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[2020] ZAGPJHC 287
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Mabote v Fundudzi Media Proprietary Limited t/a Sunday World (20/33468) [2020] ZAGPJHC 287 (13 November 2020)
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Case
No: 20/33468
In
the matter between:
KEFILWE
FAITH
MABOTE
APPLICANT
and
FUNDUDZI
MEDIA PROPRIETARY LIMITED
T/A SUNDAY
WORLD
RESPONDENT
Whether
a media defendant should be ordered in urgent court proceedings to
publish an apology, considered – more appropriate
to approach
the Press Council which has jurisdiction to do so, as urgent
determination of complaints is built into the Press Council’s
prescribed timeframes and competency of the Press Council to order a
media defendant to publish an apology exists.
JUDGMENT
INGRID
OPPERMAN J
Introduction
[1]
This is an urgent application, which has
its genesis in the publication by the respondent of comment about the
applicant, Ms Mabote,
in the gossip column of the respondent’s
Sunday World newspaper dated Sunday, 11 October 2020. The Sunday
World is a tabloid
newspaper. The publication occurred after the
assets of Mr Edwin Sodi, applicant’s ‘romantic partner’,
had been
seized by law enforcement agencies in connection with Mr
Sodi’s alleged wrongful conduct.
[2]
The applicant launched this application on
an urgent basis to have this court declare the comment published
about her as false,
defamatory and unlawful; to order the respondent
to retract the comment from all its platforms; to order the
respondent to issue
a written apology to be published on the front
page of its newspaper and related platforms; and to order the
respondent to pay
damages of R1 000 000 (One Million Rand)
upon the claim for damages being determined in oral evidence.
[3]
The applicant is on her version a public
figure, a businesswoman and digital media influencer with
approximately 1 million followers
on Instagram who enjoys a prominent
presence on social media. The respondent is a media house with a
wide-reaching, national audience.
The
common cause facts
[4]
On 11 October 2020, the respondent
published the following comments in the Sunday World Newspaper
(‘
Sunday World’
)
about the applicant who is referred to as a ‘slay queen’
and whose photograph appears nearby the following text in
a gossip
column called ‘Shwashwi’:
‘
Tough
Times for Slay Queens, Dry Season for slay queens sets in and we know
of strings of celebs who were also on Sodi’s bedroom
roll, not
payroll
hun”.
[5]
On either the 12
th
or 13
th
October 2020, the applicant received a call from her brand manager
who informed her that the respondent had published the above
comments
about her. The respondent published the comments without either
informing the applicant of the impending publication
or requesting
any comment from her.
[6]
On 14 October 2020, the applicant’s
attorneys sent a letter to the respondent explaining that the
published comments were
false, unfounded and defamatory and demanded
that the respondent retract the ‘article’ from the
newspaper and other
online platforms and issue an unconditional
apology on the front page of the newspaper no later than Sunday, 18
October 2020.
[7]
On 16 October 2020, the respondent’s
attorneys addressed a letter to the applicant’s attorneys
wherein they denied that
the comments were defamatory as the term
‘
slay queen’
,
according to them, is colloquially understood to mean
‘
an
attractive, well maintained woman who appears to live a luxurious
lifestyle which may be wholly or partially funded by a romantic
partner’
and
would therefore not lower the esteem of the applicant in the opinion
of a reasonable reader.
[8]
The respondent’s letter furthermore
stated that:
‘
Shwashwi
is a gossip page which is known for publishing tongue-in-cheek
commentary on celebrity and entertainment news. Shwashwi
does not
purport to publish factual news, nor would anything published in this
section be understood to be factual news.
’
[9]
In addition to its refusal to issue an
apology, retract the published comment and pay the applicant’s
demanded damages, the
respondent invited the applicant to lodge a
complaint with the Press Council for adjudication as a means of
seeking and obtaining
the relief that the applicant sought.
