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[2020] ZAGPJHC 179
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Khammissa and Others v Master of the High Court, Gauteng and Others (2017/49832) [2020] ZAGPJHC 179; 2021 (1) SA 421 (GJ) (19 February 2020)
Links to summary
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NO: 2017/49832
In
the matter between:
SUMAIYA
ABDOOL GAFAAR KHAMMISSA
First
Applicant
BETHUEL
BILLYBOY MAHLATSI
Second
Applicant
KEHEDITSE
DESIREE JUDITH MASEGE
Third
Applicant
ALBERT
IVAN SURMANY
Fourth
Applicant
and
THE
MASTER OF THE HIGH COURT, GAUTENG
First
Respondent
GERT
LOUWRENS STEYN DE WET
Second
Respondent
JOHAN
FRANCOIS ENGELBRECHT
Third
Respondent
JUDGMENT
SIWENDU
J
INTRODUCTION
[1]
The applicants are the joint liquidators of Duro Pressing Pty Ltd
(‘Duro’). They seek a review of the appointment
of the
second and third respondents (‘respondents’) as
liquidators and an order to set aside the appointment in terms
of
s 151 of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 (the ‘
Insolvency
Act&rsquo
;), alternatively the Promotion of Administrative Justice
Act 3 of 2000 (‘PAJA’). They claim the review
arises
because two conflicting decisions pertaining to the same
appointment were made and communicated to interested parties when the
Master was
functus officio.
[2]
Ms Dube, an assistant Deputy Master made the first decision on 31
August 2017. She had refused to appoint the respondents in
terms of
s 370(1) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 (the ‘Companies
Act’). On 25 October 2017, Mr Maphaha,
also a Deputy
Master, made the second decision. He purported to revoke the decision
by Ms Dube and appointed the respondents as
liquidators. Hence, there
were conflicting decisions in respect of the same appointment. When
asked for the reason for the decision,
Mr Maphaha posited that Ms
Dube’s refusal was made in error. He persisted his appointment
certificate was the valid one.
Ms Dube twice disputed that the
refusal to appoint the second respondent was an error of fact and/or
law. The applicants now seek
to review and set aside the decision of
25 October 2017 by Mr Maphaha, appointing respondents as joint
liquidators.
BACKGROUND
[3]
The background is a common cause. Duro was wound up by special
resolution on 27 February 2014. The applicants were appointed
as
provisional liquidators of Duro by the Master on 8 April 2014. The
winding-up was subsequently converted to one by court order
on 25
July 2014. Amongst the initial joint liquidators was CF De Wet. Mr CF
De Wet, a brother to Mr Gert De Wet the second
respondent. Mr CF De
Wet died in office on 23 May 2017. As required, the Master convened a
meeting of creditors on 24 August
2017 to nominate a
replacement. The meeting, presided over by Mr Maphaha,
reconvened on 29 August 2017. The second and third
respondents were
not appointed.
[4]
The applicants claim the Master convened the meeting of creditors to
nominate new liquidators in the stead of CF De Wet. In
terms of s 377
of the Companies Act. As stated, on 31 August 2017, Ms Dube
declined the appointment of the respondents
in terms of s 370(1).
It is a further common cause that the respondents did not avail
themselves of her invitation to seek
reasons. Instead, on
22 September 2017, Senekal Simmonds Attorneys dispatched a
letter to the Master on behalf of undisclosed
creditors. It claimed
these creditors were materially affected by the refusal to appoint
the respondents. It requested reasons
on behalf of the undisclosed
creditors.
[5]
Incredulously, the letter proceeds on the basis that only ‘the
relevant Master who has jurisdiction over this insolvent
estate’,
could issue the amended certificate of appointment. Mr Maphaha, and
not Ms Dube, presided over the meeting to nominate
a replacement. The
letter demands reasons for the change of the ‘decision-maker’
in the Master’s Office, and
called on the Master to convene
another meeting of creditors within 14 days. Simultaneously, there
was a threat to review the decision.
[6]
In response, Ms Dube furnished the reasons for not appointing the
respondents on 28 September 2017. These were inter alia that:
6.1. De Wet did not enjoy
support from the majority of creditors;
6.2. Engelbrecht was
appointed by creditors who had not proved their claims; and that
6.3. The Administration
of the estate was at its final stages.
