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[2021] ZAGPJHC 888
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Crowder v ABSA Trust Limited and Others (1301/2020) [2021] ZAGPJHC 888 (10 June 2021)
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA,
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NO: 1301/2020
REPORTABLE:
NO
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
10
June 2021
In
the matter between:
KEANO
ALCASTER
CROWDER
1
st
Applicant
And
ABSA
TRUST
LIMITED
1
st
Respondent
THE
MASTER OF THE HIGH COURT, PRETORIA
2
nd
Respondent
MARTHA
MAGDELENA PRINSLOO NO
3
RD
Respondent
(This
judgment is handed down electronically by circulation to the parties'
legal representatives by email and by uploading it to
the electronic
file of this matter on CaseLines. The date for hand-down is deemed to
be 10 June 2021.)
JUDGMENT
MIA,
J
[1]
On 12 April 2021, I handed down judgment dismissing the applicant's
request to terminate
the KA Crowder Trust. The first respondent was
ordered to pay the costs. The applicant brought an application for
leave to appeal
against the order which this court dismissed against
the applicant that
the
application did not comply with section 13 of the Trust Property
Control Act, 57 of 1988 (The Act),
excluding
the order for costs. T
he
first respondent brought a counter application opposing the order for
costs awarded against it.
The applicant only pursued four points which I deal with hereunder.
APPLICANT'S GROUNDS FOR LEAVE TO
APPEAL
[2]
Ms
Nwaila did not go into the applicant's application for leave
submitted and indicated that she intended to proceed on four issues
arising from the judgment. She thus pursued only the four points
regarding the application for leave to appeal. She submitted that
the
judgment was silent on the issues pleaded in the supplementary
application. She referred to section 6 of Trust Property Control
Act,
57 of 1988 (The Act), which provides that "
(1)
Any person whose appointment as trustee in terms of a trust
instrument,
section
7
or a court order comes into force after the commencement of this Act,
shall act in that capacity only if authorised thereto in
writing by
the Master".
The
first point she submitted and which flowed from the supplementary
application, related to section 6, was that the deponent knew
that he
had no authority to defend the application whilst the was no
authority from the Master authorising a new Trustee to act.
The
deponent thus did not have
locus
standi
because he did not have authority.
[3]
The argument she submitted was twofold. ABSA did not have capacity to
act. Furthermore,
Ms
Nwaila submitted that the
deponent
to the affidavits did not have
locus
standi
to act. She referred to the decision in
Lupacchini
NO and Another v Minister of Safety and Security
2010(6) SA 457 (SCA). In
Lupacchini
the Court stated at paragraph [3]
"Although a trustee's appointment
is effected by the trust instrument, the trustee is precluded from
acting in that capacity
by s 6(1) of the Trust Control Property Act
57 of 1988, until he or she has been authorised to do so by the
Master. The section
reads:
"Any persons whose appointment as
trustee in terms of a trust instrument, section 7 or a court order
comes into force after
the commencement of this Act shall act in that
capacity only if authorised thereto in writing by the Master."
The Court goes on to state at
paragraph [4]:
"It is not controversial in this
case that the effect of the section is that an appointed trustee may
not commence legal proceedings
relating to the affairs of a trust nor
may one trustee authorise another to institute proceedings on his or
her behalf unless he
or she has the relevant authorisation."
[4]
The effect of the above Ms Nwaila argued was that similar principles
bound ABSA Trust.
She submitted that this court departed from the
decision in
Lupacchini
by recognising that ABSA Trust had the authority to act when it did
not. This was so as the third respondent had resigned and was
no
longer employed at ABSA Trust. Furthermore, she referred to the
judgment the case of
Schierhout
v Minister of Justice
1926 AD 99
at 109,
where Innes CJ stated:
'It is a fundamental principle
of our law that a thing done contrary to the direct prohibition of
the law is void and of no effect.'
Ms Nwaila concluded thus that there
was no Trustee authorised by the Master to act, sue, or defend any
litigation. The Trust, including
the deponent, was thus acting
without authorisation. She concluded that another court would
conclude that
locus standi
and capacity regarding ABSA Trust
were null and void. The Trust lacked the requisite capacity to act
and could not have defended
the application. The effect thereof was
that the affidavits filed were to be disregarded, and ABSA Trust's
opposition in the main
application was null and void. Thus, she
submitted that another court would come to a different decision to
the one this court
reached on this aspect.
