Matthews v Douglasdale Dairy (Pty) Ltd (31670/19) [2021] ZAGPJHC 712 (25 February 2021)

80 Reportability

Brief Summary

Pleadings — Exception — Claim for damages for unlawful holding over — Plaintiff, a subsequent owner of property, claims damages for unlawful occupation by defendant post-lease termination — Defendant excepts on grounds of lack of cause of action and non-joinder of co-owner — Court finds pleadings disclose a valid claim in delict for unlawful occupation, rejecting the technical limitation of "holding over" to contractual breaches — Exception dismissed.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


This judgment concerns an opposed exception and related procedural objections raised in an action for monetary relief. The proceedings were brought in the High Court of South Africa, Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg, under case number 31670/19, and the judgment was delivered by Cowen AJ on 25 February 2021.


The plaintiff, Michael Brian Matthews, instituted action against the defendant, Douglasdale Dairy (Pty) Ltd, claiming R6 355 200.00, together with interest and costs. The plaintiff characterised the claim as one for “damages for unlawful holding over”, arising from the defendant’s continued occupation of immovable property after a lease had terminated and after an eviction order had been granted.


After summons and particulars of claim were delivered, the defendant raised an exception in terms of Uniform Rule 23, together with an objection framed as non-compliance with Uniform Rule 18(6). The defendant also raised non-joinder, contending that the plaintiff’s co-owner brother, Mr Rowan Matthews, was a necessary party who had to be joined to the proceedings. The matter was argued on the opposed roll on 23 November 2020, with senior counsel appearing for both sides.


The general subject-matter of the dispute was whether, on the plaintiff’s pleaded case, a subsequent co-owner of property could claim delictual damages (measured by reasonable rental) from an occupier who remained on the property without right after termination of a lease concluded with a previous owner, and whether a co-owner had to be joined as a necessary party in such a damages claim.


2. Material Facts


The court approached the exception on the basis that, for purposes of deciding whether the pleadings disclose a cause of action, the factual allegations pleaded by the plaintiff must be accepted as true. The facts summarised below are those treated by the court as the relevant pleaded allegations for purposes of the exception.


The pleaded background was that the late Armour Brian Hatherly Matthews bequeathed the relevant immovable property, being Portion 8 of the farm Douglasdale 195, Registration Division IQ, Province of Gauteng, to Elizabeth Anne Matthews under a fideicommissum. The will provided that, on Elizabeth’s death, the property would devolve in undivided shares to Mr Rowan Wauchope Matthews (60%) and the plaintiff (40%). The deceased died on 21 January 2000, and the property was transferred to Elizabeth in July 2006 pursuant to the fideicommissum arrangement.


On 25 March 2009, Elizabeth and the defendant concluded a written lease agreement in terms of which the defendant leased the property for 60 months, expiring on 28 February 2014. The defendant remained in occupation after expiry of the lease. Despite demand, the defendant allegedly failed, refused, or neglected to vacate and continued to occupy the property. In May 2016, Elizabeth obtained an eviction order against the defendant in the High Court.


Elizabeth died on 6 September 2016. Upon her death and in accordance with the will, the property devolved in undivided shares to Mr Rowan Matthews (60%) and the plaintiff (40%). The eviction order was not overturned, and the defendant’s appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal (heard after Elizabeth’s death) did not result in the order being set aside.


After the plaintiff became co-owner, the defendant allegedly continued to occupy the property without consent and against the express wishes of the plaintiff, and it allegedly paid no rental to the plaintiff and had no valid lease agreement with him. On the plaintiff’s pleaded case, the defendant’s occupation was therefore unlawful.


The plaintiff pleaded entitlement to 40% of a reasonable monthly rental from 6 September 2016 until the defendant vacated, or alternatively occupied with consent or under a valid lease with the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleged a reasonable rental of R400 000 per month as at 6 September 2016 escalating at 10% per annum, and he pleaded a computation leading to the amount claimed. The claim was expressly framed as “damages for holding over.”


Where the parties differed for purposes of the exception was not on the broad chronology above, but on the legal characterisation of the claim. The defendant contended that “holding over” damages, properly so-called, were confined to a claim arising from a contractual right to vacant possession at the termination of a lease, which the plaintiff (as a subsequent owner not party to the lease and without cession/assignment) lacked. The plaintiff contended that the pleaded claim was reasonably capable of being understood as a delictual claim based on unlawful occupation and patrimonial loss measured by reasonable rental.


3. Legal Issues


The court identified two central issues.


