Mdlolose v Doctor Brendan Lyne Medical Practice and Others (18/24079) [2022] ZAGPJHC 54 (1 February 2022)

80 Reportability
Personal Injury Law - Medical Negligence

Brief Summary

Prescription — Medical negligence — Special plea of prescription upheld — Plaintiff's claim for damages against medical practitioners prescribed as the plaintiff had knowledge of the facts giving rise to the claim by 4 December 2015, with the claim expiring on 3 December 2018 — Joinder of defendants did not interrupt prescription as service of the joinder order and relevant documents was not effected within the prescriptive period.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


The matter concerned a medical negligence delictual damages action instituted in the High Court of South Africa, Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg. The plaintiff, Mduduzi Ishmael Mdlalose, a member of the South African Police Service, sued Doctor Brendan Lyne Medical Practice (first defendant), Dr Natasha Fakier (second defendant), and Dr Brendan Sean Blair (third defendant) for damages alleged to flow from their unlawful and negligent conduct.


The proceedings reached the court in the context of a special plea of prescription raised by the defendants. By agreement between the parties, that special plea was heard separately and prior to the hearing of evidence on the merits of the medical negligence claim.


The procedural history was material. The plaintiff initially issued action only against Meredale Medical Centre (Pty) Ltd. He subsequently brought an application to join the present three defendants, and on 5 November 2018 an order was granted joining them to the proceedings. The plaintiff later withdrew the action against Meredale Medical Centre (Pty) Ltd on 2 December 2019. An amended combined summons and particulars of claim (together with the joinder order and related documents) were served on the joined defendants only in late January 2019.


The dispute ultimately turned on a narrow question of prescription, namely whether the joinder order (granted within three years) interrupted prescription despite service on the defendants occurring after the three-year period had run its course.


2. Material Facts


It was common cause, and ultimately conceded by the plaintiff, that by 4 December 2015 at the latest the plaintiff had knowledge of the material facts giving rise to the alleged debt, as well as the identity of the relevant medical practitioners. The defendants’ evidence (through Dr Fakier) was that the treating doctors introduced themselves during consultations and that documents relevant to a workmen’s compensation claim, reflecting the defendants’ names and practice numbers, were provided to the plaintiff. The plaintiff confirmed in his own evidence that those names and practice numbers were available to him, and that he had the requisite factual knowledge by 4 December 2015.


On those accepted facts, and applying the three-year prescription period, the parties were in agreement that the plaintiff’s claim would prescribe on 3 December 2018, unless prescription was interrupted in terms of the Prescription Act.


Within the three-year period, the plaintiff obtained an order on 5 November 2018 joining the present defendants. However, the service of the amended summons and related documents on the joined defendants occurred only in late January 2019 (the defendants’ plea referring specifically to 29 January 2019), after the date on which the parties accepted the claim would otherwise have prescribed.


The only remaining factual matter relevant to the prescription enquiry was therefore the sequence that the joinder order was granted before 3 December 2018, but that service of the process bringing the claim to the joined defendants’ attention occurred after 3 December 2018.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal question was whether, on these facts, the granting of an order joining new defendants to existing proceedings constituted an interruption of prescription under section 15(1) of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969, notwithstanding that the joinder order and amended summons were served on the joined defendants only after the prescriptive period had expired.


This was primarily a dispute about the application of legal principles to established facts. The key facts (knowledge by 4 December 2015 and service only in January 2019) were not in dispute by the end of the evidence. The dispute was whether, as a matter of law, a joinder order (or the joinder application and its outcome) could be treated as a “process” that interrupts prescription, and if so, whether interruption required service within the prescriptive period.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court identified that the defendants bore the onus to prove the special plea of prescription, while the plaintiff bore the onus to establish interruption. Once the plaintiff conceded knowledge by 4 December 2015, it followed (and was accepted by both sides) that the claim would prescribe on 3 December 2018, absent interruption.


The court approached the remaining question through section 15 of the Prescription Act, which provides for judicial interruption of prescription by the service on the debtor of a “process whereby the creditor claims payment of the debt”. The court considered four decisions dealing with the meaning of “process” and how judicial interruption operates, namely Cape Town Municipality & Another v Allianz Insurance Co Ltd 1990 (1) SA 311 (C), Peter Taylor & Associates v Bell Estates (Pty) Ltd & Another (Pty) Ltd 2014 (2) SA 312 (SCA), Huyser v Quicksure (Pty) Ltd & Another [2017] 2 All SA 209 (GP), and Nativa Manufacturing (Pty) Ltd v Keymax Investments 125 (Pty) Ltd & Others 2020 (1) SA 235 (GP).


