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[2021] ZAGPJHC 380
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Maelane v S (A128/2017) [2021] ZAGPJHC 380 (11 June 2021)
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NO: A128/2017
REPORTABLE:
NO
OF INTEREST TO OTHER
JUDGES:
YES
REVISED.
DATE.
11 June 2021
In the matter between:
MAELANE,
LEKALE
Appellant
V
THE
STATE
Respondent
JUDGMENT
SPILG,
J:
INTRODUCTION
1.
The appellant was convicted of assault with
intent to do grievous bodily harm. He was sentenced to a fine of
R12 000 or six
months imprisonment. The learned magistrate
granted the appellant leave to appeal both the conviction and
sentence. The case is
one arising from domestic violence during the
time when he and his wife were still living together.
2.
Although the appellant was granted leave to
appeal on 6 March 2013 the first step he took to prosecute the appeal
was in January
2015 when he attempted to obtain a transcript of the
proceedings at the Magistrates’ Court without success. A formal
notice
of appeal was only signed on 4 February 2020 and the
application for condonation was signed on 13 February 2020.
3.
Due to the extraordinary delay it is
necessary to deal with the application for condonation first.
APPLICATION
FOR CONDONATION
4.
The
test for granting condonation is well settled: it requires the person
in default to show good cause. This in turn involves a
consideration
by the court of whether an adequate explanation for the delay has
been furnished and whether there are prospects
of success.
[1]
5.
In the present case there are four
distinct periods of delay which the appellant must deal with. The
first is the period of almost
two years between the date when he was
granted leave to appeal and when he first approached the Magistrates
Court to obtain a transcript.
The next period is from then until he
was informed by counsel at the beginning of March 2016 that the
record was incomplete. The
third period is from then until he
contacted the senior prosecutor on 8 May 2018 to assist him in
tracking the prosecutor who had
dealt with the matter. The final
period is from then until the notice of appeal was signed at the
beginning of February 2020.
The
first period
6.
The appellant’s explanation for
failing to take any steps to prosecute the appeal until he attended
at the Magistrates’
Court in February 2015 was that he was
severely depressed after being retrenched from his work (this being
unrelated to his conviction
but rather due to company restructuring),
was unable to find work due to his criminal record and not being able
to contest the
custody of his children.
7.
The difficulty the appellant faces is the
inordinate length of time he delayed in prosecuting the appeal once
leave was granted
by the presiding Magistrate and his failure to take
the court into his confidence as to when he was retrenched, let alone
when
he was informed of the restructuring, whether he was offered a
package or whether it was an involuntary retrenchment.
8.
Instead the appellant makes the vague
allegation that “
Shortly after I
was sentenced in March 2013, my division was restructured and
consequently I was retrenched”.
The
statement without specifics suggests a restructuring process that
only commenced after he was granted leave to appeal and at
a time
when he was a Fund Manager at one of the top financial institutions.
He also states that he applied for “
numerous
job vacancies at several profitable companies after retrenchment”.
This does not suggest a person desperate to get a job, but rather
someone who was waiting for a suitable position.
9.
Accordingly the explanation is inadequate
as the court is left in the dark as to whether the
dies
for filing a notice of appeal had
expired before the restructuring had commenced, let alone when he
first decided to apply for other
jobs. In other words there is
nothing before the court to indicate whether the events which
triggered the depression set in after
the
dies
expired. Moreover, if he attended job
interviews one would have expected him to have told them that he was
pursuing an appeal and
demonstrate to them that this was the case by
reference to a notice of appeal.
10.
It also does not assist the appellant that
during this period he was sufficiently composed to enrol for an LLB
at UNISA, albeit
with the financial assistance of his parents. But
then again he does not suggest that they would not have helped him
financially
or emotionally to pursue the appeal.
11.
Despite applying for leave to appeal on the
date of sentence, no steps were taken to prosecute the appeal within
the required time
and there is no action taken by the appellant to
suggest that he was persisting with the appeal as opposed to being
content to
accept the conviction and live with paying an admission of
guilt fine in due course. The only answer given is one of severe
emotional
distress. However not enough is revealed on the papers, as
it should have been, to support this.
Second
Period
12.
In
late January 2015 the appellant went to the Magistrates’ Court
to obtain the transcripts of the proceedings so that he
could pursue
his appeal. This appears from his schedule
[2]
.
13.
