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[2021] ZAGPJHC 530
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Yellow River Property Investments (Pty) Ltd v March and Others (44135/2018) [2021] ZAGPJHC 530 (12 March 2021)
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IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA,
GAUTENG
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE NO: 44135/2018
REPORTABLE:
NO
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
REVISED:
NO
In
the matter between:
YELLOW
RIVER PROPERTY INVESTMENTS
(PTY)
LTD
Applicant
(Registration
Number: [....])
And
VUYO
MARCH
First
Respondent
(ID
Number: [....])
PASCALINAH
MAMONARE
Second
Respondent
(ID
Number: [....])
GEORGE
BALOYI
Third
Respondent
(ID
Number: [....])
ISAAC
MAEYANE
Fourth
Respondent
(ID
Number: [....])
PATRICK
RAMASEDI
Fifth
Respondent
(ID
Number: [....])
BUSISWE
DINGA
(ID
Number: [....])
Sixth Respondent
TUMISANG
PEME
(ID
Number:
[....])
Seventh Respondent
NTOMBIKAYISE
MASUKU
(ID
Number:
[....])
Eighth Respondent
NTOKOZO
MASUKU
(ID
Number: [....])
Ninth Respondent
MARIA
SEGONA
(ID
Number [....])
Tenth Respondent
ZODWA
RAMASEDI
(ID
Number: [....])
Eleventh Respondent
KGABOITSILE
TLHALATSI
(ID
Number: [....])
Twelfth Respondent
KOKETSO
MATHIBE
(ID
Number: [....])
Thirteenth Respondent
THE
CITY OF JOHANNESBURG
METROPOLITAN
MUNICIPALITY
Fourteenth Respondent
THE
UNLAWFUL OCCUPIERS OF THE OLD
HAMBURG
HOTEL
Fifteen Respondent
JUDGMENT
ENGELBRECHT,
AJ:
Introduction
and background
1.
This is an opposed
application for residential eviction in terms of the Prevention
of Illegal Eviction from and
Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE Act). The applicant
(Yellow River) seeks to evict the
first to thirteenth and fifteenth
respondents (the Respondents) from the immovable property situate at
2625 Albertina Sisulu Road,
Hamberg, Florida (the Property), which
the Respondents oppose. The fourteenth respondent is the City of
Johannesburg Metropolitan
Municipality (the City). No relief is
sought against it and the City has not filed opposing papers.
2.
The matter first came
before my sister Southwood AJ on 5 August 2019. In the
judgment of 11 September
2019 that followed upon the initial hearing, the Court expressed the
view that (i) the applicants had failed
to establish due compliance
with section 4(2) of the PIE Act for failure to provide proof of
service on each of the individual
respondents of the section 4(2)
notice; and (ii) the description of the Property in the founding
papers was inconsistent with the
deeds of transfer attached to the
papers. No order was made.
3.
On 27 January 2021, the
applicant served a supplementary affidavit to address
the concerns expressed by
her Ladyship Madam Acting Justice Southwood. The supplementary
affidavit establishes that what is referred
to as Erf [....], Hamberg
Township previously consisted of Erfs [....], [....], [....] and
[....], Hamberg Township. These Erfs
were consolidated to form Erf
[....] on or about 24 February 2014.
4.
Moreover, returns of
service filed with this Court on 20 and 27 January 2021,
respectively, provide proof
of effective service on the unlawful occupiers of notice that this
hearing was to proceed in the week
of 1 March 2021.
5.
The matter came before me
on 3 March 2021, via electronic hearing, as is the
norm
during the Coronavirus pandemic. The applicant was represented by Ms.
Matome of the Johannesburg Bar. The Respondents were
unrepresented,
and I heard submissions from the first respondent (Mr. March) and the
fifth respondent (Mr. Ramasedi), who were
assisted by certain of the
remaining Respondents who were present with them at the Johannesburg
High Court (where they were given
access to facilities to enable the
electronic hearing of this matter).