The first was whether the plaintiff’s pleadings disclosed a cause of action for damages described as “holding over.” This issue was principally a question about the legal sufficiency of pleaded facts, and thus a question of law (or, more precisely, whether the pleaded facts could sustain the pleaded legal conclusion on any reasonable interpretation).


It was common cause between the parties that the particulars of claim did not disclose a claim in contract or unjustified enrichment for holding over. The dispute was whether the pleadings nonetheless disclosed a claim in delict, available to the plaintiff as a subsequent co-owner, and whether the term “holding over” in the particulars should be treated as a technical label confined to contractual claims, or as a descriptive label for unlawful continued occupation sounding in delict.


The second issue was whether Mr Rowan Matthews, as co-owner in an undivided 60% share, had to be joined as a necessary party. This required the court to apply the law of joinder and to determine whether he had a direct and substantial interest in any order the court might make in the action, such that the matter could not properly proceed in his absence.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court began by restating the established approach to exceptions. An excipient must show that the conclusion of law pleaded cannot be supported by any reasonable interpretation of the particulars of claim, and the exception must be determined on the footing that the plaintiff’s pleaded facts are true. This framed the inquiry as whether, on a reasonable reading of the pleading as a whole, the pleaded facts could support a delictual damages claim notwithstanding the plaintiff’s use of the phrase “damages for holding over.”


On the merits of the exception, the court recorded that during argument the defendant’s counsel conceded that a subsequent owner (who was not party to the terminated lease and had no transferred contractual rights) nonetheless has a delictual claim against a former tenant who continues to occupy the property unlawfully without paying rent. The court accepted that this concession was properly made, particularly in light of the principle that continued occupation without a legal right is per se wrongful.


The defendant nevertheless maintained that the pleadings were excipiable because they were framed as “holding over,” which the defendant contended was a term with a confined technical meaning limited to contractual breach of the obligation to restore vacant possession to the lessor at termination. The defendant relied on Hyprop Investments v NCS Carriers and Forwarding CC 2013(4) SA 607 (GSJ) and Sandown Park (Pty) Ltd v Hunter Your Wine & Spirit Merchant (Pty) Ltd 1985(1) SA 248(W) for this proposition.


The court rejected the exception for three interrelated reasons.


First, the court accepted the plaintiff’s submission that, in context, the phrase “holding over” was reasonably capable of being understood not as an invocation of a narrow contractual cause of action, but as a reference to the conduct of remaining in unlawful possession. In interpreting the particulars, the court did not isolate the phrase but read it in light of the pleading’s overall purpose and context. The court also relied on the statement in Hyprop Investments v NCS Carriers and Forwarding CC 2013(4) SA 607 (GSJ) that the term “holding over” is “no more than a convenient label attached to the conduct or act which affords a remedy in damages.” On that understanding, “holding over” could coherently describe the defendant’s alleged continued unlawful occupation after termination of the prior lease and despite the eviction order.


Second, given that the defendant accepted in argument that a delictual remedy exists for an owner against an unlawful occupier, the court reasoned that if “holding over” is understood as describing continued unlawful occupation, then the pleading could support a claim under the actio legis Aquiliae for patrimonial loss. The court relied on Hefer v Grundling 1979(4) SA 858 (A) for the proposition that an owner who has suffered patrimonial loss caused by another who unlawfully possesses, occupies, or uses the thing may institute the Aquilian action. On that framing, the court held there was no “obvious defect” in the pleading as a delictual claim for patrimonial loss arising from unlawful occupation, and importantly, no further specific defect of the delictual pleading had been raised in the exception beyond the defendant’s semantic/characterisation argument.


Third, the court held that a damages claim described as “holding over” is not confined to contract or enrichment. The court treated it as established (with reference to Hyprop Investments v NCS Carriers and Forwarding CC 2013(4) SA 607 (GSJ)) that such a claim can be formulated in contract, unjustified enrichment, or delict. The court further noted that the usual measure of damages in a holding over scenario is market rental, while recognising that other damages could be competent if properly alleged and proved. The plaintiff had pleaded the usual measure, namely reasonable rental (with escalation), limited to his 40% share.


Although the court remarked that it had not been referred to a case where a delictual “holding over” claim was brought specifically by a subsequent owner rather than by the party whose contractual right to vacant possession was infringed, it found no principled basis to confine the delictual claim to cases where contractual rights vested in the plaintiff. In the court’s view, in principle there was no material difference between such a delictual “holding over” claim and the Aquilian claim contemplated in Hefer v Grundling 1979(4) SA 858 (A).


