Municipal Employees Pension Fund and Another v Ramohale and Others (27708/18) [2022] ZAGPJHC 164 (18 March 2022)

80 Reportability

Brief Summary

Pension Funds — Review of Adjudicator's Determination — Application to review and set aside a determination made by the Pension Funds Adjudicator regarding the calculation of a withdrawal benefit. The Municipal Employees Pension Fund and Akani Retirement Fund Administrators challenged the Adjudicator's decision that ordered payment based on the Old Rule, asserting that the Amended Rule should apply retrospectively. The legal issue centered on whether the Adjudicator had jurisdiction to make the determination and whether the Amended Rule was applicable to the First Respondent's withdrawal benefit. The court held that the Adjudicator's determination was lawful and within her jurisdiction, and the Amended Rule could not be applied retrospectively to benefits accrued prior to its approval.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


This matter concerned an application in the Gauteng Division of the High Court, Johannesburg, to review and set aside a determination of the Pension Funds Adjudicator. The application was brought primarily under section 30P of the Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956, alternatively under the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA).


The first applicant was the Municipal Employees Pension Fund (the fund), and the second applicant was Akani Retirement Fund Administrators (Pty) Ltd (the fund administrator). The first respondent was Mr Matome Ronald Ramohale, a former municipal employee and fund member. The second respondent (the employer municipality) was the City of Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality, cited for its interest but with no substantive relief sought against it. The third respondent was the Pension Funds Adjudicator, cited in her official capacity.


The dispute arose from the Adjudicator’s determination dated 30 January 2018, which upheld Mr Ramohale’s complaint and directed the fund to pay him a higher withdrawal benefit calculated under the fund’s earlier rule structure, together with interest. The applicants sought condonation for a late section 30P application, and substantive relief setting aside and substituting the Adjudicator’s determination with an order dismissing the complaint.


The subject-matter concerned the calculation of a member’s withdrawal benefit following resignation, in circumstances where the fund had amended its rules with retrospective effect, and where the Adjudicator concluded that the retrospective amendment could not apply to members who exited before the Registrar’s approval and registration date.


2. Material Facts


Mr Ramohale was employed by the City of Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality from 6 September 2006 until his resignation on 15 May 2013. By virtue of his employment, he became a member of the Municipal Employees Pension Fund and ceased to be a member upon payment of his withdrawal benefit on 5 August 2013.


At the time Mr Ramohale became a member, the fund’s Rule 37(1) (referred to in the judgment as the Old Rule) provided that a member who left service early would receive a withdrawal benefit calculated at three times the value of the member’s contributions.


Following advice in February 2013 from the fund’s actuaries (Itakane Actuaries and Consultants (Pty) Ltd), the fund concluded that the Old Rule imposed a significant financial strain and placed the fund at risk of failing to meet its liabilities. The fund resolved on 21 June 2013 to amend the Old Rule with retrospective effect from 1 April 2013. The amendment (the Amended Rule) reduced the withdrawal multiple from three times contributions to 1.5 times the member’s own contributions.


The fund applied to the Registrar on 22 July 2013 for approval of the amendment in terms of section 12(2) of the Pension Funds Act, with effect from 1 April 2013, and members and affected municipalities were notified between July and October 2013. The Registrar approved and registered the amendment on 1 April 2014, with an effective date of 1 April 2013. The Amended Rule remained in force and had not been challenged in proceedings directed at the Registrar’s approval decision.


After receiving his withdrawal benefit in August 2013, Mr Ramohale complained that the payment was not calculated in accordance with a projection statement he had previously received. He contended he expected R264 347.99 but received R132 173.00 (approximately half). He lodged a complaint with the Adjudicator on 16 September 2014.


The Adjudicator upheld the complaint and ordered the fund to pay the difference (and interest), on the basis that the Amended Rule could not be applied to exits prior to the Registrar’s approval date and could not affect benefits said to have “accrued” before that approval. The Adjudicator’s conclusion effectively applied the Old Rule to Mr Ramohale’s benefit despite the Registrar’s registration of the amendment with retrospective effect.


The applicants challenged that determination. They also sought condonation because the determination was made known to them on 19 February 2018, and although section 30P required an application within six weeks (by 2 April 2018), the application was filed only on 27 July 2018.


3. Legal Issues


The court identified several central questions requiring determination.


A primary issue was whether the Pension Funds Act conferred jurisdiction on the Adjudicator to make a determination that, in effect, treated a registered rule amendment as non-retrospective for certain members and thereby regulated how the rule would apply in time. This issue turned on statutory power and the lawful scope of the Adjudicator’s functions, and therefore principally concerned law and the application of law to established facts.


A further issue was whether the Adjudicator erred by failing to give effect to an amendment made with retrospective effect, which the applicants contended the fund was entitled to implement under section 12(4) of the Pension Funds Act once approved and registered by the Registrar. This required assessing the legal effect of registered fund rules and the respective roles of the Registrar and the Adjudicator.


The court also had to decide whether the determination was procedurally unfair, in that the Adjudicator decided the complaint on the basis that the amendment could not apply retrospectively (as she understood it), without affording the applicants an opportunity to address her on that decisive point. This involved the application of administrative-law fairness principles to the decision-making process.


