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[2021] ZAGPJHC 15
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Interpark South Africa (Pty) Limited v Acuity On Point Solutions (Pty) Limited and Others (A5073/2018) [2021] ZAGPJHC 15 (2 February 2021)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG
(1)
REPORTABLE:
NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER
JUDGES:
NO
(3)
REVISED:
Date:
2
nd
February
2021
APPEAL
CASE NO
:
A5073/2018
COURT
A QUO
CASE NO
:
12030/2016
DATE
:
2
nd
february 2021
In
the matter between:
INTERPARK
SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LIMITED
Appellant
and
ACUITY
ON POINT SOLUTIONS (PTY) LIMITED
First Respondent
COCKBURN
,
CRAIG RALPH
BURNSIDE
Second Respondent
McGILLAVRAY-TEALE
,
JULES
Third Respondent
WOLFAARDT
,
KATIE
ELIZABETH
Fourth Respondent
KATZ
,
DAVID MANUEL
Fifth Respondent
FOUCHé
,
ROMANA
IWETT
Sixth Respondent
Coram:
Mabuse, Francis
et
Adams JJ
Heard
:
2 September 2020 – The ‘virtual hearing’ of
the
application was conducted as a videoconference on the
Microsoft
Teams
digital platform.
Delivered:
2 February 2021 –
This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties' representatives by email, by
being uploaded to the
CaseLines
system of the GLD and by release to SAFLII. The date and time for
hand-down is deemed to be 11H00 on 2 February 2021.
Summary:
Search and seizures –
Anton
Piller
orders – nature –
Anton Piller
order directed at preserving evidence that would otherwise be lost or
destroyed – not a form of early discovery or mechanism
for
applicant to determine whether it has cause of action –
Appeal against setting
aside of Anton Piller order dismissed.
ORDER
On appeal from:
The
Gauteng Local Division of the High Court, Johannesburg (Matojane J
sitting as Court of first instance):
(1)
The appellant’s appeal against the
order of the court
a quo
is dismissed with costs.
(2)
The appellant shall pay the costs of the
first, second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth respondents, which cost
shall include the
cost of the application for leave to appeal.
JUDGMENT
Adams J (Mabuse et Francis
JJ concurring):
[1].
This appeal
concerns the lawfulness and the validity of the issue and the
execution of an
Anton
Piller
order
– the type of order which is generally described as a civil
procedure for the lawful search, seizure and preservation
of
evidence. In this process generally the court orders the sheriff to
search for, then seize and preserve evidence which is material
to a
matter. The procedure – often described as ‘a draconian
form of relief which should be granted only under exceptional
circumstances’ – is to be employed where the applicant
justifiably believes that the respondent may destroy the evidence
if
no such order is granted. An Anton Piller procedure should never be
employed to enable searches to be undertaken to look for
evidence to
identify or found a case, as distinct from the preservation of
evidence for use in an already identified claim –
this is a
fundamental principle.
[2].
The appellant
appeals against the judgment and order dated 12 February 2018 of
Matojane J, in terms of which he, on the return day
of a
rule
nisi
,
discharged and set aside an Anton Piller order issued in camera on an
urgent
ex
parte
basis by Moshidi J on 11 April 2016.
Matojane J also
ordered the appellant to restore to the respondents all documents and
data that had been seized during the execution
of the Anton Piller
order. The appellant was ordered to pay the costs occasioned by the
respondents' opposition to the application.
[3].
Leave to
appeal to this Full Court is with the leave of the court
a
quo
, same
having been granted on 6 July 2018.
[4].
The question to be
decided in this appeal is whether the court
a
quo
had,
on the return day of the
rule
nisi
,
correctly applied the applicable legal principles as enunciated
inter
alia
in
Shoba v
Officer Commanding Temporary Police Camp, Wagendrift Dam and Another
1995 (4) SA 1
(A) and
Non-Detonating
Solutions (Pty) Ltd v Dune
2016 (3) SA 445
(SCA). The question is whether the appellant, which
was the applicant in the court
a
quo
, had
proven on the return day that at the time of applying for the Anton
Piller preservation order: (1) it had a
prima
facie
cause of action; (2)
prima
facie
the
respondents were in possession of documents important to that cause
of action; and (3) it (the appellant) had a reasonable
apprehension
that the respondents might not discharge its duty to make full
discovery. If those requirements had been met in the
appellant’s
application, and provided that there were no other grounds to set
aside the order, such as serious flaws in its
execution, the
preservation order should have been allowed to stand.
