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[2014] ZASCA 204
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Mkhize: In re Mbuyazi v Premier of the Province of Kwazulu-Natal and Mbuyazi v Mbonambi Community Development Trust (822/13) [2014] ZASCA 204 (28 November 2014)
THE
SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT
Case
no
:
822/13
Reportable
In
the matter between:
SITHEMBILE
VALENCIA
MKHIZE
.............................................................................
APPELLANT
In
re:
KZP
Case Number 2367/2010
ZWELIBHEKILE
SIBUSISO
MBUYAZI
..............................................................................
Applicant
and
THE
PREMIER OF THE PROVINCE OF
KWAZULU-NATAL
.......................................................................................................
First
Respondent
MKHABYISENI
MBUYAZI
.....................................................................................
Second
Respondent
THE
uMNDENI WENKOSI OF THE LATE
INKOSI
MTHOLENI
MBUYAZI
...............................................................................
Third
Respondent
AND
KZP Case
Number 10169/2011
ZWELIBHEKILE
SIBUSISO MBUYAZI
N
.
O
.
(MBUYAZI
COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT
TRUST)
...............................................................................................
First
Applicant
ZWELIBHEKILE
SIBUSISO MBUYAZI
N
.
O
.
(MBUYAZI
COMMUNITY PUBLIC
BENEFIT
TRUST)
........................................................................................................
Second
Applicant
ZWELIBHEKILE
SIBUSISO
MBUYAZI
.....................................................................
Third
Applicant
and
MINIAS
MAFULEKA
N.O.
(MBUYAZI
COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT
TRUST)
...............................................................................
FIRST
RESPONDENT
THANDIWE
VIRGINIA MAFULEKA
N.O.
(MBUYAZI
COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT
........................................................................................
SECOND
AND FURTHER
TRUST)
AND
OTHERS
............................................................................
TWENTY
RESPONDENTS
Neutral
citation:
Mkhize: In re Mbuyazi v
The Premier of the Province of Kwazulu-Natal and Mbuyazi v Mbonambi
Community Development Trust
(822/2013)
[2014] ZASCA 204
(28 November 2014)
Coram:
Mpati P and Swain JA and Fourie AJA
Heard:
07 November 2014
Delivered:
28 November 2014
Summary:
Practice and procedure – deposed Inkosi (Traditional Leader) -
claim for reinstatement and for loss of salary –
deposed Inkosi
since deceased – application by executrix to be substituted for
deceased Inkosi in reinstatement claim unsuccessful
as claim
terminated upon his death – substitution application granted in
claim for loss of salary, it being in effect damages
claim.
ORDER
On
appeal from:
Kwazulu-Natal
High
Court, Pietermaritzburg (Booyens AJ sitting as court of appeal):
1 The appeal is
upheld in part.
2 Save for that part
of the order dismissing the appellant’s application to be
substituted for the deceased in her capacity
as guardian of
Phathokuhle, the order of the court below is set aside and for it is
substituted the following:
‘
(a)
The applicant, Sithembile Valencia Mkhize, in her capacity as
executrix of the estate of the late Zwelibhekile Sibusiso Mbuyazi,
is
hereby substituted as applicant in the deceased’s damages claim
and in his funding application.
(b) The first and
second respondents are ordered to pay the applicant’s costs in
both applications, jointly and severally,
the one paying the other to
be absolved.
(c) The first and
second respondents’ applications for the discharge of the rule
nisi
and for the rescission of the orders granted on 7 June
2011 are both dismissed, with costs.’
3
The first and second respondents are ordered to pay the costs of the
appeal jointly and severally, the one paying the other to
be
absolved.
JUDGMENT
Mpati
P (Swain JA Fourie AJA concurring):
[1]
The appellant is the executrix in the estate of her late husband, the
late Zwelibhekile Sibusiso Mbuyazi (the deceased), who
died on 7 July
2012. She is also the mother and guardian of the deceased’s
minor son, Phathokuhle. This appeal, with leave
of the court below
(Booyens AJ, in the Pietermaritzburg High Court), arose from a
decision of that court dismissing the appellant’s
application
in which she sought, in her capacity as executrix in the estate of
the deceased, to be substituted as applicant in
certain applications
launched by the deceased during his lifetime and which had not been
finalised at the time of his death. The
appellant had also sought to
be substituted as applicant in those applications in her capacity as
mother and legal guardian of
Phathokuhle. A narrative relating to the
circumstances that led to the appellant’s applications follows.
