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[2019] ZAGPJHC 199
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10 & 10a Kenmere CC v Ndebele and Others (2018/31110) [2019] ZAGPJHC 199 (19 June 2019)
SAFLII
Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
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IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NO: 2018/31110
In
the matter between
:
10
& 10a Kenmere CC
(Registration
Number:
1991/030784/23) Applicant
and
Ndebele,
Zandile
P First
Respondent
Ntozini,
S Second
Respondent
Khumalo,
M Third
Respondent
Msani,
C T
Fourth
Respondent
Majola,
N S
Fifth
Respondent
Ngwenya,
S Sixth
Respondent
Ntombiyosizi
Nkomo First
Intervening Party
Sandile
Jaca Second
Intervening Party
Liberty
Fighters
Network Third
Intervening Party
J U D G M E N T
Modiba,
J
:
INTRODUCTION
[1]
The applicant seeks an order for the eviction of
the 1
st
to 6
th
respondents from units respectively occupied by these parties at […]
Flats, Belleview, Johannesburg (“
the
property
”).
[2]
Initially, the applicant brought the application
in the ordinary course. On 1 March 2019, the applicant supplemented
its papers
to bring the application on an urgent basis.
[3]
Three interveners Ntombiyosizi Nkomo, Sandile
Jaca and Liberty Fighters Network (“LFN”) seek to
intervene. They
contend that the 4
th
and 6
th
respondents do not occupy units 1 and 3 as alleged by the applicant.
These units are occupied by the 1
st
and 2
nd
intervening party.
[4]
The applicant does not oppose the intervention
application. The intervention of the 1
st
and 2
nd
intervening party on the basis of their occupation of the aforesaid
units is proper. It stands to be granted.
[5]
In an
answering affidavit deposed to by De Beer, LFN is described as a
voluntary tenant’s association as envisaged in the
Rental
Housing Act.
[1]
With the
exception of the 4
th
and 6
th
respondent, the rest of the respondents and the intervening parties
are its members. The LFN seeks to intervene in these proceedings
in a
representative capacity. It also seeks leave of the court to be
represented by its President, De Beer, in these proceedings.
The
applicant does not oppose this request. The intervention application
stands to be granted. So is the request that De Beer represents
LFN.
[6]
The application is only opposed by the cited LFN
members. For convenience, I refer to these parties as the opposing
respondents.
[7]
The 4
th
and 6
th
respondent
are not opposing the application. I refer to them jointly as the
non-opposing respondents and individually as the 4
th
and 6
th
respondent. On the applicant’s version the non-opposing
respondents are still in occupation of the property according to
the
rental schedule. They were duly served with the application as well
as the section 4 (2) notice. The opposing respondents have
not
established their authority to make submissions on behalf of the
non-opposing respondents. If the opposing respondents’
version
is true, I see no reason why the non-opposing respondents did not
oppose their eviction on the sole basis that they are
no longer in
occupation of the property. Therefore application stands to be
determined on the applicant’s version in respect
of the status
of the non-opposing respondents.
[8]
The applicant seeks the joinder of the 4
th
intervening party (“
De Beer
”)
due to his alleged contravention of the Legal Practice Act 28 of 2014
(“
the LPA
”).
De Beer is an official of the LFN. He drafted the
opposing papers on behalf of opposing respondents. He also
argued
this application in court. It is not the applicant’s case that
De Beer acted, as aforesaid, in his personal capacity.
Therefore, on
this issues, a dispute arises from the facts. However, it does not
render the application irresolvable on the papers
because the
applicant’s eviction claim does not turn on it. The applicant
may refer the matter to the LPC should it wish
to persist with these
allegations. The Legal Practice Council is in a better position to
investigate these allegations.
[9]
The applicant has failed to establish that De
Beer has a personal interest in the outcome of these proceedings.
Therefore the application
for his joinder stands to be dismissed.
[10]
The basis on which the applicant seeks to evict
the occupiers, is its alleged ownership of the property, the
occupiers’ refusal
to pay rental despite demand and their
refusal to vacate the property despite notice, as a result of which
their occupation has
allegedly become unlawful.
[11]
The opposing respondents dispute that the
applicant is the owner of the property. They contend that they have
not entered into lease
agreements with the applicant, hence they
refuse to pay rental to it. They tender to pay rental to an
administrator of the property,
if appointed.
[12]
The opposing respondents have also raised several
points
in limine
. I
address these first.