Additional issues included whether the Amended Rule was said to be unlawful by reason of an alleged conflict with section 37A of the Pension Funds Act and Rule 48 of the fund rules, and whether the deponent to the applicants’ affidavits (Mr Letjane) had authority to depose to those affidavits. The court also had to decide whether condonation should be granted for non-compliance with the section 30P time period, which involved an evaluative discretionary assessment informed by interests of justice, explanation for delay, prospects, and importance.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court began from the statutory setting that registered pension funds are governed by the Pension Funds Act together with their registered rules, and that, subject to the Act, the rules are binding on the fund and members under section 13. Within this framework, Rule 37 governed resignation/withdrawal benefits, and Rule 48 governed amendment of rules subject to section 12 of the Act.


On jurisdiction, the court emphasised that the Adjudicator’s powers derive from the Act (including section 30A(3)), and that she is a “creature of statute”. The court accepted that the Adjudicator had concluded that the Amended Rule could not apply to members who left prior to the Registrar’s approval date, with the effect that the Amended Rule operated only prospectively for such members. The court characterised that approach as “venturing into an arena” not intended by the legislature, reasoning that it is for the fund (acting through its rule-making powers) to amend rules, and for the Registrar, as regulator, to approve and register amendments (including their effective date) and intervene if something is untoward. In this matter, the Registrar registered the Amended Rule with effect from 1 April 2013, and the court treated that registration as decisive as to the amendment’s operative date for purposes of the fund’s governance. The court relied on authority indicating that the Adjudicator lacks jurisdiction to determine whether a rule applies prospectively (the judgment specifically referred to Joint Municipal Pension Fund and Another v Grobler and Others), and also referred to the Adjudicator’s statutory nature as described in Shell and BP South Africa Petroleum Refineries (Pty) Ltd v Murphy NO and Others.


Regarding the respondent’s argument that the Registrar’s approval and the Amended Rule were invalid due to conflict with section 37A of the Act and Rule 48, the court rejected that contention. It read Rule 48(1) as conferring power to amend the rules, qualified only by consistency with section 12 of the Act. The court found that section 12 does not preclude amendments that reduce benefits; rather, its restrictions relate to prejudice to creditors’ rights and the requirement of Registrar approval and registration. The court noted there was no evidence that the amendment affected creditors’ rights, and further observed that any challenge premised on creditor prejudice would have required a challenge to the Registrar’s registration decision, which had not occurred.


The court interpreted section 37A as aimed at protecting members’ benefits against external claims by creditors, preventing cession, pledge, hypothecation, attachment, or execution, subject to limited statutory exceptions. On this interpretation, the prohibition on “reduction” in section 37A was not understood as preventing a fund from amending its rules to adjust the benefit formula; it was understood as preventing reductions in consequence of external processes such as execution. In support of that interpretive approach, the court referred to National Testing Retirement Fund v Registrar of Pension Funds, which held that a rule amendment reducing benefits does not fall foul of section 37A because the section targets reductions arising from factors external to the rules. The court also reasoned, as part of its assessment of the respondent’s section 37A argument, that the legislature could not have intended to compel adherence to an unsustainable calculation formula where it would lead to the collapse of the fund. It further accepted the applicants’ case that the trustees owed fiduciary duties to ensure fund sustainability for the benefit of all members, and that actuarial advice motivated the amendment.


On the point that the deponent (Mr Letjane) allegedly lacked authority, the court applied settled principles that authority to depose to an affidavit is not the relevant inquiry; the essential question is whether the attorney is authorised to act, and challenges to authority should be raised via Rule 7(1). The court relied on Eskom v Soweto City Counsel for the proposition that it is unnecessary to prove that a particular deponent is authorised to “bring” the application, provided the litigation is authorised through the attorney, and it noted that no Rule 7 notice was delivered. It also found that Mr Letjane, as managing director of the fund administrator since 2003, had personal knowledge of the facts.


On procedural fairness, the court accepted the applicants’ submission that they were not informed that the Adjudicator would determine the complaint on the basis that the amendment could not apply to members who exited before the Registrar’s approval date, and that they were not afforded an opportunity to address that decisive issue. The court considered that once the Adjudicator embarked on a determination concerning the validity or temporal application of the registered amendment, she went beyond simply resolving the complaint as defined, and she was obliged to invite submissions before deciding the point. The court held that the failure to afford the right to be heard constituted a serious irregularity and rendered the determination vulnerable as procedurally unfair under section 6(2)(c) of PAJA.


On condonation, the court noted the statutory six-week period in section 30P and the applicants’ delay. It weighed factors relevant to “good cause” and the interests of justice, including the explanation for the delay and the importance of the issue. The court took into account that the Adjudicator took approximately three years and four months to determine the complaint, the applicants’ explanation that time was needed to locate the file, and, materially, the stated importance of the matter for the fund’s sustainability. The court concluded that if the determination stood, it would affect the fund’s sustainability, and that this consideration favoured granting condonation.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court granted condonation for the late filing of the section 30P application.


It held that the Pension Funds Adjudicator had no jurisdiction to make the determination dated 30 January 2018 in respect of Mr Ramohale’s complaint. The determination was reviewed and set aside and declared invalid and of no force and effect.