[5]
The second ground she submitted referred to conflicting judgments of
the same court.
In terms of section 17(1) of the Superior Courts Act,
leave to appeal may only be given where :
"17.
Leave to appeal may only be given where the judge or judges concerned
are of the opinion that—
(
a
)
……
(i)..
(ii)
there is some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard,
including conflicting judgments
on the matter under consideration;"
In this matter, another court would
determine that without an appeal or an amended order, any evidence in
the supplementary affidavit
submitted by ABSA Trust that had been
dismissed could not have been used against the applicant. She
submitted that this aspect
alone warranted an exceptional
circumstance to correct the conflicting outcome.
[6]
The third ground raised by the applicant related to the discretion
exercised by this
court in the judgment. She submitted that this
court did not exercise its discretion correctly by relying on the
dismissed report
of the occupational therapist. Section 13 of the Act
limited the court's discretion to termination of the Trust and the
powers
of Trustees. She submitted that leave to appeal was therefore
sought to reconsider the facts of the case as the issues were not
properly considered. She referred to the case of
Trencon
Construction v Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa Ltd
and another
[2015] 10 BCLR 1199
CC where the Court said at
paragraph [88]:
"When a
lower court exercises a discretion in the true sense, it would
ordinarily be inappropriate for an appellate court to
interfere
unless it is satisfied that this discretion was not exercised:
"judicially,
or that it had been influenced by wrong principles or a misdirection
on the facts, or that it had reached a decision
which in the result
could not reasonably have been made by a court properly directing
itself to all the relevant facts and principles."
(Footnote
omitted.)
An appellate
court ought to be slow to substitute its own decision solely because
it does not agree with the permissible option
chosen by the lower
court."
[7]
The fourth and last ground related to what the outcome of the case
effectively translated
to. She submitted that in deciding not to
terminate the KA Crowder Trust this court essentially changed the
purpose of the trust
from safeguarding wealth damages for a minor to
a curatorship trust. This flowed from the conclusions drawn by this
court that
the applicant was not able to show he could live
independently or that he is employed. He is not in a position to deal
with the
monies or manage the funds. This view matches ABSA Trust's
defence which called for a curator to be appointed because of the
lifelong
impact the accident had on the applicant. In the absence of
an application for a curator, she submitted this constituted an
infringement
on the applicant's constitutional rights.
[8]
She referred to the decision of
Ferguson
v Road Accident Fund
,
where the C
ourt
held that the appointment of a curator had the effect of impacting
the liberty, dignity of an adult to manage his or her affairs.
This
right should not be lightly infringed upon or be taken away from the
individual. In that particular matter, the Court noted
that the
litigant was not a person described in the Mental Health Act and was
not incapable of managing her affairs. The litigant
did also not have
a serious bodily impairment that prevented her from earning an
income. She extrapolated those facts to the present
matter. She
submitted that another court would have concluded that because the
applicant is the sole beneficiary with immediate
vested rights in the
KA Crowder Trust and is an adult of sound mind, the court had no
authority to refuse his request to manage
his funds in the absence of
a medically supported application. This was even more so after
determining that the ABSA Trustee did
not adhere to its mandate as
emphasised by the founder. For the above reasons, she submitted that
another court would reasonably
have come to another decision on the
facts and the law and for which leave should be granted.
FIRST RESPONDENT'S RESPONSE TO
GROUNDS OF APPEAL
[9]
The first respondent appealed the issue of costs only and opposed the
applicant’s
application for leave to appeal. Ms Ellis appearing
for the first and third respondent, responded to the applicant's
grounds of
appeal before addressing costs. She submitted that the
court had indeed correctly found that the deponent, Mr Maphosa had
locus standi
to depose to an affidavit. The deponent, Mr
Maphosa, was still employed at ABSA Trust and was not the Trustee who
resigned. The
applicant's issue was that Mr Maphosa lacked
locus
standi
. The previous Trustee had nominated Mr Maphosa to act and
attend to matters related to the Trust. The Trustee at no stage
revoked
or withdrew this nomination. He was, therefore, still acting
within the course of his duties. It was extensively canvassed during
a previous hearing that ABSA Trust had was at fault, having cited the
incorrect Trustee on the papers. When it became apparent,
ABSA Trust
took steps to address the error and to rectify the position. They
also tendered the costs in this regard. They approached
the applicant
well before the day the supplementary application proceedings was to
be heard to avoid incurring further costs and
informed the applicant
that the Master of the High Court had issued letters of authority in
respect of a new Trustee. When the
matter came before this court,
ABSA Trust had a Trustee in place with letters of authority issued by
the Master of the High Court.