[5].
As regards the
lawfulness of the execution of the order, Matojane J, in light of his
findings that the order should not have been
granted in the first
place since the appellant did not comply with the aforementioned
requirements, did not deem it necessary to
and in fact did not deal
with this aspect of the matter. The appellant therefore contends
that, since there is no cross-appeal
relating to the issue of the
execution, same does not arise in this appeal. The respondents, on
the other hand, contend that that
issue is still very much alive and
is an additional reason why and a ground on which the court
a
quo
should
have set aside the order. I shall revert to this aspect of the matter
later on in the judgment.
[6].
The issues in this
appeal are to be decided against the factual backdrop set out in the
paragraphs that follow.
[7].
The appellant
(‘Interpark’) is a parking management company. It
provides management and operational services relating
to paid car
parking, including the operation of car parking garages and
facilities, gating and access control. Interpark is well-known
in the
parking of cars space in South Africa and the name ‘Interpark’
can be seen at most shopping malls, office blocks
and airports around
the country, as well as in inner cities and business districts where
there is a need for paid public car parking.
[8].
Four of the six
respondents, including the third respondent (‘Ms
McGillavray-Teale’) and the fourth respondent (‘Ms
Wolfaardt’) who were senior members of staff of the appellant,
were previously employed by the appellant. The first respondent
(‘Acuity’) was registered and incorporated on 9 of
February 2016, with its main business envisaged, once it was to
commence trading, to be in the parking operations market as is the
case with the appellant. The second respondent (‘Mr Cockburn’)
is the sole director and majority shareholder of Acuity, and he was
previously the Chief Executive Officer of Zeag (SA) (Pty) Ltd
(‘Zeag’), until his employment terminated on 1 April
2016. In that capacity, Mr Cockburn had limited dealings with
Interpark, to whom Zeag supplied ticketing and related IT systems for
utilisation in their carpark business. Zeag is a technology-based
company and its business includes the installation and maintenance of
electronic parking and traffic control systems. It
offers
specialised software and services to the revenue-generating parking
market. Until the termination of her employment on 16
October 2015,
Ms McGillavray-Teale, was the Head of the Human Resources Department
of the appellant. Ms Wolfaardt was its Chief
Executive Officer until
she was effectively retrenched on 2 July 2015.
[9].
On the evidence, Ms
McGillavray-Teale was not subject to a restraint of trade agreement
in favour of the appellant, whereas Ms Wolfaardt
and the sixth
respondent, Ms Fouché, were.
[10].
During 2016 the
second to sixth respondents got together and decided to go into
business together. Numerous discussions were held
between them and
understandably there was a fair amount of communication to and fro
between them during which the proposed structure
of the business
venture was discussed.
[11].
The case of the
appellant is that it was envisaged by the respondents that once it
was trading, the first respondent would compete
with the appellant.
Whilst it acknowledges the right of the respondents to compete with
it, the appellant takes issue with the
fact that the intention of the
respondents was to unlawfully compete with it in addition to the
respondents, as a collective, breaching
the restraint of trade
covenants to which some of them were subject at the time they entered
into the business association agreement
with each other.
[12].
The respondents deny
that the first respondent would be in competition with the appellant.
Whilst both entities would be operating
in the car parking market, so
the respondents contend, the focus of their respective businesses
would be different. The appellant
is involved on the operational side
of the car parking business, such as the operation of car parking
garages, access control,
ticketing and the management of parking
facilities in buildings, whereas it was envisaged that the first
respondent would be involved
not in operational matters but in the
supply, installation and maintenance of electronic parking and
traffic control systems. This
means, so the respondents contend, that
there cannot possibly be a cause of action based on unlawful
competition. Similarly, it
cannot be said that any of the respondents
would be breaching restraint of trade agreements insofar as any such
restraint of trade
agreements may have been extant at the relevant
time.
[13].
All the same, the
appellant’s case is that the execution of the Anton Piller
order at the residence of the second respondent
(‘Mr Cockburn’)
revealed that he had at his premises – also the registered
address of the first respondent –
computers on which were
stored significant quantities of financial and other information, and
documents, belonging to the appellant.
[14].
