989 (1) SA 236 (A).


Cambridge Plan A G & another v Moore & others 1987 (4) SA 821 (D).


Specsavers International Healthcare Ltd & others v Asda Stores Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 24.


Sabel B V v Puma A G, Rudolf Dassler Sport [1998] RPC 199.


Canon Kabushiki Kaisha v Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer Inc [1998] EUECJ C-39/97; [1998] ECR I-5507.


Marca Mode CV v adidas AG and adidas Benelux BV (European Court of Justice (Sixth Chamber), delivered 22 June 2000).


adidas-Salomon AG v Sketchers USA Deutschland GmbH (Hamburg District Court, delivered 11 July 2003).


Legislation Cited


Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993.


Trade Marks Act 62 of 1963.


Counterfeit Goods Act 37 of 1997.


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The Supreme Court of Appeal held that Pepkor’s use of a four-stripe mark on the footwear depicted in annexures TB8 and TB9 constituted trade mark infringement of Adidas AG’s registered three-stripe marks under section 34(1)(a) of the Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993, because the four-stripe configuration, viewed globally and with allowance for imperfect recollection, was sufficiently similar to be likely to deceive or cause confusion.


The court further held that Pepkor’s use of certain get-ups incorporating stripe motifs amounted to passing off, particularly in relation to the products depicted in annexures TB9, TB10, and TB11, because the overall presentation was likely to mislead consumers into believing that Pepkor’s footwear was Adidas’s or connected with Adidas. Passing off was not established for the two-stripe shoes compared with the Adidas Superstar shoe, where the stripes and prominent alternative branding were found to distinguish the products sufficiently.


The appeal was upheld with costs, and the High Court’s dismissal of Adidas’s application was replaced with orders granting interdicts, removal/delivery-up relief, and enquiries into damages or royalty.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The judgment applied the principle that trade mark infringement under section 34(1)(a) of the Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993 is established where there is unauthorised use, in the course of trade, in relation to goods for which the mark is registered, of a mark that is identical or so nearly resembling the registered mark as to be likely to deceive or cause confusion. The likelihood of deception or confusion is assessed from the perspective of a notional average purchaser, with proper eyesight and ordinary caution, in marketplace conditions and with allowance for imperfect recollection, based on the overall impression produced by the marks.


The judgment reaffirmed that whether a sign is used as a trade mark (as opposed to mere decoration) is a factual question determined objectively by consumer perception, and that the presence of additional branding on the product does not exclude the possibility that another sign on the same product functions as a trade mark.


It applied the evaluative proposition that the greater the distinctiveness or reputation of a registered mark, the greater the likelihood that the use of a similar mark on competing products will cause deception or confusion, rather than eliminating that risk.


For passing off, the judgment applied the orthodox two-stage enquiry: the claimant must establish that the relevant name, mark, or get-up has become distinctive of its goods through reputation, and must further establish that the defendant’s use of a similar name, mark, or get-up amounts to a misrepresentation likely to deceive or confuse a substantial segment of the public. The comparison for passing off is between the get-ups of the competing goods as encountered in the market, and not limited to registered trade marks alone. The judgment reiterated that passing off does not confer a monopoly over a successful get-up, but that copying places a trader at risk, and liability is avoided only if the trader makes it perfectly clear that the goods are its own so that deception is unlikely.

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[2013] ZASCA 3
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Adidas AG and Another v Pepkor Retail Ltd (187/12) [2013] ZASCA 3; 2013 BIP 203 (SCA) (28 February 2013)

THE
SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT
Case No: 187/12
In the matter between:
ADIDAS AG
..............................................................................................
First
Appellant
ADIDAS INTERNATIONAL
MARKETING BV
....................................
Second Appellant
and
PEPKOR RETAIL LIMITED
..........................................................................
Respondent
Neutral
citation:
Adidas AG & another v Pepkor Retail Limited
(187/12)
[2013] ZASCA 3
(28 February 2013)
Coram: Brand, Heher,
Petse JJA and Southwood and Erasmus AJJA
Heard: 19 November
2012
Delivered: 28 February
2013
Summary: Trade mark
infringement and passing off − appellants relying on four
well-known registered three parallel stripe
trademarks for
infringement and the same registered as well as unregistered three
stripe trademarks applied to their sporting footwear
for passing off
− respondent’s use of two and four parallel stripes on
its sporting footwear alleged to infringe the
first appellant’s
trademarks in terms of
s 34(1)(a)
of the
Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993
‒ also alleged to pass off the respondent’s footwear as
those of the appellants − respondent’s use of the
two and
four parallel stripes on its footwear, trademark use and not
decoration or embellishment − appellants not impermissibly

extending the ambit of their rights − the fact that appellants’
three parallel stripes trademarks so well-known not
eliminating the
likelihood of deception or confusion, but increasing it ‒
respondent’s four stripe marks infringing
registered trademarks
– respondent’s get-up incorporating four stripes a
passing off.
ORDER
_____________________________________________________________________
On appeal from
:
Western Cape High Court, Cape Town (Allie J sitting as court of first
instance):
1. The appeal is upheld
with costs, such costs to include the costs of two counsel.
2. The order of the court
a quo dismissing the application with costs is set aside and replaced
by the following order:

(a)
The respondent is interdicted and restrained from infringing the
first applicant’s rights acquired by the registration
of
trademarks numbers 1957/01959, 1995/12283, 1980/6446 and 2000/18582
(‘the registered trademarks’) by using in the
course of
trade in relation to goods for which the registered trademarks are
registered, a mark consisting of four parallel stripes
of a colour or
material different from the colour or material of the footwear, and
on the outside of the uppers of the footwear,
to which they are
applied, as represented in annexures TB8 and TB9 to the founding
affidavit of Timothy George James Behean (‘the
infringing
marks’) or any other mark so nearly resembling the registered
trademarks as to be likely to deceive or cause confusion
as
contemplated in s 34(1)(a) of the Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993 (‘the
Act’);
(b) The respondent is
directed to remove the infringing marks from its footwear and, where
the infringing marks are inseparable
or incapable of being removed
from the respondent’s footwear, it is ordered that all such
footwear be delivered to the first
applicant as provided for in s
34(3)(b) of the Act;
(c) An enquiry is
directed to be held for the purposes of determining the amount of any
damages (as contemplated in s 34(3)(c) of
the Act) or reasonable
royalty (as contemplated in s 34(3)(d) of the Act) to be awarded to
the first applicant as a result of the
infringement of the first
applicant’s rights acquired by the registration of the
registered trademarks, in accordance with
such procedures as this
Court may deem fit (as contemplated in s 34 (4) of the Act), and that
the respondent pay the amount found
to be due to the first applicant;
(d) The respondent is
interdicted and restrained from passing off its footwear as being
that of the applicants or as being connected
in the course of trade
with the applicants by using in relation thereto a get-up as depicted
in annexures TB9, TB10 and TB11 to
the founding affidavit of Timothy
George James Behean (including such trademarks as are depicted in
those annexures) or any other
get-up (including any trademarks) so
closely resembling the get-ups (including any trademarks) of the
applicants’ footwear
as depicted in paragraph 24 of the
founding affidavit of Timothy George James Behean as to be likely to
deceive or cause confusion;
(e) An enquiry is
directed to be held for the purposes of determining the amount of any
damages to be awarded to the applicants
as a result of the
respondent’s passing off as aforesaid and that the respondent
pay the amount found to be due to the applicants
and it is directed
that, in the event of the parties being unable to reach agreement as
to the further pleadings to be filed, discovery,
inspection, or other
matters of procedure relating to the enquiry, either party may make
application to the court for directions
in regard thereto;
(f) The respondent is
ordered to pay the costs of the application, including the costs of
two counsel.’
JUDGMENT
SOUTHWOOD AJA
(BRAND,
HEHER AND PETSE JJA AND ERASMUS AJA CONCURRING)
:
[1] The
first appellant, a German corporation, the parent company of the
Adidas group of companies, and the second appellant, a
Netherlands
corporation, and a wholly-owned subsidiary of the first appellant,
brought an application against the respondent in
the Western Cape
High Court, Cape Town, in which they alleged that the respondent was
infringing the first appellant’s rights
in respect of four
well-known three stripe trademarks and that the respondent was
passing off its sporting footwear as that of
the appellants. The
respondent brought a counter-application for the entry of disclaimers
in terms of s 15 of the Trade Marks Act
194 of 1993 (the Act).
1
The court
a quo
(Allie
J) found that the respondent was not infringing the trademarks or
passing off its goods as those of the appellants and dismissed
the
application. The court
a quo
also
dismissed the respondent’s counter-application. The appellants
appeal to this Court with the leave of the court a quo.
The
respondent has not sought to cross-appeal.
[2] The nature and renown
of the Adidas business, its products and trademarks was not in
dispute and may be briefly summarised.
Mr Adi Dassler (Adidas is a
combination of his names), who was both an athlete and a shoemaker,
founded the Adidas business in
1920. His aim was to create, for
athletes, footwear of the highest quality and he developed shoes
specially designed for almost
every Olympic sport. In doing so, he
pioneered the use of technology in the development of athletic shoes
and he worked closely
with leading athletes and trainers as well as
experts in medicine and materials and various other fields. The high
quality of his
adidas products was soon recognised and since 1928 an
increasing proportion of the athletes competing at the Olympic Games
have
worn his shoes. Adi Dassler also designed soccer boots, which
have also been particularly successful and these boots, including
the
Predator soccer boot, have become the most widely worn soccer boots
at the FIFA World Cup and the European Soccer Championships.
In 1967
Adi Dassler extended his range of products to include sports
clothing: tracksuits and jackets and then shorts and jerseys.
In 1974
he began to manufacture and sell sporting equipment such as bags,
balls and tennis rackets. All these products have become
very
successful and have been adopted by sportsmen and women all over the
world. Over time the business was taken over by the first
appellant
and, as it diversified, by other companies in the Adidas group of
companies.
[3] For many years the
Adidas products have been extensively advertised, marketed and
promoted throughout the world, including South
Africa, and the
strategy of associating the products with top class athletes has
proved to be very successful. Adi Dassler devised
the three stripe
trademark and started using it on the first appellant’s
footwear in 1949. From the outset the focus was
on the distinguishing
function of the three stripes and the slogan ‘die MARKE mit den
3 RIEMEN’ (‘the mark with
the 3 stripes’) was
adopted. The first appellant’s advertising and promotional
literature has always emphasised that
the first appellant’s
products can be identified by the three stripe mark. In 1967 the
business started using the three stripe
mark on clothing such as
tracksuits, jackets and trousers. The three stripe mark has become an
exceptionally valuable and distinctive
mark because of its high
degree of visibility. This enables Adidas products to be recognised
and distinguished from a distance,
something which is very important
in the field of sporting products because it enables Adidas products
to be easily recognised
when worn by Adidas sponsored athletes and
teams.
[4] As a result of its
marketing and promotion and extensive and prominent use, the three
stripe mark has become highly distinctive
and it is readily
identified by consumers as a badge of origin of adidas products.
[5] The respondent is a
South African company. It conducts retail businesses by means of
divisions such as Ackermans and Pep Stores,
which, independently,
carry on their businesses throughout South Africa. Both sell clothing
and footwear. Ackermans caters for
the mass middle market. It is a
value retailer which sells, at low prices, everyday contemporary
casual wear, as well as fashion
clothing and footwear and it also
stocks an assortment of more styled products including national and
international brands. It
sells the international ‘Hang Ten’
brand at its ‘Hang Ten” outlets. Pep Stores carries on
its business
at more than 1 300 outlets. It is a cash business, has a
low cost culture and it keeps its margins as low as possible. It
sources
its merchandise both locally and internationally to provide
its customers with a wide range of good quality and fashionable
merchandise.
Pep Stores caters for consumers in the lower to middle
markets.
[6] For many years
well-known manufacturers of sporting footwear, who market and sell
their products in South Africa, have applied
stripes of all shapes
and sizes to their products – sometimes one, sometimes two and
sometimes four or five and even more.
The modern South African
consumer is therefore exposed to such products and their get-ups and
has to be able to distinguish between
these products and the
appellant’s products.
[7] The first appellant
is the proprietor of four trademarks, each consisting of three
parallel stripes of a specific configuration.
The second appellant
holds the rights in respect of the get-ups in respect of two of the
sports shoes involved in this case: the
2006 Predator soccer boot and
the adi Racer/Tuscany shoes. The appellants market and sell in South
Africa, through adidas (South
Africa) (Pty) Ltd, a wholly-owned
subsidiary of the first appellant, sporting footwear, particularly
trainers, which bear the appellants’
registered and
unregistered three stripe trademarks. The South African company does
this through its own retail outlets as well
as a variety of
independent retail outlets such as Foschini, Edgars, Sportsman’s
Warehouse, The Cross Trainer and Studio
88. The appellants have been
doing this for many years and, as a result, the trademarks and the
get-ups of their clothing and footwear
are very well known in this
country. In about October 2007 the appellants discovered that
Ackermans and Pep Stores were selling
trainers and soccer boots which
prominently featured two and four parallel stripes which the
appellants considered to be an infringement
of the first appellant’s
four trademarks and also a passing off by the respondent of its goods
as being those of the appellants.
The appellants’ attorney
addressed letters to Ackermans and Pep Stores demanding that they
cease their wrongful conduct and,
after they refused to comply with
the demands, the appellants launched their application for interdicts
and ancillary relief. It
was clear from the respondent’s
attorney’s letters that the respondent denied that it was
infringing the trademarks
or passing off its trainers and soccer
boots as those of the appellants by using the two and four stripe
marks and that it would
continue to do so unless restrained by an
interdict.
[8] In its answering
affidavit the respondent said that it was no longer selling these
goods when the application was launched and
contended that the court
should not grant interdictory relief. However, after the appellants
demonstrated that the respondent’s
contention was factually
unfounded the respondent did not persist with it. In any event the
respondent’s attitude that it
saw nothing wrong in marketing
its sporting shoes bearing the contentious marks was good reason for
the appellants to apprehend
that the wrongful conduct complained of
would continue. Against that background I shall first consider the
question of infringement.
[9] The
first appellant relied on s 34(1)
(a)
of
the Act for its case based on trademark infringement.
2
The section provides that the rights in respect of a
trademark are infringed by the unauthorised use in the course of
trade in relation
to goods in respect of which the trademark is
registered, of an identical mark or of a mark so nearly resembling
the registered
trademark as to be likely to deceive or cause
confusion. The section provides the same protection as s 44(1)
(a)
of the old
Trade Marks Act
3
and
the principles applicable to that section, laid down
in the decided cases, are equally applicable to
s 34(1)
(a)
of the Act.
4
[10] The first
appellant’s trademarks are reproduced in the schedule at the
end of this judgment. The following features of
these trademarks are
of importance:
(1)
Trademark No 1957/01959 is registered in Class 25 in respect of