By 2 February 2015 recordings of six of the
hearing dates had been located, leaving another four outstanding.
However the first
set of recordings were only obtained a year later
in February 2016. The appellant then consulted with counsel who
advised that
three of the outstanding transcripts were important as
they dealt with the first day of the complainant’s evidence,
the reading
out of the judgment and with sentencing.
14.
It does not appear to be a coincidence that
the appellant’s attendance at the Magistrates’ Court
coincided with him
commencing employment as a candidate attorney a
month earlier at the appellant’s attorneys of record.
15.
While there is no attempt to provide a
reason for the delay in obtaining the transcripts that were
available, or to indicate whether
enquiries were being made as to
progress in transcribing the record, I am prepared to accept that at
the time litigants in general
were experiencing difficulty in
obtaining transcripts of records.
Third
Period
16.
After counsel informed him of the need to
obtain that the outstanding recordings of evidence, the appellant
returned to the Magistrates’
Court during the course of the
same month. With the assistance of the clerk of the court was able to
locate the outstanding recordings.
He also took other steps, on the
advice of counsel, to pursue the appeal by consulting a psychiatrist.
This was in order to assess
his emotional state at the time of the
incident.
17.
The clerk of the court only reverted in
late September 2016, and despite locating the recording of the
judgment on 3 October he
was unsuccessful in locating the balance of
the recordings.
This
prompted the appellant to approach the senior prosecutor at the
Randburg Magistrates’ court in order to obtain the contact
details of the prosecutor who had dealt with the matter. This was on
8 May 2018 as is confirmed by the prosecutor’s affidavit
of
that date.
18.
I am satisfied that no fault can be
attributed to the appellant during this period. He was in the hands
of the court administration
who were doing their best to locate the
missing recordings for transcription purposes.
Fourth
period
19.
It was not possible to locate the
prosecutor in questions and subsequently the presiding Magistrate was
requested to assist with
the reconstruction of the record. The
Magistrate advised that due to numerous relocations she had mislaid
her notes. This was confirmed
in an affidavit of 2 August 2019. The
defence counsel who had represented the appellant at the trial was
also asked to assist but
he failed to respond.
20.
The appellant alleges that a copy of the
court book was obtained in a further attempt to reconstruct the
record. However the clerk
of the criminal court’s stamp reveals
that the copies were obtained in April 2015 which would coincide with
the attempts
made by officials to confirm all the hearing dates and
the court where they took place
21.
The appellant does not explain why it took
so long to communicate with the presiding Magistrate or why nothing
further appears to
have taken place aside from abortive attempts to
contact his erstwhile counsel. No attempt had been made to have his
attorneys
contact the complainant to see if she had a copy of the
J88.
Conclusion
22.
It is evident from the fact that the
appellant throughout the second to fourth periods was obtaining
documents and affidavits from
the clerk of the court, the Magistrate
and the prosecutor that he intended during those periods to pursue
his appeal albeit that
during the last period it may have been with
less vigour.
23.
However there is no acceptable explanation
presented on the facts to support the appellant’s contention
that he intended to
pursue the appeal during the most critical of all
these periods, namely the first one. It appears that the motivation
to pursue
the appeal came about when he set his heart on becoming a
legal practitioner; until then he was content to have a leave to
appeal
in place and when called upon, to pay the fine.
24.
There is also prejudice to the victim and
to society at large where delay results in an inability to fully
reconstruct the record.
An appellant cannot assume that he can enjoy
a benefit which can be derived on an appeal where there is an
incomplete record and
where, had he pursued his appeal timeously
there would be every reason to believe that a full record would have
been timeously
located with all exhibits, or at worst, that the
presiding Magistrate, prosecution and defence counsel would have been
able to
reconstruct the record. In the present case a vital exhibit
which could not be located is the J88.
25.
Fortunately
the prosecutor had read into the record that part of the J88 which
identified the injuries observed by the medical practitioner.
[3]
26.
In the result the appellant has not
satisfied the requirement of demonstrating no wilful default. In
cases such as
Darries v Sheriff
Magistrates’ Court, Wynberg and another
1998(3)
SA 34 (SCA) at 40H-E the Supreme Court of Appeal has held that where
the failure to observe the rules has been flagrant
and gross,
especially where there has not been an acceptable explanation, an
application for condonation should not be granted
irrespective of the
prospects of success. merits.
27.