Because the exception failed on the main issue, the court did not address the objection based on Uniform Rule 18(6), noting that it was accepted in argument that the Rule 18(6) complaint was premised on the defendant succeeding on the “holding over” point.


On the joinder issue, the court applied established constitutional and common-law joinder principles. Relying on Matjhabeng Local Municipality v Eskom Holdings Ltd 2018(1) SA 1 (CC) and South African Riding for the Disabled Association v Regional Land Claims Commissioner 2017(5) SA 1 (CC), the court emphasised the foundational principle that a court should not make findings adverse to a person’s interests without that person being joined, and that an order is generally binding only on parties to the litigation. The court then reiterated the test that a person is a necessary party if they have a direct and substantial interest in the order the court might make, or if the order cannot be sustained or carried into effect without prejudicing that party, with reference to Amalgamated Engineering Union v Minister of Labour 1949(3) SA 637 (A) and the discussion in SARDA.


The defendant invoked authority suggesting joint owners must generally be joined, relying on Rosebank Mall (Pty) Ltd v Cradock Heights (Pty) Ltd 2004(2) SA 353 (W) and the older practice referred to in Morgan and another v Salisbury Municipality 1935 AD 167, as well as the distinction drawn in Muller’s Executors v Small Farms 1910 TPD 199 between cases involving an indivisible interest necessarily affected by a judgment and cases where others might have similar rights but are not necessarily affected by the judgment.


The court held that these authorities did not establish a universal rule that joint owners must always be joined. It treated the present matter as falling within the second class identified in Muller’s Executors v Small Farms 1910 TPD 199, namely where the absent party may have similar rights depending on similar title but is not necessarily affected by the judgment. The court reasoned that the plaintiff’s claim sought to restore his own patrimony (limited to his 40% share) and did not implicate an order altering or disposing of the co-owned property itself. In that setting, the co-owner’s proprietary rights were not directly affected by the relief sought.


The court further reasoned that, while the co-owner might independently wish to pursue a claim for damages, nothing prevented him from doing so, or from applying to join as co-plaintiff if he wished. Conversely, the prospect that he might be affected by precedent or by findings in the case did not, without more, establish a direct and substantial interest requiring joinder, and the court considered that no specific imminent precedent of that nature had been identified. On this basis, the court concluded that Mr Rowan Matthews was not a necessary party.


Finally, on costs, the court applied the ordinary principle that costs follow the result, and expressly held that the issues were sufficiently complex to justify the costs of senior counsel.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court dismissed the defendant’s exception.


The defendant was ordered to pay the costs of the exception on the party and party scale, including the costs of senior counsel.


The court did not determine the merits of the plaintiff’s damages claim at trial stage; the judgment resolved only whether the particulars of claim were excipiable and whether joinder was required at this stage.


Cases Cited


Stewart and another v Botha and another 2008(6) SA 310 (SCA).


Living Hands (Pty) Ltd and another v Ditz and others 2013(2) SA 368 (GSJ).


Hefer v Grundling 1979(4) SA 858 (A).


Hyprop Investments v NCS Carriers and Forwarding CC 2013(4) SA 607 (GSJ).


Sandown Park (Pty) Ltd v Hunter Your Wine & Spirit Merchant (Pty) Ltd 1985(1) SA 248 (W).


List v Jungers 1979(3) SA 106 (A).


Matjhabeng Local Municipality v Eskom Holdings Ltd 2018(1) SA 1 (CC).


South African Riding for the Disabled Association v Regional Land Claims Commissioner 2017(5) SA 1 (CC).


Amalgamated Engineering Union v Minister of Labour 1949(3) SA 637 (A).


Rosebank Mall (Pty) Ltd v Cradock Heights (Pty) Ltd 2004(2) SA 353 (W).


Morgan and another v Salisbury Municipality 1935 AD 167.


Muller’s Executors v Small Farms 1910 TPD 199.


Legislation Cited


Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994.


Rules of Court Cited


Uniform Rule 23.


Uniform Rule 18(6).


Held


The court held that, on a reasonable interpretation of the particulars of claim, the plaintiff’s use of the phrase “damages for holding over” was capable of referring to the defendant’s alleged continued unlawful occupation and therefore could support a delictual claim for patrimonial loss measured by reasonable rental. The exception accordingly failed because the defendant did not establish that the plaintiff’s pleaded legal conclusion was unsustainable on any reasonable reading of the pleading.


