Van Rhyn N.O and Others v Avhakholwi and Others (17887/2021) [2022] ZAGPJHC 279 (5 July 2022)

80 Reportability
Commercial Law

Brief Summary

Arbitration — Interpretation of lease agreements — Dispute over the meaning of "fair market value" in lease agreements — Applicants, trustees of two trusts, sought a declaratory order regarding the interpretation of lease terms after a valuation dispute with Transnet — The lease specified that the rental for renewal periods would be determined based on the "fair market value of the LAND," which the trusts argued excluded improvements made to the land — Transnet contended that the arbitrator, as an expert valuer, should determine the valuation without legal interpretation — Court held that the arbitrator was intended to act as an expert, not as a legal arbitrator, and that the legal interpretation of the lease terms should be determined by the court, allowing for a proper resolution of the valuation dispute.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


Introduction


The proceedings took the form of an application for a declaratory order. The application arose from a dispute concerning the interpretation of renewal-rental provisions in two long-term notarial lease agreements and, specifically, the scope of an appointed valuer’s (described in the leases as an “arbitrator”) mandate when determining the “fair market rental” for the renewal period.


The applicants were three trustees acting in their representative capacities (N.O.) as trustees of two trusts, namely the Iliad Business Development Trust (IDB Trust) and the Commercial Projects Trust (CPD Trust). The first respondent was Nthebe Avhakholwi, the individual who had been appointed to determine the fair market rental under the contractual dispute-resolution mechanism. The second respondent was Transnet SOC Limited, the lessor under both leases. The third respondent was BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd, the entity operating fuel service stations on the properties as sub-lessee/occupier, cited but not participating in the litigation.


The procedural history, as relied upon by the court, was that the parties could not agree on the renewal rental and invoked the contractual mechanism requiring valuation by party-appointed valuers and, failing agreement, determination by an appointed “arbitrator” who had to be a registered valuer. A further dispute emerged about whether the meaning of “fair market rental for the LAND” was a question of law (to be determined legally) or a valuation question (to be determined by the appointed valuer). The trusts attempted, unsuccessfully, to have the appointed valuer refer the interpretive question to a legal expert. The trusts then approached the High Court for declaratory relief. The first respondent subsequently resigned her appointment, with the result that any further determination would require a new appointee if the matter reverted to the contractual process.


In general terms, the dispute concerned whether the renewal rental must be calculated by valuing the land in an unimproved state, or whether the valuation could include the value attributable to the improvements installed by the trusts for the operation of fuel stations.


Material Facts


Two long-term notarial leases were concluded between the trusts and Transnet in December 1993 and March 1994, each for a duration of 25 years and 120 days, and each containing identical renewal provisions permitting renewal for a further 20 years. It was common cause that when the leases were entered into, the land had no improvements and that the trusts, at their expense, developed the land and installed infrastructure enabling use as fuel service stations. It was also common cause that, upon termination, those improvements would adhere to the land and would not be recoverable by the trusts.


The leases were renewed in circumstances where the leases permitted renewal before the renewal rental was agreed or determined. Because of the ongoing dispute as to the renewal rental, the trusts occupied the properties rent-free pending determination of the renewal rental.


Each lease contained a mechanism for determining the renewal rental. The renewal rental was to be the “fair market rental for the LAND”, agreed by the parties, failing which it would be determined through a process involving party-appointed valuers and, if those valuers could not reach agreement, by a third party described in the lease as an “arbitrator” who had to be a registered valuer (with appointment to be made by the President of the Council of Valuers if necessary). The lease further provided that the arbitrator’s determination would be final and binding and not subject to review by a court (in the language of the clause quoted).


A dispute emerged about what the valuation base was meant to be, given the lease’s defined terms. The lease defined “LAND” as the area of land indicated on the plans. It defined “IMPROVEMENTS” as buildings, structures, and developments erected on the land by the lessee and any existing structures not demolished. It defined “PREMISES” as the land and improvements together.


The trusts’ position (supported by their expert) was that the fair market rental had to be determined with reference to the “LAND” in its unimproved state, excluding improvements. Transnet’s expert produced two valuations: one for the land alone and another for the land plus improvements. The court recorded that the experts’ valuations of the land alone were not far apart, but that including improvements materially increased the valuation (nearly doubling in one case and substantially increasing it in the other).


The court treated as central the parties’ dispute about whether determining what “fair market rental for the LAND” means (given the defined terms) was a matter of legal interpretation that could not properly be left to a non-lawyer valuer, or whether it was instead a matter of valuation methodology for the appointed valuer to decide.