[2]
The deceased was the eldest son of the late Inkosi Mtholeni Mthiyane
Mbuyazi (Inkosi Mbuyazi), who died on 22 June 2005. At
the time of
his demise Inkosi Mbuyazi had been the traditional leader of the
Mbuyazi Traditional Community of the KwaMbuyazi area
of KwaZulu-Natal
(the Mbuyazi Community). During August 2006 the umndeni wenkosi of
the late Inkosi Mbuyazi, consisting of members
of the Royal Family
(third respondent), identified the deceased as the next Inkosi of the
Mbuyazi Community.
[1]
It appears
that the deceased subsequently received written communication from
the office of the first respondent, the Premier of
the Province of
KwaZulu-Natal (the Premier), advising him that he had been recognised
as the Inkosi of the Mbuyazi Community.
[2]
It is not in dispute that the deceased took over as
de
facto
Inkosi from approximately September 2006. During February 2007 he was
asked by the Department to provide his bank account details
and he
thereafter received a monthly salary as Inkosi.
[3]
At a family meeting held on 8 January 2010 a certain official of the
KwaZulu-Natal Department of Co-operative Governance and
Traditional
Affairs (Department) advised the deceased that a cabinet resolution
had been taken on 2 December 2009 to remove him
as Inkosi. This
followed some investigation that had been conducted by a Professor
Mathenjwa into the question whether the deceased
had been correctly
appointed as Inkosi. A notice of the deceased’s removal as
Inkosi was published in an
Extraordinary
Provincial Gazette
on 13 January 2010. On 4 February 2010 officials of the Department
made a public announcement that the second respondent, Mkhanyiseni
Mbuyazi, the deceased’s younger brother, was the Inkosi of the
Mbuyazi Community.
[4]
On 29 March 2010 the deceased launched an urgent application seeking
orders in two parts. In Part A the following interdictory
relief was
sought:
‘
1
That a
rule nisi
do issue calling upon the first, second and third respondents, and
any other interested persons, to show cause, if any, to this
Honourable Court on the day of 29 July 2010 at 09:30 or so soon
thereafter as the matter may be heard why an order should not be
granted in the following terms:
(a)
That pending the final determination of an
application for the review of the decision to withdraw the
recognition of the Second
Respondent as Inkosi of the [Mbuyazi]
Community and to reinstate the applicant as Inkosi:
(i)
the appointment of, or reference to, the
Second Respondent as Inkosi of the [Mbuyazi] Community be and is
hereby suspended; and
(ii)
the appointment of the Applicant as Inkosi
of the [Mbuyazi] Community is restored.
2
That paragraph 1 hereof shall operate as an interim order, with
immediate effect, pending the return date of the
rule
nisi
.
.
. . .’
In
Part B, which was headed ‘MAIN REVIEW APPLICATION’, the
deceased sought an order declaring him to be the Inkosi of
the
Mbuyazi Community; that the decision of the Premier to withdraw his
recognition as Inkosi published on 13 January 2010 be reviewed
and
set aside; and directing the Premier ‘to do all things
necessary and publish all notices to withdraw the appointment
of the
Second Respondent or any other person other than the applicant as
Inkosi of the [Mbuyazi] Community’ and to reinstate
his
appointment.
[5]
In an answering affidavit deposed to on 3 May 2010 the Premier
indicated that he would abide the decision of the court below.
He
also submitted that the dispute as to who was entitled to be the
Inkosi of the Mbuyazi Community was primarily between the deceased
and second respondent and that the third respondent also had an
interest in the proceedings by virtue of the role it plays under
the
applicable legislation. On the same day the Premier delivered a
record, which was supplemented on 11 June 2010. On or about
13 July
2010 the deceased filed a supplementary affidavit in terms of Uniform
Rule 53(4), together with a notice of amendment,
in terms of which he
amended Part B of his notice of motion, seeking the following
additional order:
‘
4
That the first respondent is directed to:
(a)
immediately reinstate the payment of a
salary to the applicant as Inkosi of the Mbuyazi Traditional
Community; and
(b)
immediately pay a gross salary of R96 126,
from which income tax should be deducted and paid to the Receiver of
Revenue, to
the applicant as arrear salary as Inkosi of the Mbuyazi
clan for the months of February to September 2010 inclusive, together
with
interest at the rate of 15.5% per annum on all arrear net salary
amounts.’