The court substituted the Adjudicator’s determination with an order dismissing Mr Ramohale’s complaint, and it upheld the appeal under section 30P.


The court ordered the first respondent to pay the costs of the appeal.


Cases Cited


Mostert N.O. v Old Mutual Life Assurance Company (South Africa) Ltd [2001] 8 BPLR 2307 (SCA)


IEK Corporation Provident Fund and Others v Lorentz [2003] 3 BPLR 227 (SCA)


National Director of Public Prosecutions v Carolus and Others 2000 (1) SA 1127 (SCA)


Shell and BP South Africa Petroleum Refineries (Pty) Ltd v Murphy NO and Others 2001 (3) SA 683 (D) at 690A


Joint Municipal Pension Fund and Another v Grobler and Others 2007 (5) SA 629 (SCA) para 25


National Testing Retirement Fund v Registrar of Pension Funds 2009 (5) SA 366 (SCA) paras 22–23


Eskom v Soweto City Counsel 1992 (2) SA 703 (W) at 705E


Ganes v Telecom Namibia Limited [2004] 2 All SA 609 (SCA) para 19


ANC Umvoti Council Caucus v Umvoti Municipality 2010 (3) SA 31 (KZP) paras 27–27


Barclays National Bank Ltd v Love 1975 (2) SA 514 (D) at 515C–E and 515F–G


Samancor Group Pension Fund v Samancor Chrome 2010 (4) SA 540 (SCA)


Ferris v FirstRand Bank Limited 2014 (3) SA 39 (CC) para 10


Legislation Cited


Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956, including sections 11, 12, 13, 30A(3), 30P, 30M, 37A, and 37D


Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000, including section 6(2)(c)


Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (referenced within section 37A)


Maintenance Act 1998 (referenced within section 37A)


Section 79(5) of the Ordinance (as referenced in Rule 48 of the fund rules)


Rules of Court Cited


Uniform Rule of Court 7(1)


Held


The court held that the Pension Funds Adjudicator exceeded her statutory competence by determining that a duly registered rule amendment (registered by the Registrar with a retrospective effective date) could not apply to members who exited before the Registrar’s approval date. This was treated as an impermissible determination of the temporal operation of fund rules, a matter not within the Adjudicator’s jurisdiction as a statutory functionary.


The court further held that the Adjudicator’s approach was procedurally unfair because the applicants were not afforded an opportunity to make submissions on the decisive issue that the Adjudicator relied upon, rendering the determination reviewable under PAJA for procedural unfairness.


It also held that the respondent’s reliance on section 37A of the Pension Funds Act and Rule 48 of the fund rules to attack the validity of the rule amendment was misconceived, because section 37A protects benefits against creditors and does not prohibit benefit reductions brought about by rule amendment, and Rule 48 permits amendments subject to section 12 of the Act.


Finally, the court held that a challenge to authority to depose to affidavits was unsustainable on the facts and law applied, and that condonation should be granted in light of the interests of justice and the importance of the matter to the fund’s sustainability.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


Registered pension funds are governed by the Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956 and their registered rules, and (subject to the Act) those rules are binding on the fund and its members in terms of section 13.


A fund may amend its rules in accordance with section 12 of the Act, provided the amendment is approved and registered by the Registrar and does not purport to affect a creditor’s right (other than as member or shareholder). Section 12 does not, on the court’s reading, preclude amendments that have the effect of reducing benefits, provided the statutory requirements are met.


Section 37A of the Pension Funds Act is directed at protecting pension benefits from external interference such as cession, pledge, hypothecation, attachment, or execution by creditors, and does not prohibit a reduction arising from a rule amendment altering the benefit formula, as supported by National Testing Retirement Fund v Registrar of Pension Funds 2009 (5) SA 366 (SCA).


The Pension Funds Adjudicator, as a statutory office-holder, has only those powers conferred by the Pension Funds Act and does not have jurisdiction to regulate how fund rules apply in time by effectively rendering a registered amendment prospective only; the Registrar’s registration of a rule amendment (including its effective date) is central to the rule’s operative effect within the fund’s governance framework.


Administrative-law fairness requires that parties be afforded an opportunity to be heard on issues that are decisive to the outcome. A determination taken without giving affected parties such an opportunity is procedurally unfair and reviewable under section 6(2)(c) of PAJA.


In relation to authority, the relevant focus is whether litigation is authorised through the attorney acting for the litigant, and challenges to authority should be raised through Uniform Rule 7(1); it is not generally necessary to establish that a particular deponent was separately authorised to depose to an affidavit or “bring” an application.