Legal Issues


The central legal questions the court was required to determine were whether a dispute existed that was suitable for declaratory relief and, substantively, whether the lease agreements required that the appointed valuer (referred to as an “arbitrator”) determine the renewal rental by valuing only the “LAND” as defined, namely in an unimproved state without regard to improvements.


Embedded in this was a further question concerning the capacity in which the appointed decision-maker acts under the lease: whether the parties intended that person to function as an expert valuer (exercising professional judgment and skill, without deciding legal issues), or as an arbitrator in the juridical sense (capable of deciding disputes including issues of law).


The dispute therefore concerned primarily a question of law (interpretation of defined contractual terms and the scope of the decision-maker’s mandate), with consequential issues of application of law to fact (what valuation base follows from the proper interpretation). It did not require the court to determine the factual market rental itself, but to determine the interpretive framework within which valuation must occur.


Court’s Reasoning


The court approached the dispute by focusing on what the parties’ contractual scheme revealed about the intended role of the person appointed to determine the market rental. Although the lease used the term “arbitrator”, the court considered it “clear” that, by requiring the appointee to be a person with valuation expertise (a registered valuer) rather than a lawyer, the parties intended the appointee to act as an expert, not as an arbitrator performing a quasi-judicial function. The court treated the parties’ later agreement that Arbitration Act procedures would apply as insufficient to change that essential characterisation of the function contemplated by the lease.


In support of this distinction, the court relied on the principle stated in Perdikis v Jamieson 2002 (6) SA 356 (W), namely that a valuer acting as an expert has a function distinct from an arbitrator: the valuer’s task is to decide questions by the exercise of judgment and skill without a judicial inquiry, and the valuer does not exercise a quasi-judicial function. On this approach, the court reasoned that the appointed valuer was not expected to decide legal questions such as the interpretive effect of carefully defined contractual terms.


The court then characterised the meaning of “fair market rental for the LAND” (given the contract’s express definitions of “LAND”, “IMPROVEMENTS”, and “PREMISES”) as “undoubtedly” a question of law. The court considered it artificial, and contrary to the structure of the lease, to suggest that those definitions could yield anything other than a legal interpretation. Once the interpretive question is decided, what remains is an expert valuation exercise—determining the fair market rental of the land, as legally defined, which in turn engages valuation methodology and valuation skill.


The court rejected Transnet’s contention that the meaning of “fair market value” (and whether “land” includes improvements) should be treated as a purely economic or commercial question for valuation methodology. While acknowledging Transnet’s argument that “land” may in some contexts be defined to include improvements, the court held that, in this lease, the parties had selected and defined their terms, and that chosen definition must apply.


Transnet also relied on Telcordia Technologies Inc v Telkom SA Ltd 2007 (3) SA 266 (SCA) for the proposition that an arbitrator can decide a point of law. The court distinguished Telcordia on the basis that it concerned an arbitrator who was a barrister, and whose mandate included deciding the application of law. This was not comparable to the present contractual arrangement, where the appointee was an industry expert (valuer) and not a lawyer mandated to decide legal questions.


Having determined that the interpretive dispute was appropriately for judicial determination, the court considered whether declaratory relief was competent. It applied the established two-stage approach: first, the applicant must show an interest in an existing, future, or contingent right or obligation; second, the court has a discretion whether to grant the order. Referring to the requirement of a “real and pertinent dispute”, the court found that a genuine dispute existed between the parties and that resolving it would likely avoid protracted litigation and enable a speedier resolution, which would be in the interests of both parties. On that basis, it exercised its discretion to grant declaratory relief.


Outcome and Relief


The court granted declaratory relief confirming both the existence of an interpretive dispute and the proper interpretation of the relevant renewal-rental provisions. It declared that the lease agreements require that the appointed valuer (described as an arbitrator in the lease) determine the renewal rental by determining the fair market rental for the “LAND” as defined, namely in its unimproved state and without regard to improvements effected to the land.


The court ordered that Transnet SOC Limited (the second respondent) pay the costs of the application.