[6]
The order sought by the deceased in Part A of his notice of motion
was granted by Madondo J on 11 May 2010. Despite his indication
that
he would abide the decision of the court, the Premier gave notice, on
21 May 2010, to anticipate the
rule
. Further, he sought leave
to oppose the deceased’s application. On 26 May 2010 Koen J
granted leave to the Premier as prayed.
The interim order was varied
by the deletion of paragraph 2 thereof and the following order was
made in its stead:
‘
4
Pending the final determination of the application for the said
review and to operate as an interim order forthwith:-
4.1
First Respondent is granted leave and directed to appoint an
appropriate person to function in the interim as Ibambabukhosi
(which person shall not be the Applicant or the Second Respondent)
until such time as an Inkosi has been recognised and appointed
as
contemplated in terms of section 3 of the KwaZulu-Natal Traditional
Leadership and Governance Act No. 5 of 2005.
4.2
Applicant and Second Respondent are interdicted and restrained from
attempting to, or taking office, as the Inkosi of the [Mbuyazi]
Community.
.
. . .
’
[7]
The deceased’s review application, which was now opposed by the
Premier and the second respondent, was argued before Van
Zyl J on 23
September 2010. In a judgment delivered on 7 June 2011 the learned
judge highlighted certain material disputes of fact,
which, he held,
‘do not lend themselves to meaningful formulation for purposes
of a referral of specified issues for the
hearing of oral evidence’.
He concluded that ‘the interests of the parties and
particularly those of the [Mbuyazi]
Community would best be served by
referring the matter to trial’. The learned judge made such an
order and directed that
the interim arrangements as per the order of
11 May 2010, modified by the subsequent order of 26 May 2010 shall
remain in force
pending the final determination of the matter.
[8]
On 26 October 2011 the deceased instituted further motion proceedings
in which he cited as respondents the trustees of the Mbonambi
Community Development Trust and of the Mbonambi Community Public
Benefit Trust, as well as other entities, including the first
and
second respondents, seeking an order, inter alia, that all his taxed
attorney and own client costs be paid by the first-mentioned
trust.
(I shall, for convenience, refer to it as ‘the funding
application’.) The reason for seeking this order was
given in
the founding affidavit as insufficient resources properly to pursue
the litigation. The funding application was opposed
by the Premier
and the second respondent. However, as at the date of the demise of
the deceased both the funding and the review
applications (the latter
having been referred to trial) had not been finalised.
[9]
On 25 October 2012 (following the death of the deceased on 7 July
2012) the second respondent brought an application seeking
an order
discharging the
rule
issued by Madondo J on 11 May 2010 and
modified by Koen J on 26 May 2010 and dismissing the deceased’s
review application.
And further –
‘
3
That the First Respondent’s decision to withdraw recognition of
the late Applicant as Inkosi of the [Mbuyazi] Community
which was
published in the Extraordinary Provincial Gazette on 13 January 2010
be and is hereby confirmed.
4
That the interim appointment of Hlompile Mbonambi as Ibamba Bukhosi
be and is hereby terminated.
5
that the Second Respondent’s appointment as Inkosi of the
[Mbuyazi] Community by the First Respondent be and is hereby
confirmed.
6
That the application brought by the late Applicant be and is hereby
dismissed with costs
.’
The
basis upon which this order was sought was that the interdict had in
fact been granted in favour of the deceased and that, therefore,
‘there is no legal basis upon which the Executor or any heir .
. . can lay claim to the chieftainship in the absence of a
Declaratory Order confirming [the deceased] as the rightful Inkosi’.
On 9 November 2012 the Premier joined the fray and applied,
by way of
an interlocutory application, for rescission of the orders granted by
Van Zyl J on 7 June 2011, in addition to an order
discharging the
rule
, with
costs. The grounds for the orders sought were that the rights of the
deceased to be recognised as Inkosi were personal to
him; that to be
recognised as Inkosi he must be alive; and that these rights were not
transmissible to his heirs or anyone else.