However if I am wrong then it is necessary
to consider the merits of the appeal which I will do in the following
sections..
28.
Before
doing so, I take the view that the consequences to an appellant of
finding that he must pursue an appeal with an incomplete
record
because he did not bring the appeal timeously, is that he cannot make
a virtue of such default if it is based on personal
reasons, as in
this case, and not on circumstances beyond his control.
[4]
In
the present case photographs taken the day after the incident
reflecting the injuries sustained by the complainant are said to
be
irretrievably lost as has her statement to the police. These are
serious
lacunae
in the record and in appropriate circumstances
may tip the scales in refusing condonation.
On
the basis that it would be wrong to refuse condonation, the appellant
is obliged to accept the Magistrate’s finding that
the
photographs corroborate the complainant’s version. Insofar as
one of the grounds of appeal contends that the complainant’s
testimony contradicted her statement, the appellant ‘s
submissions must be confined to what can be gleaned from the record.
Accordingly
the mere fact that the appellant’s counsel put to the
complainant in broad terms that she had contradicted herself
without
referring to the actual words used or without the context in which it
was said being clear then, provided it is reasonable,
the
complainant’s clarification or explanation must carry the day.
Similarly
if the alleged contradictions put to a witness are peripheral yet
there is no attack on the material elements of a statement
that has
been handed up as an exhibit. Without the appeal court having before
it the full statement which had been handed up, it
will not be in a
position to determine whether the material facts to which the witness
testified accorded with the statement given.
In appropriate
circumstance an appeal court would be entitled to assume that those
parts of the witness’ testimony which
are material were not
dealt with by the cross-examiner precisely because they accord with
the contents of the lost exhibit statement.
GROUNDS
OF APPEAL
29.
The appellant raises the following grounds
of appeal, some of which can be dealt with perfunctorily at this
stage.
30.
The first is that the court incorrectly
identified the date of the incident as 21 September 2010 and
considered that the events
in respect of which the appellant was
charged occurred over two days whereas he was charged only with
having assaulted the complainant
on 21 October 2010.
Neither
point is good. The magistrate can be forgiven for incorrectly
identifying the date. The trial was run sporadically from
22 March to
14 November 2012 with judgment being delivered two months later on 25
January. The events described in the judgment
clearly related to two
incidents. The one on 20 October which did not result in any injury
to the complainant but to the baby she
was holding. The other
occurred on the following evening and is the only incident in respect
of which the appellant was charged.
Furthermore
the Magistrate’s reference to the incident of the previous
night was dealt with both as part of the
res gestae
and as
evidence of the appellant’s general conduct towards the
appellant, which was relevant to explaining her being fearful
of the
appellant’s reactions and inability to control his anger. She
had already taken out a restraining order against him.
It
should be added that in response to written questions
Adv.
Carstens
on behalf of the appellant confirmed that there was only
one incident in respect of which the appellant had been charged and
that
on occasion the Magistrate had confused the date of the incident
as being in September.
31.
The
appellant also criticised the Magistrate for failing to apply the
cautionary rule to the evidence of a single witness, bearing
in mind
further that the State did not call corroborating witnesses. This
ground overlooks the clear statement by the Magistrate
when
evaluating the State’s case. The Magistrate said “…
the
complainant is a single witness … And our law requires that
her evidence be treated with caution”.
The
Magistrate did not stop there but expanded on this aspect. Albeit
that this part of the record was indistinct it is evident
from what
was audible that the Magistrate applied her mind to the issue of a
single witness.
[5]
The
Magistrate also had regard to the contents of the J88. The contents
of the J88 was not put in issue. As will be seen from the
description
of the injuries which the doctor observed and recorded on the form
(see below), the injuries mentioned in the report
corroborate the
complainant’s testimony regarding the form the assault on her
took.
The
record also shows that a witness, identified in the record as Thato
Maligan, was in court at least on the second day of hearing
(20
September 2012)
[6]
. She
presumably had attended court under subpoena on the first day,
although the record of that day is lost, as well as having
to be at
court on 22 March 2012.
[7]
This
witness was alleged to have seen the mark on the complainant’s
face on the day after the alleged assault and had suggested
that the
complainant cover up her bruises with foundation as they would be
going to the school concert on the following day. This
witness
allegedly also enquired about the broken door handle when she went to
the bathroom of the appellant and complainant’s
home and
suggested that the complainant come over to her place with her
children, which she did. It was then that the complainant
apparently
related what had occurred.