The court further held that the plaintiff’s co-owner, holding an undivided share in the property, did not have a direct and substantial interest in the specific relief sought in the action (damages limited to the plaintiff’s share) such as to require mandatory joinder. The co-owner was therefore not a necessary party.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


A party raising an exception bears the burden of showing that the pleading’s legal conclusion cannot be supported on any reasonable interpretation of the pleaded facts, and the court must decide the exception on the basis that the pleaded factual allegations are true.


The label “holding over” is not necessarily confined to a narrowly contractual claim; it may operate as a convenient descriptor for conduct giving rise to a damages remedy, and a damages claim arising from continued occupation after termination may be formulated in contract, delict, or unjustified enrichment, depending on the pleaded basis.


An owner may claim delictual damages for patrimonial loss under the actio legis Aquiliae where another unlawfully possesses, occupies, holds, or uses the owner’s property and causes patrimonial loss, and market-related rental is a commonly accepted measure of damages in unlawful holding-over scenarios.


Joinder is required where a person has a direct and substantial interest in the order the court may make, such that the order cannot be sustained or carried into effect without prejudicing that person. The fact of co-ownership does not invariably require joinder; whether joinder is necessary depends on the manner and extent to which the order sought may affect the co-owner’s interests.

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[2021] ZAGPJHC 712
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Matthews v Douglasdale Dairy (Pty) Ltd (31670/19) [2021] ZAGPJHC 712 (25 February 2021)

SAFLII
Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
redacted from this document in compliance with the law
and
SAFLII
Policy
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NO: 31670/19
NOT REPORTABLE
NOT OF INTEREST TO OTHER
JUDGES
REVISED
25 FEBRUARY 2021
In
the matter between:
MICHAEL
BRIAN MATTHEWS
(ID
NO:
[…])
Plaintiff
and
DOUGLASDALE
DAIRY (PTY) LTD
REG
NO:
2002/007084/07
Defendant
JUDGMENT
COWEN
AJ
1.
On
9 September, 2019, the plaintiff, Michael Brian Matthews instituted
an action against the defendant, Douglasdale Dairy (Pty)
Ltd for
payment of the amount of R6 355 200.00 plus interest and
costs. Douglasdale Dairy has excepted to the claim in
terms of
Uniform Rule 23 and further objected to it on the basis of a failure
to comply with Uniform Rule 18(6). Douglasdale Dairy
has also raised
an issue of non-joinder of a Mr Rowan Matthews.
2.
The
matter came before me on the opposed roll on 23 November 2020. Mr
Hellens SC (with him Mr Amm) appeared for the defendant excipient
and
Mr Eloff SC appeared for the plaintiff.
3.
The
plaintiff’s claim is formulated as a claim for “damages
for unlawful holding over”. Douglasdale Dairy excepts
centrally
on the basis that the plaintiff does not have a claim for damages for
“holding over” in circumstances where
the plaintiff is a
subsequent owner of property, is not a party to a terminated lease
agreement and does not otherwise enjoy any
contractual right to claim
the damages acquired via cession, assignment or other transfer. The
claim for damages for “holding
over”, it is said, is in
law premised on a breach of the contractual right to vacant
possession at the termination of a lease.
The excipient further
complains that the co-owner of the property, Mr Rowan Matthews, who
is the plaintiff’s brother, must
be joined to the proceedings
as a necessary party.
4.
The
two central issues in the case are:
4.1
.
Whether
the plaintiff’s pleadings disclose a cause of action for
damages for “holding over”.
4.2.
Whether
the joint owner of the property Mr Rowan Matthews must be joined to
the proceedings as a necessary party.
Do
the plaintiff’s pleadings disclose a cause of action for
damages for “holding over”?
5.
There
is no dispute between the parties that the plaintiffs’
pleadings do not disclose a claim for damages for “holding

over” formulated in either contract or unjustified enrichment.
The question rather is whether the pleadings disclose such
a cause of
action in delict that is available to the plaintiff.
6.
An
excipient must satisfy the court that the conclusions of law pleaded
by the plaintiff cannot be supported by any reasonable interpretation

of the particulars of claim.
[1]
The exception must be decided on the basis that the court accepts, as
true, the factual allegations pleaded by the plaintiff.
[2]
7.
In
summarizing the relevant factual allegations, I refer to some
individuals mentioned in the particulars of claim using their first

names. In doing so, I depart from what I regard as the more
respectful approach of using an individual’s title and surname.

