Marsland v Additional District Court Magistrate, Kempton Park and Another (29827/2019) [2019] ZAGPJHC 545 (10 September 2019)

80 Reportability
International Law

Brief Summary

Extradition — Provisional arrest — Review of Magistrate's decision — Applicant sought to set aside the Magistrate's refusal to release him from provisional arrest pending extradition to Botswana on charges of money laundering — Legal issue centered on whether an extradition request was validly received without a notice from the Minister — Court held that the extradition request was validly received through diplomatic channels and that the Magistrate acted within his authority to order provisional arrest, rejecting the applicant's arguments regarding the necessity of a Ministerial notice.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


The matter concerned an urgent review application brought in the Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg, in which the applicant sought to have a decision of a magistrate reviewed and set aside. The impugned decision was made on 23 August 2019 by the Additional District Court Magistrate, Kempton Park, who refused to discharge the applicant from provisional arrest pending an extradition enquiry.


The parties were Mr Timothy Gordon Marsland as applicant, the Additional District Court Magistrate, Kempton Park as first respondent, and the Director of Public Prosecutions, Johannesburg as second respondent. The review targeted the magistrate’s refusal to release the applicant and the magistrate’s decision to postpone the extradition enquiry for the receipt and processing of documentation.


Procedurally, the matter arose in the context of extradition proceedings initiated after the applicant was arrested under a warrant issued in terms of section 5(1)(b) of the Extradition Act 67 of 1962. The applicant had also pursued a bail application in the magistrates’ court, which was refused, and an appeal against that refusal was pending at the time of the review.


The general subject matter was extradition law and procedure, specifically the interaction between domestic extradition mechanisms under the Extradition Act and international instruments governing extradition within the Southern African Development Community. The dispute turned on whether the absence of a ministerial notice under section 5(1)(a) meant that no extradition request had been “received” for purposes of terminating provisional arrest under the relevant international framework.


2. Material Facts


The applicant was a dual citizen of South Africa and the United Kingdom. He had previously been resident in Botswana, and at the time relevant to the proceedings he was living in South Africa.


On 12 July 2019, the applicant was arrested at OR Tambo International Airport while he was about to board a flight to Germany. The arrest was effected pursuant to a warrant issued by the magistrate in terms of section 5(1)(b) of the Extradition Act. The arrest followed the issue of an Interpol “Red Notice” seeking his provisional arrest pending extradition to Botswana.


The applicant was wanted in Botswana in relation to allegations of money laundering and an alleged attempt to obtain money by false pretences. The judgment recorded allegations that, while the applicant was a director of a company in Botswana, he misappropriated funds of BWP 200 000.00 from the Botswana Public Officers Fund, and that on 25 January 2018 he attempted to obtain BWP 71 000 000 from the First National Bank of Botswana by false pretences. The judgment also recorded that the maximum possible penalty for the two offences was said to be 28 years’ imprisonment.


The applicant first appeared before the magistrate on 15 July 2019 in relation to bail, and the matter was postponed multiple times. On 23 July 2019, the magistrate, by way of a report under section 8 of the Extradition Act, informed the Minister that the matter had been adjourned to 26 July 2019 for a further bail hearing. Bail was ultimately refused on 8 August 2019, and an appeal against that refusal was pending.


The matter was postponed to 23 August 2019 for the receipt of formal extradition documentation from Botswana. On 23 August 2019, the second respondent indicated that the original extradition application had been received by the Director of Public Prosecutions and placed copies of certain documents before the court, including a note verbale dated 17 July 2019, and departmental correspondence dated 19 July 2019 and 12 August 2019 reflecting the transmission of documents through state channels.


On that date, the second respondent requested a postponement so that the extradition enquiry could proceed under sections 9 and 10 of the Extradition Act. The applicant opposed the postponement and sought his discharge, contending that because the Minister had not issued a section 5(1)(a) notice within the stipulated period, he was entitled to be released since no extradition request could be said to have been received by the Minister. The magistrate rejected this contention and postponed the enquiry to 10 September 2019. The review application in the High Court was directed at that decision.


To the extent the judgment distinguished contestation, the underlying criminal allegations in Botswana were treated as allegations motivating extradition, not as facts to be adjudicated in the review. The operative dispute was primarily legal: whether receipt of an extradition request required a ministerial notice under section 5(1)(a) where the arrest occurred under section 5(1)(b).