[10]
On 16 October 2020, the applicant lodged a
complaint with the Press Council and received their response on 19
October 2020 stating
that, because the applicant had expressed her
intention to seek relief through court proceedings, the Press Council
would defer
acceptance of the complaint pending the finalisation of
the contemplated legal proceedings.
[11]
On Thursday, 22 October 2020, the applicant
launched these proceedings.
The
nature of the opposition
[12]
The application is opposed, because it is
contended by the respondent that (a) it is not urgent, as, amongst
other reasons, the
applicant has put up no evidence that she will be
unable to obtain substantial redress in the ordinary course; (b) the
words complained
of were not defamatory; (c) if defamatory, they
constituted protected comment; and (d) the applicant has an adequate
alternative
remedy, as she can seek the same apology and retraction
through a Press Council complaint.
Urgency
Rule
6(12)
[13]
Rule 6(12)
is the
rule which defines the test for having a matter determined on the
urgent roll as opposed to the ordinary roll and it provides
in
relevant part as follows:
(a)
In urgent applications the court or a judge may dispense with the
forms and service provided for in these Rules and may dispose
of such
matter at such time and place and in such manner and in accordance
with such procedure (which shall as far as practicable
be in terms of
these Rules) as to it seems meet.
(b)
In every affidavit or petition
filed in support of any
application under paragraph (a) of this subrule,
the applicant
shall set forth explicitly
the circumstances which he avers
render the matter urgent and
the reasons why he claims that he
[she] could not be afforded substantial redress at a hearing in due
course
. (emphasis provided)
The
reason for urgency
[14]
The reason for approaching the court on
such an urgent basis is set out in the founding affidavit as follows:
’
27.
My reputation, as detailed both above and hereunder, is an integral
part of my ability to earn a living and to support my family.
28.
The Statement is currently affecting my business dealings and
livelihood as various brands have now placed my reputation in
question, which is damaging my longstanding business relationships
and could result in the cancellation and non-renewal of business
agreements.
29.
I have in my possession various Whatsapp messages and letters from
brand managers confirming the above.
30.
For the sake of keeping the content of the brands private, my counsel
shall in chambers or when requested produce this evidence.’
[15]
It
was pointed out by counsel for the applicant during argument and as
was stated by Matojane J in
Manuel
v Economic Freedom Fighters and Others
[1]
:
‘
Dignity
is not only a value fundamental to the Constitution, but it is also a
justiciable and enforceable right that must be respected
and
protected.’
Urgency
to be substantiated in founding affidavit and admission of
supplementary affidavit
[16]
It
is a jurisdictional requirement that the circumstances warranting
urgency must be set out in the founding affidavit, and explicitly
so.
Moreover, ‘
an
applicant who comes to court on an urgent basis for
final
relief bears an even greater burden to establish his right to urgent
relief than an applicant who comes to court for
interim
relief
’.
[2]
Loxton
AJ further reasoned: ‘
Where
interim
relief is sought the respondent can always address the issues at its
leisure at a later stage. Where final relief is sought that
is not
possible.
’
I agree. As the applicant sought final relief in this matter she set
herself the higher bar as the standard of proof required
to be
cleared to succeed.
[17]
Mr Winks, representing the respondent,
argued that the applicant had claimed, in the vaguest of terms, that
the matter is urgent
and that she had adduced no evidence in her
founding affidavit to support her claims – not a single letter
or message from
a single client, or any financial records to show
that the publication by Sunday World has rendered her incapable of
supporting
her family. As I have quoted above, the applicant had
offered to make some messages from brands available on a confidential
basis.
[18]
Recognising that this form of tender of
evidence without actually producing it was not going to suffice the
applicant produced a
supplementary affidavit (‘
the
supplementary affidavit’
)
attaching emails and Whatsapp messages from 4 brands she does
business with. She requested that the content be kept confidential
and contended that if this ‘
could
find themselves in the public domain, this could once again have
catastrophic consequences and further put me in a bad light
with
other brands
’.