She
iterated that the duties at the Office of the Master were assigned
and performed by all officers appointed in terms of the
Administration of Estates Act 66 of 1965 and were subject to s 370.
After this, the undisclosed creditors did not follow the
threat to
review Ms Dube’s decision but requested a reconsideration
instead.
[7]
As said, Ms Dube disputed she made an error of fact and law. In her
view, once the decision is made, the Office of the Master
was
functus
officio
and could not overrule its own decisions. Only the
Minister had the power to set aside the Master’s decision to
refuse an
appointment.
[8]
Other undisputed factual foundations for the review application are
that the appointment comes late in the liquidation. The
applicants
collected and sold the assets over a period of 3 years. The
winding-up was largely complete, and the preparation of
the
Liquidation and Distribution account finalised. The only outstanding
issue is an inquiry into the trade dealings of Duro prior
to
liquidation, as well as pending litigation by Duro against Mercantile
Bank, funded by Credit Guarantee Insurance Corporation
of Africa
Limited. Credit Guarantee Insurance Corporation of Africa Limited has
indemnified the liquidators of all costs incurred
in the litigation.
Conjoined with the complaint about the legality of the second
decision, the applicants protest that the impugned
decision
effectively allows the respondents to share in the fees without doing
the work.
SUBMISSIONS
[9]
The applicants claim the decision to appoint the respondents is
ultra
vires
on a number of interrelated grounds. The Master was
functus
officio
when Mr Maphaha purported to appoint the respondents. A
decision not to appoint them had already been made. There is no
empowering
provision for a further appointment once the decision was
made. Only the Minister could validly make an appointment and, only
after
an aggrieved person has invoked s 371. Additionally, they
claim the appointment was not taken pursuant to a nomination process,
nor was it connected to the information placed before the Master.
They also impugn the appointment on account that the decision
is
arbitrary, capricious, irrational, and procedurally unfair.
[10]
Curiously, the Master elected to abide and not oppose the review
application. Pointedly, the applicants had to launch an application
for a court order directing the Master to dispatch the record of the
proceedings as well as reasons for Mr Maphaha’s decision.
The
Master furnished the record, but not the reasons for Mr Maphaha’s
decision, only after the order of August 2018.
The error of law
alleged (which Ms Dube disputes) remained unexplained.
[11]
The respondents stand by their appointment. Although they oppose the
application, they have not filed an opposing affidavit,
but instead
issued a notice in terms of Rule 6(5)(
d
)(iii). They claim
certain legal questions arise and the applicant is not entitled to
relief. They contend that:
11.1. The applicants lack
locus standi
to seek relief;
11.2.
Section 151
of the
Insolvency Act and
PAJA do not apply; and
11.3. The applicants have
disregarded s 371 of the Companies Act.
[12]
The matter proceeds on the foundation of the facts alleged in the
Founding Affidavit. The reasons twice furnished by Ms Dube
for
declining to appoint the respondents, as well as the opinion she
formulated to base those reasons, remain unchallenged. There
are no
reasons for Mr Maphaha’s decision. A point made in the
respondents’ heads of argument is that whether valid
or
unlawful, Mr Maphaha’s decision stands until set aside by a
court.
[13]
Given the above, the Pointus Pilate posture adopted by the Master is
baffling. I agree with Mr Suttner
SC, on
behalf of the applicants, that it cannot be gainsaid that the matter
is serious because the Master seats at the apex of
Insolvency Law and
Practice, presides over important decisions affecting the appointment
of liquidators and governs the custody
of large assets. Which
decision and appointment certificate prevails in this case involves
important questions of law, and is of
importance to insolvency law
practitioners and liquidators.
ISSUES
FOR DETERMINATION
[14]
The
contested issues expose two fundamental legal considerations. The
first is, who can legitimately challenge an appointment of
a
liquidator? In this case, can the applicants challenge the
appointment of another liquidator? The second is, what is the correct
gateway to relief when there is a challenge to an appointment of a
liquidator?
[1]
There is limited
and conflicting authority on these issues.
[15]
Mr Terreblanche SC, who appears for the respondents, agreed that
locus standi
could be dispositive of the contention between
the parties. Therefore, the
locus standi
of the applicants
must be disposed of first.
LOCUS
STANDI
[16]
Mr Terreblanche SC submits that the applicants are nonsuited because
liquidators have no legal right and/or interest to challenge
the
appointment. The applicants are not ‘aggrieved persons’
because the thrust of their complaint is that they would
have to
share their fees with the respondents.
