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[2020] ZAGPJHC 18
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Mbatha v Transport Sector Retirement Fund and Another (0016223/19) [2020] ZAGPJHC 18 (19 February 2020)
HIGH
COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG)
Case
no: 0016223/19
In
the matter between:
MARGARET
LUNGILE MBATHA
Applicant
and
TRANSPORT
SECTOR RETIREMENT FUND
First
Respondent
SALT
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
Second Respondent
Case
Summary:
Death Benefit –
Distribution – Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956 (PFA) –
section 37C - allocation and distribution
of a death benefit take
place in the manner provided for in s 37C - when paying a benefit to
a minor dependent, the board of a
pension fund has a discretion to
effect payment to the guardian of the minor or it may establish a
trust, from which a monthly
income is paid to the guardian (s 37C(2))
or it may hold the monies in the fund’s portfolios and effect
monthly and
ad hoc
payments
to the guardian (s 37C(3)).
Promotion
of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA) - a decision of the
board of a pension fund taken in terms of s 37C of
the PFA
constitutes administrative action as contemplated in PAJA, which
applies to a review of such decision.
JUDGMENT
MEYER
J
[1]
The first respondent, Transport Sector Retirement Fund, is a pension
fund established
in terms of the Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956 (the
PFA), and the second respondent, Salt Employee Benefits, is its
administrator.
Following the death of the late Mr Makhosini
Andrias Sigasa (the deceased), a former member of the first
respondent, a death benefit
became payable to be allocated and
distributed in terms of s 37C of the PFA. The first respondent
allocated the benefit,
inter alia
, to the deceased’s
minor children and the applicant, Ms Margaret Lungile Mbatha, who is
the mother of two of the minor children.
One was born on 30
June 2002 and the other on 9 June 2007 (the minor children).
The first respondent paid to the applicant
the portion of the death
benefit allocated to her, but decided to administer the benefits of
the minor children in terms of s 37C(3)
of the PFA. The
applicant seeks an order that the death benefit allocated to the
minor children be paid to her as their legal
guardian and care-giver.
[2]
What the applicant in effect seeks is the setting aside of the
decision of the first
respondent’s board (the board) to
administer the death benefits of the minor children in terms of s
37C(3) of the PFA.
The attack is based firstly on an argument
that the board did not act within its powers lawfully conferred on it
and is legally
obliged to pay the death benefits allocated to the
minor children to her, she being the ‘only primary care giver
and manager
of the affairs of [her] minor children’.
Secondly, she contends that it is not in the best interests of the
minor children
for the fund to administer their death benefits
instead of paying the full amount over to her.
[3]
The allocation and distribution of a death benefit takes place in the
manner provided
for in s 37C of the PFA. Such benefit does not
form part of the deceased member’s estate and the board of a
pension
fund is enjoined to exercise an equitable discretion, taking
into account a number of factors. A pension fund is expressly
not bound by a deceased’s will nor to a nomination form.
In
Mashazi v African Products Retirement Benefit Provident Fund
and another
2003 (1) SA 629
(W) at 632I-J, Hussain J said this:
‘
Section 37C of the Act was
intended to serve a social function. It was enacted to protect
dependancy, even over the clear
wishes of the deceased. The
section specifically restricts freedom of testation in order that no
dependants are left without
support. Section 37C(1)
specifically excludes the benefits from the assets in the estate of a
member. Section 37C enjoins
the trustees of the pension fund to
exercise an equitable discretion, taking into account a number of
factors. The fund is
expressly not bound by a will, nor is it
bound by the nomination form. The contents of the nomination
form are there merely
as a guide to the trustees in the exercise of
their discretion.’
[4]
Section 37C of the PFA-
‘
. . . imposes three important
duties on the board of management of any pension fund organisation.
First, it needs to identify
the nominees and dependents (with
reference to section 1 of the Act) of the deceased member.
Hereafter it needs to effect
a distribution of the benefit amongst
the beneficiaries with reference to the four subsections outlined in
section 37C(1).
The final task of the board is to determine an
appropriate mode of payment. . . . In summary, when
paying a benefit
to a minor child, the board essentially has three
options. That is, it may effect payment to the guardian of the
minor or
it may establish a trust, wherefrom a monthly income is paid
to the guardian (section 37C(2)) or it may hold the monies in the
fund’s portfolios and effect an instalment payment to the
guardian (section 37C(3)). On a plain reading of the relevant
subsections,
it is apparent that, before the board considers an
alternative mode of payment, there must be good reason in law and
fact as to
why the option of direct payment should not be followed.’
(
Ramanyelo v Mine
Workers Provident Fund
[2005] 1 BPLR 67 (PFA) paras 9 and 13.
Also see
Baloyi v Ellerine Holdings Staff Pension Fund
[2005]
7 BPLR 606 (PFA) para 14.)
[5]
Section 37C(3) of the PFA is presently relevant. It vests the
board of a pension
fund with a discretion to administer benefits
payable to minor dependents within the fund. It reads thus:
‘
Any benefit dealt with in terms
of this section, payable to a minor dependant or minor nominee, may
be paid in more than one payment
in such amounts as the board may
from time to time consider appropriate and in the best interests of
such dependent or nominee:
Provided that interest at a
reasonable rate, having regard to the fund return earned by the fund,
shall be added to the outstanding
balance at such times as the board
may determine: Provided further that any balance owing to such
a dependant or nominee
at the date on which he or she attains
majority or dies, whichever occurs first, shall be paid in full.’
[6]
The board of a pension fund, therefore, has the discretion to
administer a minor dependant’s
benefit and to
inter alia
make monthly payments and
ad hoc
payments ‘as the
board may from time to time consider appropriate and in the best
interests of such dependant’.