[19]
The respondent accepted that the names of
the brands could be treated with confidentiality, but objected to the
applicant tendering
the supplementary affidavit out of sequence and
out of time as the applicant was, so the argument ran, attempting to
remedy her
failure to set out explicitly in her founding affidavit,
the reason why her application was urgent as required by Rule 6(12).
[20]
Mr
Winks relied on the dicta of Mojapelo DJP in
Gold
Fields Limited and others
[3]
that
an applicant is obliged to make its case in the founding affidavit
and that a fourth or further set of affidavits will only
be allowed
in exceptional circumstances. He emphasised that the considerations
for the receipt of a further affidavit listed in
Nick’s
Fishmonger Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Fish Diner In Bryanston CC
[4]
and
amplified in
White
Rock v Khaka,
[5]
had
not been complied with.
[21]
Mr Winks submitted that the applicant could
have said that she had 4 Whatsapp messages or letters but chose to
say ‘
various’
.
Although speculative, he contended that it might have been as she
wanted to intimidate the respondent into settling – she
wanted
the respondent to believe that she had a mountain of evidence. So
too, he suggested, it was only produced once she felt
where the shoe
pinched i.e. she realised that it could not simply be tendered from
the Bar and finally, he submitted that it might
have been withheld to
produce it when the respondent had the slimmest of chance to deal
with it. He suggested that it could have
been attached to the
founding affidavit in redacted form or the applicant could have
applied to have a hearing
in camera
.
Although the respondent dealt with the supplementary affidavit, the
only reason it was able to do so was because the court had
directed
that the matter be heard on Wednesday, 4 November 2020 and not
Tuesday, 3 November 2020 as set down by the applicant.
Further, the
fact that the respondent managed to file an answer to it, did not
mean that it was not prejudiced, all it meant was
that it was able to
minimize its prejudice.
[22]
Although all these criticisms might have
had merit if this matter had been brought in the ordinary course, the
application was brought
urgently and as Mr Morris representing the
applicant argued, in hindsight it might well have been wiser to have
attached redacted
versions or to have applied for an
in
camera
hearing but within the
circumstances of this case, the facts do not support the inferences
Mr Winks argues should be drawn ie that
the Whatsapp messages and
letters were withheld deliberately and in order to gain a tactical
advantage. I will adjudicate this
matter with both the supplementary
affidavit together with the response thereto (‘
the
answer to the supplementary affidavit’
).
Grounds
for urgency analysed
Inadequacy
of evidence tendered
[23]
None of the Whatsapp messages or emails
reveal that the brands won’t do business with the applicant,
nor is there a promise
that if the applicant can get the respondent
to apologise for its published comment the brands will resume
business as usual again
with the applicant. In addition, the
applicant fails to explain what proportion of her income is derived
from the alleged
clients or contracts mentioned in these 4 documents.
It may very well be negligible. It may be her entire income. This
essential
fact is to enable the Court to determine the gravity of the
situation arising from these messages but is not set out. The
applicant
also does not disclose what assets and savings she
possesses to support her family in the event of an interruption of a
portion
of her income.
Income
generating posts after publication of statement
[24]
Crucially, the applicant’s
publications on her primary social media platform, Instagram, after
publication of the Sunday World’s
column which occurred on 11
October 2020, contradicts applicant’s assertion that,
but
for
this court’s intervention,
she will be unable to support her family.
[25]
The respondent attached 10 instances of
publications to its answer to the supplementary affidavit containing
promotional content.
There was some debate as to whether they all
constituted income generating posts. Mr Morris for the applicant
accepted that those
which expressly stated that they were ‘
paid
partnerships’
, were
income-generating posts. Of the 10, 4 posts fall squarely
within this category. It is thus clear that the applicant
continues
to generate an income despite the publication of the comment by the
respondent. Regrettably, she did not disclose this
post-publication
income to the court nor did she explain what proportion of her income
comes from which source.