Similarly, so the
appellant submits, at the residence of Ms McGillavray-Teale documents
and information were found on an Interpark
laptop, which, according
to the independent supervising attorney, was ‘warm to the
touch’ – the type of warmth
a laptop generates after it
has been used for a while. The appellant makes much of this fact and
the fact that Ms McGillavray-Teale
denied that she had been using the
laptop at any time shortly before the search and seizure. What is
however important is the common
cause fact that she was in possession
of the laptop and any and all information contained thereon with the
consent and full knowledge
of the appellant, who gave her the laptop
when she left the employ of the appellant.
[15].
As regards Ms
Wolfaardt, the fourth respondent, who, as indicated above, was the
Chief Executive Officer of the appellant until
her retrenchment
during July 2015, she, according to the appellant, had clearly
indicated her intention to be associated with the
first respondent
and the other respondents in the business venture in competition with
the appellant. She also was party to the
respondents’ attempt
at concealing her involvement with the first respondent as she knew
full well, so the appellant contends,
that she was under a restraint.
On her cell phone, flash disk and laptop found during the execution
of the Anton Piller order,
so the appellant alleges, was discovered
the proprietary confidential information of the appellant.
[16].
The fifth respondent
(‘Mr Katz’) was cited as an interested party, although no
relief was sought against him or his
premises. For all intents and
purposes he takes no part in the proceedings, although there is
pertinent evidence which, according
to the appellant, relates to Mr
Katz.
[17].
The sixth respondent
(‘Ms Fouché’), who was previously employed by the
appellant as a Car Park manager, was also
subject to a restraint of
trade agreement when she left the employ of the appellant on 31 March
2016, clearly with the intention
to join the first and other
respondents in their new business venture.
The Law and its application
in casu
[18].
The appellant’s
case in support of its contention that
prima
facie
it
has a cause of action against the respondents which it intended to
pursue, was based to a large extent on an email purportedly
from a
‘whistle-blower’, who went by the name of Avansa Flemming
and in respect of whom the details and particulars
were singularly
scant. In fact, neither the respondents nor the appellant were able
to verify the existence of this person or entity
and/or the
authenticity of the email. The respondents contend that the email was
a fabrication by the appellant and the court
a
quo
agreed
with that submission.
[19].
The email was
received on 30 March 2016 by the appellant from Avansa Flemming –
supposedly a conflicted third party, possibly
a client of the
appellant – to whom a presentation had ostensibly been made by
the respondents. This is the same day on which
the respondents paid a
visit to a client of the appellant, namely V & A Watefront, for
the purpose, according to the appellant,
of soliciting business. Part
of the email reads as follows:
‘
It
is clear to me that they have intimate knowledge of your business
infrastructure, processes as well as your customer base which
they
are clearly using. … This is not the way we do business.’
[20].
The email essentially
purported to forewarn the appellant of the clandestine operations of
the respondents and their endeavours
at setting up a company in
competition with the appellant. As found by the court
a
quo
, the
point about this email is that it has very little, if any, probative
value – there is no legal or evidential basis on
which the
allegations made in the email can and should be accepted as evidence.
How, for example, would the appellant be able to
introduce this
evidence during a trial? It is not even hearsay evidence because it
would have had to be told to someone by someone
else, who will not be
giving evidence. It is inconceivable that statements made by phantom
persons can be allowed to stand as a
basis for a cause of action
against the respondents. It cannot therefore constitute evidence
advanced by the appellant in support
of its alleged
prima
facie
cause of action against the respondents.
[21].
The second ground on
which the appellant based its claim that it
prima
facie
has a cause of action against the respondent, is the fact that the
third to sixth respondents, including Ms McGillavray-Teale,
was bound
by a contractual restraint of trade which prevented her from joining
a competitor. There is no direct evidence in support
of the claim
that Ms McGillavray-Teale was subject to a restraint of trade
agreement. The appellant relies on and urges the court
to draw
inferences based on certain circumstances in support of this
averment.
[22].
As regards the
restraint of trade covenant by Ms Fouché, it is so, as
correctly pointed out by the respondents, that that
agreement was
conditional on payment by the appellant to Ms Fouché, which
condition was not complied with, rendering the
agreement null and
void.
[23].