sporting footwear of all kinds’ and
consists of ‘. . . three stripes of a colour different to the
colour of the shoe
to which they are applied. The three stripes run
parallel from the fastening downwards to the sole of the shoe and
appear on both
sides as illustrated in the representation filed. The
three stripes will run parallel to each other, be of equal width and
be equidistant
from each other in the manner depicted in the
representation affixed to the application’;
(2) Trademark No
1995/12283 is registered in Class 25 in respect of ‘Clothing,
footwear, headgear’ and consists of ‘.
. . three equally
spaced parallel stripes of the same colour, such stripes being
applied to the exterior of the goods covered by
the specification.
The colour of the stripes contrasts with the colour of that part of
the goods to which the stripes are applied.
The length of the three
stripes varies according to the location of the stripes on the
goods’;
(3) Trademark No
1980/06446 is registered in Class 25 in respect of ‘sporting
footwear of all kinds’ and consists of
‘. . . three
stripes appearing on footwear in the position depicted in the
representation affixed to the application. The
three stripes will run
parallel to each other, be of equal width and be equidistant from
each other in the manner depicted in the
representation affixed to
the application’;
(4) Trademark No
2000/18582 is registered in Class 25 in respect of ‘articles of
clothing including footwear’ and consists
of ‘. . . three
equally spaced stripes, in one or more colours, on the outside of the
uppers of the footwear. The stripes
are contrasting in colour or
material with that part of the upper on which they appear’.
[11] The
first appellant alleged that the respondent was infringing its rights
in terms of s 34(1)
(a)
of
the Act by using two and four parallel stripes of a particular
configuration on six different items of sporting footwear, which

included five trainers and one soccer boot
5
and are depicted in the schedule at the end of this
judgment.
6
These are -
(1) The LDS Sports shoe
bearing four stripes (annexures TB8 and AA16);
(2) The Mens’ ATH
Leisure shoe bearing four stripes (annexures TB9 and AA17);
(3) The soccer boot
bearing four stripes (annexures TB10, AA18 and AA19);
(4) The Boys’ ATH
Leisure shoe bearing four stripes (annexures TB11, AA20 and AA21);
(5) The ‘Hang Ten’
shoe bearing two stripes (annexures TB12, AA22 and AA23);
(6) The ‘Girls Must
Have’ shoe bearing two stripes (annexures TB13, AA24 and AA25).
[12] Apart from denying
any deceptive similarity between the two and four stripes applied to
its footwear and the first appellant’s
trademarks, the
respondent raised a number of other defences or contentions, which it
will be convenient to consider first.
[13] These are listed in
the respondent’s counsels’ heads of argument as follows:
(1) The stripes on the
respondent’s shoes are not used as trademarks, but as
embellishments or decoration. The respondent’s
own or licensed
trademarks, as depicted on the goods, serve to indicate the source of
the goods;
(2) The protection
afforded by the first appellant’s registered trademarks is
limited to three parallel stripes (and not to
any other number of
parallel stripes) configured in terms of its trademark registrations;
(3) The first appellant
has impermissibly sought to expand the scope of the protection
afforded by its registered trademarks by
claiming generic features of
shoes as constituent elements of its trademarks. Apart from the
particular three-stripe configuration
of its registered trademarks,
the further ‘
dominant and striking’
features
relied upon by the appellants for the impermissible extension of its
monopoly are in fact non-distinctive, ubiquitous,
in the public
domain and common to standard trainers featuring fashionable, but
commonplace, decorative striping;
(4) The Adidas three
stripe trademark is so notorious, recognisable and distinctive that
there is no likelihood that a consumer
of the goods concerned would,
when confronted with trainers featuring two or four parallel stripes
in a decorative fashion, be
confused into believing that they are the
goods of, or are associated with, the appellants;
(5) The appellant’s
reliance on previous South African judgments and foreign judgments is
misplaced and of extremely limited
assistance, since those cases
cannot assist the factual inquiry and comparative analysis this Court
is enjoined to make on the
facts of this case. In my view there is no
merit in any of these contentions and they serve only to divert
attention from the key
issue of whether the two and four stripes
applied to the respondent’s footwear so nearly resemble any of
the first appellant’s
trademarks as to be likely to deceive or
cause confusion.
[14] The
first defence raises the question of whether the respondent was using
the two and four stripes as trademarks or not: whether
they were
‘marks’ (they were clearly ‘ornamentation’
and were covered by the definition of ‘mark’)
used in
relation to goods for the purpose of distinguishing these goods from
the same kind of goods connected in the course of
trade from any
other person (and would therefore be ‘trademarks’ as
defined in the Act). This is a factual issue, which
must be
determined, objectively, by how the marks would be perceived by the
consumer. It seems to me that it will be very difficult
to persuade a
court that any mark applied to goods for ‘embellishment’
or ‘decoration’ (which are both
covered by the ordinary
meaning of ‘ornamentation’) is not applied for the
purpose of distinguishing the goods.
7
In
Puma AG Rudolf Dassler Sport v
Rampar Trading (Pty) Ltd
8
this Court said (in the context of counterfeiting in
terms of the Counterfeit Goods Act,
9
which the court said by its very nature amounts
a
fortiori
to trademark infringement) that one
cannot use a trademark and then argue that it was used as
ornamentation and that where the registered
mark consists of three
stripes it would be a question of fact whether the use of two or four
stripes would be perceived as decorative
or as trademark use. As far
as the factual enquiry is concerned, this Court said in
Verimark
(Pty) Ltd v BMW AG; BMW AG v Verimark (Pty) Ltd
,
10
that for infringement it must be established that
consumers are likely to interpret the mark, as it is used by the
third party,
as designating or tending to designate the undertaking
from which the third party’s goods originate. If the use
creates an
impression of a material link between the product and the
owner of the mark there is infringement, otherwise not.
11
[15] It is
obvious that if the respondent used marks identical to the first
appellant’s marks the respondent’s marks
would be
perceived to be trademarks. The consumer is used to manufacturers of
sporting footwear applying a variety of stripes to
their products to
identify them (the adidas stripes are merely one example) and there
is no reason why the consumer would perceive
marks similar to the
first appellant’s registered trademarks to be merely
embellishment or decoration. The respondent had
not advanced any
reason other than the fact that many manufacturers apply stripes to
their products but that begs the question.
If they apply these
stripes to identify the product that is trademark use. The fact that
the respondent uses other trademarks on
its footwear would not alter
this perception or the legal position. In dealing with an argument
that the offending mark was not
used as a trade mark because another
mark was also applied to the goods, the court said in
Luster
Products Inc v Magic Styles Sale CC
12
:

As
I understood him this submission rested on the statement that in all
cases the containers also bore the words “Magic Style”.

This, he said, was a trade mark and it followed that S-curl was not
being used as a trade mark. I find this difficult to follow.
I know
of no principle that says that the use of one mark on a product
excludes the possibility that any other mark thereon can
be a trade
mark. The simple fact is that the respondent’s S-curl mark is
being used on the goods and in relation to the goods
in respect of
which the trade mark is registered. That would seem to me to bring
the respondent’s use wholly within the terms
of s 44(1)(a),
it also being common
cause that it was unauthorised use’.
[16] As far
as the second and third contentions are concerned, the respondent
appears to be attempting to limit the ambit of the
first appellant’s
trademarks without formally seeking an amendment of the registrations
in terms of the Act. It will be remembered
that the respondent was
unsuccessful in its application for a disclaimer to be entered in
respect of each registered trademark
and has not sought to appeal
against that order. Each of the first appellant’s trademarks
consists of three stripes, in a
specific configuration, the colour of
which contrasts with the colour of the material to which they are
applied. Each registration
incorporates a description of the mark and
three of the registrations have a graphic representation of the mark
showing the configuration
of the stripes. Subject to the other
relevant provisions of the Act, the limits of the protection
conferred by the registration
of the trademarks are determined by the
provisions of s 34. Section 34(1)
(a)
extends the protection to preclude use of marks which so
nearly resemble the registered mark as to be likely to deceive or
cause
confusion and s 34(1)
(b)
and
(c) extend the protection to preclude the use of marks which are
‘similar’ to the registered trademarks.
13
The first appellant is simply seeking to enforce its
rights in terms of s 34(1)
(a)
to
prevent the use of marks which, it contends, so nearly resemble its
registered trademarks as to be likely to deceive or cause
confusion.
The first appellant cannot informally extend the ambit of the
registered trademarks. Each allegedly infringing mark
must be
compared with each registered mark (as recorded in the register) to
determine whether deception or confusion is likely.
14
It is the mark as it appears on the register that the
first appellant is entitled to protect.
[17] As far as the fourth
contention is concerned, the question of whether the first
appellant’s trademarks are so famous
(‘notorious,
recognisable and distinctive’) that there is no likelihood that
a purchaser of the trainers and soccer
boots would be confused by the
respondent’s two and four stripes is not a separate defence but
simply a relevant circumstance
which must be considered when the
marks are compared for purposes of determining the issue of whether
there is a likelihood of
deception or confusion.
[18] As far
as the fifth contention is concerned, the first appellant is
obviously entitled to rely on South African (and other)
judgments, as
persuasive, if not decisive precedents, if they were decided by
applying the same principles (as are now involved)
to the same or
similar facts. The case of
Adidas
Sportschuhfabriken Adi Dassler KG v Harry Walt & Co (Pty) Ltd
1976 (1) SA 530
(T) is a case in point. It
involved the infringement of trade mark no 1959/57 (the three stripe
mark in the specific configuration
on both sides of sporting
footwear) in terms of s 44(1)
(a)
of
the old Act by the use of a mark (on sporting footwear) identical in
every respect to the trade mark save that the mark consisted
of four
stripes. The court found that infringement had been established,
notwithstanding the fact that four stripes are clearly
different from
three stripes.
15
The respondent does not contend that this case was
wrongly decided, only that the relevant circumstances have changed.
It argues
that the fundamental difference is that the court did not
have to decide whether the use of the four stripes on the defendant’s

soccer boots was trademark use or mere embellishment (this has
already been decided against the respondent) and that the likelihood

of deception or confusion must be considered in the light of
present-day circumstances pertaining to the consumer: the pervasive

use of stripes in the market and the huge reputation enjoyed by the
first appellant’s three stripe trademarks. As I understand
the
argument, because of the appellants’ advertising, marketing and
promotion of its products under the three stripe trademarks,
these
three stripe trademarks have become so distinctive, or have acquired
such a reputation, that present day consumers will immediately
see
that the respondent’s two and four stripe marks are not the
first appellant’s three stripe marks (it will be remembered

that these are simply factors to be taken into account). I now turn
to the real issue of infringement.
[19] The respondent’s
use of its two and four stripe marks on the trainers and soccer boot
was unauthorised, was in the course
of trade and was in respect of
goods in respect of which the first appellant’s trademarks are
registered. The two and four
stripe marks are obviously not identical
to the registered trademarks and the issue to be decided, as far as
trademark infringement
is concerned, is whether the two and four
stripe marks so nearly resemble any of the first appellant’s
trademarks as to be
likely to deceive or cause confusion. This
requires a comparison to be made between the four registered
trademarks and the two
and four stripe marks.
[20] The
parties agree that the essential principles relating to the
comparison to be made are set out in
Plascon-Evans
Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd
:
16