Comment
already within public domain
[26]
The respondent argued that what the
respondent had published about the applicant already formed the
subject of widespread public
comment on social media and other online
publications. Seeking relief against the respondent alone would not
erase all of that
so there was little reason, and no advantage, to
grant the relief which would, on this argument, make little or no
difference to
the applicant’s reputation which would continue
to be subject to the same comment, albeit on other platforms in the
public
domain.
[27]
Prior to the respondent publishing the
statement on 11 October 2020, the following publications occurred:
27.1.
6 October 2020 - Opera News published
“
Tough times for slay queen
Kefilwe Mabote as Hawks take her car
.”
27.2.
6 October 2020 - ZAlebs published “
Kefilwe
Mabote dragged after bae Edwin Sodi has his assets seized
.”
27.3.
6 October 2020 - FakaZAnews published
“
Kefilwe Mabote dragged for
allegedly dating Edwin Sodi after his cars got seized
.”
27.4.
7 October 2020- Surgezirc published
“
Hawks seize Kefilwe Mabote’s
car after bae’s arrest.
”
27.5.
7 October 2020 - News365 published “
Kefilwe
Mabote under fire, multi-million cars and houses of her bae Edwin
Sodi taken away
.”
27.6.
7 October 2020 - IOL published “
Mzansi
defends Kefilwe Mabote as her rumoured bae has assets seized.
”
27.7.
8 October 2020 - Briefly published “
Mihlali
Ndabase addresses rumours that she dated Kefilwe Mabote’s man.”
27.8.
8 October 2020 - The Citizen
published “
What you need to know
about Kefilwe Mabote.
”
[28]
By the time the respondent published its
article, it was already in the public domain that applicant had been
involved in a romantic
relationship with Mr Edwin Sodi. No action has
been taken by applicant against Opera News or any of the other
publications. There
seems to be merit in the argument that whether
this Court grants the applicant the relief she seeks or not (apart
from the one
million rand which she does not seek be awarded to her
by the urgent Court) her reputation will not undergo any material
change
for it is already what it is and the publications above listed
have seen to that. Courts are not inclined to grant
orders that will have only academic effect, and this must weigh in
the overall decision.
The
‘Streisand effect’
[29]
The respondent stated expressly in its
answering affidavit that the applicant is the author of most of her
alleged misfortune; that
she took a tiny column from page 18 of a
weekly gossip column and broadcast it to over 1 million followers on
Instagram where she
announced to the world that she was seeking R1
million in damages from the respondent; that this was reported in The
Citizen and
IOL and by doing this, the applicant had placed the
contents of the respondent’s column so firmly into the public
consciousness
that any relief she now seeks from the respondent
cannot reverse this – the so-called ‘Streisand effect’.
None
of this was disputed in the replying affidavit. This sentiment
is echoed by the content of applicant’s very own annexure in
her supplementary affidavit in which brand 1 says: ‘
Since
this article, which
has been
exacerbated by the recent post you made on Instagram…..
’
(emphasis provided). Courts are not inclined to come to the aid of
litigants who have caused themselves the harm of which
they complain.
Press
Council
[30]
On 16 October 2020 the applicant lodged a
complaint with the Press Council and her attorney concluded the
complaint by saying: ‘
We would
appreciate if the matter could be expedited so as to receive your
recommendation and outcome
in
order to file our pleadings in Court.’
[31]
Mr Winks very persuasively argued that one
would have expected the applicant to implore the public advocate to
consider the matter
expeditiously as her livelihood was at stake, if
that were indeed the case. Casting doubt on whether the publication
of the comment
truly put the applicant’s livelihood at stake,
Mr Winks pointed out that the applicant had failed to disclose the
‘true’
reason for wanting a decision urgently in the one
forum where urgency was for the taking. She then approached the Court
urgently
for relief, which she could have obtained at the Press
Council.
[32]
On the 19
th
of October 2020, the acting public advocate responded, in relevant
part, as follows to the applicant’s attorney:
‘
Dear
Ms Thulare
Please
see attached copies of the Press Council’s Complaints
Procedures and the Press Code. It is also available on the press
Council’s website at …….