The appellant also
relied on evidence proving that the respondents had visited V & A
Waterfront, a client of the appellant,
on 30 March 2016 to, according
to the appellant, solicit business. This averment by the appellant is
key to the its allegation
that it had a claim against the respondents
based on unlawful competition, thus justifying the application for an
Anton Piller
order. The explanation of the respondents for the visit
is simply that they wanted to introduce new products of Zeag to them
and
also to seek their opinion in relation to their viability for
inclusion in the first respondent's business.
[24].
The appellant also
contended that the respondents were involved, unlawfully so, in the
termination by Dainfern Square of its contract
with the appellant.
This, so the appellant contended supported the
prima
facie
cause of action based on unlawful competition. The evidence before
the court
a
quo
however showed otherwise. The respondents had nothing whatsoever to
do with the termination of the Dainfern Square contract, which
resulted from a dissatisfaction by the client with the poor level of
service delivery provided by the appellant, which caused the
client
to move its business to an unrelated third party, namely Karabo
Parking.
[25].
The respondents
contend that it is clear from the evidence before the court
a
quo
,
properly considered, that the appellant had failed to meet the first
requirement stipulated in
Shoba
supra and
Non-Detonating
Solutions
supra, namely to demonstrate
prima
facie
that
it had a cause of action against the respondents justifying the
seeking of invasive and far-reaching relief.
[26].
The causes of action
which the appellant contends it has against the respondents are based
on some of them allegedly breaching their
restraint of trade
agreements concluded with the appellant whilst they were still in its
employment. Of the four respondents previously
employed by the
appellants only two had been proven to be subject to restraint of
trade agreement, one of which was ineffective
due to non-fulfilment
of conditions. The remaining respondent, Ms Wolfaardt, confirmed that
she had a restraint of trade agreement
with the appellant. However,
the appellant’s assertion that this concession then means that
all of the respondents acted
in concert to breach this agreement is
not sustainable.
[27].
The court
a
quo
found
that the appellant had failed to demonstrate that
prima
facie
it
has a cause of action against the respondents. I agree. The evidence
in support of this contention is non-existent or of such
poor quality
that it can and should be disregarded.
[28].
The second
requirement for the granting of an Anton Piller order is that the
appellant must have demonstrated that
prima
facie
the
respondents had in their possession specific documentation or
information that was of importance to the cause or causes of
action
of the appellant.
[29].
My reading of the
record indicates that the respondents appear to accept that they were
found to be in possession of documents belonging
to the appellant.
However, they contend that there was nothing unlawful about such
possession which came about as a result of the
relationships between
them and the appellant. In any event, so the respondents contend,
there is nothing confidential about such
information. Again, I am of
the view that there is merit in the respondents’ contention.
[30].
As regards the third
requirement, the respondents submit that the appellant has failed to
prove compliance with that requirement.
The appellant had failed, so
the respondents contend, to demonstrate that they (the respondents)
would destroy or spirit away documents
such that they could not or
would not meet their discovery obligations when the time came.
[31].
The lawfulness of
possession of information is a relevant and exculpatory factor as it
bears directly on whether or not the respondents
would comply with
their discovery obligations. If the respondents were in lawful
possession of the information of the applicants
there is nothing to
say that they would not have discovered this information when called
upon to do so.
[32].
The lawfulness of
possession by the respondents of documents goes to whether or not the
actions of the appellant in seeking Anton
Piller relief were
proportionate and measured. Therefore, so the respondents contend,
the fact that the respondents were lawfully
in possession of the
applicants’ documents and information means that this
information could simply have been requested or
obtained without
having to resort to the draconian and highly invasive Anton Piller
procedure which culminated in a search of the
respondents' homes. I
agree with this submission. In all of the circumstances if this
matter, I am not persuaded that the appellant’s
apprehension
that the documents would be hidden, destroyed or otherwise spirited
away, if they had such, was a reasonable one.
[33].
The respondents also
rely for their contention that the respondents would spirit away
documents, on an email between the respondents,
which inadvertently
ended up with the appellant. This email, which was sent by the fifth
respondent, Mr Katz, implicated the respondents,
so the appellant
contends, in the ‘creation of a façade’ that the
fourth respondent, Ms Wolfaardt, was not involved
in the business of
the first respondent. In the trail of emails there is a request by
the third respondent, Ms McGillavray-Teale,
that the name and other
details of the fourth respondent, Ms Wolfaardt – the one
respondent who was subject to a restraint
of trade covenant –
should not be mentioned in any email exchanges or other forms of
communications between them. This, the
appellant argues, is a sure
indication that the respondents intended to destroy, hide or
otherwise ‘spirit away’ documents
or evidence belonging
to the appellant. I agree with the submission on behalf of the
respondents that this cannot be correct.