3. Legal Issues


The central legal question was whether, in circumstances where a person is provisionally arrested under section 5(1)(b) of the Extradition Act, an extradition request can be regarded as “received” for purposes of continuing detention and extradition proceedings without the Minister having issued a notice in terms of section 5(1)(a) of the Act.


This issue was linked to the applicant’s reliance on article 10(5)(a) of the Southern African Development Community Protocol on Extradition, which provides for termination of provisional arrest if the requested state has not received the request for extradition and supporting documents through the channel provided for in article 6 within thirty days after arrest. In the alternative, the applicant invoked article 15(4) of the 1969 Treaty on Extradition between the Republic of South Africa and the Republic of Botswana, though the judgment’s determination focused on the Protocol and the Act.


The dispute was principally a question of law, involving statutory and treaty interpretation and the application of those instruments to essentially common-cause procedural events (the manner and timing of transmission of documents). It also involved the application of legal principles to the procedural facts of how the extradition documentation moved through diplomatic and governmental channels.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court approached the matter by setting out the relevant provisions of the Extradition Act 67 of 1962, including sections 3, 4, 5(1)(a), 5(1)(b), and by considering the relevant provisions of the SADC Protocol on Extradition, particularly article 6 (channels of communication for extradition requests) and article 10 (provisional arrest and subsequent steps). The court placed the dispute within the broader structure of extradition procedure, noting that extradition commonly begins with a request for provisional arrest to prevent flight.


A significant feature of the reasoning was the court’s treatment of the Protocol’s domestic status and interpretive role. The court stated that the Protocol is self-executing and effective after ratification without further implementing legislation, carrying legal status akin to domestic legislation, subject to the Constitution. The court further invoked section 233 of the Constitution, emphasising that courts should prefer reasonable interpretations of legislation consistent with international law over interpretations inconsistent with it.


On the question of “receipt” of an extradition request, the court analysed the interaction between section 4 of the Act and article 6 of the Protocol. While the Act contemplates requests being made to the Minister through diplomatic channels, the Protocol provides that requests and supporting documents may be transmitted through diplomatic channels directly between ministries of justice or any other authority designated by the state parties. The court accepted that the note verbale of 17 July 2019 was directed to the Department of International Relations and Cooperation, that it was duly forwarded within state channels, and that the extradition documents were forwarded to the second respondent on 12 August 2019. On that basis, the court concluded that South Africa had received the extradition documents through the channel provided for in the Protocol.


The core of the judgment addressed the applicant’s contention that the absence of a section 5(1)(a) notice meant no extradition request had been received and thus that provisional arrest had to terminate. The court rejected this submission, holding that there is no requirement in the Protocol that the Minister must issue a section 5(1)(a) notice as proof of receipt where the arrest occurred pursuant to a warrant issued by the magistrate under section 5(1)(b).


In explaining why the notice was not necessary, the court distinguished between different forms of arrest under the Act. It described a “straight” arrest under section 5(1)(a) as one triggered by the Minister’s notification that an extradition request has been received, which implies a prima facie ministerial assessment that the person is accused or convicted of an extraditable offence. In support of this description, the court referred to authorities addressing the operation of section 5(1)(a).


By contrast, the court characterised section 5(1)(b) as authorising a provisional arrest on an urgent basis where sufficient information is placed before a magistrate that would justify the issue of a warrant if the offence had been committed in South Africa. In that scenario, the statute expressly authorises the magistrate, rather than the Minister, to trigger the extradition process by issuing the warrant and ordering detention pending the extradition hearing.


The court reinforced this interpretation by reference to section 8 of the Act, under which the magistrate must furnish the Minister with particulars after issuing the warrant, and the Minister is afforded wide authority to intervene, including directing cancellation of the warrant or discharge of the arrested person. The court considered that this structure indicates that, once a section 5(1)(b) process is underway, the Minister is not required to issue a section 5(1)(a) notice to validate the continuation of proceedings; the extradition process has already commenced and the Minister’s role is not a prerequisite for the warrant’s existence.