The
Press Council’s complaints mechanism is a voluntary independent
mediation and arbitration process to deal cost-effectively
and
quickly with complaints from the public about journalistic ethics and
conduct at publications that subscribe to The Press Code.
In
your letter dated 14 October to Sunday World you demand on behalf of
your client an amount of R1 million, and, in your email
of 16 October
to our Case Officer, Ms Mndaweni, you asked that the matter “be
expedited so as to receive your recommendation
and outcome in order
to file our pleadings in Court”. It was suggested by Sunday
World’s lawyer that your client could
lodge a complaint with
the press Council for adjudication “to seek and obtain whatever
relief may be suitable and due to
your client”.
I
must advise that
the sanctions of the
Press Council’s complaints mechanism entails the following
:
the publication can be cautioned or reprimanded;
directed
that a correction, retraction or explanation
and, where appropriate,
an apology
and/or the findings of the Ombud, the Adjudication Panel, or the
Appeals Panel be published; and/or ordered that a complainant’s
reply to a published article.
From
your correspondence quoted above, it seems that your client also
wishes to seek relief through court proceedings. The Press
Council
does not require a complainant to waive
his or her rights
, but, however, will
defer acceptance of a complaint pending the finalisation of pending
or contemplated legal proceedings.’
(emphasis provided)
[33]
The acting public advocate concluded that
the applicant ‘
cannot use the
outcome of the Press Council’s complaints mechanism
‘
in order to file [y]our pleadings
in Court
’.
[34]
The
applicant did not explain why she had abandoned the speedy remedies
afforded by the Press Council, despite having lodged a complaint
to
it. A complaint to the Press Council’s Ombud is required to be
lodged no later than 20 working days after the date of
publication
[6]
, and is resolved
in accordance with very speedy timeframes.
[7]
[35]
Mr
Winks suggested that what the applicant ought to have done was to
place more facts before the acting public advocate at the Press
Council to persuade him to exercise his discretion in favour of the
applicant to accept the complaint, facts such as wanting the
exact
same relief in Court as that which the Press Council had the
jurisdiction to grant (other than the damages which she would
pursue
in the ordinary course in court and not on an urgent basis). She
could also have requested the Ombud
[8]
,
within 7 working days of the Press Council declining to accept the
complaint, to adjudicate the complaint.
Order
of apology against a media defendant
[36]
More perplexing is the fact that the
applicant approached the urgent court, where she does have to make
out a case for urgency,
for relief not recognised by our law but
available to her at the Press Council where she would not have had to
have made out a
case for urgency as urgent determination of
complaints is built into the Press Council’s prescribed
timeframes.
[37]
In
Le
Roux v Dey
[9]
the
Constitutional Court unambiguously pronounced that our law did not
recognise an apology as a remedy for defamation.
[38]
In
The
Citizen 1978 (Pty) Ltd and Others v McBride
[10]
,
Justice Cameron cautioned as follows:
‘
It
may well be that the remedies readily to hand when a court considers
the relief to which a plaintiff is entitled in a defamation
case
should include a suitable apology. The importance of apology in
securing redress and in salving feelings cannot be under-estimated.
As pointed out in
Le Roux,
apology
is an important aspect of restorative justice. In this case, it
could well have been a fit part of the order
to require the Citizen
to publish an apology for its ill-fitting assertion that Mr McBride
lacked contrition. However, Mr McBride’s
contention that an
apology would be inappropriate weighs against ordering it.
In
addition, the complexities the Citizen points to when a court orders
a media defendant to apologise, and the law reform initiatives
in
other countries, will benefit from fuller consideration and debate on
a future occasion. It would therefore not be appropriate
to order an
apology in this case, and the question of an apology where a media
defendant has defamed another must await another
day.’
[39]
Subsequently,
apologies were ordered in
Manuel
(supra),
Hanekom
v Zuma
[11]
and
Gqubule-Mbeki
and Another v Economic Freedom Fighters and Another
[12]
but
not against media defendants
.