The
prosecution expressly elected not to call this witness claiming that
there was no reason to do so
[8]
.
That was a risk it took, presumably electing to rely on the J88 and a
view of the evidence the appellant was likely to give based
on the
cross examination of the complainant and the extent of the challenge
to her testimony. The prosecution placed on record
that it was making
the witness available to the appellant
[9]
.
While that cannot change the incidence of the cautionary rule or
weight of evidence, once these aspects are satisfied then the
defence
cannot rely on the State’s failure to call in order to tilt the
balance back again in its favour.
32.
The appellant also argues that the
Magistrate erred in not placing proper weight on the contradictions
between the complainant’s
evidence and her statement. She also
should have taken into account that the appellant only laid her
complaint some three months
after the incident.
Allied
to this is the further ground that the magistrate erred in finding
that the appellant had not disputed that as a result of
pushing the
complainant while she was holding the baby, its head was knocked
against the door- whereas he had in fact done so.
In this regard a
further ground raised was that the complainant’s statement had
not mention it.
33.
Finally it was argued that the Magistrate
erred in finding that the appellant’s version was contrived.
In
this regard the Magistrate found that relevant parts of the
appellant’s evidence which contradicted the complainant’s
testimony had not been put to her. The question therefore arises
whether the Magistrate correctly found that the appellant had
changed
his version.
34.
There are therefore only two substantial
grounds which still require consideration. They amount to the trial
court having erred
in accepting the complainant’s version as
true beyond a reasonable doubt and rejecting the appellant’s
version of events
as not reasonably possibly true.
THE
EVIDENCE LEADING UP TO AND INCLUDING THE INCIDENT
35.
The complainants’ first day’s
testimony, which according to the court clerk’s records was
some 55minutes in length,
is missing from the record. The appellant
accepts that it cannot be reconstructed. It would have covered the
incident of the 20
th
and 21
st
October.
36.
Insofar as the incident of 21October is
concerned, it is evident from the available record that the
complainant had alleged that
after the assault she curled her hair
for the school play in a way that, together with the foundation her
friend had given her,
managed “
to
hide the marks and bruises”
on
the left side of her face.
She
testified that the bruises were still visible at least two days after
the incident. When asked to identify the extent of the
injuries, she
said that there was a bruise on the left side of her face on the jaw
and a long scratch mark on the inside of her
left arm as well as blue
marks on her arms. These were in the form of fingerprint marks. She
also mentioned that her head and back
were sore.
37.
The complainant stated that she went to the
Rosebank police station on the day after the incident and they wrote
up the incident
in the occurrence book. They also gave her a J88 form
which she took with her to the doctor, whom she saw on the same day.
The
J88 was admitted into evidence as exhibit A. As already mentioned
it is one of the missing exhibits.
38.
At the request of the court the relevant
part relating to the injuries was read into the record by the
prosecutor. Under “
Clinical
findings
” the examining doctor
recorded (and, save for obvious error of referring to a “
medical
aspect”
instead of “
median
aspect”
I am repeating it as the
prosecutor read it out):
“
Assault
by husband on 21 October 2010 at plus minus 21h00 in the evening
First finding:
Contusions,
Circular contusions on
right forearm x 3. All in diameter of 10mm plus minus 2.5cm apart
Contusion on the left
median aspect of upper arm. 2cm x 20cm in diameter
Third one:
Superficial abrasion linear of left median aspect of upper arm, 7cm
long
Superficial abrasion
to the right mandibular area lateral to the chin, 5cm long
Tenderness over the
occipital. no contusion seen
Tenderness over the
lower back,, para spinal area and spinal area of L3 and L5. No
contusion seen. Patient has normal range of motion
39.
On
the Friday following the incident the complainant obtained a
protection order against the complainant. That was on 28 October.
The
order was returnable on 25 November. On that date the appellant ‘s
attorney challenged the J99 and the matter appears
to have been
postponed out to mid-January 2012. In the meanwhile the complainant
had moved to Cape Town at the end of November
and the Magistrate who
granted the order indicated that it would not be effective in Cape
Town and therefore she had to withdraw
the interim protection order
in Johannesburg
[10]
. It was
only on her return to Johannesburg that she could formally lay a
charge, since this could not be done at any police station
in Cape
Town. The charge was laid on either 12 or 13 January 2011.