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[2022] ZAGPJHC 164
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Municipal Employees Pension Fund and Another v Ramohale and Others (27708/18) [2022] ZAGPJHC 164 (18 March 2022)

SAFLII
Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
redacted from this document in compliance with the law
and
SAFLII
Policy
HIGH COURT OF SOUTH
AFRICA
(GAUTENG DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG)
Case no: 27708/18
REPORTABLE: No
OF INTEREST TO OTHER
JUDGES: Yes
REVISED.
18 March 2022
In the matter between:
MUNICIPAL
EMPLOYEES PENSION FUND
First Applicant
AKANI
RETIREMENT FUND ADMINISTRATORS (PTY) LTD
Second Applicant
and
MATOME
RONALD
RAMOHALE
First Respondent
CITY
OF EKURHULENI METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY
Second Respondent
THE
PENSION FUNDS ADJUDICATOR
Third Respondent
Case
Summary
: APPLICATION TO REVIEW
AND SET ASIDE THE DETERMINATION MADE BY THE PENSION FUNDS AJUDICATOR,
APPLICATION IN TERMS OF
SECTION 30P
OF THE
PENSION FUNDS ACT NO 24 OF
1956
, OR IN TERMS OF THE
PROMOTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE ACT NO 3
OF 2000
JUDGMENT
SENYATSI J
[1]
This is an application to review and set aside the Determination made
by the Pension Funds
Adjudicator (“the Adjudicator”) the
third respondent in this proceedings. The application is brought
either in terms
of section 30P of the Pension Funds Act no. 24 of
1956 (“the Act”) or in terms of the Promotion of
Administrative Justice
Act no.3 of 2000 (“PAJA”).
[2]
First Applicant Municipal Employees Pension Fund (“the Fund”),
an entity
incorporated in terms of Section 4 of the Act with its
registered office and principal place of business at 7 Disa Road,
Extension
8, Kempton Park, Gauteng. It manages the financial
contributions of its members who are employees of local authorities.
[3]
Second Applicant is Akani Retirement Fund Administrators
(Proprietary) Limited, a
company registered in terms of company laws
of South Africa, with its principal place of business at 7 Disa Road,
Extension 8,
Kempton Park, Gauteng. It administers the funds on
behalf of First Applicant.
[4]
First Respondent is Matome Ronald Ramohale, an adult male and former
employee of Second
Respondent and whose place of residence is
situated at 128 Railway Street, Germiston.
[5]
Second Respondent is City of Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality, a
local government
authority with its place of business situated at
Benson Building, 68 Weburn Avenue, Benoni, Gauteng. Second Respondent
is cited
by virtue of an interest it may have in this matter, but no
relief is sought against it.
[6]
Third Respondent is the Adjudicator cited in her official capacity as
the authority
responsible for consideration of complaints submitted
to her under section 30A (3) of the Act. Her principal place of
business
is situated at Block A, 4
th
Floor, Riverwalk
Office Park, 41 Matroosberg Road, Shela Gardens, Pretoria, Gauteng.
[7]
First Respondent was employed by Second Respondent from 6 September
2006 until his
resignation on 15 May 2013. He was a member of the
Fund by virtue of his employment from date of commencement of his
employment
and ceased to be the member of the Fund upon payment of
his withdrawal benefit on 5 August 2013.
[8]
The Fund is regulated by the provisions of the Act, read with the
rules adopted by
the Fund and registered with the Registrar.
[9]
Rule 37(1) of the Fund Rules deals with the early, or pre-retirement
withdrawal of
benefits from the Fund by its members. This only
therefore provides guidance on benefits payable to members whether
resign from
or are discharged or leave for any other reason the
employ of a municipality.
[10]
At the time when First Respondent became a member of the Fund, rule
37(1) provided that a member
leaving the Fund early, would be paid a
withdrawal benefit calculated at three times the value of his or her
contributions. This
rule is conveniently referred to as the Old Rule.
[11]
Applicants aver that the Fund was able to sustain this generous
withdrawal benefit by virtue
of the fact that prior to the 2008
global financial meltdown, the Fund enjoyed high investment returns
and was able to meet the
withdrawal benefits provided under the Old
Rule. Applicants furthermore aver that this changed with the global
financial meltdown
with the result that the Fund’s investment
returns dropped significantly. Its ability to meet its liabilities to
members
became uncertain.
[12]
During February 2013, the Fund was advised by its actuaries, Itakane
Actuaries and Consultants
(Pty) Ltd (“Itakane”) that the
Old Rule and the high withdrawal benefit provided in terms thereof
was placing a significant
financial strain on the Fund and that the
Fund was at risk of failing to meet its liabilities. It was
recommended the Old Rule
be amended in order to secure the continued
financial sustainability of the Fund.
[13]
The Fund resolved on 21 June 2013 to amend the Old Rule with
retrospective effect from 1 April
2013. The new amendment deviated
from the Old Rule and provided for the calculation of withdrawal
benefits at a rate of 1.5 times
the member’s own contribution
(“the Amended Rule”).
[14]
For the Amended Rule to be of force and effect it had to be
registered with Registrar. The application
to the Registrar was done
on 22 July 2013 for the approval of the amendment in terms of section
12(2) of the Act with effect from
1 April 2013. Members of the fund
were notified of the changes of the Rule 3 between July and October
