About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: Supreme Court of Appeal
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: Supreme Court of Appeal
>>
2014
>>
[2014] ZASCA 80
|
|
Body Corporate of "The Avenues" v Hurwitz N.O. and Another (217/2011) [2014] ZASCA 80; [2014] 4 All SA 1 (SCA) (29 May 2014)
THE
SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT
REPORTABLE
Case No: 217/2011
In the matter
between:
THE
BODY CORPORATE OF “THE AVENUES”
…..................................................
APPELLANT
and
BARNEY
HURWITZ N.O.
…..........................................................................
FIRST
RESPONDENT
LAWRENCE NEIL MILLER
N.O.
….......................................................
SECOND RESPONDENT
Neutral
citation:
The Body Corporate of “The Avenues” v
Barney Hurwitz
(217/2011)
[2014]
ZASCA 80
(29 May 2014)
Coram
:
Navsa, Shongwe and Leach JJA and Swain and Mocumie AJJA
Heard:
16 May 2014
Delivered:
29 May 2014
Summary:
Sectional Title – competing claims in respect of extension of
sectional title scheme – Body Corporate relying upon
s 25 of
Sectional Titles Act No 95 of 1986
– developers relying upon
Rules of Scheme passed by Body Corporate in terms of Sectional Titles
Act 66 of 1971 – rule
to be read subject to s 18(1) of 1971 Act
– rule cannot confer powers beyond those set out in the Act.
ORDER
On appeal from
Western Cape High Court, Cape Town, (Desai J sitting as court of
first instance):
1 The appeal is
upheld with costs, such costs to include the costs of two counsel
where employed.
2 The order of the
court a quo is set aside and replaced with the following order:
“
(a) It is
declared:
(i) that no right of
extension in respect of the sectional title scheme known as „The
Avenues‟ No. SS120/87 in the Cape
Town Deeds Office (“the
Scheme‟) vests in the trustees of The Hurwitz-Smilg Sea Point
Trust or The High Level Trust
(“the Trusts‟).
(ii) that all rights
of extension in respect of the Scheme vest in the applicant.
(iii) that the consent of the trustees of
the Trusts is not required
for the exercise by the applicant of the rights referred to in
section 25(6) of the Sectional Titles
Act No. 95 of 1986.
(iv) that by virtue
of the condition of the establishment of the scheme imposed by the
local authority the Trusts are not entitled
to continue to have the
units currently registered in their names, namely Units 92, 93 and 97
to 103 (garages), Units 94 and 95
(storerooms) and Unit 96 (domestic
workers quarters) in the names of the respective Trusts.
(b) The Trusts are
afforded an opportunity, within six months of the court‟s
order, to sell the said units to qualifying purchasers
(namely owners
of residential sections in the Scheme) and / or the applicant on such
terms as may be acceptable to the respondents,
provided that any such
sale shall make provision for the transfer of the unit in question to
be registered within a period not
longer than six months from the
date of the sale.
(c) The applicant is
authorised to apply to the high court, on the same papers,
supplemented insofar as it may be advised, and on
notice to the
respondents, for further relief in the event of any such unit
remaining unsold by the respondents after the expiry
of the first
six-month period referred to in (b) above.
(d) The respondents,
jointly and severally are to pay the costs of the applicant, such
costs to include the costs of two counsel
where employed.”
JUDGMENT
Swain
AJA
(
Navsa, Shongwe, Leach JJA and Mocumie AJA
concurring):
[1] This case
concerns competing claims to exercise the right of extension of a
Sectional Title Scheme (the scheme). The contesting
parties are
respectively the appellant, the body corporate of “The Avenues‟
Scheme No SS120/1987 (the body corporate)
and the developers of the
scheme, being the first respondent, Mr Barney Hurwitz in his capacity
as the sole trustee of the Hurwitz-Smilg
Sea Point Trust and the
second respondent, Mr Lawrence Miller in his capacity as the sole
trustee of the High Level Trust (the
developers).
[2] The claim of the
body corporate to exercise the contested right of extension is based
upon the provisions of s 25 of the Sectional
Titles Act 95 of 1986
(the 1986 Act). That of the developers is based upon the provisions
of rule 77 of the rules of the scheme
as adopted by the body
corporate and duly registered with the Registrar of Deeds in terms of
s 5(3)
(f)
of the Sectional Titles Act 66 of 1971 (the 1971
Act).