[40]
No
court has, to the best of my knowledge, duly assisted by counsel for
the parties in this matter and the research facilities available
to
High Court Judges in this Division, post the
Dey
[13]
case,
ever
[14]
ordered
a media defendant in a defamation claim, to publish an apology. This
is probably so for, amongst other reasons, those
advanced by the
learned authors de Milo and Steyn
[15]
being
that it may well be found to ‘
unjustifiably
limit the media’s constitutional right to freedom of
expression.’
[16]
[41]
The Constitutional Court hinted at the need
for a court to receive extensive, careful and constitutional
arguments in respect of
such relief being granted. This novelty was
neither addressed in the founding affidavit nor in the heads of
argument for the parties.
Mr Winks raised this at the hearing and in
argument.
[42]
It may well be that the Press Council is
the only remedy available to the applicant if she wants to compel a
published apology against
a media defendant such as the respondent.
[43]
The
application was served on 22 October 2020 and the respondent was
required to file an answering affidavit by Tuesday 27 October
2020.
This afforded the respondent two court days to prepare its answering
affidavit. As Cachalia J said in
Digital
Printers v Riso Africa (Pty) Ltd
[17]
:
‘
The
urgent court is not geared to dealing with a matter which is not only
voluminous
but clearly includes
complexity and even some novel points of law
.’
(emphasis provided)
Rules
exist for the Court
[44]
Finally,
conscious that
‘…
..the
Rules exist for the Court, rather than the Court for the Rules’
[18]
I
would not be inclined to enrol this matter as one of urgency for the
following reasons: the applicant came to court contending
that the
statement ‘
casts
aspersions on my character and integrity, insinuating that I am a
prostitute on a bedroom roll’
.
She contended that:
‘
Moreover,
I am advised that the term by which the Respondent describes me, i.e.
'slay queen’ is defined to be: "a young
dumb woman who
chases after wealthy men" or women who resort to sex work in
order to make a living.
This term is a
veiled insult
for women who one makes
an assumption about based solely on their outward appearance and
lifestyle. (emphasis provided)
[45]
The undisputed evidence presented in this
court was that the applicant was referred to by GK Dream Hair, a hair
salon which the
applicant represents as a brand ambassador, no fewer
than in five publications on both Instagram and on Twitter during
2018, as
a ‘
slay queen’
.
This was done clearly in a positive and non-defamatory manner. The
publication on Twitter on 27 November 2018 was endorsed ‘
liked
’
by the applicant’s own Twitter account. Further, on 16 October
2020 the applicant confirmed that she and Edwin Sodi
had been in a
romantic relationship for ‘
no more
than a year
’. This was reported
in an article by The Citizen – not affiliated or related to the
respondent.
[46]
During the replying argument, reliance on
‘
slay queen
’
as constituting the defamatory matter was disavowed by the applicant.
The complaint was directed at the use of the phrase
‘
bedroom
roll
’ exclusively.
[47]
What
is not at all clear for me from the papers is whether it is the
applicant’s association with Mr Edwin Sodi which is causing
the
brands to have put their collaborations with the applicant on hold
(if that is indeed so) or whether it is because of the publications
by Sunday World. It is not for me to decide this issue as I won’t
be enrolling the matter as one of urgency however, what
is clear is
that the very recent reasoning of Tolmay J in
Mokate
v UDM
is apposite:
[19]
‘
I
am of the view that in the light of the fact that the publication
took place on 17 June 2020 [three weeks before the hearing],
the
statement has been in the public domain for a significant time and
the harm that may have been done, has already occurred.
The
proverbial horse has bolted.
Such harm that Dr Mokate may
suffer, due to the statements, can be addressed in due course when
the matter is heard and the
issues between the parties are property
ventilated.
She will be able to obtain redress at a
hearing in due course, as all other litigants in defamation matters
do.’