In
an infringement action the
onus
is
on the plaintiff to show the probability or likelihood of deception
or confusion. It is not incumbent upon the plaintiff to show
that
every person interested or concerned (usually as customer) in the
class of goods for which his trademark has been registered
would
probably be deceived or confused. It is sufficient if the
probabilities establish that a substantial number of such persons

will be deceived or confused. The concept of deception or confusion
is not limited to inducing in the minds of interested persons
the
erroneous belief or impression that the goods in relation to which
the defendant’s mark is used are the goods of the
proprietor of
the registered mark, ie the plaintiff, or that there is a material
connection between the defendant’s goods
and the proprietor of
the registered mark; it is enough for the plaintiff to show that a
substantial number of persons will probably
be confused as to the
origin of the goods or the existence or non-existence of such a
connection. The determination of these questions
involves essentially
a comparison between the mark used by the defendant and the
registered mark and, having regard to the similarities
and
differences in the two marks, an assessment of the impact which the
defendant’s mark would make upon the average type
of customer
who would be likely to purchase the kind of goods to which the marks
are applied. This notional customer must be conceived
of as a person
of average intelligence, having proper eyesight and buying with
ordinary caution. The comparison must be made with
reference to the
sense, sound and appearance of the marks. The marks must be viewed as
they would be encountered in the marketplace
and against the
background of relevant surrounding circumstances. The marks must not
only be considered side by side, but also
separately. It must be
borne in mind that the ordinary purchaser may encounter goods,
bearing the defendant’s mark, with
an imperfect recollection of
the registered mark and due allowance must be made for this. If each
of the marks contains a main
or dominant
feature
or idea the likely impact made by this on the mind of the customer
must be taken into account. As it has been put, marks
are remembered
rather by general impressions or by some significant or striking
feature than by a photographic recollection of
the whole. And finally
consideration must be given to the manner in which the marks are
likely to be employed as, for example,
the use of name marks in
conjunction with a generic description of the goods.’
The court
proceeded to say that where the contending marks have been used by
both parties, ‘the issue of deceptive or confusing
resemblance
can be decided on the basis of actual user by both parties’
17
and emphasized that –
‘…
the
comparison must not be confined to a viewing of the marks side by
side. I must notionally transport myself to the market place

and consider whether the average customer is likely to be deceived or
confused. And here I must take into account relevant
surrounding
circumstances, such as the way in which the goods to which the marks
are applied are marketed, the types of customer
who would be likely
to purchase the goods, matters of common knowledge in the trade and
the knowledge which such purchasers would
have of the goods in
question and the marks applied to them.’
18
[21] It must be
emphasized that the likelihood of confusion must be appreciated
globally and that the –

global
appreciation of the visual, aural or conceptual similarity of the
marks in question, must be based on the overall impression
given by
the marks, bearing in mind, in particular, their distinctive and
dominant components’.
19
[22] It must
be borne in mind that the question of the likelihood of confusion or
deception is a matter of first impression and
that ‘one should
not peer too closely at the registered mark and the alleged
infringement to find similarities or differences’.
20
The court must not consider the question of deception or
confusion as if the purchaser of the goods will have had the
opportunity
of carefully considering the marks and even comparing
them side by side. They must look at the marks as they will be seen
in the
marketplace and take into account a notional purchaser: ‘a
person of average intelligence, and proper eyesight, buying with

ordinary caution’.
21
[23] The
question of deception or confusion for the purposes of infringement
proceedings in terms of s 34(1)
(a)
requires a comparison of the allegedly offending mark
with the registered mark: in this case, the two and four stripe marks
with
the first appellant’s three stripe trademarks.
22
Unlike passing off, the get-up or trade dress of the
goods is irrelevant.
[24] In my
view, the fact that the first appellant’s three stripe
trademarks are famous, does not justify a finding that there
is no
likelihood of deception or confusion because purchasers of the goods
will see immediately that the respondent’s marks
are not the
first appellant’s trademarks. In my view the contrary is true.
The more distinctive the trademark is, or the
greater its reputation,
the greater the likelihood that there will be deception or confusion
where a similar mark is used on competing
products. Purchasers who
are used to seeing the first appellant’s trademarks will still
experience imperfect perception or
imperfect recollection and will be
far more likely to conclude that the similar mark is the first
appellant’s trademark or
is associated with the first
appellant’s trademark and consequently that the competing
products come from the same source.
That is clearly the position in
other jurisdictions where the law is comparable with ours.
23
[25] When making the
comparison it is permissible to refer to the trademarks as they are
applied to the appellants’ sporting
footwear. When this is
done, it is immediately apparent, on first impression, that the four
stripe marks on the respondents soccer
boot (TB10) and the
respondent’s Boys ATH Leisure Shoe (TB11) and the two stripe
marks on the respondent’s ‘Hang
Ten’ sports shoe
(TB12) and the respondent’s ‘Girls Must Have’ shoe
(TB13) are not similar to the first
appellant’s trademarks and
consequently that there is no likelihood of deception or confusion.
That leaves the four mark
stripe on the LDS Sportshoe (TB8) and on
the Men’s ATH Leisure Shoe (TB9).
[26] In
making the comparison in the founding affidavit the appellants’
deponent used, what the respondent’s deponent
dismissively
referred to as the ‘adidas technique’: the individual
elements of the competing marks were enumerated
and compared and, by
this means, it was demonstrated that the only difference between them
was the number of stripes. It was then
contended that this difference
is not sufficient to exclude the likelihood of deception or
confusion. This is, of course, not how
consumers will perceive the
marks. However, it does illustrate that it is the configuration of
the marks that will impress itself
upon the mind. The three stripes
are grouped together, run parallel from the fastening of the shoe or
boot to the sole, slant towards
the heel, are the same width, are
equidistant from each other and are in a colour which contrasts with
the colour of the material
to which they are applied. The
configuration of the four stripes is the same and the first
appellant’s trademarks and the
respondent’s four stripe
marks make the same general impression. In my view the reasoning of
the court in the
Harry Walt
case
still applies, particularly if allowance is made for imperfect
recollection and imperfect perception.
24
As already pointed out the likelihood of deception or
confusion is increased by the distinctiveness or reputation which the
registered
trademarks have.
[27] The
respondent made much of the absence of evidence of deception or
confusion but deception or confusion is a matter for the
court to
decide
25
and, taking into account the difficulties associated
with the admissibility and the weight to be given to such evidence,
no significance
can be attached to the absence of this evidence.
26
The respondent also contended that there is no
likelihood of deception or confusion because the respondent’s
footwear was
sold in a market completely different from that in which
the appellants’ footwear was sold and the respondent’s
shoes
and soccer boot were sold for prices ranging from R59,99 to
R115,95 whereas the appellants were sold for prices ranging from R695