[10] Ms
Ellis submitted that the applicant raised the lack of citation of the
third respondent as
a ground for leave to appeal. She submitted that
ABSA Trust addressed this issue as soon as it came to their attention
and relied
on the court order to secure an expedited letter of
authority for the new Trustee to be appointed. She submitted that the
applicant
could Regarding the papers filed and the joinder the
applicant ought to have had regard to the order of acting judge
Vukeya regarding
the identity of the newly appointed Trustee and
cited same. The first respondent had already covered the costs of the
application
for joinder. The applicant failed to do so.
[11]
Ms Ellis submitted that the ground raised that the court erred in its
introduction of the applicant
as "...Mr Keano Crowder (Mr
Crowder), is an adult male residing with his parents in Eldorado
Park, Johannesburg" also
had no bearing on the outcome of the
finding as to whether the KA Crowder Trust should be terminated or
not. This application was
related to the Trustees conduct rather than
the applicant's residence or how he was described.
[12]
On the applicant's third ground that another court could have
reasonably found that on the first
respondent's version that the
monthly administration fee is R2 529.47, Ms Ellis submitted that the
Trustee’s fees were determined
by the Trust Deed and the court
order. She referred to the first respondent's answering affidavit and
the accompanying annexures
TM 16 and TM 17, which reflect that
between 2014 to 2019, the KA CrowderTrust generated a combined annual
income and dividends
of around R345 711 .58. The first respondent was
entitled to charge six percent before VAT on the amount. The
suggestion that the
amount was not in accordance with the Trust Deed
was rejected and due to the applicant's incorrect calculations. Ms
Ellis submitted
that the applicant's attorneys calculations were not
clear and that the bank's charges fell within the 6% permitted in
terms of
the court order.
[13]
In response to the ground of relief that the court
erred in finding that the applicant or his parents did
not have
driver's licenses when it was not clear on the papers, Ms Nwaila
submission was that that the applicant's only source
of income is the
KA Crowder Trust fund. Therefore, any responsibility for the vehicle
insurance or damages to the vehicle, as a
result, falls squarely with
the first respondent. Ms Ellis submitted that neither the applicant
nor the applicant's mother, who
usually approached the ABSA Trust for
any applicant's requirement, requested funds for insurance purposes.
She submitted that the
R7000 monthly amount ought to have covered
insurance as well, and if this was insufficient, then the applicant
was at liberty to
approach the Trust to cover this amount directly or
through an increase of the monthly amount. On the applicant's papers,
there
was no indication of such a request at all. She submitted that
the applicant's mother made all requests to the Trust on his behalf.
Upon reaching the age of majority, he did not approach the Trust to
indicate that he would be receiving the funds directly.
[14]
Whilst Ms Ellis conceded there was no curatorship order in place; she
also submitted that she
was not in a position to address the court
further as she was not privy to the initial proceedings when the
court order was made.
She did point out that at that stage already,
the court had in mind that the applicant was a minor with a head
injury and epilepsy
featured in the injury sequelae. She submitted
further that it would be speculative to make any further submissions;
however, the
applicant's application for termination of the KA
Crowder Trust was not complete as he did not provide any report
regarding his
present state and ability. There were real concerns
that were evident and accepted by this court as reflected in the
judgment.
The amount left in KA Crowder Trust was substantial. The
applicant was currently only managing R 2000 per month as his mother
received
and managed the R7000 paid by the Trust. The applicant had
not approached the Trust to indicate he wished to receive the funds
directly. This, too, reflected his ability to manage administrative
and financial issues. Consequently, she submitted that there
was no
basis for the Trust to be terminated. The submissions that the first
respondent had overcharged the applicant were unfounded,
and there
was no evidence on the application that the first respondent was
acting contrary to the purpose for which it was founded
or that there
were grounds in terms of section 13 of the Trust Control Property
Act. She thus submitted that the applicant's application
for leave to
appeal be dismissed.