(emphasis provided)
[48]
Rule
6(12) requires the applicant to present facts that tend to prove that
any relief she might obtain in the ordinary course would
not be
‘substantial relief’. It is not good enough for her
to allege that an interdict (i.e. apology and retraction)
granted in
the ordinary course would be of lesser value – she must show
that it would be of insubstantial value (i.e. incapable
of
substantially vindicating her reputation)
[20]
when
compared to one published more speedily. The applicant has not
put up any averments to this effect and her case has thus
failed to
clear the bar for urgent adjudication by this Court, differently put,
the applicant has not made out a case for urgent
relief as required
by rule 6(12).
Conclusion
and Order
[49]
In the result I find that this matter does
not attain the legally prescribed standard for urgent determination
and I accordingly
make the following order, as is traditionally made
in such circumstances, and which leaves the doors of justice open to
the applicant
to return to Court should she be so advised to seek her
relief in the ordinary course as ordinary litigants do:
The
matter is struck off the roll with costs.
Judge
of the High Court
Gauteng
Local Division, Johannesburg
Electronically
submitted therefore unsigned
Delivered:
This judgment was prepared and authored by the Judge whose name is
reflected and is handed down electronically
by circulation to the
parties/their legal representatives by email and by uploading it to
the electronic file of this matter on
CaseLines. The date for
hand-down is deemed to be 13 November 2020.
Counsel
for the applicant: Adv B Morris and Adv S Kunene
Instructed
by: Zwane Inc Attorneys
Counsel
for the respondent: Adv B Winks
Instructed
by: Willem de Klerk Attorneys
Date
of hearing: 4 November 2020
Further
submissions: 5, 6 & 7 November 2020
Date
of Judgment: 13 November 2020
[1]
2019
(5) SA 210 (GJ)
[2]
Tshwaedi
v Greater Louis Trichardt Transitional Council
[2000] 4 BLLR 469
(LC), para 11.
[3]
Gold
Fields Limited and Others v Motley Rice LCC; In re: Nkala and others
v Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited and others
[2015] 2 All SA 686
(GJ) at [121] and [123]
[4]
2009
(5) SA 629
(W) at 641G – 642D
[5]
2017
ZAGPHC 175
at paragraph
[11]
[6]
Clause
1.3 of the Press Council’s Complaints Procedure.
[7]
Clauses
2, 3 and 4 of the Press Council’s Complaints Procedure.
[8]
Clause
1.8 of the Press Council’s Complaints Procedure.
[9]
2011
(3) SA 274 (CC)
[10]
2011
(8) BCLR 816
(CC) at paragraph [134}
[11]
[2019]
ZAKZDHC 16 (6 September 2019)
[12]
[2020]
ZAGPJHC 2 (24 January 2020)
[13]
supra
[14]
The
applicant’s legal representatives attempted, post the hearing,
to provide authorities to the contrary but did not succeed.
The
minority judgment of Nugent JA in
Media
24 Ltd and Others v SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd
,
2011 (5) SA 329
(SCA) does not support the applicant’s
position as he was not dealing directly with the question of whether
a media defendant
can be ordered to publish an apology for
defamation, but rather whether a plaintiff which is a trading
corporation (as opposed
to a natural person) is in principle
entitled to general damages when other remedies for defamation are
available.
[15]
Milo
& Steyn: A Practical Guide to Media Law (2013)
[16]
p48
[17]
Case
number 17218/02 unreported delivered in Gauteng Local Division,
Johannesburg.
[18]
Safcor
Forwarding
(Johannesburg) (Pty) Ltd v National Transport Commission,
1982
(3) SA 582
(W) at 586 G
[19]
Mokate
v United Democratic Movement and Another
[2020] ZAGPPHC 377 (23 July 2020), para [7]
[20]
See
East
Rock Trading 7 (Pty) Ltd and Another v Eagle Valley Granite (Pty)
Ltd and Others
[2011] ZAGPJHC 196 (23 September 2011) at paras [6] – [9]