The court also adopted a “plain reading” and logical analysis: it considered that it would not make sense for the Minister to issue a notice to proceed with issuing a warrant where the magistrate has already issued the warrant under section 5(1)(b). On this reasoning, the applicant’s argument that the extradition application could not proceed without the section 5(1)(a) notice was not accepted.


Applying these principles to the challenged decision, the court concluded that the magistrate committed no error in refusing to release the applicant from provisional arrest under article 10(5)(a) of the Protocol and committed no error in postponing the matter to 10 September 2019 for the extradition enquiry under sections 9 and 10 of the Act.


5. Outcome and Relief


The High Court dismissed the review application. It upheld the magistrate’s decision not to discharge the applicant from provisional arrest and upheld the postponement of the extradition enquiry to 10 September 2019.


The court ordered that the application was dismissed with costs, including reserved costs.


Cases Cited


Palazzolo v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others (4731/2010) ZAWCHC 42 (14 June 2010)


S v Von Schlicht 2000 (1) SACR 558 (C)


Patel v S 2016 (2) SACR 141


Legislation Cited


Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (section 233)


Extradition Act 67 of 1962 (sections 2(3), 3, 4, 5(1)(a), 5(1)(b), 8, 9, 10)


Southern African Development Community Protocol on Extradition (articles 2, 6, 10, 10(5)(a))


Treaty on Extradition between the Republic of South Africa and the Republic of Botswana, 1969 (article 15(4))


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The court held that, where a person has been provisionally arrested under section 5(1)(b) of the Extradition Act, there is no requirement that the Minister must first issue a section 5(1)(a) notice for an extradition request to be regarded as received or for extradition proceedings to continue. The court held further that the extradition documents were received through the channels permitted by article 6 of the SADC Protocol, and that the magistrate did not err in refusing to terminate provisional arrest under article 10(5)(a) or in postponing the extradition enquiry.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The judgment applied the principle that, when interpreting legislation, courts should prefer a reasonable interpretation consistent with international law, as required by section 233 of the Constitution, where such an interpretation is available.


The judgment applied the principle that the SADC Protocol provisions governing extradition requests, channels of communication, and provisional arrest operate together with domestic extradition law, and that a request may be transmitted through diplomatic channels to designated authorities as contemplated by article 6 of the Protocol.


The judgment applied the distinction within the Extradition Act between a “straight” arrest under section 5(1)(a) (which requires a ministerial notification that an extradition request has been received) and provisional arrest under section 5(1)(b) (which empowers a magistrate to issue a warrant on sufficient information without requiring prior ministerial notice). The court treated section 8 as confirming that ministerial involvement may occur after a section 5(1)(b) warrant has issued and does not constitute a prerequisite for the initiation or continuation of the magistrate-driven provisional arrest process.

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[2019] ZAGPJHC 545
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Marsland v Additional District Court Magistrate, Kempton Park and Another (29827/2019) [2019] ZAGPJHC 545 (10 September 2019)

REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NO: 29827/2019
In
the matter between:
MARSLAND,TIMOTHY
GORDON
Applicant
And
THE
ADDITIONAL DISTRICT COURT MAGISTRATE,
KEMPTON
PARK
First
Respondent
THE
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS,
JOHANNESBURG
Second
Respondent
JUDGMENT
MATOJANE
J
Introduction
[1]
The applicant brings an urgent review application, amongst others, to
set aside the decision by the first respondent (‘the

Magistrate’) on 23 August 2019 to not release the applicant
from his provisional arrest in terms of article 10(5)(
a
) of
the Southern African Development Community Protocol on Extradition.
In the alternative, the applicant relies on article 15(4)
of the 1969
Treaty on Extradition between the Republic of South Africa and the
Republic of Botswana (the ‘Treaty’).
Background
[2]
The applicant holds dual citizenship for South Africa and the United
Kingdom. He was born in the United Kingdom in 1966 and
was resident
in Botswana, but is currently living in South Africa.
[3]
The applicant was arrested at the OR Tambo International Airport on
12 July 2019 as he was about to board a plane to Germany.
The arrest
was under a warrant issued by the Magistrate in terms of s 5(1)(
b
)
of the Extradition Act 67 of 1962 (‘the Act’).
[4]
Interpol had issued a ‘Red Notice’ for the applicant to
be provisionally arrested, pending his extradition to Botswana,
where
a warrant for his arrest was issued on charges of money laundering.
It is alleged that while the applicant was a director
of a company in
Botswana, he misappropriated funds amounting to BWP 200 000.00
from the Botswana Public Officers Fund.
[5]
It is further alleged that the applicant, on 25 January 2018,
attempted to obtain by false pretences from the First National
Bank
of Botswana, an amount of BPW 71 000 000. The maximum
penalty possible for the two offences is said to be 28 years