The plaintiff relied principally on Huyser, contending that the joinder order was a judicial pronouncement sufficient to interrupt prescription, and that the joinder application should be treated as a “process” for purposes of section 15(1). The defendants relied on Nativa, which had rejected interruption by joinder in circumstances where service of the relevant process was not achieved within the prescriptive period.


In analysing the authorities, the court accepted the contextualisation in Nativa of the principles emanating from Allianz and their later consideration in Peter Taylor. The court emphasised that Allianz concerned declaratory proceedings that determined an element of liability under an insurance policy and thereby constituted a step in enforcing a claim for payment, because the declarator finally disposed of part of the cause of action that would underpin a later monetary claim. The court described this as involving a “substantive link” or “shared cause of action” between the declaratory process and the later claim for payment.


Against that background, the court characterised the joinder application and resulting order in the present case as procedural in nature. The joinder order had the effect only of adding parties to existing proceedings; it did not finally determine any element of the medical negligence claim, nor did it move the substantive dispute closer to a determination of liability or quantification in the way the declarator did in Allianz. The court reasoned that the joinder application did not constitute a process “whereby the creditor claims payment of the debt” in the sense required by section 15(1), because it did not itself involve enforcement of the debt but merely sought the inclusion of additional parties who might be liable.


The court also drew a distinction between the cause of action for joinder and the cause of action for medical negligence. It held that the joinder application depended on the elements required for joinder under Uniform Rule 10, which are markedly different from the elements of the delictual claim. The medical negligence claim served as context for the joinder, but the court concluded that it did not share a cause of action with the joinder application in the manner contemplated in the interruption jurisprudence discussed in Allianz and Nativa.


Even accepting that the joinder order had been granted within the prescriptive period (a factual feature distinguishing this matter from Nativa, where the joinder application was heard after prescription had already occurred), the court held that interruption under section 15(1) requires service of the relevant process on the debtor, and that this requirement is tied to certainty and the triggering of the debtor’s obligation to respond. Relying on Nativa (which in turn relied on Allianz), the court treated service, rather than merely the issue of documents or the granting of an order, as the operative act that institutes proceedings for purposes of section 15(1) and removes uncertainty about the existence and enforcement of the debt.


On that reasoning, the court held that for the plaintiff to rely on the joinder step to interrupt prescription, it would have been necessary for the plaintiff not only to obtain the joinder order within the three-year period but also to serve the joinder order together with the amended summons and relevant documents on the joined defendants within that same period, namely on or before 3 December 2018. Because service occurred only in January 2019, the requirement for judicial interruption was not satisfied.


The court also addressed the approach in Huyser and expressed respectful agreement with Nativa that there is no substantive difference between an order seeking joinder and an order granting leave to join, and aligned itself with the reasoning in Nativa on interruption and service.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court upheld the defendants’ special plea of prescription. It dismissed the plaintiff’s action and ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendants’ costs.


Cases Cited


Cape Town Municipality & Another v Allianz Insurance Co Ltd 1990 (1) SA 311 (C).


Peter Taylor & Associates v Bell Estates (Pty) Ltd & Another (Pty) Ltd 2014 (2) SA 312 (SCA).


Huyser v Quicksure (Pty) Ltd & Another [2017] 2 All SA 209 (GP).


Nativa Manufacturing (Pty) Ltd v Keymax Investments 125 (Pty) Ltd & Others 2020 (1) SA 235 (GP).


Legislation Cited


Prescription Act 68 of 1969, section 12(3).


Prescription Act 68 of 1969, section 15(1).


Rules of Court Cited


Uniform Rules of Court, Rule 10.


Held


The court held that the plaintiff had knowledge of the facts giving rise to the alleged debt and of the identity of the relevant defendants by 4 December 2015, with the consequence that the claim prescribed on 3 December 2018 unless interrupted.


The court held further that a joinder application and the granting of a joinder order did not, in itself, constitute a “process whereby the creditor claims payment of the debt” in the sense required by section 15(1), because it merely added parties and did not determine any substantive element of the medical negligence claim or advance enforcement of the debt.