The
PIE Act
6.
The PIE Act, which came
into operation on 5 June 1998, was promulgated to
provide for the prohibition
of unlawful occupation and to put in place fair procedures for the
eviction of unlawful occupiers who
occupy property without
permission. No person may be evicted without a court order, which
order may only be granted after consideration
of all relevant
circumstances.
7.
Under section 4(1), the
owner of a property is included as a party with the
necessary
locus
standi
to
apply for eviction.
8.
The procedural
requirements are laid down in section 4(2), which provides for
effective notice of the
hearing on the unlawful occupier and the municipality having
jurisdiction.
9.
Eviction proceedings can
only commence after a lease has been cancelled, and
a
notice of cancellation must be clear and unequivocal (
Morkel
v Thornhill,
unreported
case no A105/2009, judgment of Hancke J of 4 March 2010).
10.
If all of the requirements have been met, and no valid defense is
raised by an unlawful
occupier, an order for eviction may be granted.
This
Court’s approach to the proceedings
11.
In a PIE application such as this, the Court is required to engage
upon a fact-finding mission
to ensure that a just and equitable order
is ultimately made, as I shall discuss more fully below in the
consideration of the merits
of this application. The obligation to
ensure fairness, and a just and equitable outcome, weighs even more
heavily on the Court
in a case where the respondents in a PIE
application are unrepresented. In my view, it is wholly inappropriate
in such circumstances
to insist on formalities and for the Court to
become shackled by technicalities.
12.
In the present case, the applicant raised an objection to the form of
the notice of opposition,
because it failed to set out a service
address as required under Uniform Rule 6(5)(d)(i). Further, as my
sister Southwood AJ pointed
out in her aforementioned judgment (at
para 18), the document purporting to be the answering affidavit was
signed by an unidentified
person, with the document itself suggesting
that all Respondents had been deponents to the document. Additional
facts were set
out in a document purporting to be heads of argument
but which once more was presented in
quasi-
affidavit
form. Moreover, as indicated above, the applicant filed a
supplementary affidavit without specifically
requesting
leave to do so. In argument, counsel for the applicant made reference
to an email of Mr. March (which was sent to my
Registrar), and Mr.
March offered to email proof of the fact that he had suffered loss of
employment.
13.
In ordinary circumstances, all of this would be deemed highly
irregular. But, in
PPE
International Inc (BVI) and others v Industrial Development
Corporation of South Africa Limited
2013
(1) BCLR 55
(CC), the Constitutional Court emphasized that “
rules
are made for courts to facilitate the adjudication of cases”
,
and that the Superior Courts “
enjoy
the power to regulate their processes, taking into account the
interests of justice”
(at para 30), recognizing that in “
some
cases the mechanical application of a particular rule may lead to an
injustice”
,
which must be avoided (at para 31). In
South
African Broadcasting Corporation SOC Ltd v South African Broadcasting
Corporation Pension Fund and Others
2019 (4) SA 279
(CC) the Constitutional Court pointed out that Courts
have always been inclined to adopt a pragmatic approach in dealing
with formalistic
and technical objections (at para 37).
14.
In these circumstances, all forms of non-compliance with the Uniform
Rules and applicable
practices are condoned. This Court is interested
in the appropriate resolution of the disputes between the parties,
not a formalistic
approach that would prevent it from bringing
relevant information into account.
15.
Against that backdrop, I now turn to a discussion of the available
facts.
Relevant
facts
16.
Yellow River is the registered owner of the Property, colloquially
known as the Old Hamburg
Hotel. It is in the business of letting and
hiring of rental accommodation in residential buildings owned by it,
including the
Property.
17.
The Property comprises 52 dwelling units, and it would seem that, by
February 2014, when
Yellow River took transfer of the Property, the
first to thirteenth respondents (the Original Respondents) already in
occupation
of the units, under rental agreements with the previous
owner, Richmond Hotel Investments (Pty) Ltd. Indeed, the Original
Respondents
are said to have resided on the Property since 2012.