2013 as required by the Act.
The municipalities affected by the
change were also notified. The process involved circulars and
meetings with all affected parties
throughout Gauteng province.
[15]
The approval and registration of the amended Rule was effected by the
Registrar on 1 April 2014
with an effective date from 1 April 2013
(“the effective date”). The amended Rule has not been
challenged and therefore
remains in force.
[16]
Following receipt of his withdrawal benefit on August 2013, First
Respondent noted that payment
made was not calculated in accordance
with the statement of projection he had received prior to him
existing the Fund. It was in
fact calculated in accordance with the
Amended Rule which was for less than he had hoped for. He lodged a
complaint with the Adjudicator
on 16 September 2014 as he was paid
the sum of R132 173.00 instead of R264 347.99 he had
expected to receive.
[17]
The Adjudicator ordered the Fund to pay the First Respondent the
difference between the expected
amount of R264 347.99 and the
amount required which was R132 174.00. It should be stated that
this finding by the Adjudicator
was in accordance with the Old Rule
and not the new amended Rule. It is against this finding that
Applicants are seeking this court
to review and set aside. The
Determination itself was made on 30 January 2018.
[18]
The Determination stated that the First Respondent was to be paid the
withdrawal benefit in accordance
with the Fund’s Rules as they
applied as at the date of withdrawal using the formula of a member’s
contributions, plus
interest multiplied by three less any deductions
permissible in terms of the Act plus interest at a rate of 10.25% per
annum calculated
from 15 June 2013 to date of payment.
[19]
The basis of upholding the complaint by the Adjudicator was based on
two grounds, namely that:
(a)
the Amended Rule, although applicable with retrospective effect from
1 April 2013, was only
approved by the Registrar on 1 April 2014
(“the approval date”) and the Amended Rule could not be
applied prior to
their registration and approval by the Registrar.
The Adjudicator relied on
Mostert
N.O. v Old Mutual Life Assurance Company (South Africa) Ltd
[1]
and
IEK
Corporation Provident Fund and Others v Lorentz
[2]
and
(b)
Amended Rule could not be applied to benefits that have accrued
before the Amended Rule
was approved by the Registrar. In support of
this finding the Adjudicator relied on
National
Director of Public Prosecutions v Carolus and others
.
[3]
The Adjudicator’s finding was accordingly that in as much as
the rule was amended with retrospective effect it would only
be
applicable to active members to date and those who left the Fund on
or after the approval date of which First Respondent was
not one,
having ceased to be a member of the Fund on 15 May 2013.
[20]
The appeal against the Determination in terms of section 30P of the
Act alternatively to have
the Determination reviewed and set aside in
terms of PAJA. Applicants contend that the Determination was made
without the requisite
jurisdiction and that it is otherwise,
unlawful.
[21]
Applicants seek an order:
(a)
condoning their failure to bring this appeal within the six-week time
period stipulated in section
30P of the Act;
(b)
setting aside the Determination under section 30P of the Act
alternatively reviewing it
and setting it aside in terms of PAJA, and
(c)
substituting the Determination with an order dismissing the
complaint.
[22]
The issues for Determination can be summarized as follows:
(a)
whether the Act conferred jurisdiction on the Adjudicator to make a
Determination in respect
of the Complainant.
(b)
whether the Adjudicator erred in making the Determination in that she
failed to give effect
to an amendment made by the Fund, with
retrospective effect, as the Fund was entitled to do in terms of
section 12(4) of the Act
and
(c)
whether the Determination was procedurally unfair in that the
Adjudicator determined
the complainant on the basis that the amended
rule did not apply retrospectively without having given Applicants an
opportunity
to address her on the issue;
(d)
whether the Amended Rule was lawful and whether Mr Letjane had the
authority to depose to
Applicants’ founding and supplementary
affidavits;
[23]
Each issue will be dealt with as set out below, but before that is
done, it is proper to analyze
the legal principles and the law
relating benefits in pension funds.
[24]
The registered pension funds such as First Applicant, are governed by
the provisions of the Act
read together with the rules adopted by
each Fund and registered with the Registrar.
[25]
Section 11 of the Act provides that the rules of a fund shall be in
official languages of the
Republic and provides for how the fund
shall regulate itself.
[26]
Section 13 of the Act states that subject to the provisions of the
Act the rules of a registered
fund shall be binding on the fund and
the members, shareholders and officers thereof, and on any person who
claims under the rules
or whose claim is derived from a person so
claiming.
[27]
As already stated before, Rule 37 of the rules of the Fund regulates
resignation, discharge or
leaving of service in the circumstances not
elsewhere provided for. The Old rule 37(1)(a) provided that upon
resignation of a member
he/she would be entitled to the amount of his
contributions multiplied by 3 times. This formula, as already stated,
was changed
by the Amended Rule which reduced the multiplication to
1.5 times.
[28]
Section 30P of the Act provides as follows:

Access
to court
-
(1)
Any party who feels aggrieved by a determination of the
Adjudicator may, within six weeks after the date of the
determination, apply
to the division of the High Court which has
jurisdiction, for relief, and shall at the same time give written
notice of his or
her intention so to apply to the other parties to
the complaint.
(2)
The division of the High Court contemplated in subsection may
consider the merits of the complaint made to the Adjudicator under

section 30A(3) and on which the Adjudicator’s determination was
based, and may make any order it deems fit.”
As stated before, this
court is required to make the determination and Applicants bring this
Application in terms of this section
30P of the Act.
[29]
I now deal with the first issue, which is whether the Act conferred
jurisdiction on the Adjudicator
to decide in respect of the
Complaint. The Adjudicator derives her powers from section 30A (3) of
the Act which states that if
a complainant is not satisfied with the
reply from the fund or the employer who participates in the fund or
the employer who participates
in the fund fails to reply within 30
days after receipt of the complaint, the complainant may lodge the
complaint with the Adjudicator.
[30]
The Adjudicator, as already stated, ruled that the Rule Amendment
could not be applied to members
who left the Fund prior to the
registration of the rule amendment on 1 April 2014. The effect of
this finding by the Adjudicator
is Amended Rule can only apply
prospectively. This in my respectful view, amounts to venturing into
an arena which the legislature
never intended. First Applicant is
allowed by its rules to regulate itself and even amend its own rules.
The Adjudicator has no
authority to determine how the rules will
apply. The legislature clearly intended to have any amendment of the
rule registered
with the Registrar because for the latter as a
regulator, it there was something untoward about any amendment, the
Registrar will
intervene for the good of the members and all parties
adversely affected by the amendment. In this case, the Registrar
found no
irregularity in giving effect to the application of the
Amended Rule retrospectively from 1 April 2013.
[31]
In opposing the application, First Respondent contends that the
approval and registration of the Rule Amendment
by the Registrar was
invalid in that it conflicts with section 37A of the Act and rule 48
of the Fund Rules.
[32]
Rule 48 of the Fund Rules reads as follows:

(1)
The Rules of the Fund may be amended,
rescinded or added by the Committee, subject to the provision of
section 12 of the Act and
section 79 quote (5) of the Ordinance
.
(2)
The Committee may, at the request of a particular Local Authority
and member, increase the benefits to which a member is entitled
in
terms of the Rules of the Fund provided that any increase in
obligations of the Fund caused by such amendment, as calculated
by
the Attorney, is paid to the Fund.
(3)
The Committee may for any reason which it after consultation with the
Actuary deems equitable,
increase the benefits to which a member is
entitled in terms of the Rules of Fund, provided that any increase in
obligations of
the Fund caused by the Actuary, is paid to the Fund.”
[33]
Section 37A of the Act provides as follows:

(1)
Save to the extent permitted by this
Act, the Income Tax Act, 1962 (Act No. 58 of 1962) and the
Maintenance Act, 1998
, no benefit provided for in the rules of a
registered fund (including an annuity purchased or to be purchased by
the said fund
from an insurer for a member) or right to such benefit,
or right in respect of contributions made by or on behalf of a member
shall,
notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the
rules of such fund, be capable of being reduced, transferred or
otherwise
ceded, or being pledged or hypothecated or be liable to be
attached or subjected to any form of execution under a judgment or a

court of law.”
[34]
Rule 48 of the Fund Rules reads as follows:

(1)
The Rules of the Fund may be amended,
rescinded or added by the Committee, subject to the provision of
section 12 of the Act and
section 79 quote (5) of the Ordinance
(2)
The Committee may, at the request of a particular Local Authority and
member, increase the
benefits to which a member is entitled in terms
of the Rules of the Fund provided that any increase in obligations of
the Fund
caused by such amendment, as calculated by the Attorney, is
paid to the Fund.
(3)
The Committee may for any reason which it after consultation with the
Actuary deems equitable,
increase the benefits to which a member is
entitled in terms of the Rules of Fund, provided that any increase in
obligations of
the Fund caused by the Actuary, is paid to the Fund.”
[35]
The authority conferred upon the trustees by rule 48(1) to amend the
Fund’s rules is qualified only
by the requirement that such
amendment be consistent with section 12 of the Act. However, section
12 of the Act does not preclude
an amendment for the purposes of
reducing benefits.
[36]
Section 12 of the Act provides as follows:

(
1)
A registered fund may, in the manner directed by its rules, alter or
rescind any rule or make additional
rule, but no such alteration,
rescission or addiction shall be valid-
(a)
if it purports to effect any right of a creditor of the fund, other
than as a member or
shareholder thereof; or
(b)
unless it has been approved by the registrar and registered as
provided in subsection (4).”
[37]
It is evident from the reading of section 12 that the only
restrictions placed on amendments
are that such amendments may not
affect any right of a creditor of the fund, as opposed to a member,
and they must be approved
and registered by the Registrar. I have not
found evidence or allegation by Respondent that the amendment affects
the rights of
the Fund’s creditors. Even if he did, that would
have required the Registrar to have been challenged on registration
of the
Amended Rule and this has not happened. It follows therefore
that there is no inconsistency between the Rule Amendment and rule