I do this to avoid confusion that would otherwise result in the
context of this case, and because this is how the individuals
concerned are referred to in the particulars of claim.
8.
On
this approach and in short:
8.1.
Under his Will, the late Armour Brian
Hatherly Matthews (Brian) bequeathed Portion 8 of the farm
Douglasdale 195, Registration Division
IQ, Province of Gauteng (the
immovable property) to Elizabeth Anne Matthews (Elizabeth) in terms
of a
fideicommissum
.
The Will provided that upon Elizabeth’s death, the property
would devolve to Rowan Wauchope Matthews (Mr Rowan Matthews)
in a 60%
undivided share and the plaintiff in a 40% undivided share. Brian
died on 21 January 2000 and in July 2006, the immovable
property was
then transferred to Elizabeth under the
fideicommissum
.
8.2.
On 25 March 2009, Elizabeth and the
defendant, Douglasdale Dairy, concluded a written lease agreement in
terms of which Douglasdale
Dairy would lease the property for a
period of 60 months expiring on 28 February 2014. Douglasdale Dairy
let the property until
the expiry of the lease agreement and
thereafter remained in occupation of the property. Despite demand,
the defendant failed,
refused or neglected to vacate and remains in
occupation. In May 2016, Elizabeth obtained an eviction order in this
Court against
the defendant.
8.3.
Elizabeth died on 6 September 2016. In
accordance with the provisions of Brian’s Will, the property
then devolved in undivided
shares to Mr Rowan Matthews (60%) and the
plaintiff (40%). The eviction order was not overturned following the
defendant’s
appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal, which appeal
hearing occurred subsequent to Elizabeth’s death.
8.4.
The defendant continues to occupy the
property without consent and against the express wishes of the
plaintiff, pays no rental to
the plaintiff, has never paid any rental
to the plaintiff and has no valid lease agreement with the plaintiff.
In the result, the
plaintiff pleads, the defendant is in unlawful
occupation of the property.
8.5.
The plaintiff pleads that he is entitled to
be paid 40% of a reasonable monthly rental in respect of the property
from 6 September
2016 until the defendant vacates the property
alternatively occupies with consent or in terms of a valid lease
agreement with the
plaintiff. A reasonable rental is alleged to be
R400 000 monthly as at 6 September 2016 escalating by 10%
annually. A table
is provided showing the manner of arriving at the
amount claimed. The claim is framed as “damages for holding
over”.
9.
During
the course of argument, Mr Hellens conceded that a subsequent owner
of property that is the subject of a lease terminated
prior to the
acquisition of ownership and who otherwise has no contractual rights
derived from such such has a claim in delict
against the former
tenant in circumstances where the former tenant continues in unlawful
occupation of the property and does not
pay rent. In my view, this
concession was responsibly made:
[3]
continued occupation without a legal right to do so is
per
se
a wrongful act.
[4]
Mr Hellens
submitted, however, that the pleadings nevertheless do not disclose a
cause of action centrally because they are framed
as a claim for
damages for “holding over”.
10.
The
submission was premised on a contention that a claim of damages for
“holding over” has a technical meaning in law
which is
confined to a claim grounded in a breach of contract by a lessee or
erstwhile lessee to give vacant possession to a
lessor
on termination of the lease agreement. Absent a lessor ceding,
assigning or otherwise transferring contractual rights, or some
other
vesting of contractual rights, the argument continued, a subsequent
owner does not have any claim for damages for holding
over. In
advancing this submission, reliance was placed on
Hyprop
Investments
[5]
and
Sandown
Park (Pty) Ltd v Hunter Your Wine & Spirit Merchant (Pty)
Ltd.
[6]
11.
Mr
Eloff, relying on the principle that an excipient must satisfy the
Court that the conclusion of law pleaded cannot be supported
by any
reasonable interpretation of the particulars of claim, submitted that
term “damages for holding over” is not
used in a
technical sense in the particulars of claim. Rather, the reference to
“holding over” should be understood
as a reference to the
act of continuing unlawfully in occupation. Mr Eloff further
submitted that there is no reason in law to
limit a claim for damages
for holding over to a claim grounded in breach of contract where the
claim is formulated in delict.
12.
In
my view, the exception cannot be upheld for three reasons.
13.
First,
I agree with Mr Eloff that the term “holding over” as
used in context of the particulars of claim can reasonably
and should
be understood to refer to the defendant’s act of continuing in
unlawful possession of the property. In interpreting
the language, I
have not focused solely on the words “holding over” but
have understood them in the context in which
they are used in the
pleadings and their apparent purpose.
[7]
It may be that some of the historical background to how the plaintiff
acquired co-ownership of the property is not strictly necessary,
as
Mr Amm submitted in reply, but even if this is so, this does not
render the pleadings excipiable. Moreover, to ascribe the term