URGENCY
[13]
The opposing respondents contend that the
application is not urgent.
[14]
The applicant contends that the application is
commercially urgent. It is a small business entity enduring
severe financial
losses as a result of the rental boycott and
attempted hijacking of the property by the occupiers. It owns
only one property
and has not yielded a profit for almost a year. It
is sustained on its sole member’s personal funds. It only
receives R8 000,00
per month in rental income from tenants in
good standing. The monthly bond repayment on the property is
R24 000,00.
Rates and services cost R19 000,00 per
month. Employees’ salaries cost R15 000,00 per
month. Consequently,
it experiences a monthly shortfall in
excess of R50 000,00. It cannot afford to maintain the property.
As a result, the property
faces the risk of foreclosure or
termination of municipal services. It has no access to funding, to
finance the monthly shortfall
pending the determination of this
application in the ordinary course.
[15]
Additionally, the applicant complains that the
occupiers threatened and harassed its contractors and employees. They
also detained
the applicant’s caretaker at the property for a
few hours, insulted, harassed and threatened him. There are illegal
electricity
connections established at each of the occupiers’
units. This places the entire property as well as the occupiers and
other
tenants’ lives at risk. The 3
rd
,
4
th
and 5
th
respondents have denied the applicant or any of its contractor’s
access to the units.
[16]
The
opposing respondents barely deny these allegations. Such a response
does not constitute a
bona
fide
factual dispute.
[2]
Therefore
urgency stands to be determined on the applicant’s version.
[17]
The
applicant has been dilatory in its conduct of the application. The
opposing respondents filed their answering affidavit on 28
October
2018. It appears that for a period of almost four months, the
applicant took no further steps to advance this matter further.
It
fails to explain why it delayed to bring this application. This, the
court frowns upon. Be that as it may, it is trite that
an applicant
is not denied an urgent hearing solely because it delayed to bring
the application. The ultimate test in respect of
urgency is whether
the applicant will be denied substantive redress in due course if the
application is not heard on an urgent
basis.
[3]
[18]
Commercial
urgency has been held to constitute urgency as contemplated by Rule 6
(12).
[4]
The basis for urgency
relied upon by the applicant was successfully relied upon in
Teaca
[5]
and
Nyathi
[6]
.
On
these authorities, the financial predicament that the occupiers have
placed the applicant in by refusing to pay rental to it
and their
continued occupation without any financial consideration, renders
this matter commercially urgent. Hearing the application
in the
ordinary course is likely to result in the applicant’s
financial ruin, thereby denying it substantial redress in due
course.
[19]
In the premises, I find that the application is
urgent.
THE
DECISION OF THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLE’S RIGHTS
OF THE AFRICAN UNION
[20]
The opposing respondent’s reliance on a
communication by the African Commission on Human and People’s
Rights of the
African Union (“the ACHPR”) to dispute the
applicant’s allegations regarding the rental boycott as well as
the
hijacking of the property is misplaced. The ACHPR has not made
any determination regarding the LFN’s complaint. The ACHPR
seems to have accepted the LFN’s complaints and gave it two
months to submit evidence in substantiation of the complaint.
[21]
Further, the proceedings pending before the ACHPR
are not an impediment to the determination of this application. The
ACHPR decision
does not reflect this matter as subject to the LFN
complaint to it.
[22]
Therefore this point
in
limine
stands to be dismissed.
THE
RESPONDENT’S RULE 30 NOTICE
[23]
On 22 February 2019, the applicant issued Rule 35
(12) and 14(9) notices, calling on the opposing respondents to
produce for inspection
documents listed in these notices. On the same
date, the applicant filed its replying affidavit. The opposing
respondents filed
their answering affidavit on 28 October 2018. It is
common cause that the replying affidavit was due on or about 12
November 2018.
[24]
On 7 March 2019, the respondents issued a notice
in terms of Rule 30 objecting to the late filing of the replying
affidavit as well
as the filing of the Rule 35 (12) and 14(9)
notices. The applicant has not complied with the notice in terms of
Rule 30. It had
to do so on or about 22 March 2019. In terms of Rule
30 (2) (c), the respondents were entitled to bring a Rule 30
application within
15 days of 22 March 2019. The applicant enrolled
the urgent application for hearing on 19 March 2019. This court heard
it on 22
March 2019 and reserved judgment.