imprisonment.
[6]
The applicant appeared before the Magistrate on 15 July 2019 for a
bail application. The matter was postponed on several occasions.
On
23 July 2019, by way of a report in terms of s 8 of the Act, the
Magistrate informed the Minister that the matter had been
adjourned
until 26 July 2019 for a further bail hearing. The applicant was
denied bail on 8 August 2019. The matter was then postponed
to
23 August 2019 for the receipt of the formal extradition
documentation from the Republic of Botswana. The applicant has
in the
meantime noted an appeal against the refusal of bail, which bail
appeal is currently pending.
[7]
On 23 August 2019, the second respondent indicated to the Court that
the original extradition application had been received
by the
Director of Public Prosecutions. Copies of the following documents
were placed before the Court as exhibits, namely: a note
verbale from
the Republic of Botswana dated 17 July 2019; a letter on behalf of
the Director-General of the Department of International
Relations &
Cooperation dated 19 July 2019; and a letter by the Chief
Directorate: International Legal Relations on behalf
of the
Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, dated 12 August
2019.
[8]
The second respondent requested a postponement for the extradition
enquiry to be held in terms of s 9 and s 10 of
the Act. The
applicant opposed the application; it was argued on his behalf that
as the Minister has not issued a notice in terms
of s 5(1)(
a
)
of the Act within the specified period, he was entitled to be
discharged as no extradition request can be said to have been
received
by the Minister.
[9]
The Magistrate rejected the applicant’s arguments and dismissed
the application. The matter was postponed to 10 September
2019 for
the extradition enquiry to be conducted in terms of s 9 and s 10
of the Act. It is this decision of the Magistrate
that the applicant
now wishes to have reviewed and set aside.
The
issue
[10]
In order to determine whether the Magistrate erred in dismissing the
application to discharge the applicant, it must first
be determined
whether an extradition request can be said to have been received
where the Minister has not issued a notice in terms
of s 5(1)(
a
)
of the Act.
The
relevant legislation
[11]
In
determining this issue, ss 3, 4, 5(1)(
a
),
5(1)(
b
)
of the Act and article 6 of the Southern African Development
Community Protocol on Extradition
[1]
(the ‘SADC Protocol’) set out below, must first be
considered.
[12]
The extradition process generally commences when a requesting state
issues a request for a provisional arrest to the requested
state. The
purpose is to detain fugitives who are likely to flee once they
become aware of proceedings to extradite them.
[13]
Section
3(1)
[2]
of the Act makes
provision for extradition of the fugitive to a foreign state in terms
of an extradition agreement. Where there
is no extradition agreement
with such a foreign state, the President has to consent, in writing,
to the extradition as provided
for in section 3(2)
[3]
of the Act. The third type of extradition is to a designated
state.
[4]
[14]
The SADC
Protocol outlines the general judicial procedure for extraditing a
person to the requesting state. It sets out specific
deadlines within
which the request for extradition must be received and within which
the authority to proceed must be issued. In
this case Botswana, as a
requesting state, had 30 days within which to provide a formal
request for extradition. These deadlines
exist to protect the accused
from being detained without charge.
[5]
[15]
In terms of article 2 of the SADC Protocol, South Africa, as a State
Party to the Treaty, has agreed to extradite to other
member states,
in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol and their
respective domestic law, any person within its jurisdiction
who is
wanted for prosecution or the imposition or enforcement of a sentence
in the requesting state for an extraditable offence.
[16]
In terms of s 233 of the Constitution, when interpreting any
legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable interpretation
of
the legislation that is consistent with international law over any
alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international

law.
[17]
The Protocol is self-executing, in that it is effective immediately
after the Minister had ratified it without any further
implementing
legislation. It carries the same legal status as domestic legislation
and is subject to limitations by the Constitution.
The Constitution
is supreme and therefore limits the power of treaties.
[18]
Where South
Africa has an extradition treaty with the requesting state, as in the
present matter, the Act requires the request for
extradition to be
made to the Minister of Justice as communicated through diplomatic
channels. Where the request is received by
any person other than the
Minister, any such request must be handed to the Minister.
[6]
[19]
Section 4 must be read with article 6 of the protocol which deals
with the channels of communication and the required document
as
follows:

A request for
extradition shall be made in writing. The request, supporting
documents and subsequent communications shall be transmitted
through
the diplomatic channel, directly between the Ministries of Justice or
any other authority designated by the State Parties.’
[20]
Section 4 of the Act is subject to article 6 of the Protocol, which
provides for a different manner of receipt of the request
for
extradition. The request for extradition can also be transmitted
through the diplomatic channel
to any other authority
designated by the State Parties
(own emphasis). The note
verbale dated 17 July 2019 was directed to the Department of
International Relations and Cooperation.
The Department, in turn,
duly forwarded the documents to the Director-General: Department of
Constitutional Development. I find
that South Africa received the
extradition documents and they were forwarded to the second
respondent on 12 August 2019.
[21]
Article 10 deals with provisional arrest and provides:
1. In all cases, the
competent authority of the Requesting State may apply by any means
which allows for a written record for the
provisional arrest of the
person sought.
2. A request for
provisional arrest shall be sent to the competent authority of the
Requested State either through the diplomatic
channel or directly by
post or telegraph or through the International Criminal Police
Organisation (INTERPOL) or by any other means
affording evidence in
writing or accepted by the Requested State.
[22]
The submission by the applicant that it must be the Minister only who
should receive the request for extradition and that until
such time
that the Minister has issued the s 5(1)(
a
) notice, no
extradition request can be said to have been received must be
rejected. There is no requirement in the Protocol that
the Minister
must issue a section 5(1)(
a
) notice as proof of such receipt
where the arrest is pursuant to a warrant issued by the Magistrate in
terms of section 5(1)(
b
) of the Act.
[23]
There are
three forms of arrest under the Act to bring a person before a court
to face an extradition enquiry: first, a ‘straight’

arrest pursuant to s 5(1)(
a
)
[7]
of the Act in terms whereof the Minister confirms that he has
received an extradition request as contemplated by s 4(1) of
the
Act by issuing a so-called s 5(1)(
a
)
notice. The Minister by implication is required to conclude, at least
prima
facie
,
that,
ex
facie
the request, the person sought has been convicted or is accused of an
extraditable offence. This will avoid a situation where a
person who
has not committed an extraditable offence is requested. See
Palazzolo
v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others
(4731/2010) ZAWCHC 42 (14 June 2010) at para 13;
S
v Von Schlicht
2000 (1) SACR 558
(C) at para 4; and
Patel
v S
2016 (2) SACR 141
at para 10.
[24]
The second
form of arrest is a ‘provisional’ arrest in terms of
section 5(1)(
b
)
[8]
of the Act. In this instance, the request for arrest is made on an
urgent basis and there is fear that the fugitive will flee if
not
detained immediately. Section 5(1)(
b
)
of the Act expressly authorises the Magistrate, and not the Minister,
to trigger the extradition process by ordering the detention
of a
suspect pending an extradition hearing – if sufficient
information is placed before the court that the fugitive has