“holding over” this meaning, is consistent with the
following dictum of Spilg J in
Hyprop
Investment
:
“The term ‘holding over’ is no more than a
convenient label attached to the conduct or act which affords a
remedy in damages.”
[8]
In
this case, that conduct is the act of remaining in unlawful
occupation of property co-owned by the plaintiff in circumstances

where a prior lease with a previous owner has terminated and an
eviction order has been granted and dishonored.
14.
Second,
as Mr Hellens conceded, an owner has a claim in delict for damages
arising from unlawful occupation of property. The then
Appellate
Division held in
Hefer’s
case
[9]
that an owner who has or had no possession of property has a claim
against another who unlawfully possesses, holds (occupies) or
uses
the thing and can institute the
actio
legis Aquiliae
if
he has suffered patrimonial loss.
[10]
If the phrase “damages for holding over” is understood to
refer to damages for continuing in unlawful occupation, as
I hold it
reasonably can and should be, then the exception must fail. There is
no obvious defect in the pleadings when viewed as
a claim by an owner
under the
actio
legis Aquilia
for patrimonial loss arising from unlawful occupation, and
pertinently for present purposes, none has been raised in the
exception
before me.
15.
Third,
a claim for damages for “holding over” of the sort in
issue before the courts in
Hyprop
Investment
and
Sandown
Park
are not restricted to claims formulated in contract, or indeed
unjustified enrichment. It is now established that a claim for
damages for “holding over” can be formulated in contract,
unjustified enrichment or delict.
[11]
It is settled law that the measure of damages that is usually claimed
in a claim for holding over is the market rental of the premises,
[12]
although other damages if correctly alleged and proved are also
competent. In this case the usual measure of damages is claimed.
In
Hyprop Investments, Spilg J noted that in the vast majority of cases
this “accepted method of determining damages obviates
the need
of deciding whether to formulate the claim in contract or delict and
to rely on a breach of wrongfulness respectively;
nor are the damages
reduced to the lesser of the benefit to the occupier or the loss to
the landlord as would be the case under
an enrichment action.”
One of the reasons for this, as Spilg J explained, is that where
under contract the breach is a failure
to restore possession on
termination and damages arises because a landlord is deprived of the
use and enjoyment of property because
an erstwhile tenant is in
occupation, under delict the continued occupation without a legal
right to do so is
per
se
a wrongful act and loss of a market related rental is reasonably
foreseeable damages.
[13]
The
court held:

Accordingly,
in the usual case where the landlord sues for a market related
rental, the claim may be formulated either in contract
or in delict.
In both cases damages will be the market rental value (unless there
is a rental survival clause in the contract.).
Although viable, an
unjust enrichment action is cumbersome because of the method for
computing damages with the risk of recovering
less than a market
related rental.”
16.
These
dicta in
Hyprop
Investments
also concern the usual case where
the
landlord
sues for a market related rental, as occurred in that case. And as Mr
Hellens pointed out, when characterizing the claim, the Court
refers
to it being “founded on a breach of the contractual obligation
to give vacant possession on termination as required
by the relevant
clause in the lease agreement, or as an incidence of the common
law.”
[14]
However, the
judgment is also clear that a claim is not a claim for rent, but a
claim for damages, and that it can be formulated
in contract
or
delict.
Further,
and as mentioned, the court also held that the term “holding
over” is “no more than a convenient label
attached to the
conduct or act which affords a remedy in damages”
[15]
17.
I
am not found a case and none was referred to in which a claim framed
as “holding over” is instituted in delict by
a subsequent
owner rather than a person whose contractual right to vacant
possession has been breached. However, I can see no reason
why the
claim in delict should be confined to a plaintiff in whom contractual
rights to vacant possession vests. And in principle
there appears to
be no material difference between a case instituted by a subsequent
owner in delict for “damages for holding
over” and a
claim of the sort recognized in
Hefer’s
case, both being claims based on the
actio legis Aquilia
.
18.
In
the result, the exception as pleaded must fail. Although the
excipient also raised non-compliance with Rule 18(6), it was accepted

in argument that the alleged non-compliance is premised on the Court
finding for the excipient on the above issues. I accordingly
do not
deal with that further.
Joinder
of Mr Rowan Matthews
19.
The
second issue is whether Mr Rowan Matthews must be joined to the
proceedings as a necessary party. As explained above, Mr Rowan