Yellow Property became the lessor by operation of law, with effect
from February
2014. Renovations of the Property and upgrading of
“
most
of the dwelling units”
is said to have occurred at this time.
18.
Yellow Property does not have copies of the lease agreements
available, but it is asserted
that the lease agreements provided that
the Original Respondents rented the various dwelling units on a
month-to-month basis, with
the obligation to pay rent on the first
day of every month, as well as that they would pay for all
electricity, water and sanitation
charges in regard to the services
supplied and/or consumed by them at the Property. (The Respondents
assert that the additional
charges were included in the rental
amount, but that dispute need not be resolved for present purposes.)
19.
It is common cause that, prior to November 2017, the Original
Respondents were tenants in
good standing living at the Property.
They paid rent in the amount of between R1 700 and R2 600 per month,
depending on the size
of the unit.
20.
Then, in November 2017 a dispute arose between Yellow River and the
City concerning the
charges levied for the supply of water and
electricity to the Property and/or applicable rates and taxes. In
essence that dispute
concerns the fact that Yellow River is being
charged at the business tariff, whereas the Property is used for
residential purposes.
It is alleged that the tariff charges applied
to the consumption of municipal services at the Property resulted in
Yellow River
“
not
being able to recover
enough to
pay its local municipality for use of municipal services”
.
On account of its invoices for the supply of services to the
Property, the City terminated the supply of all services to the
Property. In particular, this resulted in the Property having its
electricity and water supply disconnected by the City. (The dispute
with the City is currently the subject of proceedings under case
number 1398/2019.)
21.
According to the Respondents, “
There
was no services at the Property for over a month, leaving the tenants
suffering from exposure of the lack of basic services
for their basic
needs”
,
and despite their efforts to engage with Yellow River, there was no
meaningful response. The Respondents cite
“
extensive
fruitless attempts to engage with the Applicant”
and assert that this,
“
along
with the costs of sourcing alternative resources for our basic
services, had resulted in intolerable circumstances for all
of us. As
much as we all needed roofs over our heads, we could not afford to
still continue paying rent whilst sourcing alternative
power and
water”
.
On the Respondents’ version, they then started to divert their
rental money to an account used to obtain legal representation.
The
Respondents therefore accept that they had engaged upon a rent
boycott.
22.
In a letter of 18 January 2018 (incorrectly dated as 18 January
2017), Yellow River directed
a letter to the then tenants residing at
the Property:
“
Please
note that we have been engaged in a long battle with City of
Johannesburg over municipal charges for this property.
The
current water and electricity charges exceed the monthly rent
collected.
The
issue lies in COJ charging us a commercial tariff for water and
electricity. The water alone comes out extremely high. It is
also
possible there is underground leaks.
Our
advice to tenants is to find an alternate place for accommodation as
it seems we are in for a long legal battle with City of
Johannesburg
before they will provide us with water and electricity again.
We
have decided to appoint attorneys to help assist in getting the
tariff changed.
If
tenants wish to come back once we are up and running again, they
should please leave their number with the caretaker and we will
let
them know when we can rent out units again”
.
23.
Just over a month later, the approach became more heavy-handed: the
attorneys for Yellow
River asserted that the tenants had “
failed,
neglected and/or refused to vacate the Property”,
and provided the tenants with “
one
final opportunity”
to
vacate the Property. In terms of the letter, which was served by
Sheriff as a
“
Notice
to Vacate”
:
“
Our
client instructs us to inform you of its intention to cancel the
Agreement and give notice for you and all occupants within
your unit
to find alternative accommodation and vacate the Property by no later
than 31 March 2018, failing
which
our client will have no option but to approach the Roodepoort
Magistrates Court to obtain an order for your eviction”
.
24.
