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[2021] ZAGPJHC 712
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Matthews v Douglasdale Dairy (Pty) Ltd (31670/19) [2021] ZAGPJHC 712 (25 February 2021)
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REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NO: 31670/19
NOT REPORTABLE
NOT OF INTEREST TO OTHER
JUDGES
REVISED
25 FEBRUARY 2021
In
the matter between:
MICHAEL
BRIAN MATTHEWS
(ID
NO:
[…])
Plaintiff
and
DOUGLASDALE
DAIRY (PTY) LTD
REG
NO:
2002/007084/07
Defendant
JUDGMENT
COWEN
AJ
1.
On
9 September, 2019, the plaintiff, Michael Brian Matthews instituted
an action against the defendant, Douglasdale Dairy (Pty)
Ltd for
payment of the amount of R6 355 200.00 plus interest and
costs. Douglasdale Dairy has excepted to the claim in
terms of
Uniform Rule 23 and further objected to it on the basis of a failure
to comply with Uniform Rule 18(6). Douglasdale Dairy
has also raised
an issue of non-joinder of a Mr Rowan Matthews.
2.
The
matter came before me on the opposed roll on 23 November 2020. Mr
Hellens SC (with him Mr Amm) appeared for the defendant excipient
and
Mr Eloff SC appeared for the plaintiff.
3.
The
plaintiff’s claim is formulated as a claim for “damages
for unlawful holding over”. Douglasdale Dairy excepts
centrally
on the basis that the plaintiff does not have a claim for damages for
“holding over” in circumstances where
the plaintiff is a
subsequent owner of property, is not a party to a terminated lease
agreement and does not otherwise enjoy any
contractual right to claim
the damages acquired via cession, assignment or other transfer. The
claim for damages for “holding
over”, it is said, is in
law premised on a breach of the contractual right to vacant
possession at the termination of a lease.
The excipient further
complains that the co-owner of the property, Mr Rowan Matthews, who
is the plaintiff’s brother, must
be joined to the proceedings
as a necessary party.
4.
The
two central issues in the case are:
4.1
.
Whether
the plaintiff’s pleadings disclose a cause of action for
damages for “holding over”.
4.2.
Whether
the joint owner of the property Mr Rowan Matthews must be joined to
the proceedings as a necessary party.
Do
the plaintiff’s pleadings disclose a cause of action for
damages for “holding over”?
5.
There
is no dispute between the parties that the plaintiffs’
pleadings do not disclose a claim for damages for “holding
over” formulated in either contract or unjustified enrichment.
The question rather is whether the pleadings disclose such
a cause of
action in delict that is available to the plaintiff.
6.
An
excipient must satisfy the court that the conclusions of law pleaded
by the plaintiff cannot be supported by any reasonable interpretation
of the particulars of claim.
[1]
The exception must be decided on the basis that the court accepts, as
true, the factual allegations pleaded by the plaintiff.
[2]
7.
In
summarizing the relevant factual allegations, I refer to some
individuals mentioned in the particulars of claim using their first
names. In doing so, I depart from what I regard as the more
respectful approach of using an individual’s title and surname.
I do this to avoid confusion that would otherwise result in the
context of this case, and because this is how the individuals
concerned are referred to in the particulars of claim.
8.
On
this approach and in short:
8.1.
Under his Will, the late Armour Brian
Hatherly Matthews (Brian) bequeathed Portion 8 of the farm
Douglasdale 195, Registration Division
IQ, Province of Gauteng (the
immovable property) to Elizabeth Anne Matthews (Elizabeth) in terms
of a
fideicommissum
.
The Will provided that upon Elizabeth’s death, the property
would devolve to Rowan Wauchope Matthews (Mr Rowan Matthews)
in a 60%
undivided share and the plaintiff in a 40% undivided share. Brian
died on 21 January 2000 and in July 2006, the immovable
property was
then transferred to Elizabeth under the
fideicommissum
.
8.2.
On 25 March 2009, Elizabeth and the
defendant, Douglasdale Dairy, concluded a written lease agreement in
terms of which Douglasdale
Dairy would lease the property for a
period of 60 months expiring on 28 February 2014. Douglasdale Dairy
let the property until
the expiry of the lease agreement and
thereafter remained in occupation of the property. Despite demand,
the defendant failed,
refused or neglected to vacate and remains in
occupation. In May 2016, Elizabeth obtained an eviction order in this
Court against
the defendant.