40.
The
complainant testified that this was not the first incident where the
appellant had assaulted her. She claimed that he had kicked
her and
she had told the appellant’s mother about it
[11]
.
Moreover she had gone to an attorney on 22 October and was conflicted
between attempting to make the marriage work, bearing in
mind her
children and taking a stand against the appellant and reclaiming what
he took from her.
[12]
41.
By 26 October which was their second
wedding anniversary the complainant was uncertain as to whether to
try and save the marriage
or leave.
42.
The complainant described that she had been
in an abusive relationship, both physically and emotionally. On 21
October she attempted
to deal with issues that were causing their
relationship to fall apart. He however refused to engage in any
meaningful discussion
to move the relationship forward, first telling
her to get out the house. She refused. He then left and returned at
between 2 to
3am.
43.
On
the day of the incident after she returned from work the complainant
approached the appellant to sort out what was happening
to their
relationship. As she put it; “
I
did not want to go into my second anniversary agitated and regretting
marrying him”
[13]
.
The
anniversary was on 26 October and she felt that they had the five
intervening days to attempt to iron out whatever issues were
between
them so that “
we
can just either call it quits or move forward as a couple and seek
help …”
[14]
That
evening after putting their baby to bed she sat next to him on the
couch because she really wanted to discuss their relationship
as she
did not want to go into their anniversary upset. The appellant said
“
You
know what, I am not going to talk about it now. I am going to talk
about it when I am ready “.
She replied that she wants to have the discussion now and said that
this, meaning his aggression and domineering way, needs to
stop.
[15]
He
said no. there was some silence between them. She then asked for the
TV remote because he was just flipping through the channels.
He threw
it at her aggressively. She turned the volume down
44.
He
then got up and put the volume of the TV up. She then also got up and
said that in this marriage there are two people and he
must give her
a hearing, and not just when he decides because then it will never
happen. She told him that they needed to discuss
what is happening in
their relationship and why she was being accused of being insecure
and everything else.
[16]
45.
The
constant theme adopted by the appellant, through his counsel, in
cross examination was that he was simply minding his own business
and
that it was the complainant who was being confrontational and acted
aggressively towards him whereas he did not want to get
into a
confrontation with the complainant
[17]
and this culminated in a shoving match where she inadvertently
slipped and sustained her injuries.
46.
She
however persisted that she was not being confrontational but was
insisting on having a discussion between husband and wife because
otherwise they would never be able to resolve anything, that it was
necessary to do so then for the sake of their relationship
and
whether it was capable of weathering the storm or was at an end.
[18]
47.
At
this stage they were both standing in front of the TV and the
appellant then pushed her away and she pushed him back. They both
were shoved back by the other. She claimed that he then grabbed her
and shoved her through the bathroom door and against the basin
and
then started to punch her. she tried defending herself by covering
her face and avoid the blow because that was where his blows
were
being directed. His punch however landed on her chin She fell against
the bath, got up and before he could hit her again she
shoved him and
said “
You
know what, go ahead and just do whatever”.
[19]
.
48.
In
attempting to discredit here evidence counsel had admitted into
evidence the statement the complainant had made. What is that
even
after the incident in the bathroom she told him that his actions were
unacceptable, that he was not a man for doing so, to
which he
responded by telling her that if she cannot keep her mouth shut he
will, hit her again. She then went to the room where
her children
were asleep
[20]
. He then went
into a different room to sleep.
49.
Of importance is that aside from testing
her evidence the appellant’s counsel did not put a version of
what the appellant
would say actually occurred. And at best his
challenge was to nit-pick and maintain the theme that the complainant
was aggressive
while the appellant attempted to avoid a
confrontation. However it is clear from the evidence that it was the
appellant who sought
to evade a discussion which was vital to their
continued marriage relationship and refused to do so to the point
that he became
aggressive. When she for the first time stood her
ground by pushing him back after he had pushed her he then escalated
his aggressive
behaviour by grabbing her with sufficient force to
leave his fingerprint marks on her and also tried to hit her as her
defensive
wounds on her arms indicate. Furthermore it was not
challenged that he had punched the complainer and that one of the
punches managed
to strike her chin despite her attempts to defend
herself and avoid his blows.
50.
However,
when the appellant testified he denied punching the complainant but
could give no acceptable explanation for her injuries.