On the version of Yellow River, the
Respondents have (i) vandalized the
Property;
(ii) permitted and/or facilitated and/or solicited the occupation of
vacant dwelling units at the Property by third parties
without Yellow
River’s consent and against its will; and (iii) are receiving
money or other consideration for having permitted
and/or facilitated
and/or solicited the occupation of vacant dwelling units at the
Property by third parties. This version is supported
by an affidavit
of the caretaker of the Property. The Respondents deny these
allegations, saying that it was Yellow River that
removed geysers and
sinks from the Property. This is consistent with a letter of 18 May
2018 in which Yellow River’s attorneys
explained to the then
attorney for the Respondents that the geysers and sinks were to be
removed to secure them, although the letter
asserts that removed
items were then stolen. The letter also asserts that at least two of
the units were allegedly being rented
out by the Respondents. That
letter was never responded to. Five months later, in October 2018,
Yellow River’s attorneys
wrote once more to the Respondents’
erstwhile attorney, complaining that the Original Respondents had
hi-jacked the building
and therefore that they had acted in a manner
demonstrating that they did not consider themselves bound by the
terms of their lease
agreements. This was characterized as a
repudiation, which was accepted. On behalf of Yellow Property, a
demand was made to vacate
the Property “
forthwith”
.
An intention to embark upon eviction proceedings was then signaled.
25.
In November 2018, this application was launched, seeking an order
that the Original Respondents
vacate the Property, and ancillary
relief to give effect to that order, together with costs.
26.
The June 2019 Section 4(2) Notice informed the Respondents of the
institution of proceedings.
The Section 4(2) Notice informed the
Respondents that the aspects to be dealt with by the Court in
exercising its discretion would
include the Respondents personal
circumstances (including whether the Property is occupied by elderly
persons, children or disabled
persons or is a household headed by
women) and whether the Respondents would be rendered homeless should
an order for their eviction
be granted.
27.
By order of 22 January 2020, the fifteenth respondent was joined. The
fifteenth respondent
is, for present purposes, the Unlawful Occupiers
of the Property.
28.
In response to the application, the Respondents essentially asserted
that the situation
in which they found themselves was the consequence
of Yellow River’s failure to pay its dues to the City. The
invoked
inter
alia
the
right to access to adequate housing, asserting that a “
common
ground”
was all that they were seeking. The response did not include any
evidence on the personal circumstances of the Respondents, and
included no discussion of whether the Respondents (or any of them)
would be rendered homeless as a result of the eviction.
29.
In heads of argument filed by the Respondents, some information was
provided, to the effect
that:
29.1.
“
Finding
alternative accommodation then had also not been a feasible
alternative for any of us
as the families that were residing on the subject-site could not find
any other alternatively feasible
means to access their
place of work and
schooling”
(para 4);
29.2.
the actions of Yellow
River would render the families homeless (para 11);
29.3.
some of the
Respondents would not be able to afford the alternative
accommodation that had been
identified by Yellow River, due to job losses and retirement in some
cases; and
29.4.
the fourth respondent (Mr. Maeyane) had been forced to take early
retirement due to a medical
condition (loss of eyesight), and he lives on the Property with a son
that is dependent on him, whilst
their only income is a grant Mr.
Maeyane receives (para 13).
30.
Moreover, in submissions made to me during the hearing included
reference to the effect
of the Coronavirus pandemic, which has
included persons living on the Property losing their jobs. This
included Mr. March, one
of the spokespeople.
The
case for relief
31.
Yellow River contends that eviction would be just and equitable,
because it established
that:
31.1.
there were other properties for rent in the area at more
or less the
same
price
point;
31.2.
Yellow River has suffered substantial damages, because
its investment
has
been
sterilized as a result of the rent boycott;
31.3.
the Original Respondents had usurped the role of Yellow
River by
leasing
unoccupied
units to third parties; and
31.4.
the Property was under the effective control of a voluntary
association
comprised
of the Original Respondents.
The
duty of this Court
32.