[34].
The appellant also
relies heavily on the fact that, according to it,
Ms McGillavray-Teale, whilst in its employ had destroyed
documents. This allegation against Ms McGillivray-Teale was
extrapolated and
inter
alia
underpinned the appellant's submission that all the respondents were
likely to engage in the destruction of documents. How this
quantum
leap is made is a mystery since no similar allegation was levelled
against Mr Cockburn, Ms Wolfaardt, Ms Fouché
or Mr Katz that
they had or that they intended to engage in the destruction of
evidence. Moreover, in my view, the evidence on
which the appellant
relied for the allegation against Ms McGillavray-Teale was far from
convincing.
[35].
I find myself in
agreement with the submission on behalf of the respondents that the
attempted extrapolation of this allegation
to encompass all the
respondents is unjustified and amounts to paranoia and vaguely
postulated conspiracy theories. This is exactly
what Binns-Ward J
cautioned against in
Web
Call (Pty) Ltd v Botha and Another
(A50/2014)
[2014] ZAWCHC 179
(5 December 2014). It is not sufficient
to create a real or well-founded apprehension (even prima facie) that
the respondents would
not comply with their discovery obligations.
[36].
The appellant also
attaches significant weight to an email sent by Mr Katz on 1
April 2016 in support of the first and third
requirements for the
granting of an Anton Piller order. This email inadvertently ended up
in the hands of the appellant. The email
clearly had as its purpose
the appraisal of all of the respondents of steps that Mr Katz had
taken or proposed to take in relation
to the setting up of a domain
name for the emails of Acuity as well as work that he intended to
undertake with Ms Fouché
in relation to setting up a standard
set of documents to be used by Acuity when it entered the market.
[37].
In the trailing
emails which followed the suggestion was also made by Ms
McGillavray-Teale that they, as a group, should avoid using
the name
of Ms Wolfaardt in communiqués between them. This, the
appellant contends, is proof that the respondents underhandedly
planned on competing unlawfully with it.
[38].
A proper reading of
the email does not support this conclusion. There was no suggestion
that the documents that were to be created
by Mr Katz and Ms Fouché
were going to be copied from existing documents of the appellant. The
indications were that the
documents were to be created from scratch
by the respondents and would become the property of Acuity.
[39].
The request by Ms
McGillavray-Teale that the email correspondence between the
respondents not bear reference to Ms Wolfaardt cannot
possibly
indicate an intention by the respondents to hide or ‘spirit
away’ evidence. It was not suggested that the
email should be
deleted simply that reference to Ms Wolfaardt be removed. The
respondents submit that if the appellant truly believed
as a result
of Mr Katz's email that there was a reasonable apprehension that
documents would be destroyed or spirited away, one
would have
expected them to have immediately taken steps to execute the order
against Mr Katz. It chose not to do so, which indicates,
so the
respondents argue, that the appellant truly did not have the
apprehension that the respondents would be spiriting away documents.
I find myself in agreement with this submission. As with all of the
evidence relied upon by the appellant in support of its application
for the Anton Piller order, this email does very little to advance
the case of the appellant in relation to their alleged apprehension
that the respondents were likely to destroy the evidence.
[40].
For the aforegoing
reasons I am of the view that the court
a
quo
was
justified, on account of the appellant’s failure in its
founding papers to comply with the requirements for the issue
of the
Anton Piller preservation order, in discharging the Anton Piller
order on the return day.
That
conclusion would, by itself, be enough to result in the dismissal of
the appeal. But there were also other aspects of
the matter
that support that result.
[41].
The court
a
quo
also
concluded that the appellant sought to ‘steal a march’ on
the first respondent ‘in respect of the introduction
of new and
innovative technology'. In addition, it accepted that the
respondents’ submissions that the Anton Piller application
was
nothing more than a fishing expedition. This, so the respondents
contend, is clear from the conversations conducted on the
WhatsApp
social media platform between the participants in the various
searches conducted at the respondents' premises. During these
discussions
Mr Hulley, the deponent to the appellant’s founding
affidavit, for example encouraged the search teams with the
statements
like: ‘Good hunting guys’. Other participants
said things like: ‘Haven't hit the jackpot yet’ and ‘It
seems that the exercise will provide what we need.’