Matthews co-owns the property with the plaintiff in undivided shares
(60%/40%). In my view, he is not a necessary party to the

proceedings.
20.
During
the course of argument, Mr Eloff pointed out that Mr Rowan Matthews
is the controlling shareholder of Douglasdale Dairy.
Mr Hellens did
not object to this being drawn to the court’s attention. In my
view, however, these circumstances do not alter
the legal question
which must be decided, namely whether a co-owner of an undivided
share in a property must be joined in a claim
in delict for damages
for patrimonial loss instituted by one co-owner against an unlawful
occupier. In circumstances where Mr Matthews
is not a co-plaintiff,
the submissions is that he should be joined as a co-defendant with a
legal interest in the subject matter
of the litigation. Mr Hellens
submitted that this is necessary because, as a co-owner, he has an
interest in the questions of law
and fact which are decided by the
Court in the action. Before he is bound on these issues, either by
virtue of legal precedent
or issue estoppel - the submission
continued – Mr Rowan Matthews has a right to be heard.
21.
The
Constitutional Court held in
Matjhabeng
Local Municipality
:
‘The law on joinder is well settled. No court can make findings
adverse to any person’s interests, without that person
first
being a party to the proceedings before it.’
[16]
And in
SARDA
,
[17]
in which a lessee applied to join proceedings under the
Restitution
of Land Rights Act 1994
in which the Land Claims Court had ordered
restitution of state-owned land which was leased to the applicant for
joinder in its
absence, the Constitutional Court held:

If
the applicant shows that it has some right which is affected by the
order issued, permission to intervene must be granted. For
it is a
basic principle of our law that no order should be granted against a
party without affording such party a pre-decision
hearing. This is so
fundamental that an order is generally taken to be binding only on
parties to the litigation.”
22.
A
party is a necessary party and a plea of non-joinder should be
allowed if such person has a direct and substantial interest in
any
order the court might make, or if such an order cannot be sustained
or carried into effect without prejudicing that party.
[18]
A party can waive their right to be joined but the question of waiver
is not before me.
[19]
23.
Mr
Hellens submitted that it is well established that joint owners must
be joined in legal proceedings relying on
Rosebank
Mall (Pty) Ltd v Cradock Heights (Pty) Ltd.
[20]
In
Rosebank
Mall
,
Cilliers AJ held: “Where a right sought to be enforced vests in
parties jointly, or an obligation sought to be enforced
rests on
parties jointly, joinder of the joint creditors or joint debtors is
generally necessary. Such joint contracting parties
are in a similar
position to joint owners and partners. (Compare
Morgan
and another v Salisbury Municipality
1935 AD 167
at 171.)”
24.
In
turn, in
Morgan’s
case
,
De Villiers JA stated: “The position may therefore be broadly
stated to be that by South African practice the only cases
in which a
defendant has been allowed to demand a joinder as of right are the
cases of joint owners, joint contractors and partners,
in all of
which cases there exists a joint financial or proprietary interest,
but that in other cases a defendant, as a general
rule, has not been
allowed to demand such joinder. Now it is not necessary or advisable
to formulate here any general statement
as to the principles on which
the practice, hitherto so narrowly confined, ought to be based in
future, or as to the directions
(if any) it ought to be extended or
enlarged.” This statement must however be understood in light
of a prior statement of
De Villiers JA which appears earlier in the
same paragraph following his consideration of Mason J’s
decision in
Muller’s
Executors v Small Farms
:
[21]
“South African practice must therefore be looked to, and
according to that practice the position is (I think correctly) stated

by Mason J in the above-mentioned case, viz, that the cases in which
a plea of non-joinder has been allowed, have usually been
those in
which one of two co-owners, or one of two joint contractors, or one
of two partners, was the sole plaintiff or the sole
defendant in the
action. (Even in such cases there are many exceptions in which
joinder is not necessary; see 1910 TPD at p200
and Beck on Pleadings
pp 10-19.).”
25.
What
is important to appreciate is that these dicta should not be
understood as authority for any proposition to the effect that
joint
owners must always be joined in legal proceedings. Thus, in
Mullers
,
Mason J distinguished between cases where “other parties have
such an indivisible interest that the judgment must necessarily

affect them notwithstanding the principle of
res
inter alios acta,
and
those in which other parties may have similar rights depending on a
similar title, but not necessarily affected by any judgment
in an
action in which they were not parties.”
[22]
The case before Mason J was an illustration of the former class where
co-owners of a dam were regarded as “absolutely necessary