The court held that, in any event, interruption under section 15(1) depends on service of the relevant process on the debtor within the prescriptive period, and that service of the joinder order and amended summons after 3 December 2018 could not interrupt prescription. The special plea was upheld and the action dismissed with costs.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


Section 12(3) of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969 fixes the commencement of prescription with reference to a creditor’s knowledge of the identity of the debtor and the facts giving rise to the debt; where such knowledge exists, prescription runs from that point, subject to interruption.


Section 15(1) of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969 provides for judicial interruption of prescription by the service on the debtor of a process whereby the creditor claims payment of the debt; service (not merely issue or the obtaining of an order) is treated as essential to remove uncertainty and to require the debtor to respond to the claim.


A procedural application such as joinder under Uniform Rule 10, which operates to add parties to an action, does not, without more, constitute a process enforcing payment of a debt, nor does it necessarily share a “substantive link” or “shared cause of action” with the main claim in the sense required by the interruption jurisprudence derived from the authorities considered.

About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
>>
2022
>>
[2022] ZAGPJHC 54
|

|

Mdlolose v Doctor Brendan Lyne Medical Practice and Others (18/24079) [2022] ZAGPJHC 54 (1 February 2022)

IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA,
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NO: 18/24079
REPORTABLE:
YES
/ NO
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES:
YES
/NO
REVISED.
01.02.2022
In
the matter between:
MDLALOSE
MDUDUZI ISHMAEL
Plaintiff
and
DOCTOR
BRENDAN LYNE MEDICAL PRACTICE
First Defendant
DOCTOR
NATASHA
FAKIER
Second Defendant
DR
BRENDAN SEAN
BLAIR
Third Defendant
JUDGMENT
CRUTCHFIELD
J:
[1]
This is a medical negligence action brought
by the plaintiff, Mduduzi Ismael Mdlalosi, a male member of the South
African Police
Service. The plaintiff’s claim is for damages
pursuant to the alleged unlawful and negligent conduct of the
defendants, Dr
Brendan Lyne Medical Practice, Dr Natasha Fakier and
Dr Brendan Sean Blair, the defendants before me.
[2]
The plaintiff issued the action initially
against the Meredale Medical Centre (Pty) Ltd only. Thereafter, the
plaintiff issued an
application for joinder of the three defendants
referred to afore. This Court, on 5 November 2018, granted an
order joining
the three defendants to the proceedings. On 2 December
2019, the plaintiff withdrew the action against the Meredale Medical

Centre (Pty) Ltd.
[3]
On 25 January 2019, the plaintiff
served the amended combined summons and particulars of claim, the
order for joinder, the
defendant’s special plea and the amended
pages on the defendants.
[4]
The defendants raised a special plea of
prescription that I heard separately by agreement between the
parties, prior to the parties
commencing with the evidence on the
issue of the defendants’ alleged liability in the medical
negligence claim.
[5]
The special plea comprised of two legs:
5.1
Firstly, that in terms of s 12(3) of the
Prescription Act, 68 of 1969 (‘the Act’), the plaintiff
had knowledge of the
identity of the defendants and the facts giving
rise to the debt on 4 December 2015. Accordingly, the claim
expired on 3 December
2018.
5.2
Secondly, that service of the amended
summons and relevant documents aforementioned, including the order of
joinder, on the defendants
on 29 January 2019 did not serve to
interrupt prescription as the claim prescribed on 3 December
2018.
[6]
The defendants carried the onus to prove
the special plea of prescription and the plaintiff to prove the
interruption of prescription.
[7]
The defendants led the evidence of the
second defendant, Dr Natasha Fakier, who testified that the treating
doctors introduced themselves
to the plaintiff at the respective
consultations. Furthermore, that the forms necessary for a claim in
terms of the workman’s
compensation regime, reflecting the
names and practice numbers of the defendants, were handed to the
plaintiff after the plaintiff
attended upon the relevant defendants.
[8]
The defendants then closed their case on
the special plea of prescription and the plaintiff led the evidence
of the plaintiff himself.
The latter confirmed essentially that the
names and practice numbers of the defendants were available to him,
and that he had knowledge
of the facts underpinning the debt on
4 December 2015 at the latest.
[9]
The plaintiff, having heard the evidence,
conceded that the plaintiff had knowledge of the underlying facts as
at 4 December
2015. Thus, the claim prescribed on 3 December
2018, a point on which the parties were
ad
idem.
[10]
The sole remaining issue was whether the
granting of the order of joinder on 5 November 2018 served to
interrupt prescription
in terms of s 15 of the Act.
[11]
Section 15 provides for judicial
interruption of prescription. Section 15(1) provides for the
interruption of prescription by service
on the debtor of any process
whereby the creditor claims payment of the debt.
[12]
Four
decisions of our courts are relevant to the issue before me; the
decision of Howie J in
Cape
Town Municipality & Another v Allianz Insurance Co Ltd,
[1]
that of the Supreme Court of Appeal in
Peter
Taylor & Associates v Bell Estates (Pty) Ltd & Another
,
[2]
followed by
Huyser
v Quicksure (Pty) Ltd & Another
[3]
in the Gauteng Division and
Nativa
Manufacturing (Pty) Ltd v Keymax Investments 125 (Pty) Ltd &
Others.
[4]
[13]
The plaintiff relied on
Huyser
and the defendants on
Nativa
.
[14]
The
plaintiff argued that the granting of the joinder order was a
judicial pronouncement of joinder that served to interrupt
prescription
in terms of s 15(1) of the Act. Secondly, that the
application for joinder was a process as envisaged in
Allianz
[5]
and
referred to in
Nativa,
[6]
being
a process whereby:
14.1