My duty in adjudicating upon this application has its starting point
in the Constitution
of the Republic of South Africa Act No 108 of
1996 (Constitution): section 26(3) of the Constitution provides that
no one may be
evicted from their home without an order of court made
after considering all relevant circumstances, and so I have to
consider
such relevant circumstances.
33.
The PIE Act gives effect to section 26(3) in that it enjoins a court
to grant an eviction
order only if it is “
just
and equitable to do so”,
after
considering all of the relevant circumstances as contemplated in
sections 4(6) and (7) and section 6(1). The Constitutional
Court in
Port
Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers
[2004] ZACC 7
;
2005
(1) SA 217
(CC) at para 36 emphasized that the court must take an
active role , that it is “
called
upon to go beyond its normal functions and to engage in active
judicial management according to equitable principles”
and
that “
in
addition to lawfulness of the occupation the court must have regard
to the interests and circumstances of the occupier and pay
due regard
to broader considerations of fairness and other constitutional
values, so as to produce a just and equitable result”.
The active role includes that the court must “
probe
and
investigate
the surrounding circumstances”,
as
explained in
Pitje
v Shibambo
2016
(4) BCLR 460
(CC) at para 19.
34.
Those observations appear to contrast with the judgment of the
Supreme Court of Appeal in
Ndlovu
v Ngcobo; Bekker and Another v Jika
2003 (1) SA 113
(SCA) at para 19 that “
Unless
the occupier opposes and discloses circumstances relevant to the
eviction order, the owner, in principle, will be entitled
to an order
for eviction. Relevant circumstances are nearly without fail facts
within the exclusive knowledge of the occupier and
it cannot be
expected of an owner to negative in advance facts not known to him
and not an issue between the parties.”
But this sentiment
appears to have met with approval of the Constitutional Court, as
Willis J explains in
Johannesburg
Housing Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Unlawful Occupiers, Newtown Urban
Village
2013
(1) SA 583
(GSJ) (
Johannesburg
Housing Corporation
)
at paras 70 to 71. Does this mean that the court is absolved from the
obligation to interrogate matters more actively where the
party
seeking to avoid eviction has made bald, vague or laconic assertions,
as the Court considered in
Johannesburg
Housing Corporation
at
para 122? I think not.
35.
In the case of
City
of Johannesburg v
Changing
Tides 74 (Pty) Ltd and others
2012
(6) SA 294
(SCA) (
Changing
Tides
) the
nature of an enquiry under the PIE Act was examined and it was held
that the enquiry cannot be concluded “
until
the court is satisfied that it is in possession of all the
information necessary to make both findings based on justice and
equity’
”
(
Changing
Tides
at
para 25). That proposition was reiterated in
Occupiers,
Berea v De Wet N.O. and another
2017
(5) SA 346
(CC) at paras 46 and 48, where the Constitutional Court
held that, where the relevant information is not before the court,
the
enquiry cannot
be
concluded and “
no
order may be granted”
and
that the court can only grant an eviction order where “
it
has all the information about the occupiers to enable it to decide
whether the eviction is just and equitable”.
In paragraph 51, the Constitutional Court stated in no uncertain
terms that “
where
only inadequate information is available, the court must decline to
make an eviction order. The absence of information is
an irrefutable
confirmation of the fact that the court is not in a position to
exercise this important jurisdiction”.
Discussion
36.
This Court has a great deal of sympathy for the position of Yellow
River: it has not been
able to collect rental for an inordinate
amount of time; and that inability to collect rental is closely
associated with its ongoing
dispute with the City. But even accepting
that to be the position, the case precedent makes clear that the
Court has to play an
active role in finding out all relevant facts if
they are not available; without access to all of the relevant facts,
I cannot
grant an order for eviction, according to the jurisprudence
of the highest Court in the land. And even counsel for Yellow River
was constrained to submit that all the facts are not before this
Court.
37.