[42].
These statements
confirm, according to the respondents, that rather than to search for
and seize evidence and documents which the
applicants knew to be in
possession of the respondents, the purpose of the execution of the
Anton Piller order was to see if they
could find anything
incriminating against the respondents in support of their possible
causes of action. In fact, so the respondents
contend, the very
nefarious purpose of the Anton Piller order and its execution was to
gain access to and take possession of the
confidential information of
Acuity, which planned to enter the market with a novel and unique
product. The appellant, fearing competition
from Acuity, sought to
exclude it from the parking management market and to ‘steal a
march’ on Acuity in respect of
the introduction of new and
innovative technology.
[43].
I find myself in
agreement, as did Matojane J, with these submissions on behalf of the
respondents. The appellant failed to demonstrate
the requirements for
the Anton Piller order to secure specific and specified documents in
the possession of the respondents which
constituted vital evidence to
support its cause of action. The execution of the order was nothing
more than a fishing expedition.
This is another ground on which the
order was set aside and the appeal should be dismissed.
[44].
In the circumstances,
I am of the view that the learned Judge
a
quo
was
correct in in setting aside and discharging the
rule
nisi
granted by Moshidi J. The court
a
quo
was
also correct in ordering that the items seized by the sheriff during
the execution of the order be returned to them. In my
view there was
no misdirection on the part of Matojane J.
[45].
In light of my
findings, it is not necessary for me to deal with the other issue
raised by the respondents namely the defects complained
of by them in
relation to the execution of the order. Suffice to say, that we agree
with the submissions by the respondents that
this issue is still very
much alive. It is trite that an appeal lies against the order of a
lower court and not against the reasons
for its judgment. If the
reasons are wrong, but the order is correct, an appeal court is fully
entitled and empowered to confirm
the order for the right reasons. In
other words, if the finding of this court was that the court
a
quo
erred
in holding that the appellant complied with the requirements for the
issue of an Anton Piller order, this court would nevertheless
have
been entitled to dismiss the appeal on the basis that the execution
of the order was unlawful. This is an issue which we however
do not
believe we need to rule on since the appeal stands to be dismissed on
the basis that the appellant did not comply with the
requirements for
an Anton Piller order.
[46].
In sum, Interpark has
not demonstrated that
prima
facie
it
has a sustainable cause of action against the respondents whether
based on breach of restraint of trade agreements or on unlawful
competition. Furthermore, on the basis of the evidence before the
court
a quo
it cannot be said that the respondents had in their possession
documentary or other electronic evidence in support of such cause,
which the respondents would destroy or conceal unless an Anton Piller
order was issued in respect of such evidence.
[47].
As was said by
Mathopo JA in
Viziya
Corporation v Collaborit Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Others
2019 (3) SA 173
(SCA), in every case it is notionally possible that a
litigant will, when it comes to the time for discovery, suppress
documents
which are adverse to its case. This notional possibility is
not enough. An Anton Piller order is highly invasive and must be
restricted
to those cases where,
inter
alia
,
there is a substantial case for believing that the respondent will
not properly honour its discovery duties in due course. This
is not
such a case.
[48].
In the circumstances, we are of the view
that the appeal against the order of the High Court should be
dismissed.
Order
In the
result, the following order is made: -
(1)
The appellant’s appeal against the
order of the court
a quo
is dismissed with costs.
(2)
The appellant shall pay the costs of the
first, second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth respondents, which cost
shall include the
cost of the application for leave to appeal.
L R ADAMS
Judge of the High Court
Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg
I agree, and it is so ordered
P
M MABUSE
Judge
of the High Court
Gauteng
Local Division, Johannesburg
I agree,
E
J FRANCIS
Judge
of the High Court
Gauteng Local Division,
Johannesburg
HEARD ON:
2
nd
September 2020 – in a ‘virtual hearing’
during a videoconference on the
Microsoft Teams
digital
platform.
JUDGMENT DATE:
2
nd
February 2021 – judgment handed down
electronically
FOR THE APPLICANT:
Advocate Owen Salmon SC
INSTRUCTED BY:
Schindler Attorneys
FOR THE RESPONDENTS:
Advocate A J S Redding SC, with Advocate P Bosman
INSTRUCTED BY:
Brand Potgieter Incorporated