[17]
Three
authorities about who qualifies as an ‘aggrieved person’
by the courts is at issue.
[2]
Mr
Terreblanche SC submits that Patel J’s decision in
Janse
Van Rensburg v The Master and Others
settles
the dispute
.
[3]
He argued that a different conclusion means every busybody would come
to court to have decisions of the Master set aside. In
Janse
Van Rensburg
the
court held that an ‘aggrieved person’ means a person with
a legitimate grievance. When construed within the bounds
of s 371,
[4]
it means a creditor and not an ‘interested’,
‘disappointed’ or ‘disgruntled’ person
because
of a benefit he might have received. Patel J further held
that where an appointment is by virtue of the discretion conferred on
the Master by s 374,
[5]
and
not as a result of the nomination process, an aggrieved person cannot
invoke s 371 to challenge the appointment.
[18]
Mr Suttner
SC contends
Janse
Van Rensburg
was wrongly decided. The case is distinguishable because it was not
based on an unlawful administrative action. He argued I should
follow
Davis J in
Geduldt
v The Master and Others
.
[6]
In
Geduldt,
the applicant, who was a member of a close corporation sought an
interim interdict to halt an appointment of a liquidator pending
a
review. Confirming that the applicant had a legal grievance, Davis J
had this to say about
Janse
Van Rensburg
:
‘
I do not
consider this particular dictum necessarily correct. If the source
upon which this dictum rests, namely the judgment of
Hoexter JA in
Francis George Hill Family Trust v South African Reserve Bank and
Others
1992 (3) SA 91
(A) at 98-100 is examined, it does not appear
that the words “person aggrieved” were given the
restricted interpretation
adopted by Patel J in Janse Van
Rensburg (supra) and urged upon me by Mr Potgieter…’
[7]
[19]
To this, Mr
Terreblanche SC submits the
Geduldt
case was decided on a balance of convenience. In addition he argues
that based on the principle in
Shifren
,
[8]
I should not lightly depart from a principle that has withstood the
test of time. He contends I am bound to follow
Janse
Van Rensburg
as the judgment of this Division unless I am persuaded that it is
wrong. He argues that even if the decision sought to be reviewed
is
unlawful, I must consider whether the applicants are proper
applicants.
[20]
The
conspectus of the applicable provisions pertaining to the appointment
of liquidators under the
Insolvency Act and
the Companies Act is set
out in the
Minister
of Justice v First Rand Bank
,
[9]
which is referred to in
Janse
Van Rensburg.
It
is not necessary to revisit those provisions. I accept that at
inception, Insolvency Law developed on the main to protect the
interest of creditors. As pointed in
Janse
Van Rensburg,
also
referred to in
Geduldt
—
‘
A “person
aggrieved” must surely be a person who had a legitimate
grievance, for example, a person against whom a decision
has been
pronounced that wrongfully deprives him or her of something...or
wrongfully affected his or her title to do something…’
[10]
[21]
Henriques
J, in
Applemint
Properties 45 (Pty) Ltd and Others v Master of the High Court,
KwaZulu Natal Division, Pietermaritzburg and Others
,
[11]
finding that the applicants who were creditors
fall
within the category of a ‘person aggrieved’ and therefore
entitled to institute review proceedings in relation
to the rejection
of their claims, referred
to
long-standing cases, and held that:
‘
A
“person aggrieved” for the purposes of
s 151
of the
Insolvency Act is
someone who is injured or wronged in his rights or
interests. The term a person aggrieved is capable of a wider meaning
in that
it also includes a person who has a legal grievance as well
as a trustee who may also institute review proceedings in terms of
this section.’
[12]
[22]
I have considered the issue in the context of the myriad of the
decisions the Master makes.
At the outset, t
he
courts have been careful not to create an exhaustive definition of a
‘person aggrieved’.
[23]
In my view, the decision giving rise to the legal grievance
and
the effect of that decision on the legal rights or interests of
the parties before the court are important considerations. An undue
emphasis on the identity of the complainant or the nature or category
of the complaint cannot be the sole determiner. It would
unduly
exclude a range of persons who, though not nominated and are or not
‘a creditor’ might have a legitimate legal
grievance and
are affected by the decision. I am of the view that an inquiry into
the nature of the decision complained of, its
legal validity, as well
as its effects on the rights of the applicants should weed out the
‘busybodies’ raised by Mr Terreblanche
SC.