This leaves this court in a difficult position. On the traditional
grounds for avoiding
eviction, the Respondents have given me very
little to go by. If the affidavits were to be measured on the
principles ordinarily
applying in applications, there would be no
basis for me to decline granting the relief sought by Yellow River.
But in light of
the aforesaid Constitutional Court guidance on the
matter, I am bound to seek further information concerning the
situation of the
persons residing on the Property. I am further bound
to seek information to establish whether the
Respondents will be rendered
homeless by an order of eviction. On the basis of the papers before
me, I cannot conclude with certainty
that the eviction will not
result in homelessness for at least some of the Respondents and/or
adversely affect minor children and
elderly persons. Notably, when I
asked information of the Respondents’ representatives during
the hearing, it was asserted
that there are any number of children
residing at the Property and that they are enrolled in schools in the
vicinity of the Property.
It was also asserted that there were
elderly persons residing on the Property, and that a number of the
persons there residing
had lost their jobs due to the pandemic. Upon
being directly asked what would happen if the Court evicted them, the
Respondents’
representative asserted that they would be left to
live on the street. Upon being prompted on what that meant, he
confirmed that
they would be rendered homeless.
38.
In all of these circumstances, I am compelled to ensure that the
circumstances of all of
the persons residing on the Property are
placed before this Court.
39.
Furthermore, it is absolutely essential for a Court considering this
matter to have the
benefit of the City’s position available to
it. Municipalities play a central, increasingly complex role in
facilitating
the determination of whether or not the courts will
grant an eviction order. Both the Constitutional Court and the
Supreme Court
of Appeal have expressed the view that a municipality's
obligations extend, at the very least, to providing a Court with all
of
the information necessary to establish when an eviction would be
just and equitable. Consequently, that input must not only be
comprehensive but must also be meaningful and specific, to assist the
court to come to a just decision in a particular case. This
would
include information on the interests of female-headed
families, children, the
elderly and disabled, if land may be made available, and if
alternative accommodation is in fact available.
40.
The only entity that can provide the necessary information is the
municipality in question.
Meaningful information regarding the
existence of housing available for the homeless is critical.
41.
The failure by municipalities to discharge the role implicitly
envisaged for them by statute,
that is, to report to the Court in
respect of any of the factors affecting land and accommodation
availability and the basic health
and amenities consequences of an
eviction, especially on the most vulnerable such as children, the
disabled and the elderly, not
only renders the service of the notice
a superfluous and unnecessarily costly exercise for applicants, but
more importantly, it
frustrates an important objective of the
legislation. It hampers the Court’s ability to make decisions
which are truly just
and equitable.
42.
The City needs to fulfil its role in the present case. The
circumstances of the case which
are so closely associated with the
City’s alleged charging practices demands that the City cannot
adopt a supine approach
in this matter.
Conclusion
43.
Each eviction has its own history, its own dynamics, its own
intractable elements that must
be lived with and its own creative
possibilities that must be explored as far as is reasonably possible.
The circumstances of unlawful
occupiers either as individuals or as a
group are also unique. Since each eviction case is different each
must be treated differently.
Courts have a duty to seek concrete
case-specific solutions in cases of unlawful occupation, keeping all
of the relevant
factors
in mind. A one-size-fits-all solution in eviction cases is,
therefore, not only unworkable but also unacceptable. As Sachs
J said
in the
Various
Occupiers
case
the
"...managerial
role of the courts may need to find expression in innovative ways
".
44.
The order that I make seeks to give expression to this directive.
Ideally, this matter should
be resolved through meaningful engagement
between the City, Yellow River and the occupiers of the Property, to
come to a practical
solution. But that is not something I can order.
This Court can also not allow the situation to drag on indefinitely.
I am therefore
placing the parties under strict time limits to
collate further information that will enable this Court to perform
its duties as
aforesaid.
45.
In the circumstances, I make the following order:
45.1.
the applicant is directed to serve a copy of this judgment
and order
on the
City of
Johannesburg, within 5 days of this order.