The proceedings begun thereunder are
instituted as a step in the enforcement of a claim for payment of a
debt’; and
14.2

A creditor prosecutes his claim
under that process to final, executable judgment, not only when the
process and the judgment constitute
the beginning and end of the same
action, but also where the process initiates an action, judgment in
which finally disposes of
some elements of the claim, and where the
remaining elements are disposed of in a supplementary action
instituted pursuant to and
dependent upon that judgment.’
[15]
Keightley J
[7]
contextualised the findings in
Allianz
[8]
that were referred to and relied upon by the Supreme Court of Appeal
in
Peter
Taylor
.
[9]
[16]
The
court in
Nativa
[10]
found that
Allianz
did
not deal with an application for joinder but with a declarator to the
effect that the defendant was liable to indemnify the
plaintiff under
an insurance policy. Howie J found that the declarator was a process
that served to interrupt prescription in terms
of s 15 of the
Act.
[11]
[17]
The
reasons were twofold. Firstly, that the proceedings for the
declarator constituted a ‘step in the enforcement of a claim

for payment of a debt,’
[12]
in that the judgment in the declaratory proceedings finally disposed
of some of the elements of the claim, being liability under
the
insurance policy, with the balance of the required elements being
determined in a supplementary action linked to and dependent
upon
that judgment.
[13]
The
supplementary and dependent action in
Allianz
was
a claim for payment of the amount for which the defendant was liable
under the insurance policy.
[18]
Thus,
the action for payment in
Allianz
arose
pursuant to declaratory proceedings that determined the issue of
liability under the insurance policy. Accordingly, there
was a
‘substantive link’, a ‘shared cause of action,’
[14]
between the declaratory proceedings and those for payment of the
amount due, sufficient to interrupt the payment of prescription.
[19]
The process before me is an application for
joinder together with an order of court ordering joinder of the three
defendants.
[20]
Finalisation
of the joinder application by way of the granting of the order of
joinder served, in my view, only to add the defendants
as parties to
the action but did not finalise any of the necessary elements of the
medical negligence claim.
[15]
[21]
The
application for joinder did not move the substantive process of the
medical negligence claim a step closer towards ‘the
enforcement
of a claim for payment of a debt’.
[16]
It served only to include the defendants as parties who were
potentially liable under the claim. Nor did the judgment in the
application
for joinder dispose of an element of the medical
negligence action as occurred in
Allianz
.
[17]
[22]
Furthermore, the cause of action in the
joinder application comprised the required elements of a claim and
order for joinder in
terms of rule 10 of the uniform rules of court.
Joinder is a procedure governing the addition of parties and/or
causes of action
whatever the characterisation of the main claim and
the necessary elements of the main claim may be. The medical
negligence claim
in this matter served as context to the joinder
application but did not share a cause of action with the joinder
application.
[23]
The required elements of the joinder
application are markedly different from those of the medical
negligence claim.
[24]
The
next issue is the effect of the granting of the order of joinder
pursuant to the joinder application. In
Nativa
the joinder application was heard at a stage when the claim against
the proposed defendant had already prescribed.
[18]
This is distinguishable from the matter before me in which the claim
against the defendants had not prescribed as and when the
order for
the defendants’ joinder to the action was granted.
[25]
In my view, in order for the granting of
the joinder order to have the effect of interrupting prescription in
terms of s 15 of the
Act, the order had to be served upon the
defendants together with the amended summons and particulars of claim
and such additional
process as had been delivered in the matter as at
that stage. Furthermore, service of the joinder order together with
the various
relevant documents had to be effected during the
prescriptive period, the last day for such service being 3 December
2018.
[26]
The
necessity for service of the order and relevant documents during the
prescriptive period was dealt with by Keightley J
in
Nativa,
[19]
relying on
Allianz
,
[20]
to the effect that under the Act service of a process claiming
payment of a debt is required in order to complete the requirements