[25]
The opposing respondents contend that they are
entitled to a determination of the Rule 30 application before this
application is
heard. I disagree. Nothing precluded them from
bringing a Rule 30 application on an urgent basis and set it down for
hearing simultaneously
with this application. They failed to do
so. The opposing respondents are not entitled to a postponement of
this application
in order to bring an application in terms of Rule
30. Further, for the reasons set out below, the opposing respondents
will not
suffer prejudice if they are not given time to pursue the
Rule 30 application.
[26]
The opposing respondents did not comply with the
Rule 35 (12) and 14(9) notices. The applicant did not bring an
application to compel
such compliance. Therefore for the purpose of
the eviction application, these notices are irrelevant.
[27]
The court takes note of the opposing respondents’
objection for the late filing of the replying affidavit. The
applicant has
not applied for condonation. Its flagrant
disregard for court rules cannot be ignored, particularly because it
had an opportunity
when it filed a supplementary affidavit as well as
an amended notice of motion seeking to be heard urgently, to seek
condonation.
Under these circumstances, the replying affidavit is
disallowed as it was filed out of time.
[28]
Therefore the opposing respondent’s point
in limine
regarding
the Rule 30 application stands to be dismissed.
COMPLIANCE
WITH SECTION 4 (2) OF THE PIE ACT
[29]
The opposing respondents contend that the
applicant has failed to comply with section 4 (2) of the PIE Act.
This section provides:
“
Eviction of unlawful
occupiers
4 (2) At least 14 days before the
hearing of the proceedings contemplated in subsection (1), the court
must serve written and effective
notice of the proceedings on the
unlawful occupier and the municipality having jurisdiction.”
[30]
On 18
September 2018, Mohlala AJ authorised a notice in terms of section
4(2) to be served on the 1
st
to 6
th
respondents. According to a return of service filed in this
application, the notice was duly served on these respondents as well
as the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality in terms of the
court rules. As already stated, the 1
st
and 2
nd
intervening party have sought and stand to be granted leave to
intervene. Together with the initially cited respondents, with the
exception of the non-opposing respondents, they are not only opposing
the application, they have filed a counter application. Under
these
circumstances, the purpose of section 4(2) has been achieved.
[7]
[31]
Therefore this point
in
limine
stands to be dismissed.
NON-JOINDER
OF THE MUNICIPALITY
[32]
The opposing respondents complain that the
applicant has failed to join the municipality. As already stated, the
applicant has notified
the municipality of these proceedings. The
municipality has elected not to file a report in the PIE Act.
[33]
The
opposing respondents have not established that the municipality has
an interest in the outcome of these proceedings. Such an
interest
arises in terms of section 12 of the Housing Act read with section 26
of the Constitution,
[8]
where an
occupier requires emergency accommodation. The occupiers previously
paid the rental in excess of R5 000,00 per month
(excluding
electricity and water charges). The occupiers’ tender to make
payments of the monthly rental to an administrator,
if appointed. It
is not their case that they are unable to find alternative rental
accommodation in an approximate amount and in
the same area. It is
probable that the occupiers can afford to pay rental, but elect not
to do so due to a rental boycott, which
they do not deny. Under these
circumstances, it is improbable that the occupiers would qualify for
emergency accommodation.
[9]
It
also is improbable that they have requested such assistance from the
municipality. They have not placed information in this
regard before
the court.
[34]
Therefore this point
in
limine
stands to be dismissed.
PRIVILEGE
AND THE LPA
[35]
To the founding and replying affidavits, the
applicant annexed Whatsapp messages, demanding payment from the
occupiers before the
4
th
intervening party renders legal services to them. The opposing
respondents object to the inclusion of the messages to the
applicant’s
papers on the basis that it is privileged
information. The applicant contends that the message does not
constitute privileged information.
[36]
The basis for the privilege sought to be relied
on by LFN is unclear. LFN is not a legal service provider. The
message demanded
payment for legal services. It did not communicate
legal advice. The opposing respondents do not dispute the content of
the messages
and its source. The filed papers in opposition to the
eviction application were drafted by De Beer, a representative of the
LFN.
The LFN denies that De Beer and it provides legal services to
the opposing respondents. The applicant’s allegation against
the LFN and De Beer gives rise to a suspicion that these parties may
have contravened the LPA, which is a criminal offence. Hence
the
applicant is urged to report the matter to the LPA for investigation,
should it wish to pursue these allegations.