45.2.
the Respondents are
directed to serve on the applicant’s attorneys and file
with this court, within 15
days of this order, affidavits deposed to separately
by at least one
person per unit -
45.2.1.
identifying the unit
of the Property in which the person resides;
45.2.2.
confirming whether
the persons residing in the unit commenced
occupation
prior to or after November 2017;
45.2.3.
confirming whether
occupation of the unit was in consequence of a
rental
agreement concluded with the erstwhile owner of the Property and, if
not, what the basis for occupation of the unit is;
45.2.4.
setting out the names
and ages of all persons residing in the particular
unit
on the Property;
45.2.5.
in the case of any
minor children residing in the unit on the Property,
providing details of such
children’s enrolment in school (including the
school/s where the
minor children are enrolled and the grades in
which they are
enrolled);
45.2.6.
in the case of any
occupant of a unit suffering from any disability,
setting out in full the
nature of the disability
(supported by
documentation);
45.2.7.
in the case of
elderly persons occupying a unit, asserting that fact
(identifying the age of the
occupant/s that are said to be elderly);
45.2.8.
providing details of
permanent and/or temporary employment, if any,
of
all occupants of the unit on the Property that are not of
school-going age over the past 12 months (including identity of the
employer and income received);
45.2.9.
providing details of
any income and/or monies received by any person
residing on the Property
other than as a consequence of temporary or permanent employment (for
example, grants); and
45.2.10.
setting out in full
what alternatives to accommodation, if any, are or
may
be available to the occupants of the Property in the event that an
order for eviction is granted, including (i) with family
members or
(ii) taking into account properties available for rental in the
vicinity of the Property at rates similar to the rental
rates
applicable at the Property prior to the cancellation, taking into
account inflationary increases.
45.3.
The Respondents are
directed to attach to the affidavit to be filed:
45.3.1.
copies of the birth
certificates of all minor children residing on the
Property;
45.3.2.
copies of the
identity documents of all other persons residing on the
Property;
45.3.3.
any documents proving
enrolment of the minor children at school,
including
the date of enrolment and the period of such enrolment; and
45.3.4.
any documents that the Respondents may wish to rely on to illustrate
the financial position of
those residing on the Property.
45.4.
If
any of the documents are not provided, the affidavit
must contain an
explanation as to why the
documents cannot be so provided.
45.5.
The applicant’s attorneys shall ensure service of
the
Respondents’
affidavits
on the City, within 5 days of receipt of the affidavits from the
Respondents.
45.6.
The City of Johannesburg is directed to file a report with
this
court,
confirmed
on affidavit, within 25 days of receipt of the affidavits on what
steps it has taken and what steps it intends or is able
to take in
order to provide alternative land or emergency accommodation to the
Respondents in the event of them being evicted,
and when alternative
land or accommodation can be provided.
45.7.
The applicant and the Respondents may, within 15 days of
delivery of
the
City of
Johannesburg’s report, file affidavits in response.
45.8.
The applicant may, in the affidavit contemplated in the
preceding
paragraph, also respond to
the affidavits of the Respondents.
45.9.
Immediately upon issue of this order, the applicant’s
attorney
shall
approach
the Registrar for a set-down of this matter in the week of 21 June
2021, or so soon thereafter as the Registrar is able
to provide a
date for hearing on the opposed roll.
45.10.
There is no order as to costs.
MJ
ENGELBRECHT
ACTING
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Electronically
submitted therefore unsigned
Delivered:
This judgement was prepared and authored by the Judge whose name is
reflected and is handed down electronically by circulation
to the
Parties/their legal
representatives
by email and by uploading it to the electronic file of this matter on
CaseLines. The date for hand-down is deemed
to be 12 MARCH 2021.
Date
of hearing:
3 March 2021
Date
of judgment:
12 March 2021
Appearances
For
the applicants:
Adv. M. Matome
Instructed
by:
Schindlers Attorneys
For
the respondents:
Unrepresented