[10]
The appellant responded by filing what is headed ‘Notice of
Application and Counter-application’ on 19 November
2012
seeking the order referred to in paragraph 1 above, which was
dismissed by the court below as mentioned above. To the order
sought
by the deceased in the amended notice of motion in the review
application, the appellant added the following prayers:
‘
4
That the first respondent is directed to pay the first applicant, in
her capacity as the executrix of the estate of the late Zwelibhekile
Sibusiso Mbuyazi:
(a)
. . . ;
(b)
the further amounts which the deceased was
entitled to as salary from November 2010 until 7 July 2012, from
which income tax should
be deducted and paid to the Receiver of
Revenue, together with interest at the rate of 15.5% per annum, and
an account of how such
amount has been computed.
5
That uMndeni weNkosi of the [deceased] are directed to meet and
identify a successor and, if necessary, Ibambabukhosi, to the
late
Inkosi.
.
. . .’
The
Premier once again opposed the appellant’s counter-application
on the grounds that the deceased’s review application
‘is
now terminated, it having ceased upon the death of the deceased’
and that the appellant ‘has no legal interest
or standing to
continue with the review’.
[11]
As has been alluded to above, the court below dismissed the
appellant’s applications to be substituted for the deceased
as
applicant in both the funding and review applications. It also
dismissed both the funding and review applications brought by
the
deceased, but made no order as to costs. In dismissing the funding
application the court below held that it (the application)
depends on
whether the appellant can successfully be substituted for the deposed
Inkosi [deceased] as an applicant for review.
In that regard the
court reasoned as follows:
‘
The
right that the deposed Inkosi alleged that he was entitled to was the
right to be the Inkosi, this right however is a purely
personal right
of his. He cannot in any way deal with this right by transferring it
in any way whatsoever.’
[3]
As
to the application for the appellant’s substitution in her
capacity as mother and natural guardian of the deceased’s
minor
son, Phathokuhle, the court held that in view of the fact that the
deceased’s right to set aside the Premier’s
decision was
a personal right, and that right ‘died’ with the
deceased, the application cannot succeed. In respect
of the claim for
arrear salary the court said:
‘
Had
the deposed chief been alive and still the chief, he would
ex
contractu
have been entitled to receive a salary to the date of his death. In
my view the executrix faced the same stumbling block that she
faces
in her claim on behalf of her minor child. The right to challenge the
decision of the Premier was a right personal to the
deposed chief.
That right, as I have stated earlier, died with the chief. It would
then follow that the claim as presently formulated
cannot stand. I
express no view as to whether the executrix could in her capacity as
executrix institute a separate action for
payment of the salary that
the deceased would have received.’
[4]
[12]
I propose to consider first the appellant’s application to be
substituted as applicant in the review application. I agree
with the
finding of the court below that the deceased’s claim, in the
review application, that the Premier’s withdrawal
of his
recognition as Inkosi of the Mbuyazi Community be set aside; that the
Premier be directed to do all things necessary to
withdraw the
appointment of the second respondent as Inkosi of the Mbuyazi
Community and to reinstate him (the deceased) as such,
was personal
to him and therefore not transmissible to anyone else. He was the
only one, were he to be successful, who could be
reinstated as
Inkosi. However, since he has died, an order setting aside the
Premier’s withdrawal of the deceased’s
recognition as
Inkosi and directing the Premier to reinstate him as Inkosi can no
longer be made. That claim, therefore, could
no longer be pursued
after the death of the deceased. It terminated upon his death. (See
the relevant authorities referred to by
Holmes JA in
Government
of the Republic of South Africa v Ngubane
1972
(2) SA 601
(A) at 607A-B.) In my view, the claim for reinstatement
could not be ceded, even after
litis
contestatio
, and is thus not
transmissible to the deceased’s heirs. It follows that the
appellant cannot be substituted as applicant
in the review
application proper.
[13]
The same considerations apply in respect of the appellant’s
application to be substituted for the deceased in her capacity
as
mother and natural guardian of Phathokuhle. It is so that Phathokuhle
may well have had a claim, upon the death of the deceased
while still
Inkosi, to succeed his late father, but would not, on the case as
presented on the papers as they stand, have been
able to obtain an
order directing the Premier to appoint him as Inkosi. This is because
whenever the position of an Inkosi is to
be filled certain procedures
must be followed. Section 19 of the KwaZulu-Natal Traditional
Leadership and Governance Act 5 of 2005
(the Act) reads:
‘
(1)
Whenever the position of an
Inkosi
is to be filled, the following process must be followed -
(
a
)
Umndeni
wenkosi
must, within a reasonable time after the need arises for
the position of an
Inkosi
to be filled, and with due regard to
applicable customary law and section 3 –
(i)
Identify a person who qualifies in terms of
customary law to assume the position of an
Inkosi
after taking into account whether any
of the grounds referred to in section 21(1)(
a
),
(
b
) or (
d
)
apply to that person;
(ii)
Provide the Premier with the reasons for
the identification of that person as an
Inkosi
;
and
(iii)
The Premier must, subject to subsection (3)
of this section and section 3, recognise a person so identified in
terms of subsection
(1)(
a
)(i)
as
Inkosi
:
Provided that if the reason for the vacancy is the death of the
recognised
Inkosi, Umndeni wenkosi
must, before identifying the person to be recognised as
Inkosi
,
consider the content of the testamentary succession document referred
to in section 19A.