[3] The body
corporate accordingly launched an application before the Western Cape
High Court against the developers in which orders
were sought
declaring that the right to extend the scheme vested in it and that
the developers‟ consent to the extension
of the scheme was not
required. An additional order sought directed the developers to
dispose of certain sections in the scheme
registered in their names.
[4] The application
before the court a quo (Desai J) was dismissed with costs, such costs
to include the costs of two counsel. The
present appeal is with the
leave of the court a quo.
[5] The court a quo
held that the provisions of rule 77 were binding upon the body
corporate and the developers accordingly were
the sole holders of
rights of extension. Desai J reasoned that the logical consequence
was that the developers were entitled to
withhold their consent to
the extension of the scheme proposed by the body corporate. In
addition, the court a quo held the developers
could not be compelled
to alienate their sections.
[6] Before us
counsel for the developers disavowed any reliance upon the relevant
statutory provisions as the basis for the developers‟
claim to
the right of extension of the scheme and relied, as they did in the
court below, solely upon the provisions of rule 77
of the scheme. In
order to properly consider the competing claims of the parties it is
necessary to examine the scheme and purpose
of the 1986 Act, its
provisions and its predecessor, the 1971 Act. First, the historical
development of the scheme will be examined
to place the dispute in
context.
[7]
On 6 July 1987 a sectional plan was registered and a sectional title
register opened in the Cape Town Deeds Office in terms
of s 8 of the
1971 Act. The scheme comprised sections, exclusive use areas and
common property. There were 54 units incorporating
residential
sections, 44 units incorporating garage sections, two units
incorporating storeroom sections and two units incorporating
sections
for the accommodation of domestic workers (referred to in the
sectional plan and rules as „maids rooms‟) in
the scheme.
[8] The
conveyancer‟s certificate attached to the sectional plan in
terms of s 5(3)
(d)
(i) of the 1971 Act provided as follows:
“
I certify
that the following further conditions were imposed by the
Municipality of Cape Town when approving of the Sectional Title
Scheme known as “THE AVENUES”, namely:-
SUBJECT to the
condition “that a garage sectional unit (i.e. one of sections
numbered 5588, 90-93 and 97-102 inclusive) a
storeroom sectional unit
(i.e. one of sections numbered 94 and 95 inclusive) and a maids room
sectional unit (i.e. one of sections
numbered 89 and 96 inclusive) be
not sold or transferred to any person other than the owner of a flat
section in the building to
which the application relates (i.e. one of
the sections numbered 1-54 inclusive).” Such restrictions are
not to apply to
the Body Corporate where such sections are required
by the Body Corporate for management purposes only.
SUBJECT FURTHER to
the condition that no flat sectional unit to which a garage sectional
unit, storeroom sectional unit and maids
room sectional unit as above
relates, may be sold or transferred unless such related garage
sectional unit, storeroom sectional
unit and maids room sectional
unit are simultaneously registered either in the name of the
transferee of the related flat sectional
unit, or in the name of the
owner of any other flat sectional unit in the building to which this
application relates.
The tie conditions
must be enforced by the Developer, and on establishment, the Body
Corporate.‟
These conditions
were imposed by the local authority as part of the certificate of
approval dated 12 May 1987.
[9] In addition,
certain real rights were registered over the property in favour of
“The Sisters of the Holy Family in South
Africa‟ (the
Sisters) by way of notarial deeds of servitude. As will be seen, the
portion of the property subject to the
rights of servitude of the
Sisters is the subject of the contested right of extension.
[10] The rules of
the scheme were adopted by a unanimous and special resolution
of the members of the Body Corporate on 17
February 1988, in
substitution for the rules contained in Schedules 1 and 2 in terms of
s 5(3)
(f)
of the 1971 Act.
[11] The rules which
are relevant to the present dispute read as follows:
“
RIGHTS
RESERVED TO THE DEVELOPER
77.(1)
Notwithstanding the fact that certain buildings and outbuildings
indicated as “Existing Monastery” and situated
within the
servitude area as appears from Annexure “A” hereto are
part of the common property as reflected on the registered
sectional
plans in respect of THE AVENUES Sectional Title Scheme, the Body
Corporate acknowledges that the developers, THE HURWITZ-SMILG
SEA
POINT TRUST and THE HIGH LEVEL TRUST may (subject to the cancellation
of the Notarial Deed of Servitude concluded by the
Developers with the
SISTERS OF THE HOLY FAMILY IN SOUTH AFRICA) develop at their sole
cost and expense the aforesaid buildings which
development shall then
be for the benefit of the Developers.