It ‘is also not
precluded from making direct capital payments to third parties in
respect of money owed in respect of the
minor, such as to a school or
university, or for medical expenses and so on’. (Rosemary
Hunter et al
The
Pension Funds Act: A
Commentary on the Act,
regulations, selected notices, directives and circulars
at 707.)
The statutory power to decide which of the three payment methods to
follow in paying the death benefits of the minor
children is that of
the board of the first respondent. This the board did, and in
acting in terms of s 37C(3), it decided
to administer their death
benefits. There is accordingly no merit in the contention that
the board did not have the power
to resolve to administer the death
benefits of the minor children within the fund.
[7]
It is trite that affidavits in motion proceedings constitute both
pleadings and evidence.
(See
Radebe and others v Eastern
Transvaal Development Board
1988 (2) SA 785
(A) at 793C-F.)
The applicant has failed to put up the requisite primary facts in
support of her conclusion that it is not
in the best interests of the
minor children for the first respondent to administer their death
benefits and not to pay the full
amount directly over to her.
In her founding affidavit she merely states:
‘
From their birth to date, the
minor children have always been under my care as their parent and
primary care-giver. This was
the case even during the lifetime
of the deceased. I remain the person responsible for managing
the affairs of the minor
children and meeting their daily needs such
as, inter alia, education, shelter, clothing food, transport,
entertainment, discipline
and religious development.’
And:
‘
. . . I have not been
approached by any of the respondents to inquire into the needs of my
minor children or as to how the
beneficiary account could operate and
assist my minor children. I do not know where it is held or
administered and my children
remain unassisted by the benefit left
for them by their deceased father. I continue to take care of
my minor children, albeit
frugally, out of my own pocket and limited
means.’
In her replying affidavit
she states:
‘
The older minor child . . . ,
for example, is 17 years old and is now attending Grade 11. It
goes without mention that this
is a crucial stage for any child’s
educational development if their life is to come to anything
meaningful. She, thus,
needs all the material support possible
to be able to assist her succeed in her matric. There are funds
left behind by her
late father for her benefit yet she, and her
sister are having to rely on borrowed and donated money to meet the
most basic of
their educational needs.’
[8]
However, after having given notice of its intention to oppose the
applicant’s
application and before the filing of the first
respondent’s answering affidavit on 25 June 2019
,
its
attorneys of record addressed a letter dated 5 June 2019 to the
applicant’s attorneys of record in order to persuade
them that
the application should not proceed any further. Therein, it is
stated,
inter alia
, that-
‘
. . . the Fund’s
trustees, acting in accordance with section 37C(3) of the PFA, took
the decision to administer within the
Fund the benefits payable to
[the minor children]. In administering the allocated benefits
for those minors’ benefit,
the Fund may pay regular monthly
instalments and may also make ad hoc payments to cover the costs of
school fees, uniforms, stationery,
clothing and the like.’
The applicant’s
attorneys of record replied by letter dated 7 June 2019, confirming
the applicant’s intention to pursue
the application. The
financial requirements of the children were not raised nor was any
request made for monthly and
ad hoc
payments in respect of the
minor children. Furthermore, the applicant omits to set out
primary facts in her founding affidavit
why it would serve the
interests of the minor children best if she is to administer their
death benefits and not the first respondent
and why it would not
serve their best interests if the first respondent
inter alia
makes monthly and
ad hoc
payments as the board may from
time to time consider appropriate and in their best interests.
[9]
Nevertheless, until an unlawful administrative act is set aside by a
court it exists
in fact and is capable of having legally valid
consequences:
Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape
Town and others
2004 (6) SA 222
(SCA) para 26. I subscribe
to the generally accepted view that a decision of the board of a
pension fund taken in terms of
s 37C of the PFA constitutes
administrative action for the purposes of the Promotion of
Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA)
and that PAJA applies to
such a review (
Mashazi v African Products Retirement Fund and
another
2003 (1) SA 629
(W) at 635C;
Titi v Funds at Work
Umbrella Provident Fund
((1728/2010 [2011] ZAECMHC (10 March
2011)) para 14;
Themba and another v Retail Provident Fund
(Shoprite) and others
((unreported) WCHC case no 9647/13 (6 May
2014) para 21;
Guarnierie v Funds At Work Umbrella Pension
Fund and others
(47754/2016) [2018] ZAGPPHC 579 (24 May 2018)
para 39;
Moshoshoe v Sentinel Retirement Fund and others
((unreported) GPJ case no 2506/19 (13 September 2019), paras
11-13), unlike the contrary view expressed in
Gerson v Mondi
Pension Fund
2013 (6) SA 162
(GSJ) that PAJA was not applicable
to s 37C reviews.
[10]
The applicant did not attack the decision of the board by way of
review in terms of PAJA or by
way of a legality review nor did she
exhaust the internal remedies provided in the PFA or apply for an
exemption from the duty
to exhaust internal remedies in terms of s
7(2)(c) of PAJA. (See
Titi
paras 15-20;
Kim v
Afgri Staff Pension Fund and others
(2017/47543) [2019] ZAGPJHC
(6 February 2019) paras 12-16.)
The application, therefore, falls to be dismissed.
[11]
The applicant is impecunious and she, I accept, attempts to advance
the best interests of the
minor children in these proceedings.
I am therefore reluctant to award costs against her and consider it
appropriate in the
circumstances rather to make no order as to costs.
[12]
In the result the following order is made:
The
application is dismissed.
____________________________
P.A.
MEYER
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
Hearing:
20
November
2019
Judgment: 19
February 2020
Applicant’s
counsel: Adv E Nhutsve
Instructed
by: Qhali
Attorneys, Johannesburg
First
Respondent’s
counsel:
Adv
P van der Berg
SC
Instructed
by: Shepstone &
Wylie, Sandton, Johannesburg