[15]
Ms Ellis referred to the decision in
Khumalo
v Twin City Developers (Pty) Ltd
2017
JDR 1579 SCA, and submitted while the facts differ significantly to
the present matter the Court was asked to decide on an
appeal
relating to the costs order only. The Court on appeal considered at
paragraph [13] that:
"[13] This appeal raises the
following issues:
(a) Whether the
fact that the order on the merits is not the subject of the appeal
precludes the adjudication
of the appeal in relation to the costs
order.
(b) Whether there
are exceptional circumstances warranting the hearing of the appeal in
terms of s 16(2) (a)
of the Superior Courts Act.
(c) Whether the
court a quo's discretion in relation to the award of costs was
judicially exercised."
The Court had to consider whether it
could consider costs alone and stated:
"Does the fact that the order in
respect of the merits has not been attacked on appeal preclude this
Court from considering
an appeal directed only at costs?
[14] The short answer to that question
is 'no'. From the definition, it appears that s 16(2)(a) of the
Superior Courts Act does
not oblige this Court to dismiss an appeal
directed solely at costs. Rather, it grants this Court a discretion
to decide whether
there are exceptional circumstances that warrant
the hearing of such an appeal. Significantly, this Court in
De Vos
v Cooper & Ferreira
1999 (4) SA 1290
(SCA) at 1302A stated as
follows.' 'Hoe so 'n appel teen die kostebovel benader word waar die
landdros se bevel ten opsigte van
die meriete nie appellerbaar is
nie, blyk uit die meerderheidsbesslising on hierdie aspek in die
Pretoria Garnson saak on 863,
naamlik '...the merits of the dispute
in the Court below must be investigated in order to decide whether
the order as to costs
made in that dispute was properly made or not.”
[16] Ms
Ellis submitted that an appeal in relation to the costs order only is
competent to be heard
by this court and does not fall within the
ambit of
Section 16(2)(a)
of the
Superior Courts Act, 10 of 2013
. In
relation to the caveat of "exceptional circumstances", she
submitted that in determining which factors amounted to
"exceptional
circumstances" the court ought to have regard to the decision of
Jazz Spirit (Pty) Limited v Regional Land Claims Commissioner:
Western Cape
[2014] ZASCA 127
at paragraph
[27]
where the Court
had occasion to consider the provisions of s 21A(1) and (3) of the
Supreme Court Act. She continued that the appeal
that served before
that court was directed only at the fact that the court
a quo
had not made any costs order. On appeal, the court considered whether
the facts or circumstances of the case constituted 'exceptional
circumstances' for purposes of s 21A(3). Having regard to the
decision
MVAIS MAMAS Seatrans Maritime v Owners, MVAIS MAMAS, &
another
2002 (6) SA 150
(C) at 157E-F, the court stated:
"I think that, for the purposes
of s 5 (5) (a) (iv) the phrase exceptional circumstances' must, both
for the specific reason
mentioned by Jones J and by reason of the
more general consideration adumbrated by Innes ACJ in
Norwich
Union Life Insurance Society v Dobbs
, (supra bc cit), be given a
narrow rather than a wide interpretation. I conclude to use the
phraseology of Comrie J in
S v Mohammed
(supra, bc cit), that,
to be exceptional within the meaning of the subparagraph, the
circumstances must be "markedly unusual
or specially different";
and that, in applying that test, the circumstances must be carefully
examined."
[17] In
the present matter, the applicant sought the termination of the K.A.
Crowder Trust with immediate
effect, coupled with a punitive costs
order against the first respondent. Ms Ellis submitted that there is
a fiduciary duty on
the first respondent as well as the duly
appointed Trustee and the authorised nominee to give effect to the
Court order as well
as to the provisions of the Trust Deed, by way of
preserving the integrity of the awarded funds for the sole benefit of
the beneficiary.
Her submission was that the first and third
respondents showed to the Court that there was a clear need for the
continued protection
of the funds. She continued that it would have
been negligent on the part of the first respondent and the Trustee
not to oppose
the relief sought as the applicant failed to furnish
sufficient evidence before the court for the termination of the
Trust.