[24]
For these
reasons, I disagree with the narrow construction adopted in
Janse
Van Rensburg.
Curiously,
Patel
v Master of the High Court
,
[13]
a decision Mr Terreblanche SC relies on albeit for different reasons
dealt with later in this judgment, by implication does not
limit a
liquidator from a range of ‘persons aggrieved’.
Significantly,
Janse
Van Rensburg
was decided before the current company law regime which seeks to take
account of a range of stakeholders. Adopting the approach
proposed
would be inconsistent with the prevailing regime. This brings me to
the argument about the applicants’ grievance,
particularly the
rights or interests they seek to protect.
[25]
The essence of the grievance pertains to an allegation of an
unlawful, arbitrary, capricious appointment and decision in an
estate
they are charged with. The legal grievance is beyond merely acting to
secure their fees. Barring the requirements for qualification
to be
included in the Master’s Panel, the scheme of the
Insolvency
Act requires
that the Master appoints a liquidator who is nominated
by creditors who hold the majority votes in number or value. Ms
Dube’s
decision was based on this fact amongst others. As said,
the respondents have not disputed it.
[26]
Serious allegations of an unlawful appointment in respect of the
estate they oversee points a finger at the internal workings
of the
Master’s office. The allegations were not opposed by the
Master. They have not been explained. While the applicants
do not
have the right to stop a legitimate appointment in accordance with
the law and the rules, I find the decision giving rise
to the
grievance, as well as the nature of the grievance, legitimate. It
pertains to allegations of an unlawful decision and action
by the
Master in respect of the estate they are administering. They are not
busy bystanders or strangers to the issue. Accordingly,
I find that
the applicants have the
locus standi
to review and set aside
the unlawful appointment alleged.
IS
SECTION 371
THE ONLY GATEWAY TO RELIEF FOR THE APPLICANTS?
[27]
Even though
during the argument, I agreed with Mr Terreblanche SC that the
disputed
locus
standi
could be dispositive of the issue, there is a second contention
relating to the correct gateway to the review challenge.
Mr
Terreblanche SC argues that
s 151
of the
Insolvency Act
[14
]
is not available to the applicants because
s 339
of the
Companies Act 71 of 2008
[15]
states that recourse under the
Insolvency Act is
available only to
the extent that a matter is not provided for under the
Companies Act.
The
thrust of this argument is that the applicants have used an
incorrect gateway and the correct route to relief is
s 371.
[16]
For this reason, he submits that a review under PAJA is not available
to the applicant either, because the applicants ought to
have
exhausted their internal remedies under
s 7(2)
of PAJA. He
argues that
s 371
affords the applicants the remedy to have a
dispute about the nomination referred to the Minister.
[28]
Mr
Terreblanche SC’s contention is based on the decision in
Patel
v Master of the High Court
where, as in this case, the applicant challenged an appointment of a
co-liquidator.
[17]
In
Patel,
Traverso DJP held that even if the applicant had the
locus
standi
to seek the review and have the appointment set aside,
s 371
provides the applicant the
only
means of obtaining redress. Notwithstanding
s 371
of the
Companies Act, the
applicant failed to exhaust the internal remedy in
s 7(2)
of PAJA. She held that:
‘
In my view for
the reasons that follow, it is not open to Mr. Patel to challenge the
nomination of Mr. Terblanche in the fashion
that he did. His remedy,
in my view, is misconceived. The old
Companies Act provides
a remedy
for those aggrieved by the appointment of a liquidator, to wit,
section 371
(which also applies to closed corporations in winding
up). The authors of Henochsberg on the
Companies Act, Vol
. 1, p. 796,
have the following to say about this provision:
“
This section
provides the only means of obtaining redress in respect of the
Master's appointment of a liquidator or liquidators
... save that the
decision by the Minister under subsection 3 is no longer final ...
and such decision may be brought under review
by the High Court ...”
If this conclusion is
correct, which I believe it is, the Act prescribes an administrative
appeal against the appointment of a liquidator
by the Master. The
process contemplates a reconsideration of the appointment by the
Minister. Only once the Minister has made a
decision can the
aggrieved party, if still aggrieved, approach the High Court for
review of the Minister's decision. This ground
too does not come to
Mr. Patel's assistance.’