committed an extraditable offence in a foreign state which would
justify the issue of the warrant if such an offence was committed
in
the Republic.
[25]
In terms of
s 8 of the Act, the Magistrate, after issuing a warrant for the
arrest of further detention of a fugitive, shall
forthwith furnish
the Minister with particulars relating to the issue of such warrant.
The Minister may at any time after having
been notified that a
warrant has been issued, in the case where the warrant has not yet
been executed, direct the Magistrate concerned
to cancel the warrant;
in the case where the warrant has been executed, direct that the
person who has been arrested be discharged
forthwith.
[9]
[26]
By its terms, s 5(1)(
b
) applies only to those who have
been provisionally arrested. The Minister is not called upon to
decide whether a valid extradition
request was received. The Minister
is given wide authority to intervene at any given time during the
extradition proceedings which
has already started before the
Magistrate. It is not correct to argue, as the applicant does, that
this extradition application
cannot proceed because the Minister did
not issue a notification in terms of s 5(1)(
a
) of the
Act. In my view, it is not necessary under the circumstances for
s 5(1)(
a
) notice to be issued as the extradition process
has already commenced.
[27]
A plain reading of the subsection confirms that the Magistrate does
not require the section 5(1)(a) notice from the Minister
to trigger
the extradition process by the issue of a warrant of arrest. Logic
compels the same conclusion. For clarity, there is
no reason for the
Minister to issue a notice to proceed with issuing a warrant of
arrest when the magistrate has already done so.
A straight arrest
warrant, on the other hand, may be obtained only after a request for
extradition has been received and the notice
to proceed has been
issued by the Minister.
[28]
Therefore, the Magistrate did not err in concluding that the
applicant was not entitled to be discharged on the basis that
the
Minister did not issue a notice in terms of s 5(1)(
a
) of
the Act.
Conclusion
[29]
The Magistrate committed no error in not releasing the applicant from
his provisional arrest in terms of article 10(5)(
a
) of the
SADC Protocol on Extradition.
[30]
The Magistrate further did not err in postponing the extradition
enquiry hearing to 10 September 2019.
Order
1. The application is
dismissed with costs, including reserved costs.
_____________________________
K
E MATOJANE
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
I
agree.
_____________________________
F
DIPPENAAR
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Date
of hearing: 6 September  2019
Date
of judgment: 10 September 2019
Appearances:
Counsel
for the Applicant: Adv. C E Thompson
Instructing
Attorneys: Bernard L Du Plessis Inc
Counsel
for the 2
nd
Respondent: Adv. PJ Schutte, Adv D Barnard
[1]
The Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development gave notice
in terms of section 2(3) of the extradition Act,1962 that
Parliament
has on 14 April 2003 agreed to the ratification of the protocol
which entered into force on 1 September 2006. GG NO
35368 of 25 May
2012.
[2]
(1) Any person accused or convicted of an offence included in an
extradition agreement and committed within the jurisdiction
of a
foreign State a party to such agreement, shall, subject to the
provisions of this Act, be liable to be surrendered to such
State in
accordance with the terms of such agreement, whether or not the
offence was committed before or after the commencement
of this Act
or before or after the date upon which the agreement comes into
operation and whether or not a court in the Republic
has
jurisdiction to try such person for such offence.
[3]
Any person accused or convicted of an extraditable offence committed
within the jurisdiction of a foreign State which is not
a party to
an extradition agreement shall be liable to be surrendered to such
foreign State, if the President has in writing
consented to his or
her being so surrendered.
[4]
Any person accused or convicted of an extraditable offence committed
within the jurisdiction of a designated State shall be liable
to be
surrendered to such designated State, whether or not the offence was
committed before or after the designation of such
State and whether
or not a court in the Republic has jurisdiction to try such person
for such offence.
[5]
10.5(a) Provisional arrest shall be terminated if the Requested
State has not received the request for extradition and supporting

documents through the channel provided for in Article 6 within
thirty (30) days after the arrest.
[6]
4 (1) Subject to the terms of any extradition agreement any request
for the surrender of any person to a foreign State shall
be made to
the Minister by a person recognized by the Minister as a diplomatic
or consular representative of that State or by
any Minister of that
State communicating with the Minister through diplomatic channels
existing between the Republic and such
State.
(2)
Any such request received in terms of an extradition agreement by
any person other than the Minister shall be handed to the
Minister.
[7]
Any magistrate may, irrespective of the whereabouts or suspected
whereabouts of the person to be arrested, issue a warrant for
the
arrest of any person-
1.
(a)
upon receipt of a notification from the Minister to
the effect that a request for the surrender of such person to a
foreign State
has been received by the Minister; or …
[8]
Any magistrate may, irrespective of the whereabouts or suspected
whereabouts of the person to be arrested, issue a warrant for
the
arrest of any person-
1.
(b)
upon such information of his or her being a person
accused or convicted of an extraditable offence committed within the
jurisdiction
of a foreign State, as would in the opinion of the
magistrate justify the issue of a warrant for the arrest of such
person, had
it been alleged that he or she committed an offence in
the Republic.
[9]
Section 8(2)(
a
)
and (
b
).