8.3.
Elizabeth died on 6 September 2016. In
accordance with the provisions of Brian’s Will, the property
then devolved in undivided
shares to Mr Rowan Matthews (60%) and the
plaintiff (40%). The eviction order was not overturned following the
defendant’s
appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal, which appeal
hearing occurred subsequent to Elizabeth’s death.
8.4.
The defendant continues to occupy the
property without consent and against the express wishes of the
plaintiff, pays no rental to
the plaintiff, has never paid any rental
to the plaintiff and has no valid lease agreement with the plaintiff.
In the result, the
plaintiff pleads, the defendant is in unlawful
occupation of the property.
8.5.
The plaintiff pleads that he is entitled to
be paid 40% of a reasonable monthly rental in respect of the property
from 6 September
2016 until the defendant vacates the property
alternatively occupies with consent or in terms of a valid lease
agreement with the
plaintiff. A reasonable rental is alleged to be
R400 000 monthly as at 6 September 2016 escalating by 10%
annually. A table
is provided showing the manner of arriving at the
amount claimed. The claim is framed as “damages for holding
over”.
9.
During
the course of argument, Mr Hellens conceded that a subsequent owner
of property that is the subject of a lease terminated
prior to the
acquisition of ownership and who otherwise has no contractual rights
derived from such such has a claim in delict
against the former
tenant in circumstances where the former tenant continues in unlawful
occupation of the property and does not
pay rent. In my view, this
concession was responsibly made:
[3]
continued occupation without a legal right to do so is
per
se
a wrongful act.
[4]
Mr Hellens
submitted, however, that the pleadings nevertheless do not disclose a
cause of action centrally because they are framed
as a claim for
damages for “holding over”.
10.
The
submission was premised on a contention that a claim of damages for
“holding over” has a technical meaning in law
which is
confined to a claim grounded in a breach of contract by a lessee or
erstwhile lessee to give vacant possession to a
lessor
on termination of the lease agreement. Absent a lessor ceding,
assigning or otherwise transferring contractual rights, or some
other
vesting of contractual rights, the argument continued, a subsequent
owner does not have any claim for damages for holding
over. In
advancing this submission, reliance was placed on
Hyprop
Investments
[5]
and
Sandown
Park (Pty) Ltd v Hunter Your Wine & Spirit Merchant (Pty)
Ltd.
[6]
11.
Mr
Eloff, relying on the principle that an excipient must satisfy the
Court that the conclusion of law pleaded cannot be supported
by any
reasonable interpretation of the particulars of claim, submitted that
term “damages for holding over” is not
used in a
technical sense in the particulars of claim. Rather, the reference to
“holding over” should be understood
as a reference to the
act of continuing unlawfully in occupation. Mr Eloff further
submitted that there is no reason in law to
limit a claim for damages
for holding over to a claim grounded in breach of contract where the
claim is formulated in delict.
12.
In
my view, the exception cannot be upheld for three reasons.
13.
First,
I agree with Mr Eloff that the term “holding over” as
used in context of the particulars of claim can reasonably
and should
be understood to refer to the defendant’s act of continuing in
unlawful possession of the property. In interpreting
the language, I
have not focused solely on the words “holding over” but
have understood them in the context in which
they are used in the
pleadings and their apparent purpose.
[7]
It may be that some of the historical background to how the plaintiff
acquired co-ownership of the property is not strictly necessary,
as
Mr Amm submitted in reply, but even if this is so, this does not
render the pleadings excipiable. Moreover, to ascribe the term
“holding over” this meaning, is consistent with the
following dictum of Spilg J in
Hyprop
Investment
:
“The term ‘holding over’ is no more than a
convenient label attached to the conduct or act which affords a
remedy in damages.”
[8]
In
this case, that conduct is the act of remaining in unlawful
occupation of property co-owned by the plaintiff in circumstances
where a prior lease with a previous owner has terminated and an
eviction order has been granted and dishonored.
14.
Second,
as Mr Hellens conceded, an owner has a claim in delict for damages
arising from unlawful occupation of property. The then
Appellate
Division held in
Hefer’s
case
[9]
that an owner who has or had no possession of property has a claim
against another who unlawfully possesses, holds (occupies) or
uses
the thing and can institute the
actio
legis Aquiliae
if
he has suffered patrimonial loss.