He claimed
that they might have scratched each other but really had no idea how
the abrasions were caused.
[21]
51.
The
complainant had taken photographs of her injuries the day after the
incident. It is evident from the record that they were handed
up in
evidence
[22]
. These
photographs are also missing. However, the Magistrate in her judgment
found that the photographs corroborate the complainant’s
version.
[23]
WHETHER
THE COMPLAINANT’S EVIDENCE WAS CONTRADICTORY
52.
I am satisfied that on the material
allegations concerning the assault the complainant’s evidence
was not contradictory. Moreover
the appellant’s counsel did not
put a version to the complainant which effectively challenged her
account of the actual assault.
53.
The complainant’s statement is
missing. However, such extracts as are mentioned in the record
support the material facts.
It must also be recalled that there would
be no reason for the police to take down any details regarding the
events of the night
preceding the incident nor are they relevant to
the charge of assault against the complainant on the following
evening.
54.
That leaves the contention that the
Magistrate failed to take into account that the charges were only
formally laid some three months
later. However the evidence regarding
the nature of the assault by reference to the J88, her making a
report at the Rosebank police
station and taking photographs which,
it is not disputed, corroborates the complainant’s version of
the nature of the assault,
is more than sufficient to dispel any
doubt about the assault having taken place.
The
reason for the appellant not laying charge formally at the only
police station where she could prior to when she did is also
adequately explained and can be readily adduced from the facts set
out earlier both as to her own emotional situation regarding
the
continuation of the marriage and the fact that she had then relocated
to Cape Town with the children.
55.
The nature of the assault leaves no doubt
that it was with intent to do grievous bodily harm. The appellant had
pushed the complainant
through the bathroom door and inter alia had
directed punches to her head. That suffices for elevate the incident
to beyond a simple
common assault.
56.
The appellant has wisely not pursued the
issue of sentencing and nothing has been placed before us to suggest
that the sentence
imposed was inappropriate in so far as the
appellant is concerned. It mat-y well have been lenient considering
the history of the
appellant’s conduct towards the complainant
which had not been disputed during the course of her evidence and
included her
being kicked by him.
57.
Accordingly, whether by reference to the
question of the appellant satisfying the court that there are
reasonable prospects of success
on appeal (if considered by reference
to the grant or otherwise of condonation) or even if condonation did
not come into the reckoning,
there is no grounds for appealing the
Magistrate’s conviction of the appellant or the sentence
imposed.
ORDER
58.
In the result the appeal is dismissed with
costs
SPILG,
J
DLAMINI
AJ
Electronically
submitted therefore unsigned
Delivered:
This judgement was prepared and
authored by the Judge whose name is reflected and is handed down
electronically by circulation to
the Parties/their legal
representatives by email. It will also be released for publication on
SAFLII. The date for hand-down is
deemed to be 11 June 2021.
DATE
OF JUDGMENT: 11 June 2021
FOR
APPELLANT:
Adv. T Carstens
Meltz
Le Roux Motshekga Attorneys
FOR
THE STATE:
Adv. M Mashego
Office
of the Director of Public Prosecutions Gauteng Local Division,
Johannesburg
[1]
Ponnan JA set out in detail the factors which are to be taken into
account in
Dengetenge
Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Southern Mining and Development Company (Pty)
Ltd [
2013]
2 All SA 251
(SCA) at para 11.
[2]
The
affidavit mentions the first attempt being in February 2015 but
annexure LM2 to the affidavit indicates that he had already
attended
the magistrates’ court in late January.
[3]
This
does not mean that other relevant information may have been
contained in the J88.
Adv.
Carstens
for
the appellant confirmed in her written response to queries raised by
the court that she was bound by the available record
with regard to
the contents of the J88.
[4]
See also
Tshivase
Royal Council and another v Tshivase and another
[1992] ZASCA 185
;
1992
(4) SA 852
(AD) at 852E-F.
[5]
Record
p122
[6]
Record p30
[7]
Record
p 30 line 19
[8]
Record
p 74
[9]
Ibid
[10]
Record p 39
[11]
Record
p 34
[12]
Record p39. See also p 44
[13]
Record p 51
[14]
Record p 52
[15]
Record
p 56
[16]
Record p 56
[17]
Record pp 52 and 54
[18]
Record at pp 57 and 58
[19]
Record p60
[20]
Record p70
[21]
Record p82
[22]
Record p72
[23]
Record p 122