Cases Cited


Perdikis v Jamieson 2002 (6) SA 356 (W)


Telcordia Technologies Inc v Telkom SA Ltd 2007 (3) SA 266 (SCA)


Cordiant Trading CC v Daimler Chrysler Financial Services (Pty) Ltd 2005 (6) SA 205 (SCA)


Competition Commission v Hosken Consolidated Investments Ltd and Another 2019 (3) SA 1 (CC)


Legislation Cited


Arbitration Act 42 of 1965


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The court held that, despite the lease using the term “arbitrator”, the parties intended the appointed decision-maker to act as an expert valuer rather than an arbitrator determining legal disputes. As a result, the interpretation of the lease’s defined terms—specifically whether “fair market rental for the LAND” excludes improvements—was a legal question suitable for determination by the court via declaratory relief.


On the proper interpretation of the lease agreements read with their definitions, the court held that the renewal rental must be determined by valuing the LAND in its unimproved state, excluding the value attributable to improvements effected by the trusts. Transnet was ordered to pay the costs.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The judgment applied the principle that an expert determination (such as a valuation) is distinct from arbitration in the juridical sense. An expert valuer’s role is to apply specialist skill and judgment to questions submitted, without conducting a quasi-judicial inquiry and without necessarily being empowered to determine legal issues, even where the contract uses the label “arbitrator”.


The judgment further applied the principle that a declaratory order is competent where the applicant demonstrates an interest in an existing, future, or contingent right or obligation, and where a court, in the exercise of its discretion, considers it appropriate to grant declaratory relief in light of all relevant circumstances, including the existence of a real and pertinent dispute and whether declaratory relief may avoid protracted litigation.


Finally, the judgment applied the principle that where parties have expressly defined contractual terms, those definitions govern the interpretation and application of the agreement in that contractual setting, notwithstanding that similar words may bear different meanings in other legal contexts.

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[2022] ZAGPJHC 279
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Van Rhyn N.O and Others v Avhakholwi and Others (17887/2021) [2022] ZAGPJHC 279 (5 July 2022)

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG
CASE NO: 17887/2021
REPORTABLE:
NO
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES
REVISED.
NO
DATE:
5 July 2022
In the matter
between:
WERNER RUDOLPH VAN
RHYN N.O