(2) The recognition
of a person as an
Inkosi
in terms of subsection (1)(
a
)(iii)
must be done by way of –
(
a
)
a notice in the
Gazette
recognising the person identified as an
Inkosi
;
and
(
b
)
the issuing of a certificate of recognition to the identified person.
(3) The Premier must
inform the Provincial House of Traditional Leaders of the recognition
or appointment of an
Inkosi
.
.
. . .
’
It
was with this process in mind that the appellant sought to add prayer
5
[5]
to the notice of motion in
the review application.
[14]
It must be stressed, however, that it does not follow from the
finding that the deceased’s claim for his reinstatement
as
Inkosi was not transmissible upon his death, that Phathokuhle has no
claim to the position of Inkosi of the Mbuyazi Community.
Section
19(1)(
a
)(i) of the Act enjoins the umndeni wenkosi (royal
family) to identify a person ‘who qualifies in terms of
customary law to
assume the position of an Inkosi . . . ’. In
Umndeni (Clan) of Amantungwa & others v MEC, Housing and
Traditional Affairs, KwaZulu-Natal & another
[2011] 2 All SA
548
(SCA) this court expressed itself thus:
‘
Langalibalele
Mathenjwa, an erstwhile professor and Acting Head of Department of
the University of Zululand, in the department of
IsiZulu Namagugu,
where he “dealt with teaching and resource into the Zulu
heritage” and presently Provincial Manager
of the South African
Heritage Resources Agency, set out “the Zulu laws of hereditary
succession” as follows in an affidavit
annexed to the
respondents’ answering affidavit:
“
The
successor of a deceased Inkosi is appointed on the basis of the Zulu
laws of hereditary succession, from within the Royal or
Ruling House.
That is, the [successor to] the chieftainship is the heir of a
deceased chief. In this way succession is retained
within the Royal
House. In essence the successor to a deceased chief will be the
eldest son from
indlunkulu
.
(This means the first or the great house.) If the eldest son is dead
or cannot take up the position, then the eldest son’s
senior
male descendant: failing which the second son of the
indlunkulu
,
failing him the senior male and so on through the sons of the
indlunkulu
and their descendants. Thereafter the eldest son of the house first
affiliated to the
indlunkulu
,
failing which the senior male descendant through such house and their
descendants in order of seniority, and so on.”
This
custom of hereditary succession has not been disputed by the
appellants. It must, therefore, be accepted as correct.’
[6]
[15]
Thus, under Zulu laws of hereditary succession Phathokuhle would be
next in line for the position of Inkosi, were it to be
proved that
the deceased had been wrongfully removed as Inkosi. But s 3 of the
Act obliges a traditional community to ‘transform
and adapt
customary law and custom so as to comply with the principles
enshrined in the Constitution . . . ’ by, in particular,
preventing unfair discrimination, promoting equality and seeking to
progressively advance gender representation in the succession
to
traditional leadership positions. Phathokuhle is therefore not
necessarily guaranteed, by reason only of his being the deceased’s
eldest son, to succeed the deceased as Inkosi (assuming it could be
established that the deceased was wrongfully and unlawfully
removed
as Inkosi). That will depend on development, if any, within the
Mbuyazi Community.
[7]
But, as
eldest son, he would at least have a right to be considered when
umndeni wenkosi goes into the process of identifying a
person who
qualifies in terms of customary law to assume the position of Inkosi
(s 19(1)(
a
)
of the Act). The question whether or not the deceased was wrongfully
removed is not before us.