for the Adi-Racer shoe to R3128 for the most expensive Predator
Absolute soccer boot. However, the evidence does not show that
the
markets are divided into watertight compartments, or that purchasers
of Ackermans’ and Pep Stores’ goods do not
shop in stores
where the appellants’ shoes and soccer boot were sold. The
likelihood of at least momentary deception or confusion
where the
purchaser must select the goods from those on display was therefore
shown. Accordingly, the first appellant established
that the
respondent’s use of four stripes on its LDS Sport shoe (TB8)
and on its Mens ATH Leisure shoe (TB9) was an infringement
of the
first appellant’s trademark rights in terms of s 34(1)
(a)
of the Act and the first appellant is entitled to an
interdict and the ancillary relief sought in the notice of motion. I
now turn
to consider the question of passing off.
[28] The
principles governing passing off are well-established. Passing off
occurs, in relation to goods or merchandise, when one
trader
represents to the public that his goods or merchandise are the goods
or merchandise of another trader. Where the representation
is implied
it will usually be made by the one trader adopting a name, mark or
get-up for his goods or merchandise which so resembles
that of the
other trader that there is a reasonable likelihood that ordinary
members of the public, or a substantial section thereof,
may be
confused or deceived into believing that the goods or merchandise of
the former are the goods or merchandise of the latter
or are
connected therewith. Whether there is such a reasonable likelihood of
confusion or deception is a question of fact to be
determined in the
light of the particular circumstances of the case. In order to
succeed in passing off proceedings based upon
an implied
representation the aggrieved trader must establish, first, that the
name, mark or get-up used by that trader has become
distinctive of
the trader’s goods or merchandise in that the public associates
the name, mark or get-up with the goods or
merchandise marketed by
that trader and, secondly, that the name, mark or get-up used by the
other trader is so used as to cause
the public to be confused or
deceived in the manner described.
27
[29] The
degree of distinctiveness (or the extent of the reputation) is of
great importance in passing off proceedings as it affects
the issue
of whether the general public will be confused or deceived into
thinking, because of the similarity of the name, mark
or get-up, that
the goods or merchandise of the second trader are those of the first
trader or are connected therewith.
28
It follows therefore that (just as in the case of
trademark infringement) the more distinctive the get-up is (or the
greater the
extent of its reputation) the greater the likelihood will
be that the public will be confused or deceived. An aggrieved trader
can establish such distinctiveness (or reputation) in respect of the
goods or merchandise by adducing evidence as to the manner
and the
scale of the use of the name, mark or get-up which justifies the
inference that the name, mark or get-up has become recognised
by a
substantial section of the relevant public as distinctive of the
aggrieved trader’s ‘goods or merchandise’.
29
In this case the distinctiveness (or reputation) of the
appellants’ trademarks is not in dispute and the
distinctiveness (or
reputation) of the rest of the get-ups can be
safely inferred from the scale and manner of the use of the
trademarks and other
features of the get-ups on the shoes and
football boots concerned, which has not been disputed by the
respondent.
[30] When
considering whether the public will be confused or deceived by an
implied representation the court must postulate neither
the very
careful nor the very careless buyer, but an average purchaser, who
has a good idea in his mind’s eye of what he
means to get but
not an exact and accurate representation of it. The court must also
take into account that the purchaser will
not necessarily have the
advantage of seeing the products side by side and will not be alerted
to fine points of distinction or
definition. The court must further
take into account that the purchaser may not be able to read simple
words as there are many
people in South Africa that are illiterate.
30
[31] Finally, it must be
borne in mind that the law of passing off does not confer monopolies
on successful get-ups. A trader may,
to an extent, copy the
successful get-up of a rival. However, the moment he copies he will
be at risk. The trader will only avoid
liability for passing off if
‘he makes it perfectly clear to the public that the articles
which he
is selling
are not the other manufacturer’s, but his own, so that there is
no probability of the ordinary purchaser being
deceived’.
31
[32] Passing
off (unlike trademark infringement in terms of s 34(1)(a) of the Act)
requires that a comparison be made between the
get-ups of the
competing goods and not just the trade marks applied to those goods.
What had to be proved was that, by adopting
the particular get-ups,
which included the two and four stripe marks, the respondent was
representing its goods to be those of
the appellants or to be
connected therewith. This is a matter of first impression.
32
In opposing the grant of relief on the grounds of
passing off, the respondent again referred to what it considered to
be the appellants’
improper use of the ‘adidas technique’
and the fact that the appellants’ trademarks are famous.
[33] The appellants
contended that, by selling the footwear depicted in the schedule at
the end of this judgment, the respondent
was passing off its Mens ATH
Leisure shoe (TB9 and AA17) as the appellants’ Tuscany shoe
(TB54) and Adi/Racer shoe (TB56);
that the respondent was passing off
its Soccer boot (TB10, AA18 and AA19) and its Boys ATH Leisure Shoe
(TB11, AA20 and AA21) as
the appellants’ Predator Absolute
(TB57) and Absolion soccer boots (TB58); and that the respondent was
passing off its ‘Hang
Ten’ shoe (TB12, AA22 and AA23) and
its ‘Girls Must Have’ shoe (TB13, AA24 and AA25) as the
appellants’
Superstar shoe (TB62).
[34] It will be
convenient to deal first with the alleged passing off of the ‘Hang
Ten’ and ‘Girls Must Have’
shoes as the Superstar
shoe. The most prominent feature of the Superstar shoe is obviously
the three stripe trade mark. In my view
the two stripe marks on the
respondent’s shoes, which are widely spaced, are clearly
different from the stripes on the Superstar
shoes and are not
confusingly similar to the appellants’ trade mark. In addition
the Superstar shoe prominently features
the adidas name and trefoil
device on the back of the heel , the tongue of the shoe and the
insole, while the respondent’s
shoes prominently feature the
‘Hang Ten’ and ‘actif’ trademarks on the back
of the heel, the tongue of
the shoe and on the insole. The marks on
the respondent’s shoes therefore
clearly identify the
products in such a way that the notional purchaser of the shoes would
not be misled. The appellants have therefore
not made out a case of
passing off in respect of the Superstar shoe.
[35] The remaining shoes
fall into two categories: the shoes to which the marks (in the
specific configuration) have been applied
and the soccer boots and
shoes to which bent stripes have been applied. The first category
presents no difficulty. The appellants’
famous trademark,
consisting of three bold black stripes with serrated edges against a
white background, is the most prominent
feature of the Adi-Racer shoe
(TB56). This is highlighted by the black and white colouring of the
shoe and the distinctive black
heel. The respondent’s Mens’
ATH Leisure shoe (TB9) has four bold black stripes with serrated
edges against a white
background, the shoe is also black and white
and it has the same distinctive black heel. It is also striking that
the pattern of
the stitching on both shoes is identical. The
respondent’s shoe has no distinctive marks on the outside of
the shoe. In my
view the notional purchaser would be confused, at
least momentarily, as to whether the respondent’s shoe is the
appellants’
shoe or is connected therewith.
[36] The Predator soccer
boots do not feature the famous stripes in the configuration of the
first appellant’s trademarks.
On the instep the three stripes
run from the sole up and over the top of the boot to meet the
fastening or end at the line of the
fastening, which is off-centre.
These three stripes are more or less parallel and more or less the
same width but taper slightly
before they terminate. On the outside
of the boots the three stripes run from the sole to the fastening.
The stripes taper as they
run away from the sole. They are more or
less parallel. The Predator Absolute boot (TB57) features black
stripes on a white background
with decorative areas in gold on the
heel, around the ankle and along the sole. It also features gold
stripes along the top of
the boot next to the fastening. The adidas
trade mark and device appear on the tongue of the boots and another
device on the heel.
The stripes and the colouring are prominent
features of the boots. The Predator Absolion boot (TB58) has all the
features of the
Absolute boot save that the stripes are blue against
a white background and the heel and additional decorative stripes are
blue.
The respondent’s competing products have similar
features, but the colours of the respondent’s football boot
(TB10)
are not the same as the colours of the Absolion boot. The
stripes are white against a blue background and the additional
markings
are white. The colours of the Boys ATH Leisure Shoe (TB11)
are white and gold. Neither product bears any other identifying mark