APPLICANT
IBRAHIM MIA N.O SECOND

APPLICANT
SIDNEY REAN BOOYSEN
N.O

THIRD APPLICANT
And
NTHEBE
AVHAKHOLWI
FIRST RESPONDENT
TRANSNET
SOC LIMITED
SECOND RESPONDENT
BP
SOUTHERN AFRICA (PTY) LTD
THIRD RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
MANOIM J
[1]
This is an application for declaratory order arising out of a dispute
over the interpretation
of the remit of an arbitrator’s
valuation powers.
Background
[2]
The applicants are the trustees of two trusts, respectively, the
Iliad Business Development Trust
(IDB Trust) and the Commercial
Projects Trust (the CPD Trust). I will refer to the applicants from
now on as the trusts. The trusts
are related because the first
applicant is a trustee of both trusts, serving with the second
applicant in the IDB Trust and the
third applicant in the CPD Trust.
For the purpose of this decision the circumstances of the two trusts
are identical.
[3]
In December 1993 and March 1994, the trusts entered into long term
notarial leases with the second
respondent, Transnet. The duration of
the leases was for 25 years and 120 days. Each lease contained
identical terms allowing the
trusts to renew the leases for another
20 years.
[4]
When the leases were first entered into the land had no improvements.
The Trusts at their expense
developed the land installing the
necessary infrastructure so the land could be used for fuel stations.
Once the leases terminate
these improvements adhere to the land are
not recoverable by the trusts.
[5]
The properties have since both been leased to the third respondent
BPSA, which runs fuel service
stations on the properties, both
located on land owned by Transnet in the inner city of Johannesburg.
This is why BPSA is the third
respondent in the application although
it has not elected to participate in the litigation.
[6]
Both leases have since been renewed. It is a peculiar feature of
these leases that they can be
renewed before the rental for the
renewal period has been agreed upon or determined. Because of a
dispute between the trusts and
Transnet, the trusts have been
occupying the properties rent free until the outcome of the dispute
over the rental for the renewal
period is determined.
Rental
Dispute
[7]
Each lease contains an identical term in relation to the calculation
of the rental for the renewal
period. The relevant clause in the one
lease states as follows:
15.1
If the LESSEE decides to exercise its option to this Lease as set out
in 4.2 of the agreement the rental amount for the option
period shall
be determined as follows:
15.1.1
The rental amount shall be the fair market rental for the LAND agreed
by the parties, failing agreement, the rental amount
shall be
determined as follows:
[1]
[8]
The lease goes on to state how the rental will be determined absent
an agreement. The first step
is for each party to appoint its own
registered valuer and for them to reach agreement jointly. If they
are not able to do so,
then the applicable market rental is to be
determined by an arbitrator who must be a registered valuer. If there
was no agreement
on who the arbitrator should be, then the President
of the Council of Valuers would make the appointment.
[9]
The arbitrator’s duties are then provided for in the following
manner;
15.1.1.3
After the appointment of the arbitrator, the respective valuers
appointed by the parties shall, within twenty one (21)
days after
being called upon to do so, be entitled to furnish the arbitrator
with their written submission explaining the method
used and ail
relevant factors which were taken into account in determining their
respective market values.
15.2
The determination of the market value by the arbitrator in terms of
sub- clause 15.1.1.2 hereof shall be final and binding
on the parties
and the finding of the arbitrator shall not be subject to review by a
court; ..."
[10]
The parties were not able to agree on what a fair market rental was
and nor were their respective experts.
The trusts invoked the dispute
mechanism provided in the lease agreements, and this led to the
President of the Council appointing
the second respondent as the
arbitrator.
[11]
Once the arbitrator had been appointed two issues were agreed upon.
Each party’s experts would make
submissions over the
appropriate fair market rental. They also agreed that the procedure
outlined in the Arbitration Act would
apply.
[12]
A dispute then emerged between the parties over the interpretation of
the lease. Essentially the dispute
was over whether the expression
fair market value raised an issue for legal determination or not. The
trusts view was that it did,
Transnet disagreed. Since the arbitrator
was not a lawyer the trusts unsuccessfully attempted to persuade the
arbitrator to refer
the interpretation to a legal expert to
determine.
[13]
The first respondent was of the view that it was an issue that she as
an expert valuer of property could
determine.
[14]
The rest of the procedural details of this dispute are not relevant,
save to state that having failed to
persuade Transnet and the first
respondent to refer the matter to a legal expert to determine, the
trusts have proceeded with this
application for a declaratory order.
It is their view that the legal question needs to be determined first
because once it has,
the fair market rental would be easily resolved
by them or an arbitrator. In the meantime, the first respondent has
resigned her
appointment so if the matter is returned to an
arbitrator it will have to be someone else.
The
nature of the dispute
[15]
According to the trusts the dispute is a legal one because of the way
certain terms are defined the lease
agreements.
[16]
In clause 15.1.1, quoted earlier, the rental for the renewal period
is to be determined on the “…
fair market value of
the LAND”.
The term land is in capitals because it is a
defined term in the lease. According to the lease, ‘LAND’
means “
the area of land indicated on the plans”.
There
is a separate definition for ‘IMPROVEMENTS’ which means:

all buildings and structures erected on or any other
development of the LAND by the LESSEE and any existing structures not
demolished;”
[17]
Finally, there is a definition for ‘PREMISES’ which is
defined as “…
the LAND and IMPROVEMENTS”
.
[18]
The trusts contend that the fair market value of the land means
valuing the land without its improvements.
This is what it says their
expert has done. The Transnet expert has done two valuations. First,
a valuation of the land and then
a second valuation of the land plus
the improvements. The two experts valuations of the land are not far
apart. Where the dispute
lies is that if the improvements are taken
into account the fair market value almost doubles in respect of the
one property and
is substantially higher in respect of the other.
[19]
The trusts argue that this interpretation is simple and
straightforward. The term land does not include improvements
because
the lease has a separate definition for improvements. If the
agreement contemplated fair market value to be the land plus
the
improvements, then the parties would have used the term ‘premises’
which is the defined term in the lease which
includes both. But
instead, they used the term land which means that the value of
improvements was to be excluded in the determination
of a fair market
value.
[20]
The trusts also offer a purposive interpretation in addition to this
textual one. Because the trusts had
paid for the improvements during
the first rental period it made sense that during the second this
value they had created was excluded
from the future rental valuation.
[21]
This interpretation is unassailable. So why is there a dispute?
Initially Transnet’s opposition was
based on prematurity
because the first respondent had not yet made any decision. However,
a change of counsel by the time of the
hearing, led Transnet to
abandon reliance on this point. Instead, Transnet’s main point
is that this is not a legal dispute
over the interpretation of the
lease. This is because Transnet contends that the valuation of fair
market value is an economic
or commercial one for which the
arbitrator who is to be an expert valuer is best placed to determine.
Thus, in approaching the
question of whether fair market value of
land should include improvements the expert would have regard to
valuation methodology
and not to the interpretation of the language
used.
[22]
The real question is in what capacity the arbitrator is intended to
act in terms of the lease. It seems clear
to me that by choosing to
give the task of determining fair market value to a person with
valuation expertise as opposed to a lawyer,
the parties had intended
for the person to act as an expert not as an arbitrator. This means
that the person was not expected to
decide questions of a legal
nature. This notwithstanding that the term arbitrator was used in the
lease and the reference the parties
had to the processes of the
Arbitration Act when they had a meeting with the first respondent to
decide on process.
[23]
This distinction in function is explained in the case of
Perdikis v
Jamieson
2002 (6) SA 356
(W) at paragraph 5:

Our
law recognises that the function of an expert who acts as a valuer is
distinct from that of an arbitrator. The valuer's duty
is not to hear
and determine a dispute but to decide the questions submitted to
him by the exercise of his judgment and skill
without a judicial
inquiry. He does not exercise a quasi-judicial function.”
[24]
Because of this distinction, a question of law which undoubtedly this
is, can appropriately be referred to
the court to decide by way of a
declaratory order. It would be highly artificial and subvert the
meaning of the lease to suggest
that the careful definitions provided
were capable of anything other than a legal interpretation. Once the
legal question has been
determined the question of determining land
value, as defined in the agreement, which mean without consideration
of improvements,
becomes a question of expert valuation and hence
methodology. Transnet’s further argument that ‘land’
is sometimes
defined as including improvements in other areas of law
may be correct. But in this lease the parties chose their preferred
definition,
and this is the one that must apply.
[25]
Transnet also argued that in terms of the well-known
Telcordia
decision, the leading
case on the question of the review of arbitration proceedings the
arbitrator could decide a point of law.
[2]
But that case involved an arbitrator who was a barrister, whose
mandate included deciding the application of law.
[3]
This is not the case with the present agreement where the arbitrator
is an industry expert and not a lawyer mandated to decide
legal
questions.
[26]
It has long been held that a declaratory order is competent when the
following prerequisites are met.
a.
The applicant has an interest in an existing, future, or contingent

right or obligation; and if that requirement has been proved;
b.
It then has a discretion
considering all the relevant facts, to decide whether to grant or
refuse the declaratory order sought.
[4]
[27]
In this case I am satisfied on both legs. There is a “real and
pertinent dispute” between the
parties. Resolving it would
obviate further protracted litigation and may lead to a speedy
resolution of this dispute which is
in the interests of both parties.
ORDER
[1]
It is declared that a dispute exists between the Applicants and the
Second Respondent as to the
proper interpretation of clause 14.1.1 of
the IDB Lease (as defined in the Applicants’ founding
Affidavit) and clause 15.1.1of
the CPD Lease (as defined in the
Applicants ‘founding Affidavit) ("the dispute") ("the
lease agreements"),
read with clause 2.1 of the lease
agreements.
[2]
It is declared that the lease agreements mean that the arbitrator,
appointed in terms of clause
15.1.1.2 of the CPD lease and 14.1.1.2
of the IDB lease, is required to determine the rental for the renewal
period by determining
the fair market rental for the "LAND",
as defined in each lease agreement, in its unimproved state, without
regard for
the improvements effected to the land.
[3]
The Second Respondent
is ordered to pay the costs of the application.
N. MANOIM
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION
This
judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties’ and/or parties’ representatives by email
and by
being uploaded to CaseLines. The date and time for hand-down is
deemed to be 10h00 on
4
July 2022.
Date
of Hearing:

30 May 2022
Date
of Judgment:

5 July 2022
Appearances:
Counsel
for the Applicant:

Adv O Cook, SC
cook@group21.co.za
082 553
69 36
With

Adv H Vorster
henry@law.co.za
Instructed
by:

Faber Goertz Ellis Austen Inc
diaan@fgea.co.za
Counsel
for the Respondent:
Adv L. Mgwetyana
Instructed
by:

Mfinci Balhamann Inc
vuyisa@mfincibahlmann.co.za
[1]
This
is the clause in the CPD lease; the equivalent clause in the IDB
lease is 14.1.1
[2]
Telcordia
Technologies Inc v Telkom
SA
Ltd 2007(3) SA 266 (SCA).
[3]
See
Telcordia
supra
paragraph 84
[4]
See
Cordiant
Trading CC v Daimler Chrysler Financial Services (Pty) Ltd
2005 SA (6) 205 SCA at
213 E to G and
Competition
Commission v Hosken Consolidated Investments Ltd and Another
2019 (3) SA 1
(CC) at
paragraph 88