[18]
[29]
There is no dispute between Mr Suttner SC and Mr Terreblanche SC
about the import of s 151. It affords the court the power
to
enter the merits and decide the disputed issues afresh.
Interestingly, both agreed during the argument that s 371
applies
to a decision taken by a Master in relation to a nomination
at a meeting of creditors. In particular, s 371 provides a
remedy
for a grievance resulting from an appointment or
non-appointment of a person duly nominated within the meaning of the
Act. It seems
to me the provisions would be most compatible if the
respondents or the creditors had taken up the cudgels. They did not.
[30]
Firstly, s 371
is not
the only provision dealing
with a complaint about appointment and non- appointment of a
liquidator. Secondly, the answer also boils
down to the grievance
before the Court. On the contrary, the dispute is not about a
nomination or a failure to appoint a liquidator.
It is about the
legal validity of the second appointment by Mr Maphaha,
after
a decision was made on the same issue – practically resulting
in two conflicting decisions and two conflicting appointment
certificates. Accordingly, it is not an issue provided in the
Companies Act in
terms of
s 339
as argued. On these grounds, I
find that recourse to the
Insolvency Act remained
available to the
applicants.
[31]
Ms Cirone,
who appeared with Mr Suttner SC in reply for the applicants, argued
that
s 57(7)
to (10) also creates an inexpensive alternative
procedure to challenge the decision of the Master.
These
provisions are not intended to supplant or derogate from the powers
of the court under
s 59
or the Master under
s 60
of the
Insolvency Act.
[19
]
I am
persuaded because of the variety of decisions made by the Master and
the wider definition of ‘persons aggrieved’.
[32]
Given the
nature of the grievance and the unique facts of this case, it is
incorrect and superfluous to argue the applicants should
have called
on the Master to submit reasons to the Minister to exhaust some
internal remedy. There were no reasons for the decision
and none were
furnished, even after a court order. Whether inadvertently or not,
the argument incorrectly excludes the recourse
to
s 57
[20]
and
s 59
[21]
of the
Insolvency Act. On
this score, the applicants correctly invoked
s 151
of the
Insolvency Act.
>
[33]
Lastly on
the merits, as a creature of statute, the Master exercises
public power and perfoms a public function. The decisions
of the
Office are administrative action in the widest sense. The power to
revoke or amend administrative decisions once communicated
is
limited. Whether the Master is
functus
officio
must be answered with reference to the language of the legislation.
The legislation must expressly authorise for the power to revoke
the
decision, and by implication, prescribe the procedure to be
followed.
[22]
The
Administration of Estates Act does not confer that power to the
Office of the Master. Once the decision is communicated to
interested
and affected parties, it is final and irrevocable.
[23]
Accordingly, I find that the Master was
functus
officio
and not empowered to issue a second decision once the decision not to
appoint the second and third respondent was made.
[34]
I am at large under
s 151
of the
Insolvency Act to
enter the
matter
de novo.
Accordingly, I make the following order:
34.1. The Master’s
decision on 25 October 2017 to appoint the second and third
respondents as liquidators to Duro Pressing
(Pty) Ltd is reviewed and
set aside;
34.2. The Certificate of
Appointment dated 25 October 2017 purporting to appoint the second
and third respondents as liquidators
is set aside;
34.3. The Master’s
Certificate of Appointment dated 31 August 2017 is declared the valid
Certificate;
34.4. The second and
third respondents are ordered to pay the costs, including the costs
of two counsel.
_____________________________
T
SIWENDU
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Appearances
for the applicants: Suttner SC
With
Ms Cirone
Instructed
by: Goodes & Seedat Inc Attorneys
Appearances
for the respondents: Mr Terreblanche SC
With
Mr Mokoena
Instructed
by: Senekal Simmonds Attorneys
[1]
Whether such a decision is reviewable under PAJA was raised but not
pursued.
[2]
Janse
Van Rensburg v The Master and Others
2004 (5) SA 173
(T);
Geduldt
v The Master and Others
2005 (4) SA 460
(C); and
Patel
v Master of the High Court
2014 JDR 0346 (WCC).
[3]
Janse
Van Rensburg
(note
2 above).
[4]
Section 371
provides as follows:
(1) Any person aggrieved
by the appointment of a liquidator or the refusal of the Master to
accept the nomination of a liquidator
or to appoint a person
nominated as a liquidator, may within a period of seven days from
the date of such appointment or refusal
request the Master in
writing to submit reasons for such appointment or refusal to the
Minister.