[10]
If the phrase “damages for holding over” is understood to
refer to damages for continuing in unlawful occupation, as
I hold it
reasonably can and should be, then the exception must fail. There is
no obvious defect in the pleadings when viewed as
a claim by an owner
under the
actio
legis Aquilia
for patrimonial loss arising from unlawful occupation, and
pertinently for present purposes, none has been raised in the
exception
before me.
15.
Third,
a claim for damages for “holding over” of the sort in
issue before the courts in
Hyprop
Investment
and
Sandown
Park
are not restricted to claims formulated in contract, or indeed
unjustified enrichment. It is now established that a claim for
damages for “holding over” can be formulated in contract,
unjustified enrichment or delict.
[11]
It is settled law that the measure of damages that is usually claimed
in a claim for holding over is the market rental of the premises,
[12]
although other damages if correctly alleged and proved are also
competent. In this case the usual measure of damages is claimed.
In
Hyprop Investments, Spilg J noted that in the vast majority of cases
this “accepted method of determining damages obviates
the need
of deciding whether to formulate the claim in contract or delict and
to rely on a breach of wrongfulness respectively;
nor are the damages
reduced to the lesser of the benefit to the occupier or the loss to
the landlord as would be the case under
an enrichment action.”
One of the reasons for this, as Spilg J explained, is that where
under contract the breach is a failure
to restore possession on
termination and damages arises because a landlord is deprived of the
use and enjoyment of property because
an erstwhile tenant is in
occupation, under delict the continued occupation without a legal
right to do so is
per
se
a wrongful act and loss of a market related rental is reasonably
foreseeable damages.
[13]
The
court held:
“
Accordingly,
in the usual case where the landlord sues for a market related
rental, the claim may be formulated either in contract
or in delict.
In both cases damages will be the market rental value (unless there
is a rental survival clause in the contract.).
Although viable, an
unjust enrichment action is cumbersome because of the method for
computing damages with the risk of recovering
less than a market
related rental.”
16.
These
dicta in
Hyprop
Investments
also concern the usual case where
the
landlord
sues for a market related rental, as occurred in that case. And as Mr
Hellens pointed out, when characterizing the claim, the Court
refers
to it being “founded on a breach of the contractual obligation
to give vacant possession on termination as required
by the relevant
clause in the lease agreement, or as an incidence of the common
law.”
[14]
However, the
judgment is also clear that a claim is not a claim for rent, but a
claim for damages, and that it can be formulated
in contract
or
delict.
Further,
and as mentioned, the court also held that the term “holding
over” is “no more than a convenient label
attached to the
conduct or act which affords a remedy in damages”
[15]
17.
I
am not found a case and none was referred to in which a claim framed
as “holding over” is instituted in delict by
a subsequent
owner rather than a person whose contractual right to vacant
possession has been breached. However, I can see no reason
why the
claim in delict should be confined to a plaintiff in whom contractual
rights to vacant possession vests. And in principle
there appears to
be no material difference between a case instituted by a subsequent
owner in delict for “damages for holding
over” and a
claim of the sort recognized in
Hefer’s
case, both being claims based on the
actio legis Aquilia
.
18.
In
the result, the exception as pleaded must fail. Although the
excipient also raised non-compliance with Rule 18(6), it was accepted
in argument that the alleged non-compliance is premised on the Court
finding for the excipient on the above issues. I accordingly
do not
deal with that further.
Joinder
of Mr Rowan Matthews
19.
The
second issue is whether Mr Rowan Matthews must be joined to the
proceedings as a necessary party. As explained above, Mr Rowan
Matthews co-owns the property with the plaintiff in undivided shares
(60%/40%). In my view, he is not a necessary party to the
proceedings.
20.
During
the course of argument, Mr Eloff pointed out that Mr Rowan Matthews
is the controlling shareholder of Douglasdale Dairy.
Mr Hellens did
not object to this being drawn to the court’s attention. In my
view, however, these circumstances do not alter
the legal question
which must be decided, namely whether a co-owner of an undivided
share in a property must be joined in a claim
in delict for damages
for patrimonial loss instituted by one co-owner against an unlawful
occupier. In circumstances where Mr Matthews
is not a co-plaintiff,
the submissions is that he should be joined as a co-defendant with a
legal interest in the subject matter
of the litigation. Mr Hellens
submitted that this is necessary because, as a co-owner, he has an
interest in the questions of law
and fact which are decided by the
Court in the action. Before he is bound on these issues, either by
virtue of legal precedent
or issue estoppel - the submission
continued – Mr Rowan Matthews has a right to be heard.