(2) The nature and
extent of the development contemplated in (1) above shall be within
the sole and absolute discretion of the Developer.
The Body Corporate
further acknowledges that it is aware of the terms and conditions
relating to the said possible development
imposed by the Developer,
which terms and conditions are contained in Annexure “A”
to sheet 1 of the registered sectional
plans of the building THE
AVENUES Sectional Title Scheme.
(3) NOTWITHSTANDING
(1) and (2) above it is specifically recorded that the buildings and
outbuildings situated within the servitude
area aforesaid which are
common property, none of the obligations contained in the Notarial
Deeds of Servitude concluded by the
developers with THE SISTERS OF
THE HOLY FAMILY IN SOUTH AFIRCA shall devolve upon the owners save
the provisions of clauses 1.D.
of the Notarial Deed of Variation and
clause (e) of a further Notarial Deed of Servitude which relate to
the maintenance of roads,
pavements and lighting on the Servitude
Area.
GARAGES
78. The Unit in
which the section is a garage shall not be capable of being owned by
any person who is not the owner of a unit in
which the section is not
a garage, i.e. by a person who is not an owner of a “residential”
unit, residential in this
instance excluding a maids room.
STOREROOMS
79. The Unit in
which the section is a storeroom shall not be capable of being owned
by any person who is not the owner of a unit
in which the section is
not a storeroom, i.e. by a person who is not an owner of a
“residential” unit, residential
in this instance
excluding a maids room.
MAIDS ROOMS
80. The Unit in
which the section is a maid‟s room shall not be capable of
being owned by any person who is not the owner
of a unit in which the
section is not a maid‟s room, i.e. by a person who is not an
owner of a “residential”
unit, residential in this
instance excluding a maids room.”
[12] It appears the
Sisters had relocated from the property in question and that
agreement had been reached with them by the body
corporate for the
cancellation of their rights of servitude.
[13] The developers
are the joint registered owners of units 92 to 102 in the scheme.
These comprise garages, storerooms and a so-called
„maid‟s
room‟, more appropriately described as domestic workers
quarters. Since 1987 no other unit and in particular
no residential
unit in the scheme, has been registered in the names of the
developers.
[14] On 18 April
2005 the body corporate entered into an agreement with one Colin
Blacher for the sale to Mr Blacher of a portion
of the body
corporate’s alleged right of extension in the scheme being that
portion of the property subject to the notarial
deed of servitude in
favour of the Sisters. The sale was subject to the suspensive
condition that the body corporate obtains the
written consent of all
its members and existing bond holders to the sale in terms of s 25(6)
of the 1986 Act.
[15] The developers,
as members of the body corporate, however, declined to furnish their
consent to the sale. In their answering
affidavit they state that
there is no obligation on them to do so, nor to give reasons for
their refusal. It is clear, however,
that their refusal to grant
consent is based upon their contention that they possess the right to
extend the scheme. As stated
above they rely on what they contend to
be rights of extension reserved to them in terms of rule 77.
[16] It is against
that background that the dispute must be considered. Before doing so,
however, the relevant provisions of the
1971 Act and the 1986 Act
must be considered as they form the basis for the claim advanced by
the body corporate to extend the
scheme.
[17] In accordance
with the purpose and scheme of the 1971 Act, s 18(1) read with s
18(8) made provision for the phased development
of a sectional title
scheme on a single piece of land in successive stages. As each stage
was completed the developer would be
entitled to pass transfer of the
units comprising that stage. The sections provide as follows:
“
(1) Where a
building, in respect of which a sectional plan has been registered
under this Act, is to be extended in such a manner
that an existing
section is to be added to or that the building may be further divided
into more sections, the developer or, if
the developer has ceased to
have any share in the common property, the body corporate, with the
consent in writing of all the owners
of sections and of all holders
of mortgage bonds shall
(a) prepare a scheme
in respect of the extension and, in terms of section 4, submit that
scheme to the local authority for approval;
(b) if the scheme in
question is approved by the local authority, upon the extension being
certified by an architect or a land surveyor
as being sufficiently
complete for occupation, apply to the registrar for the registration
of a plan in respect of the relevant
extension.