THE
AUTHORITY OF THE DEPONENT TO THE APPLICANT’S AFFIDAVITS
[37]
The
opposing respondents dispute the authority of the deponent to the
applicant’s affidavits. It is trite that a deponent
need not be
authorised to depose to an affidavit. He is only required to have
personal knowledge of the facts set out therein.
The authority to
institute legal proceedings ought to be challenged in terms of Rule
7
[10]
. The opposing
respondents have not followed the procedure prescribed in this rule.
[38]
Therefore this point
in
limine
stands to be dismissed.
THE
DISPUTE BEFORE THE RENTAL HOUSING TRIBUNAL
[39]
The opposing respondents’ complaint that
this court lacks jurisdiction because there is a dispute between some
of the opposing
respondents and the applicant, pending before the
Rental Housing Tribunal (“RHT”), lacks merit. The RHT
tribunal does
not have jurisdiction in respect of the relief the
applicant seeks in this application. Further, any pending proceedings
before
the RHT do not impede the determination of this application.
OWNERSHIP
OF THE PROPERTY
[40]
As mentioned, the opposing respondents challenge
the applicant’s contended ownership of the property. They would
not accept
a printout from the Deeds Office website, obtained by the
applicant’s attorney to prove the applicant’s ownership
of
the property. They also refuse to accept the applicant’s
identity as set out in a certificate issued by the Companies and
Intellectual Property Commission (“CIPC”).
[41]
The CIPC
certificate is a public document, admissible on mere production.
[11]
It proves the applicant’s identity. The deed of transfer of the
property confirming ownership is the best evidence
of ownership.
[12]
It confirms the applicant’s ownership of the property. The
opposing respondents have not provided any basis for disputing
these
forms of proof.
[42]
In the premises, I am satisfied that the
applicant is an owner of the property as envisaged in terms of
section 4(1). This section
provides:
“
Eviction of unlawful
occupiers
4 (1) Notwithstanding anything to
the contrary contained in any law or the common law, the provisions
of this section apply to proceedings
by an owner or person in charge
of land for the eviction of an unlawful occupier.”
UNLAWFUL
OCCUPATION
[43]
The occupiers occupy the property in terms of
leases entered into with the applicant’s predecessor in title.
The applicant
took transfer of the property on 1 July 2016, after
which the trite
huur gaat voor koop
doctrine applied in respect of these leases. The leases have expired
with the effluxion of time. The occupiers remained in occupation
on
the basis of monthly tenancies.
[44]
The occupiers have failed to pay rental to the
applicant, payable monthly in advance. Instead, the occupiers have
engaged in a rental
boycott. They failed to meet a demand to pay and
were given notice to vacate the property. Despite these measures, the
occupiers
remain in occupation. Their tender to pay rental to an
administrator, if appointed, lacks merit. They are not entitled to
the appointment
of an administrator under circumstances were the
applicant is the owner of the property and is in terms of monthly
leases, entitled
to receive rental from the occupiers.
[45]
On the occupiers’ own version they are
unlawful occupiers. They contend that there is no lease agreement
between the parties.
The occupiers have no right in law to
occupy the applicant’s property. This renders their occupation
unlawful as envisaged
by section 4(1) of the PIE Act.
[46]
In the premises, I find that:
[46.1] the applicant is
the owner of the property.
[46.2] the occupiers are
unlawful occupiers. Therefore the applicant has complied with section
4 (1).
[46.3] the occupiers do
not face the risk of homelessness. Therefore it is not necessary for
the applicant to join the municipality
to these proceedings.
THE
APPLICANT’S EVICTION CLAIM
[47]
Given that the occupiers have occupied the
property for more than six months, section 4 (6) of the PIE Act is
applicable. This section
provides:
“
Eviction
of unlawful occupiers
4
(6) if an unlawful occupier has occupied the land in question for
less than six months at the time when the proceedings are initiated,
a court may grant an order for eviction if it is of the opinion that
it is just and equitable to do so, after considering all the
relevant
circumstances, including the rights and needs of the elderly,
children, disabled persons and households headed by women.”
[48]
Our courts
have repeatedly found on circumstances similar to those under which
the occupiers occupy the property, that it is just
and equitable to
grant an order, evicting them from the property.
[13]
[49]
I also find on the same basis that
,
it would be just and equitable to grant the
eviction order as prayed for by the applicant.