48.
[38]
The analysis of section 37A and the intention of the legislature
reveal that its purpose is to
protect a member’s pensionable
benefit from the member’s such creditors against cession,
transfer, pledge, hypothecation,
or attachment in satisfaction of a
judgment debt against the member. The only exceptions on the use of a
member’s pensionable
benefits to be used to reduce or settle
the debts are listed in section 37A(3) from (a) to (d) and section
37D of the Act. The
section is not applicable between a member of the
Fund and the Fund itself but applicable to a relationship between a
member and
his or her creditors. This is so because the fund must
protect a member’s pensionable benefit from his or her
creditors and
a member’s pensionable interest may be used in
reduction of a debt owed to the fund under sections 37A(3)(d) or 37D
of the
Act.
[39]
In my respectful view, the contention by First Respondent is not
supported by facts and the law and must
fail. Firstly the objective
of section 37A of the Act is to protect the member’s benefits
in pension against his creditors.
Secondly the decrease referred to
in the section has bearing on the formula of calculation of benefits.
The legislature would not
have intended that the calculation of
payout benefit formular to be adhered to even in circumstances where
such retention would
lead to the collapse of the Fund.
[40]
Rule 48 of First Applicant’s rules places no limit on its
trustees regarding reduction of benefits.
This is so because the
trustees owe fiduciary duties to the Fund to ensure its
sustainability for the benefit of all its members.
It is for that
very reason that upon being advised by its actuaries that the Old
Rule calculation of benefits was unsustainable
that the Amended Rule
was introduced.
[41]
In assessing the powers of the adjudicator the court in
Shell
and BP South Africa Petroleum Refineries (Pty) Ltd v Murphy NO and
others
[4]
,
the court held that “the Adjudicator is a creature of the
Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956 (the Act). His function is to consider
a
complaints lodged with him in terms of section 30A(3) of the Act.”
[42]
In
Joint
Municipal Pension Fund and Another v Grobler and Others
[5]
,
it was held that as a creature of statute the Adjudicator has no
jurisdiction to determine whether a rule applies prospectively.
[43]
The authority confessed upon the trustees by rule 48(1) to amend the
Fund’s rules is qualified
only by the requirement that such
amendment be consisted with section 12 of the Act: Section 12 does
not preclude an amendment
for the purposes of reducing benefits.
[44]
It is evident from the reading of section 12 that the only
restrictions placed on amendments
are that such amendments may not
affect any right of a creditor of the fund, as opposed to a member,
and they must be approved
and registered by the Registrar. I have not
found evidence or allegation by Respondent that the amendment affects
the rights of
the Fund’s creditors. It follows therefore that
there is no inconsistency between the Rule Amendment and rule 48.
[45]
In confirming this principle the court held in
National
Testing Retirement Fund v Registrar of Pension Funds
[6]
the
that a rule amendment, which has the effect of reducing a pension
benefit, does not face foul of the prohibition in section
37 A of the
Act against reducing pension benefit. The court held that:
“…
the
combination of ‘reduced’ with transferred or otherwise
ceded, or of being pledged or hypothecated or be liable to
be
attached or subject to any form of execution under a judgment or
order of a court of law indicated that what the legislature
had in
mind was not reduction effected by a rule amendment, but a reduction
in consequence of factors
external
to the rule
.” Consequently, the
submission by the Respondent must fail.
[46]
I deal with the contention by the Respondent that Mr Zamini Ernest
Ephraim Letjane (“Letjane”)
managing director of Akani,
does not have the necessary authority to depose the founding and
supplementary affidavit on behalf
of the Applicants due to lack of a
resolution of Applicants.
[47]
The law or authority to depose an affidavit is settled. Our courts
have held that it is irrelevant
whether a particular witness or
deponent or other person who become involved in the proceedings is
authorized to act in the proceedings.
The Rules of this court also
make that point clear.
[48]
In
Eskom
v Soweto City Counsel
[7]
the court held as follows in dealing with the issue of authority:

The
developed view, adopted in Court Rule 7(1) is that the risk is
adequately managed on a different level. If the attorney is
authorized to bring the application on behalf of the applicant, the
application necessarily is that of the applicant. There is no
need
that any other person, whether he be a witness or someone who becomes
involved especially in
the
context of authority, should additionally be authorized. It is
therefore sufficed to know whether or not the attorney acts with

authority. As to when and how the attorney’s authority should
be proved, the Rule maker made a policy decision. Perhaps because
the
risk is minimal that an attorney will act for a person without
authority to do so, proof is dispensed with except only if the
other
party challenges the authority. See Rule 7(1). Courts should honour
that approach. Properly applied, that should lead to
the elimination
of the many pages of resolutions, delegation and substitutions still
attached to applications by some litigants,
especially certain
financial institutions.
In
the present case the ‘interlocutory application’ was
delivered under the name and signature of Mr Attorney Bennett.
He
probably did so on behalf of respondent. If he was authorized to do
that, Respondent is bound to accept the application as his

application. That remains so irrespective of whether deponent Rossouw
was also authorized ‘to bring this application.’
There is
no logical need to insist on proof that someone other than
Bennet
[the attorney] was also authorized
.”
This approach has been accepted in other cases.
[8]
[49]
Letjane clearly has personal knowledge of the facts deposed to in the
affidavit. He has been
the managing Director of Akin since it began
managing the Fund in 2003. This is apparent from paragraph 61 of the
replying affidavit.
He did not need to be authorized either to depose
to the affidavit or to bring the application on behalf of Applicants.
In any
event, Respondent did not raise the issue of authority is
required by way of Rule 7 notice. It follows therefore that the
challenge
of authority has no legal basis and must therefore fail.
[50]
I now deal with whether the Adjudicator committed procedural
irregularity when the Determination
was made. Applicants contend that
at no stage were they informed by the Adjudicator that she would be
dividing the matter on the
basis that the Rule amendment could not be
applied to members who exited the Fund after approval date.
Applicants argue that they
were not afforded opportunity to make
submissions in this regard.
[51]
In reply to Applicants contention First Respondent states that the
complaint he lodged related
to the interpretation of the Fund’s
Rules and the maladministration of the Fund / a decision in excess of
the Fund’s
Rules and therefore fell within the definition of a
complaint under the Act. This cannot be correct. Once the Rule
Amendment was
approved it was not up to the Adjudicator to make a
Determination of its application. The registration of the Rule
Amendment by
the Registrar with retrospective effect did not require
any interpretation because it was what it said to be and its
application
was without any doubt, that is 1 April 2013, nothing more
and nothing less. Once the Adjudicator decided to make a finding
regarding
its validity, she was no longer dealing with the complaint
submitted not a complaint as defined in the Act.
[52]
The Adjudicator was obliged to afford Applicants to make submissions
before she made findings
on the point. It was not up to her
meru
moto
to make that determination without calling for more
submissions from Applicants. Once the right to be heard was not
offered to
Applicants, this in my view, amounted to a serious
irregularity. The right to be heard is a basic principle of our
administrative
law and failure to accord a party affected by a
decision to present his or her side of the case, renders any
Determination made
null and void.
[53]
The Determination by the Adjudicator therefore falls faul of section
6(2)(c) of the PAJA which
provides as follows:

(2)
A court or tribunal has the power to
judicially review an administrative action if –
(c)
the action was procedurally unfair.”
It
follows in my respectful view, that the contention of Applicants on
this point must succeed.
[54]
I now deal with the condonation application by Applicants for
bringing the application outside
of the time limits imposed by the
Act.
[55]
The Determination was made known to Applicants on 19 February 2018.
In terms of section 30P of
the Act, Applicants were required to
launch the appeal by 2 April 2018, but only filed the papers on 27
July 2018.
[56]
The Rules of Court state that Applicant must show good cause in the
condonation application.
[9]
The
court must also consider whether it is in the interest of justice to
grant condonation.
[10]
Factors
to be considered in the assessment whether or not to grant
condonation include: the explanation tendered for the delay;
the
applicant’s prospects of success and the importance of the
issue to be adjudicated upon. The stranger an applicant’s

prospects of success or the more the importance of the matter, the
less the explanation of any delay will weigh.”
[57]
In the instant case, the Adjudicator was sent the complaint during
September 2014 and handed
down her Determination 3 (three) years 4
(four) months later during January 2018. The applicants state it took
time to locate the
file pertaining to the matter.
[58]
Respondent contends that condonation should be refused because:
(a)
the delay in lodging the appeal was excessive;
(b)
the delay was not fully explained and
(c)
Applicant did not attach confirmatory affidavits of persons who
retrieved the information
relevant to the complaint in mid-July 2018.
[59]
The sustainability of the Fund going forward hinges on the
determination of this appeal. The
Old Rule on calculation of benefits
placed the Fund under significant pressure as the contributions of
members which invested were
not yielding high returns post the global
financial meltdown of 2008. It follows in my respectful view, that
the trustees acted
within reason so as to protect the sustainability
of the Fund to amend the Rules.
[60]
If the Determination of the Adjudicator is left unchallenged, it will
lead to the unsustainability
of First Applicant and in my view the
trustees acted properly by implementing the recommendations of their
actuaries. It is for
those grounds that the application for
condonation of the late filing of the appeal must be favorably
considered.
ORDER
[61]
The following order is made:
(a) The application for
condonation for late filing of an appeal in terms of section 30P of
the Act in respect of the Determination
is hereby granted.
(b)
The Pension Funds Adjudicator had no jurisdiction to make the
determination dated 30 January
2018 ostensibly issued by her with
reference number [....] in terms of
section 30M
of the
Pension Funds
Act 1956
in respect of the complaint lodged by First Respondent with
the Adjudicator on 17 September 2014.
(c)
The Determination is hereby review and set aside and is invalid and
of no force and
effect.
(d)
The Determination of the Adjudicator is replaced with the following:
The Complaint
lodged by First Respondent is dismissed.
(e)
The appeal against the Determination in terms of section 30P of the
Act is upheld.
(f)
First Respondent is ordered to pay the costs of the appeal.
M.L. SENYATSI
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT
Heard:

17 August 2021
Judgment:

18 March 2022
Counsel for
Applicant:
Advocate
AC McKenzie
Instructed
by:

Webber Wentzel, Johannesburg
Counsel for First
Respondent:     Advocate K Maleka
Instructed
by:

Leshilo Inc. Pretoria
[1]
[2001]
8 BPLR 2307 (SCA)
[2]
[2003]
3 BPLR 227 (SCA)
[3]
2000
(1) SA 1127 (SCA)
[4]
2001
(3) SA 683
(D) at 690A
[5]
2007
(5) SA 629
(SCA) para 25
[6]
2009
(5) SA 366
(SCA) paras 22-23
[7]
1992(2)
SA 703 (W) at 705E
[8]
See
Ganes v Telecom Namibia Limited
[2004] 2 All SA 609
(SCA) para 19,
ANC Umvoti Council Caucus v Umvoti Municipality
2010 (3) SA 31
(KZP)
paras 2727, Barclays National Bank Ltd v Love
1975 (2) SA 514
(D) at
515C-E and 515 F- G.
[9]
See
Samancor Group Pension Fund v Samancor Chrome 2010 (4) SA 540 (SCA).
[10]
See
Ferris v First Rand Bank Limited
2014 (3) SA 39
(CC) para 10.