. . .
(8) The provisions
of this section shall mutatis mutandis apply with reference to any
additional building to be erected on land
shown on a sectional plan
registered under this
Act.”
[18]
The developer accordingly acquired the right to extend the scheme, if
the developer, as provided by the statutory provisions
in the
previous paragraph, still owned a share in the common property and
had obtained the written consent of all the owners of
sections and
holders of mortgage bonds. In the event that the developer no longer
owned any share in the common property, the body
corporate could
acquire the right to extend the scheme once it had obtained the
necessary consents.
[19] Section
5(3)
(d)
(i) of the 1971 Act provided that the application for
the opening of a sectional title register had to be accompanied by a
sectional
plan relating to the scheme
“
. . .
endorsed with the servitudes, other real rights and conditions, if
any, certified by a conveyancer as burdening or benefiting
the land
or the sections and common property in terms of the developers‟
title deed or as conditions of sectional title imposed
by the
developer or the local authority or the Administrator.”
In terms of s 10(2)
the effect of endorsement is that an owner‟s title to his unit
is subject to any such servitudes, real
rights or conditions. The
object was to achieve certainty and minimise any contested future
claims in this regard.
[20]
Regulation 5(2)
(a)
(x) of the regulations promulgated in terms
of s 40 of the 1971 Act provided that the first sheet of the
sectional plan (with annexures
if necessary) had to contain
particulars of the servitudes, other real rights and conditions,
certified by a conveyancer as burdening
or benefiting the land or the
sections and common property. In order for a developer to ensure that
conditions imposed by the developer
in the individual contracts of
sale concluded with purchasers of units in the scheme would be
converted into real rights enforceable
against subsequent purchasers
of units as well as bond holders, such conditions would have to be
registered as conditions of sectional
title in terms of s 5(3)
(d)
(i)
of the 1971 Act.
[21]
It is common cause that although rule 77(2) provided that the terms
and conditions relating to the developers‟ right
of extension
were contained in „annexure “A” to sheet 1 of the
registered sectional plans‟, no such conditions
exist in the
annexure. As pointed out above the only real rights registered were
those in favour of the Sisters and the condition
imposed by the local
authority restricting the alienation of garages, storerooms and
„maids rooms‟ independently from
the alienation of
„flats‟ in the scheme.
[22]
The 1971 Act was repealed by the 1986 Act with effect from 1 June
1988. Under the 1971 Act a developer could acquire a right
of
extension provided the developer satisfied the requirements of s
18(1). However, in terms of s 25(1) of the 1986 Act, a developer
has
to reserve this right in the application for the registration of a
sectional plan. The reservation has to be effected by way
of a
registered condition imposed by the developer in terms of s 11(2) at
the time of registration of the sectional title register.
The
condition has to stipulate a period within which the extension has to
be completed.
[23]
If the developer makes no such reservation, or such right has lapsed,
then in terms of s 25(6) of the 1986 Act, the right to
extend the
scheme vests in the body corporate, which is entitled, subject to
compliance with the requirements of s 25 to obtain
a certificate of
real right in respect of the right of extension. The body corporate
may only exercise such right with the written
consent of all its
members and the mortgagee of each unit in the scheme. A member or a
mortgagee is not entitled to withhold approval
„without good
cause in law.”
[24]
Section
60(1)
(b)
of the 1986 Act preserved any right of extension „acquired‟
by a developer in terms of s 18 of the 1971 Act. Section
60(1) was
thereafter amended to provide for the issue to the developer, on
application, of a certificate of real right in respect
of a right of
extension acquired in terms of s 18 of the 1971 Act. A time period of
24 months was provided within which the developer
was obliged to
obtain a certificate of real right, failing which the right would
lapse. The expiry period was thereafter extended
by GNR 1357
(published in Government Gazette 20619 on 19 November 1999) to 31
December 2001.
[1]
It has however to be noted that for a right to be preserved such a
right would have to have been in existence at the relevant time.
[25] The developers
concede that they had not „acquired‟ any right of
extension under the 1971 Act and accordingly no
such right could be
preserved in their favour in terms of s 60(1)
(b)
. However they
submitted:
(a) Section 27(5) of
the 1971 Act and s 35(4) of the 1986 Act provide that the rules shall
bind the body corporate, the owners of
sections and anybody occupying
the sections. (b) The rules have the status of a contract between the
body corporate and its members,
including the developers. The rights
conferred on the developers by the rules are accordingly binding on
and enforceable as against
the body corporate. (c) Section 60(4) of
the 1986 Act preserved any rights arising from any agreement
concluded before its commencement.