21.
The
Constitutional Court held in
Matjhabeng
Local Municipality
:
‘The law on joinder is well settled. No court can make findings
adverse to any person’s interests, without that person
first
being a party to the proceedings before it.’
[16]
And in
SARDA
,
[17]
in which a lessee applied to join proceedings under the
Restitution
of Land Rights Act 1994
in which the Land Claims Court had ordered
restitution of state-owned land which was leased to the applicant for
joinder in its
absence, the Constitutional Court held:
“
If
the applicant shows that it has some right which is affected by the
order issued, permission to intervene must be granted. For
it is a
basic principle of our law that no order should be granted against a
party without affording such party a pre-decision
hearing. This is so
fundamental that an order is generally taken to be binding only on
parties to the litigation.”
22.
A
party is a necessary party and a plea of non-joinder should be
allowed if such person has a direct and substantial interest in
any
order the court might make, or if such an order cannot be sustained
or carried into effect without prejudicing that party.
[18]
A party can waive their right to be joined but the question of waiver
is not before me.
[19]
23.
Mr
Hellens submitted that it is well established that joint owners must
be joined in legal proceedings relying on
Rosebank
Mall (Pty) Ltd v Cradock Heights (Pty) Ltd.
[20]
In
Rosebank
Mall
,
Cilliers AJ held: “Where a right sought to be enforced vests in
parties jointly, or an obligation sought to be enforced
rests on
parties jointly, joinder of the joint creditors or joint debtors is
generally necessary. Such joint contracting parties
are in a similar
position to joint owners and partners. (Compare
Morgan
and another v Salisbury Municipality
1935 AD 167
at 171.)”
24.
In
turn, in
Morgan’s
case
,
De Villiers JA stated: “The position may therefore be broadly
stated to be that by South African practice the only cases
in which a
defendant has been allowed to demand a joinder as of right are the
cases of joint owners, joint contractors and partners,
in all of
which cases there exists a joint financial or proprietary interest,
but that in other cases a defendant, as a general
rule, has not been
allowed to demand such joinder. Now it is not necessary or advisable
to formulate here any general statement
as to the principles on which
the practice, hitherto so narrowly confined, ought to be based in
future, or as to the directions
(if any) it ought to be extended or
enlarged.” This statement must however be understood in light
of a prior statement of
De Villiers JA which appears earlier in the
same paragraph following his consideration of Mason J’s
decision in
Muller’s
Executors v Small Farms
:
[21]
“South African practice must therefore be looked to, and
according to that practice the position is (I think correctly) stated
by Mason J in the above-mentioned case, viz, that the cases in which
a plea of non-joinder has been allowed, have usually been
those in
which one of two co-owners, or one of two joint contractors, or one
of two partners, was the sole plaintiff or the sole
defendant in the
action. (Even in such cases there are many exceptions in which
joinder is not necessary; see 1910 TPD at p200
and Beck on Pleadings
pp 10-19.).”
25.
What
is important to appreciate is that these dicta should not be
understood as authority for any proposition to the effect that
joint
owners must always be joined in legal proceedings. Thus, in
Mullers
,
Mason J distinguished between cases where “other parties have
such an indivisible interest that the judgment must necessarily
affect them notwithstanding the principle of
res
inter alios acta,
and
those in which other parties may have similar rights depending on a
similar title, but not necessarily affected by any judgment
in an
action in which they were not parties.”
[22]
The case before Mason J was an illustration of the former class where
co-owners of a dam were regarded as “absolutely necessary
parties” in a suit where an order directing the destruction of
the dam could be granted. While the Court acknowledged that
the cases
where joinder is regarded as necessary are usually those involving
two co-owners or two joint contractors or two partners,
it also
acknowledged the existence of numerous exceptions. Importantly, in
Amalgamated
Engineering,
Fagan
AJA, after considering
Mullers
and
Morgan’s
case
,
and their identification of cases in which a plea of non-joinder is
“usually” allowed, holds that: “The question
of
joinder should surely not depend on the nature of the subject-matter
of the suit, as some of the head-notes I have referred
to would seem
to imply, but – whether the suit relates to a will, an
aqueduct, a partnership, or anything else – on
the manner in
which, and the extent to which, the Court’s order may affect
the interests of third parties.”