of s 15(1).
The
requirement for service of the process claiming payment of the debt
arises from the necessity for certainty as between the debtor
and the
creditor. It is only upon service on the debtor that the latter is
required to comply with the demand for payment or to
take steps to
defend the process.
[27]
Keightley J
relied on Howie J’s finding that it is service of the
process claiming payment of the debt that comprises
the ‘taking
of judicial steps to recover the debt, thereby removing all
uncertainty as to its existence’.
[21]
[28]
Furthermore,
Keightley J noted
[22]
that it is the service of the process, not the issue of the process,
that institutes the proceedings. Service on the defendant
requires
the defendant to answer to the claim.
[29]
Hence, in my view, not only did the
plaintiff have to procure the order for the joinder of the defendants
within the three-year
period terminating on 3 December 2018 but
also had to effect service of the order together with the relevant
documents, on
or before 3 December 2018, being within the
prescriptive period.
[30]
Regard
being had to the judgment in
Huyser
,
[23]
I am in respectful agreement with the findings of Keightley J in
Nativa
[24]
that there is no substantive difference in an order that seeks the
joinder of a prospective defendant or an order that seeks the
leave
of the court to join a prospective defendant to the proceedings.
[31]
In the circumstances, I respectfully align
myself with the judgment of Keightley J in
Nativa
and find that the special plea of prescription is upheld.
[32]
Accordingly, I grant the following order:
1.
The special plea of prescription is upheld
and the action is dismissed with costs.
I
hand down the judgment.
_________________
CRUTCHFIELD
J
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION
JOHANNESBURG
Electronically
submitted therefore unsigned
Delivered:
This judgment was prepared and authored by the Acting Judge whose
name is reflected and is handed down electronically
by circulation to
the Parties / their legal representatives by email and by uploading
it to the electronic file of this matter
on CaseLines. The date of
the judgment is deemed to be 1 February 2022.
COUNSEL
FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

Mr T Mathopo.
INSTRUCTED
BY:

N. T Mdlalose Incorporated.
COUNSEL
FOR THE DEFENDANTS:

Mr L Choate.
INSTRUCTED
BY:

Webber Wentzel Attorneys.
DATE
OF THE HEARING:

31 January 2022.
DATE
OF
JUDGMENT:

1 February 2022.
[1]
Cape
Town Municipality & Another v Allianz Insurance Co Ltd
1990 (1) SA 311
(C) (‘
Allianz
’).
[2]
Peter
Taylor & Associates v Bell Estates (Pty) Ltd & Another (Pty)
Ltd
2014 (2) SA 312
(SCA) (‘
Peter
Taylor’
).
[3]
Huyser
v Quicksure (Pty) Ltd & Another
[2017] 2 All SA 209
(GP) (‘
Huyser’
).
[4]
Nativa
Manufacturing (Pty) Ltd v Keymax Investments 125 (Pty) Ltd &
Others
2020 (1) SA 235
(GP) (‘
Nativa
’).
[5]
Allianz
above n 1 at 334H-I.
[6]
Nativa
above n 4 para 12.1 – 12.2 referring to
Allianz
above note 1 at 334H-I.
[7]
Nativa
above n 4 para 12.3.
[8]
Allianz
above note 1 at 316E-F.
[9]
Peter
Taylor
above n 2 para 8.
[10]
Nativa
above n 4 para 12.3.
[11]
Id.
[12]
Id para 12.1.
[13]
Id para 12.6.
[14]
Id para 12.4.
[15]
Id
para 12.6 referring to
Allianz
at
317G-I.
[16]
Id
para 12.1 referring to
Allianz
at
316F-H.
[17]
Id
para 12.3.
[18]
Nativa
above n 4 para 3.
[19]
Id para 16.
[20]
Allianz
above
n 1 at 329H-I.
[21]
Nativa
above n 4 para 18 referring to
Allianz
at
317D.
[22]
Nativa
id at footnote 23.
[23]
Huyser
above
note 3
[24]
Nativa
above n 4 para 23.