The developers‟ rights were
accordingly explicitly preserved as the provisions of rule 77 were
based upon an agreement concluded
between the developers and the body
corporate.
[26] At the heart of
the developers‟ submissions lies the enforceability of rule 77
which must be determined in the context
of the 1971 Act, the
prevailing legislation at the time. As pointed out above, in terms of
s 18 of that Act the developer only
acquired a right of extension if
the developer owned a share in the common property and had obtained
the consent in writing of
all the owners of sections and all holders
of mortgage bonds. See
Erlax Properties (Pty) Ltd v Registrar of
Deeds & others
1990 (3) SA 262
(W) at 268C.
[27] Counsel for the
developers initially submitted that the provisions of rule 77 were
simply a „springboard‟, as he
put it, in terms of which
the developers could then proceed to obtain the requisite consent
from owners of sections and mortgage
bond holders to exercise the
right of extension, as required by s 18(1) of the 1971 Act. This
submission sought to resolve the
inevitable conflict between the
provisions of s 18, which required the consent of all the owners of
sections and all holders of
mortgage bonds before a right of
extension was acquired, and the fact that the agreement relied upon
by the developers as embodied
in rule 77 only included the consent of
the body corporate. In other words, so the argument went, rule 77 did
not per se confer
a right of extension upon the developers, but
simply a right to obtain the necessary consent to acquire such a
right. When faced
with the consequence of this submission, namely
that the developers accordingly possessed no right of extension per
se in terms
of rule 77, counsel for the developers fairly and
properly conceded that his submission would have to be that rule 77
conferred
upon the developers a right of extension.
[28] It is clear
that the body corporate could not, by agreement with the developers,
confer a right of extension of the scheme
on the developers and
thereby deprive individual owners of sections and holders of mortgage
bonds of their statutory right to withhold
their written consent. The
body corporate in concluding this agreement and purporting to
represent the interests of the owners
of sections, could not
compromise the statutory right of the owners to grant or withhold
their consent to an extension of the scheme.
In addition, because at
the relevant time the developers must have still had a share in the
common property, the body corporate
could not have acquired the right
of extension of the scheme in terms of s 18 of the 1971 Act, even if
it had obtained all of the
necessary written consents. Simply put,
the body corporate had not acquired any right of extension at the
time of the agreement
with the developers, which it was thereby able
to confer upon the developers in terms of that agreement.
[29] There is in
addition a more fundamental challenge to the developers‟
argument that they acquired a right of extension
in terms of rule 77.
Section 27(1) of the 1971 Act provides as follows:
“
A building
and the land on which it is situated shall as from the date of the
establishment of the Body Corporate be controlled
and managed,
subject to the provisions of this Act,
by means of rules.‟
(My emphasis.)
[30] To be „subject
to‟ the 1971 Act, implies that any rule must not conflict with
any provision of the Act. See
Sentra-Oes Koöperatief Bpk v
Commissioner for Inland Revenue
[1995] ZASCA 9
;
1995 (3) SA 197
(A) at 207B-G. If
a rule is in conflict with the Act it would be ultra vires the powers
of the body corporate to make such a rule.
See CG Van der Merwe and
DW Butler
Sectional Titles Share Blocks and Time-Sharing
1 ed
at 221 note 12. The conflict between the provisions of rule 77 and s
18(1) of the 1971 Act is readily apparent. Rule 77 was
accordingly
ultra vires the powers of the body corporate to pass this rule and it
is accordingly unenforceable.
[31] In addition,
whilst notionally in terms of rule 77 the developers could have
reserved the right of extension by registering
this right together
with its specific terms and conditions against the sectional plan,
they in fact did not do so. Simply put,
whilst the rule purports to
reserve the sole right of extension, the terms and conditions of such
extension upon which the right
is said to be premised do not exist.
Essentially the requirements necessary for the statutory reservation
of a right of extension
referred to above were not met. The
developers‟ reliance upon rule 77 is therefore without
foundation. The court a quo accordingly
erred in concluding that the
developers possessed the right to extend the scheme in terms of rule
77.