[18] Of
more significant concern, she argued, was the 'chilling effect' that
an adverse costs order
could have in the future if it were not set
aside. She submitted that in
Hotz & others v University of
Cape Town
BCLR 815 (CC) para 29, the Constitutional Court stated
that:
"…the starting point when
determining an award of costs is to have regard to the nature of the
issues. To this end the
court emphasised that what is to be taken
into account is the 'nature of the issues' rather than the
Hlatshwayo
& others v Hein
1999 (2) SA 834
(LCC) para 24;
1998 (1) BCLR
123
(LCC). 21
Haakdoornbult Boerdery CC v Mphela & others
2007 (5) SA 596
(SCA) para 75. 22
Hotz & others v University
of Cape Town
[2017] ZACC 10
; 2017 (7). 'characterisation of the
parties'. It is thus important for issues to be seen in their proper
context.".
[19] The
impact of the costs order in the present case has effectively created
a "chilling effect"
on all Trustees, and Trust
Administrators in the profession in that the awarding of costs where
the opposition was successful and
was coupled with an adverse costs
order now implied that although the opposition was warranted and
where the parties indeed performed
their fiduciary duties to preserve
the funds for the sole benefit of the beneficiary they would be
penalised with an adverse costs
order. She submitted further that
this creates a dangerous precedent in that such a costs order is in
direct conflict with the
powers of the Trustee who rightfully opposes
applications of this nature where an applicant has failed to make out
a proper case
for the relief sought.
[20]
Such an order will have a negative impact where Trustees seek to
oppose matters in future. They
would be open to risk. They would not
be able to effectively attend to the protection and preservation of
funds in their care.
This would be potentially prejudicial to
Trustees and Administrators and the applicants who may be bullied
into launching applications
of this nature by family members or
attorneys looking to gain access to the funds. In the present matter,
the first respondent
demonstrated that it had preserved the funds and
that the funds required protection. It further showed that the
applicant is not
capable of managing his own affairs. The first
respondents showed that the applicant's family does indeed wish to
have access to
the applicant's funds.
[21] Ms
Ellis submitted that the first respondent demonstrated to this court
that the funds were invested
for the applicant's benefit.
Furthermore, the first respondent has facilitated the monthly
maintenance of the applicant whilst
maintaining the integrity of the
capital balance. In the circumstances, she continued that the
Trustees should not fear opposing
bogus applications of this nature
in the fear that a costs order will be granted. She submitted that
there was a reasonable possibility
that another court would come to a
different finding.
[22] In
exercising its judicial discretion about the costs award, Ms Ellis
submitted that the basic
principle enunciated in
Norwich Union
Fire Insurance Society Ltd v Tutt
was that the Court has a
discretion, to be exercised judicially upon a consideration of the
facts of each case, and in essence,
it is a question of fairness to
both sides. She continued that this warranted a cautious approach. In
referring to the
Trencon
decision, she argued that the court
erred 'in not pertinently considering all the relevant factors which
require consideration when
an award of costs is made.' The general
rule she submitted was that costs follow the event. Thus an adverse
costs order could not
reasonably follow had this court directed
itself to all the relevant facts and principles.
[23]
Given the above, Ms Ellis submitted that considering the evidence,
the supporting financial documentation,
that there was a reasonable
prospect of success that another court may conclude that the first
respondent and or the Trustee did,
in fact, manage the funds of the
applicant as directed by the court order to be read in conjunction
with the Trust Deed and that
the first respondent or the Trustee will
not be liable for any costs.
[24] In
considering the applicant's application for leave to appeal, I have
considered section 13
of the Trust Property Control Act, 57 of 1988
and that the applicant has not adequately made out a case for the
termination of
the KA Crowder Trust as contained in the provisions of
the section. In this regard, the KA Crowder Trust was established in
compliance
with the Court order dated 28 January 2014. I have
considered the first respondent's response and their conduct as
required by
the order and the Trust Deed. There is a duty on the
first respondent in terms of the Court order dated 28 January 2014 to
preserve
and protect the funds received by the Road Accident Fund for
the benefit and interest of the applicant. In assessing whether the
first respondent has preserved the same, I have regard to the
evidence presented. The applicant has not disputed this except to
state that it ought to have been invested differently. Without the
benefit of a financial advisor stating otherwise, it is not
evident
that the first respondent's investments were not in the applicant's
interests. The statement is thus unsubstantiated and
lacks
particularity.