…
.
(2) The Minister may,
after consideration of the reasons referred to in
ss2
and any
representations made in writing by the person who made the request
referred to in ss (1) and all the relevant documents,
information or
objections submitted to him or the Master by any interested person,
confirm, uphold or set aside the appointment
or the refusal by the
Master and in the event of the refusal by the master being set
aside, direct the Master to accept the nomination
of the liquidator
concerned and to appoint him as the liquidator of the company
concerned.
[5]
Section 374(1):
Whenever the Master considers it desirable he may
appoint any person not disqualified from holding the office of
liquidator and
who has given security to his satisfaction, as a
co-liquidator with the liquidator or liquidators of the company
concerned.
[6]
Geduldt
(note
2 above).
[7]
Ibid at 464H-I.
[8]
SA
Sentrale Ko-op Graanmaatskappy Bpk v Shifren
1964 (4) SA 760 (A).
[9]
Minister
of Justice v First Rand Bank
2003 (6) 636 (SCA).
[10]
Janse
van Rensburg
(note
2 above) para 23;
Geduldt
(note
2 above) at 465A-B.
[11]
Applemint
Properties 45 (Pty) Ltd and Others v Master of the High Court,
KwaZulu Natal Division, Pietermaritzburg and Others
[2019] JOL 41553 (KZP).
[12]
Ibid para 29, with reference to
Jeeva
& Another v Tuck NO & Others
1998 (1) SA 785
(SE) 792G-J;
Millman
& another NNO v Pieterse & Others
1997
(1) SA 784 (C).
[13]
Patel v
Master of the High Court
2014 JDR 0346 (WCC) para 12.
[14]
151.
Review.
– Subject to the provisions of
section 57
any person aggrieved
by any decision, ruling, order or taxation of the Master or by a
decision, ruling or order of an officer
presiding at a meeting of
creditors may bring it under review by the court and to that end may
apply to the court by motion,
after notice to the Master or to the
presiding officer, as the case may be, and to any person whose
interests are affected.
[15]
Section
339
–
Law
of Insolvency to be applied mutatis mutandis
- In the winding up of a company unable to pay its debts the
provisions of the law relating to insolvency shall, in so far as
they are applicable, be applied mutatis mutandis in respect of any
matter not specially provided for by this Act. A
provision
of
the
law
relating
to
insolvency
will
not
apply
if
the
matter
is
‘specifically
provided’ for in the Companies Act.[15]
The
Constitutional Court has
approved
this approach.[15] (
Woodley
v Guardian Assurance Company of SA Ltd
1976 (1) SA 758
(W) at 763. J A Kunst, P Delport and Q
Voster,
Henochsberg on the Companies Act 5 ed (2011) at 668;
Bernstein
& others v Bester & others NNO
[1996] ZACC 2
;
1996 (2) SA 751
(CC) para 96.)
[16]
Section 371 -
‘
Any
person aggrieved by the appointment of a liquidator or the refusal
of the Master to accept the nomination of a liquidator
or to appoint
a person nominated as a liquidator may within a period of seven days
from the date such appointment or refusal
request the Master in
writing to submit his reasons for such appointment or refusal to the
Minister.’
[17]
Patel
(note
13 above).
[18]
Ibid paras 9-10 (original emphasis omitted).
[19]
Jordaan
v Richter en Andere
1981
(1) SA 490 (O).
[20]
Section 57 has similar provisions with s 371 and also deals
with appointment of liquidators and the powers of the Master
relative thereto. Section 57(7) reads: ‘Any person aggrieved
by the appointment of a trustee or the refusal of the Master
to
confirm the election of a trustee or to appoint a person elected as
a trustee, may within a period of seven days from the
date of such
appointment or refusal request the Master in writing to submit his
or her reasons for such appointment or refusal
to the Minister.’
[21]
Section 59 deals with court’s powers to declare certain
persons disqualified from appointed and the removal of such persons
whether before or after appointment.
[22]
Afdelingsraad
van Swartland v Administrateur Kaap
1983 (3) SA 469 (C).
[23]
Nkosi
v Khanyile
2003 (2) SA 63
(N); M Wiechers ‘Administrative Law’ at
169.
Lek
v Estate Agents Board
1978 (3) SA 160
(C).