[32] I turn to the
ancillary relief sought by the body corporate, ordering the
developers to furnish their written consent to the
extension of the
scheme, as well as an order directing the developers to alienate the
units registered jointly in their names.
[33] As pointed out
in para 8, the scheme was subject to the local authority's condition
in terms of which a garage unit, storeroom
unit or „maids room‟
unit could not be sold or transferred to any person other than the
owner of a “flat”
sectional unit in the scheme. In
addition, no „flat‟ sectional unit to which a garage
unit, storeroom unit or „maids
room‟ unit relates, could
be sold or transferred unless such a unit was registered either in
the name of the transferee of
the „flat‟ sectional unit,
or in the name of the owner of any other “flat” sectional
unit in the scheme.
[34] When regard is
had to the fact that there were more „flat‟ sectional
units (i.e. 54) than the total number of garages,
storerooms and
„maids rooms‟ (i.e. 48) it is clear that the object of
the restrictive condition was to ensure that
the garages, storerooms
and “maids rooms” could not be owned by anybody who did
not own a “flat” sectional
unit in the scheme. This
condition was binding upon the developer as the condition expressly
provides that „the tie conditions
must be enforced by the
Developer”.
[35] It appears
that, contrary to the restrictive condition, the developers
maintained ownership of these units, presumably to continue
to exert
influence and obtain rights of extension. The developers‟ joint
ownership of units 92 to 102 is consequently in
contravention of this
condition of establishment and is unlawful. They therefore do not
possess any right to grant or withhold
consent in terms of s 26(5) of
the Act to any proposed extension of the scheme by the body
corporate. In addition, the developers
are not entitled to retain
ownership of these units in contravention of the condition and are
obliged to sell and pass transfer
of these units to the owners of
residential units in the scheme. Counsel for the developers fairly
and properly conceded that if
it were found that the ownership of
these units by the developers was unlawful, the body corporate would
be entitled to the relief
sought.
[36] Counsel agreed
that the costs of two counsel where employed would be an appropriate
order in favour of the successful party.
[37] The following
order is made:
1 The appeal is
upheld with costs such costs to include the costs of two counsel
where employed.
2 The order of the
court a quo is set aside and replaced with the following order:
“
(a) It is
declared:
(i) that no right of
extension in respect of the sectional title scheme known as „The
Avenues‟ No. SS120/87 in the Cape
Town Deeds Office („the
Scheme‟) vests in the trustees of The Hurwitz-Smilg Sea Point
Trust or The High Level Trust
(„the Trusts‟).
(ii) that all rights
of extension in respect of the Scheme vest in the applicant.
(iii) that the
consent of the trustees of the Trusts is not required for the
exercise by the applicant of the rights referred to
in
section 25(6)
of the
Sectional Titles Act No. 95 of 1986
.
(iv) that by virtue
of the condition of the establishment of the scheme imposed by the
local authority the Trusts are not entitled
to continue to have the
units currently registered in their names, namely Units 92, 93 and 97
to 103 (garages), Units 94 and 95
(storerooms) and Unit 96 (domestic
workers quarters) in the names of the respective Trusts.
(b) The Trusts are
afforded an opportunity, within six months of the court‟s
order, to sell the said units to qualifying purchasers
(namely owners
of residential sections in the Scheme) and / or the applicant on such
terms as may be acceptable to the respondents,
provided that any such
sale shall make provision for the transfer of the unit in question to
be registered within a period not
longer than six months from the
date of the sale.
(c) The applicant is
authorised to apply to the high court, on the same papers,
supplemented insofar as it may be advised, and on
notice to the
respondents, for further relief in the event of any such unit
remaining unsold by the respondents after the expiry
of the first
six-month period referred to in (b) above.
(d) The respondents,
jointly and severally are to pay the costs of the applicant, such
costs to include the costs of two counsel
where employed.”
K G B SWAIN
ACTING JUDGE OF
APPEAL
Appearances:
For
the Appellant:
S
C Kirk-Cohen SC
Instructed by:
Abrahams
& Gross Inc, Cape Town
Lovius
Block Attorneys, Bloemfontein
For
the Respondent:
M
A Chohan (with him M T A Costa)
Instructed
by:
Routledge
Modise t/a Eversheds Attorneys, Cape Town
Matsepes
Inc, Bloemfontein
[1]
Section 14
(a)
of the Sectional Titles Amendment Act 11 of 2010 has subsequently
repealed s 60(1) of the 1986 Act.