[23]
26.
In
my view, the case before me falls into the second class identified by
Mason J. While Mr Rowan Matthews and the plaintiff are
joint owners,
and may both have a claim for damages arising from such title, it is
difficult to see how Mr Rowan Matthews’
rights or interests
would be adversely affected by the order sought by the plaintiff if
he is not joined to the proceedings. The
joint owners’
proprietary rights are not affected by the order sought. To the
extent that a co-owner such as Mr Rowan Matthews
may himself wish to
pursue a damages claim to restore his own patrimony, there is nothing
precluding him from doing so or indeed
from applying to join this
case as a co-plaintiff. And if he does not pursue that route, and
subject to the principles of notice
and waiver (which are not before
me), he cannot be bound by findings of fact that the Court may make
in his absence. While he may
be affected by legal precedent that may
or may not be established in the case, no such imminent precedent was
identified and, in
any event, this alone does not give rise to a
necessary joinder. If legal findings are made by this court in one
case that are
clearly wrong, they can be departed from by another and
if need be rectified on appeal.
27.
I
conclude that Mr Rowan Matthews is not a necessary party to the
proceedings.
Costs
28.
There
is no reason why costs should not follow the result. To avoid any
doubt when costs are taxed, I have concluded that the main
issues
raised in this exception were sufficiently complex to warrant the
appointment of senior counsel.
Order
29.
The
following order is made:
29.1.
The
exception is dismissed.
29.2.
The
defendant is ordered to pay the costs of the exception on a party and
party scale which costs shall include the costs of senior
counsel.
COWEN
AJ
Date of hearing: 23
November 2020
Date of judgment: 25
February 2021
Appearances:
Excipient:
MR
Hellens SC and GW Amm instructed by Livingstone Crichton Attorneys.
Plaintiff:
C
Eloff SC instructed by Schindlers Attorneys
[1]
Stewart
and another v Botha and another
2008(6)
SA 310 (SCA)
[2]
For
this trite proposition, both parties referred to the useful
summation by Makgoka J of the general principles applicable to
exceptions in
Living
Hands (Pty) Ltd and another v Ditz and others
2013(2) SA 368 (GSJ) at para 15. See too
Stewart
and another v Botha and another
2008(6) SA 310 (SCA) at para 4.
[3]
Hefer
v Grundling 1979(4) SA (A) (Hefer’s case)
[4]
Hyprop
Investments v NCS Carriers and Forwarding CC (Hyprop Investments)
2013(4) SA 607 (GSJ) at para 43.
[5]
Supra
[6]
1985(1)
SA 248(W) (Sandown Park).
[7]
List
v Gungers 1979(3) SA 106 (A) at 118, Christie’s Law of
Contract in South Africa (7 ed) p 244-5.
[8]
Supra
at para 54.
[9]
1979(4)
SA (A)
[10]
See
p858G-H and 960C.
[11]
Hyprop
Investments supra at para 45 to 51.
[12]
Sandown
Park at 256I and Hyprop Investments at para 42.
[13]
Hyprop
Investments at para 42.
[14]
Hyprop
Investments at para 42.
[15]
Hyprop
Investments at para 54.
[16]
Matjhabeng
Local Municipality v Eskom Holdings Ltd
2018(1)
SA 1 (CC) at 33E-F.
[17]
SA
Riding for the Disabled Association v Regional Land Claims
Commissioner 2017(5) SA 1 (CC) (SARDA).
[18]
SARDA,
supra.
Amalgamated
Engineering Union v Minister of Labour
1949(3)
SA 637 (A)
[19]
The
issue of non-joinder was raised on exception and the arising
questions thus must arise
ex
facie
the
particulars of claim. Erasmus
Superior
Court Practice
D1-127. The issue or waiver or the impact of any prior notice to Mr
Rowan Mattews can still be raised should the issue of joinder
be
revisited as it still can be.
[20]
2004(2)
SA 353 (W).
[21]
1910
TPD 199
(Mullers)
[22]
See
p 199.
[23]
At
657. See Erasmus at D1-124.