which is clearly visible. The only other trade mark used on the boot
and the shoe is ‘Xtreme Sports’, which is on the
insole.
In my view, taking into account the distinctiveness of the
appellants’ footwear and soccer boots, the market and
the
purchasers of the competing goods, these get-ups are misleading and
would be likely to cause the notional purchaser to think
that the
respondent’s products are or are connected with the appellants’
goods. The appellants have therefore established
a passing off in
respect of the respondent’s football boot and Boys Leisure shoe
and they are entitled to an interdict and
the ancillary relief
claimed.
[37] It remains to record
that the respondent contended without any factual basis that the
appellants had acquiesced in the use
by other manufacturers of two
and four stripes on their sporting footwear. Although this was raised
in the respondent’s heads
of argument it was not referred to in
argument at the hearing and it requires no further consideration.
[38] There
was no dispute as to the relief to be granted in the event of this
Court finding infringement and passing off.
33
Both parties employed two counsel and, in my view, that
was justified.
[39] The following order
is made:
1. The appeal is upheld
with costs, such costs to include the costs of two counsel.
2. The order of the court
a quo dismissing the application with costs is set aside and replaced
by the following order:

(a)
The respondent is interdicted and restrained from infringing the
first applicant’s rights acquired by the registration
of
trade-marks numbers 1957/01959, 1995/12283, 1980/6446 and 2000/18582
(‘the registered trademarks’) by using in the
course of
trade in relation to goods for which the registered trademarks are
registered, a mark consisting of four parallel stripes
of a colour or
material different from the colour or material of the footwear, and
on the outside of the uppers of the footwear,
to which they are
applied, as represented in annexures TB8 and TB9 to the founding
affidavit of Timothy George James Behean (‘the
infringing
marks’) or any other mark so nearly resembling the registered
trademarks as to be likely to deceive or cause confusion
as
contemplated in s 34(1)
(a)
of
the Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993 (‘the Act’);
(b) The respondent is
directed to remove the infringing marks from its footwear and, where
the infringing marks are inseparable
or incapable of being removed
from the respondent’s footwear, it is ordered that all such
footwear be delivered to the first
applicant as provided for in s
34(3)
(b)
of the Act;
(c) An enquiry is
directed to be held for the purposes of determining the amount of any
damages (as contemplated in s 34(3)
(c)
of the Act) or
reasonable royalty (as contemplated in s 34(3)
(d)
of the Act)
to be awarded to the first applicant as a result of the infringement
of the first applicant’s rights acquired
by the registration of
the registered trademarks, in accordance with such procedures as this
Court may deem fit (as contemplated
in s 34(4) of the Act), and that
the respondent pay the amount found to be due to the first applicant;
(d) The respondent is
interdicted and restrained from passing off its footwear as being
that of the applicants or as being connected
in the course of trade
with the applicants by using in relation thereto a get-up as depicted
in annexures TB9, TB10 and TB11 to
the founding affidavit of Timothy
George James Behean (including such trademarks as are depicted in
those annexures) or any other
get-up (including any trademarks) so
closely resembling the get-ups (including any trademarks) of the
applicants’ footwear
as depicted in paragraph 24 of the
founding affidavit of Timothy George James Behean as to be likely to
deceive or cause confusion;
(e) An enquiry is
directed to be held for the purposes of determining the amount of any
damages to be awarded to the applicants
as a result of the
respondent’s passing-off as aforesaid and that the respondent
pay the amount found to be due to the applicants
and it is directed
that, in the event of the parties being unable to reach agreement as
to the further pleadings to be filed, discovery,
inspection, or other
matters of procedure relating to the enquiry, either party may make
application to the court for directions
in regard thereto;
(f)
The respondent is ordered to pay the costs of the application,
including the costs of two counsel.’
______________________
BR Southwood
Acting Judge of Appeal
APPEARANCES
For Appellants:
L
BOWMAN S C (with B du Plessis)
Spoor and Fisher,
Pretoria
Matsepe’s Inc,
Bloemfontein
For Respondent:
A
SHOLTO-DOUGLAS SC (with B Vaughan)
Werksmans Inc, Cape Town
Webbers
Attorneys, Bloemfontein
1
The
respondent sought the following disclaimer in respect of each of the
registered trademarks:

Registration
of this trademark shall give no right to the exclusive use of
parallel and equidistant stripes upon the goods other
than three
such equidistant stripes as depicted.’
2
After
the respondent disputed that the goods in respect of which the
respondent was using its two and four stripe marks were goods
in
respect of which all the trade marks were registered, the appellants
amended their papers to rely on s 34(1)(b) of the Act
as well. At
the hearing of the appeal, it was common cause that only s 34(1)(a)
need be considered.
3
Act
62 of 1963.
4
PPI
Makelaars and another v Professional Provident Society of South
Africa
1998 (1) SA 595
(SCA) at 602G-603D.
5
In
its answering affidavit the respondent disputed that its trainers
were sporting footwear and consequently that its use of the
stripes
on these trainers could infringe two of the first appellant’s
trademarks. The respondent did not persist with this
a
t
the hearing.
6
The
shoes and soccer boots depicted in the photographs in the schedule
were shown to the court at the hearing of the appeal and
it was
observed that the colours were not always faithfully reproduced in
the photographs.
7
See
the definitions of ‘mark’ and ‘trade mark’
in the Act.
8
2011
(2) SA 463
(SCA) at 470G-471A.
9
Act
37 of 1997.
10
2007
(6) SA 263
(SCA) para 5.
11
See
also
Puma AG Rudolf Dassler Sport v Global Warming (Pty) Ltd
2010 (6) SA 600
(SCA) para 6.
12
1997
(3) SA 13
(A) at 27H-27A.
13
The
learned authors of
Webster and Page:
South African Law
of Trade Marks
4 ed (Webster and Page) contend in para 12.22
that the word ‘similar’ in s 34(1)(b) is synonymous with
the words
‘so nearly resembling’ in s 34(1)(a) and that
the degree of similarity required between the marks must be such
that
it is likely to give rise to deception or confusion. In para
12.26 they contend that in s 34(1)(c) the ordinary dictionary
meaning
should be given to the term ‘similar’; namely
‘Having a marked resemblance or likeness’ and that the

offending mark should immediately bring to mind the well-known trade
mark. That is the conclusion reached in
Bata Ltd v Face Fashions
CC
2001 (1) SA 844
(SCA) at 852B-E. On either interpretation it
is clear that the protection is not limited to marks consisting of
three stripes
having a specific configuration.
14
Cointreau
et Cie SA v Pagan International
[1991] ZASCA 89
;
1991 (4) SA 706
(a)
at
709I-712B;
Weltevrede Nursery v Keith Kirstens (Pty) Ltd &
another
2004 (4) SA 110
(SCA):
[2004] 1 All SA 181
(SCA) para 8.
15
The
judgment has been followed ever since. See eg
Adidas
Sportschuhfabriken Adi Dassler Stiftung & Co v Continental
Wholesalers
(Unreported judgment: Roux J: 16 August 1988:
Transvaal Provincial Division: Case No 12034/87);
Adidas
Aktiengesellschaft and another v Woolworths (Pty) Ltd
1999 BIP
433 (C);
International Power Marketing (Pty) Ltd v Searles
Industrials (Pty) Ltd
1983 (4) SA 163
(T) at 165G-170B.
16
Plascon-Evans
Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd
[1984] ZASCA 51
;
1984 (3) SA 623
(A)
at 640G-641E.
17
Plascon-Evans
supra at 642B-C.
18
Plascon-Evans
supra at 642D-F.
19
Bata
Ltd v Face Fashions CC & another
2001 (1) SA 844
(SCA) para
9;
Sabel B V v Puma
A G, Rudolf Dassler
Sport
[1998] RPC 199
at 224.
20
Puma
A G, Rudolf Dassler Sport v Global Warming (Pty) Ltd
2010 (2) SA
600
(SCA) para 9;
Laboratoire Lachartre SA v Armour-Dial Inc.
1976 (2) SA 744
(T) at 746B-F.
21
Laboratoire
Lachartre SA v Armour-Dial Inc.
1976 (2) SA 744
(T) at 746B-F.
22
Adidas
Sportschuhfabriken Adi Dassler K G v Harry Walt & Co (Pty) Ltd
1976 (1) SA 530
(T) at 532A;
John Craig (Pty) Ltd v Dupa
Clothing Industries (Pty) Ltd
1977 (3) SA 144
(T) at 149C-H;
Plascon-Evans Paints (Pty) Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints Ltd
1984
(3) SA 620
(A) at 640I-641A.
23
See
eg
Specsavers International Healthcare Ltd & others v Asda
Stores Ltd
[2012] EWCA Civ 24
where the court summarised the
position as follows: ‘The Court of Justice has said in many
cases … that the reputation
of an earlier mark is to be taken
into account when determining the likelihood of deception or
confusion. In particular, the
more distinctive the earlier mark the
greater the risk of confusion, and marks with a highly distinctive
character, either
per se
or because of the reputation they
possess in the market, enjoy broader protection than marks with a
less distinctive character.’;
Sabel BV v Puma AG, Rudolf
Dassler Sport
[1998] RPC 199
(European Court of Justice) 224
lines 6-24;
Canon Kabushiki Kaisha v Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer Inc
[1998] EUECJ C-39/97
;
[1998] ECR I-5507
para 18;
Marca Mode CV v adidas AG and adidas
Benelux BV
(European Court of Justice (Sixth Chamber)),
delivered 22 June 2000 para 41;
adidas-Salomon AG v Sketchers USA
Deutschland
GmbH (Hamburg District Court) delivered 11 July
2003;
Webster and Page
para 12.8.2.
24
Adidas
Sportschuhfabriken KG v Harry Walt & Co Ltd
1976 (1) SA 530
(T) at 536A-537H.
25
Reckitt
& Colman SA (Pty) Ltd v SC Johnson & Son SA (Pty) Ltd
1993 (2) SA 307
(A) at 315D.
26
Webster
and Page
paras 8.36, 8.37 and 8.39.
27
Brian
Boswell Circus (Pty) Ltd & another v Boswell-Wilkie Circus (Pty)
Ltd
1985 (4) SA 466
(A) at 478F-479B;
Williams t/a Jenifer
Williams & Associates & another v Life Line Southern
Transvaal
[1996] ZASCA 46
;
1996 (3) SA 408
(A) at 418D-F;
Pasquali Cigarette
Co. Ltd v Diaconicolas & Capsopolus
1905 TS 472
at 474;
Capital Estate and General Agencies (Pty) Ltd & others v
Holliday Inns Inc. & others
1977 (2) SA 916
(A) at 929C;
Blue Lion Manufacturing (Pty) Ltd v National Brands Ltd
2001
(3) SA 884
(SCA) para 2.
28
Brian
Boswell Circus
at 479B-I.
29
Hollywood
Curl (Pty) Ltd v Twins Products (Pty) Ltd
(1)
1989 (1) SA 236
(A) at 251D-E;
Cambridge Plan A G & another v Moore &
others
1987 (4) SA 821
(D) at 837B-E.
30
Blue
Lion Manufacturing (Pty) Ltd v National Brands Ltd
2001 (3) SA
884
(SCA) para 3.
31
Para
4.
32
Para
1.
33
The
appellants’ counsel formulated its relief in a draft notice.