[25] I
have expressed concern about the lack of insurance on the vehicle and
the failure to engage
with the applicant once he reached the age of
majority, so funds are paid to him directly. These two aspects were
the only issues
of concern for this Court. The first respondent may
be correct in that the application fails to set out the prejudice he
suffers
as a result of the first respondent continuing to act as
Trustee(s) regarding the K.A. Crowder Trust. The first respondent
raises
the issue of the applicant being unable to manage the funds
and indicates that his mother raised the same concerns at some point.
The first applicant also suggests the applicant being bullied into
accessing the funds without proper arrangements being made for
the
management of the funds.
[26]
Whilst the applicant has failed to set out how the conduct of the
first respondent indeed hampers
the achievement of the object of the
Founder, being the protection and preservation of the funds, the
applicant does not indicate
how the funds will be protected and
preserved for his benefit if the KA Crowder Trust is terminated. The
applicant requests termination
of the KA Crowder Trust rather than a
substitution of the Trustees or a variation of any provisions as
contemplated in section
13 of Act 57 of 1988. Where it is not
indicated how the funds will be utilised and what safeguards will be
implemented to protect
and preserve the funds, this court is not
satisfied that the KA Crowder Trust be terminated. Ms Nwaila
submitted however that the
order did not create a curatorship. I am
mindful of this. It is for this reason that I am inclined to grant
leave to appeal on
the merits.
[27] I
move now to the aspect of leave to appeal with regard to the costs
order. I have indicated
previously that the usual order is departed
from under special circumstances. Both Ms Ellis and Ms Nwaila have
drawn various cases
to my attention. The
Trencon
decision is
common to both parties. Each relies on the same decision for a
different reason. It is trite that a court considering
an order of
costs exercises a discretion and that such discretion must be
exercised judicially. There are instances however where
costs do not
follow the cause. In
Pretoria Garrison Institutes v Danish Variety
Products (Pty) Limited
1948 (1) SA 839
(A) at 863-864; the Court
said:
"A
litigant's right to recover the costs of an opposed application from
his opponent will, in general, depend upon whether
he was in the
right, either in making the application or in opposing it as the case
may be (provided always there are no grounds
for exercising a
judicial discretion to deprive him of these costs). The form in which
this rule is usually stated is that the
successful party is entitled
to his costs unless the Court for good reason in the exercise of its
discretion deprives him of those
costs. Now, discarding for the
moment the idea of discretion, in an appeal against an order for
costs the Court of appeal does
not judge a party's right to his costs
in the Court
a quo
by asking the question
was he the
successful party
in that Court. It asks
ought he to have been
the successful party in the Court and decides the question of costs
accordingly. It may or may not be necessary in such cases to
deal
with the order which was actually made on the merits; it may even be
that no order on the merits was made in the Court
a quo
because by the time the matter came before that Court the necessity
for an order was gone and the sole question was one of costs.
This
shows that the merits of the dispute in the Court below must be
investigated in order to decide whether the order as to costs
made in
that dispute was properly made or not. In deciding whether or not the
Court below made the correct order as to costs the
reasons which
prompted that Court to make its order must be examined and those
reasons must be the actual reasons and no others."
[28]
It is evident that if another court were to determine the merits
differently then the costs order
would change. It is for this reason
that it is appropriate to grant leave appeal on the merits as well as
the costs. Both counsel
agreed that leave to appeal be granted to the
Full Court of the Division.
ORDER
[29] For
the reasons above, I grant leave to appeal to the Full Court of the
Gauteng Local Division
against the whole of my judgment on the merits
as well as the counter appeal against costs.
Costs to be costs in the appeal.
S
C MIA
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Appearances:
On
behalf of the applicant
:
K
Nwaila
Instructed
by
: Nwaila Attorneys Inc
On
behalf of the respondents
: C.B Ellis
Instructed
by
: Gildenhuys Malatji Attorneys
Date
of hearing
: 17 May 2021
Date
of judgment
: 10 June 2021