parties” in a suit where an order directing the destruction of
the dam could be granted. While the Court acknowledged that
the cases
where joinder is regarded as necessary are usually those involving
two co-owners or two joint contractors or two partners,
it also
acknowledged the existence of numerous exceptions. Importantly, in
Amalgamated
Engineering,
Fagan
AJA, after considering
Mullers
and
Morgan’s
case
,
and their identification of cases in which a plea of non-joinder is
“usually” allowed, holds that: “The question
of
joinder should surely not depend on the nature of the subject-matter
of the suit, as some of the head-notes I have referred
to would seem
to imply, but – whether the suit relates to a will, an
aqueduct, a partnership, or anything else – on
the manner in
which, and the extent to which, the Court’s order may affect
the interests of third parties.”
[23]
26.
In
my view, the case before me falls into the second class identified by
Mason J. While Mr Rowan Matthews and the plaintiff are
joint owners,
and may both have a claim for damages arising from such title, it is
difficult to see how Mr Rowan Matthews’
rights or interests
would be adversely affected by the order sought by the plaintiff if
he is not joined to the proceedings. The
joint owners’
proprietary rights are not affected by the order sought. To the
extent that a co-owner such as Mr Rowan Matthews
may himself wish to
pursue a damages claim to restore his own patrimony, there is nothing
precluding him from doing so or indeed
from applying to join this
case as a co-plaintiff. And if he does not pursue that route, and
subject to the principles of notice
and waiver (which are not before
me), he cannot be bound by findings of fact that the Court may make
in his absence. While he may
be affected by legal precedent that may
or may not be established in the case, no such imminent precedent was
identified and, in
any event, this alone does not give rise to a
necessary joinder. If legal findings are made by this court in one
case that are
clearly wrong, they can be departed from by another and
if need be rectified on appeal.
27.
I
conclude that Mr Rowan Matthews is not a necessary party to the
proceedings.
Costs
28.
There
is no reason why costs should not follow the result. To avoid any
doubt when costs are taxed, I have concluded that the main
issues
raised in this exception were sufficiently complex to warrant the
appointment of senior counsel.
Order
29.
The
following order is made:
29.1.
The
exception is dismissed.
29.2.
The
defendant is ordered to pay the costs of the exception on a party and
party scale which costs shall include the costs of senior
counsel.
COWEN
AJ
Date of hearing: 23
November 2020
Date of judgment: 25
February 2021
Appearances:
Excipient:
MR
Hellens SC and GW Amm instructed by Livingstone Crichton Attorneys.
Plaintiff:
C
Eloff SC instructed by Schindlers Attorneys
[1]
Stewart
and another v Botha and another
2008(6)
SA 310 (SCA)
[2]
For
this trite proposition, both parties referred to the useful
summation by Makgoka J of the general principles applicable to

exceptions in
Living
Hands (Pty) Ltd and another v Ditz and others
2013(2) SA 368 (GSJ) at para 15. See too
Stewart
and another v Botha and another
2008(6) SA 310 (SCA) at para 4.
[3]
Hefer
v Grundling 1979(4) SA (A) (Hefer’s case)
[4]
Hyprop
Investments v NCS Carriers and Forwarding CC (Hyprop Investments)
2013(4) SA 607 (GSJ) at para 43.
[5]
Supra
[6]
1985(1)
SA 248(W) (Sandown Park).
[7]
List
v Gungers 1979(3) SA 106 (A) at 118, Christie’s Law of
Contract in South Africa (7 ed) p 244-5.
[8]
Supra
at para 54.
[9]
1979(4)
SA (A)
[10]
See
p858G-H and 960C.
[11]
Hyprop
Investments supra at para 45 to 51.
[12]
Sandown
Park at 256I and Hyprop Investments at para 42.
[13]
Hyprop
Investments at para 42.
[14]
Hyprop
Investments at para 42.
[15]
Hyprop
Investments at para 54.
[16]
Matjhabeng
Local Municipality v Eskom Holdings Ltd
2018(1)
SA 1 (CC) at 33E-F.
[17]
SA
Riding for the Disabled Association v Regional Land Claims
Commissioner 2017(5) SA 1 (CC) (SARDA).
[18]
SARDA,
supra.
Amalgamated
Engineering Union v Minister of Labour
1949(3)
SA 637 (A)
[19]
The
issue of non-joinder was raised on exception and the arising
questions thus must arise
ex
facie
the
particulars of claim. Erasmus
Superior
Court Practice
D1-127. The issue or waiver or the impact of any prior notice to Mr
Rowan Mattews can still be raised should the issue of joinder
be
revisited as it still can be.
[20]
2004(2)
SA 353 (W).
[21]
1910
TPD 199
(Mullers)
[22]
See
p 199.
[23]
At
657. See Erasmus at D1-124.