[16]
I come now to the question whether the appellant should be
substituted, in her capacity as executrix in the deceased’s
estate, as applicant in the monetary compensation part of the
deceased’s claim. I can conceive of no reason why she should
not be so substituted. It is true that the claim for payment of
arrear salary is included in the review application, but that does
not detract from the fact that it is a claim separate from the one
for reinstatement of the deceased as Inkosi. It is in effect
a
damages claim founded on an alleged wrong (wrongful removal of the
deceased as an Inkosi, with the consequent loss of salary)
which
caused a diminution in the patrimony of the deceased’s estate.
It is therefore transmissible to the deceased’s
heirs (see
Hoffa, N.O. v S AMutual Fire &
General Insurance Co. Ltd
1965 (2) SA
944
(C) at 953D, cited with approval in
Ngubane
,
supra, at 606G-H). The appellant could even have instituted this
claim after the death of the deceased if the deceased had not
himself
filed the claim before his demise. Her application is for her to be
substituted as applicant in place of the deceased so
as to act as a
representative of the deceased in a claim which accrued to him while
he was alive. (Cf
Hoffa
,
supra.) And, as executrix in the estate of the deceased, she is the
only person who can represent the deceased for purposes of
his claim
(
Pentz v Gross & others
1996 (2) SA 518
(C) at 523A-D). It seems to me, therefore, that the
question whether or not
litis
contestatio
had been reached, which was
raised by counsel for the respondents, does not arise. The appeal
must accordingly succeed on this
part of the appellant’s
counter-application.
[17]
The issue of convenience also comes into play. For the appellant to
succeed in the deceased’s damages claim she will
have to prove
that the deceased was wrongfully and unlawfully removed as Inkosi. As
has been mentioned above, the disputes relating
to this and other
issues have already been referred to trial by Van Zyl J. It is
therefore convenient, and in fact to the advantage
of all involved,
that the matter proceeds as directed by Van Zyl J, so that the
important question of the rightful successor to
late Inkosi Mbuyazi
and/or the deceased may be settled as soon as possible.
[18]
There remains the appellant’s application to be substituted for
the deceased in the funding application. In view of my
conclusion
that the appeal should succeed, albeit partly, it should follow that
the appellant’s appeal should also succeed
in respect of this
application. The deceased’s application for funding has already
been argued before Henriques J and judgment
was reserved. At the time
that judgment was handed down by the court below, the reserved
judgment had not as yet been delivered
(see the judgment of the court
below at paras 8 & 9). That application should now be finalised
with the executrix substituted
for the deceased. Although the
appellant has been partly successful, she should, in my view, be
awarded all her costs.
[19]
In the result, the following order shall issue:
1 The appeal is
upheld in part.
2 Save for that part
of the order dismissing the appellant’s application to be
substituted for the deceased in her capacity
as guardian of
Phathokuhle, the order of the court below is set aside and for it is
substituted the following:
‘
(a)
The applicant, Sithembele Valencia Mkhize, in her capacity as
executrix of the estate of the late Zwelibhekile Sibusiso Mbuyazi,
is
hereby substituted as applicant in the deceased’s damages claim
and in his funding application.
(b) The first and
second respondents are ordered to pay the applicant’s costs in
both applications, jointly and severally,
the one paying the other to
be absolved.
(c) The first and
second respondents’ applications for the discharge of the rule
nisi
and for the rescission of the orders granted on 7 June
2011 are both dismissed, with costs.’
3 The first and
second respondents are ordered to pay the costs of the appeal jointly
and severally, the one paying the other to
be absolved.
_______________________
L
MPATI
PRESIDENT
APPEARANCES
For
Appellant: G D Goddard
Instructed
by: Schreiber Smith Inc, Empangeni
McIntyre
& van der Post, Bloemfontein
For
First Respondent: A J Dickson SC
Instructed
by: PKX Attorneys, Pietermaritzburg
Lovius
Block, Bloemfontein
For
Second and Third Respondents: C van der Merwe
Instructed
by:
Pretorius,
Mdletshe & Partners Inc, Kwadukuza (Stranger)
Phatshoane
Henney, Bloemfontein
[1]
See
Section 19 of the KwaZulu-Natal Traditional Leadership and
Government Act No 5 of 2005, quoted in paragraph 13
.
[2]
Paragraph
13
[3]
Paragraph
13.
[4]
Paragraph
21.
[5]
Quoted
in para 10 above.
[6]
Para
21.
[7]
See
Shilubana
& others v Nwamitwa
2009 (2) SA 66
(CC) para 49.