[50]
The occupiers have been aware since the applicant
served termination letters on them on 6 February 2018 that the
applicant intends
evicting them from the property. They had more than
sixteen months to find alternative accommodation. They only have
themselves
to blame for choosing not to find alternative
accommodation. They have benefited from free occupation under
circumstances were
they took the law into their own hands by
embarking on a rental boycott, to the applicant’s financial
peril. In the premises,
the court consider a shorted eviction date to
be just and equitable.
COSTS
[51]
The applicant seeks punitive costs
de
bonis propriis
against both LFN and De Beer.
De Beer has not been admitted as a party. Therefore a cost order
against him is incompetent.
[52]
The applicant seeks punitive costs on the basis
that the opposition was frivolous, placed reliance on what it
considers to be abusive
interlocutory issues as well as technical
points
in limine
aimed
at causing frustration and delay. It further contends that there is
no reason why the opposing respondents should be liable
for costs,
when being presented by the LFN and De Beer, allegedly in
contravention of the LPA. As already stated, there is a dispute
of
facts on the papers regarding the LFN and De Beer’s alleged
contravention of the LPA. Having made no finding regarding,
the LFN
and De Beer’s alleged unlawful conduct, the applicant’s
mere allegations do not justify mulcting LFN and De
Beer with costs
de bonis propriis
.
Conversely, the respondent’s lack of respect for the rule of
law, as well as their unlawful occupation found in this application
does not justify their absolution from costs.
[53]
The applicant’s dilatory conduct as found
in this application, also does not justify such a cost order in their
favour. Costs
are the only way the court is able to express its
displeasure against such conduct. In the premises, the applicant
stands to only
be allowed costs on the ordinary scale.
[54]
Costs stand to be granted against all the
respondents on the basis of the trite principle that costs follow the
course. The
non-opposing respondents’ costs ought to be
limited to the costs of an unopposed application.
EXECUTION
OF THE EVICTION ORDER PENDING APPEAL
[55]
In his
heads of argument, counsel for the applicant seeks an order
authorising the execution of the eviction order pending appeal
processes. Such an order is normally granted on the basis of section
18 of the Superior Courts Act.
[14]
Stringent requirements for such an order are set out therein.
An order permitting execution pending appeal is extra-ordinary
because an application for leave to appeal ordinarily suspends the
execution of an order until the application for leave to appeal
is
determined.
[56]
I do not deem it appropriate to consider such an
order as requested by the applicant. The order is not prayed for in
the two notice
of motions. The respondents were not given prior
notice that it will be sought. Therefore they have not been afforded
an opportunity
to address the court in this regard. Under these
circumstances, the request stands to be refused.
COUNTER
APPLICATION
[57]
Having disallowed the applicant’s replying
affidavit where it answers to the opposing respondents’
counterclaim, the
counterclaim is determined on an unopposed basis.
It does not stand to be granted merely because it has been
instituted. The opposing
respondents ought to make a proper case for
the relief set out therein. This, they failed to do.
[58]
In the counter-application, the respondents seek
an order in the following terms:
“
1. That the Court
declares that the first, second, third, and fifth respondents to the
main application, together with the second
and third intervening
parties have not been declared as unlawful occupiers by any court or
other competent body and therefore the
proceedings in terms of the
PIE Act may not be followed against them until they have been
declared as unlawful occupiers;
2.
That the second respondent in the
counter-application is ordered to investigate the property situated
at […] A. Street, Danhella
Court, Rosettenville, Johannesburg
as a potential “
problem property
”
and to follow the necessary processes in terms of the Problem
Property By Laws, 2014;
3.
That the main application be dismissed;
4.
In
the alternative to paragraph 3
supra
,
that the matter be referred to trial and that the Notice of Motion in
the main application stand as a simple summons, that founding
affidavit stands as the first respondent’s (as plaintiff)
declaration, that the answering affidavit stand as the first, second,
third, and fifth respondents to the main application, together with
the second and third intervening parties’, plea and the
court
to make any order as to the proceedings of the trial it deems
necessary;
5.
Costs against the first respondent in this
counter-application.
[59]
The counter-application is spurious and has no
basis in law. It stands to be dismissed for that reason. There is no
legal requirement
that occupiers ought to be declared to be unlawful
occupiers before eviction proceedings may be brought against them.
The respondents
have not set out any cogent basis for the
investigation of the applicant’s property as a problem property
in terms of the
Problem Property by Laws, 2014. Neither have they set
out a basis for the referral of the application to trial.
[60]
In the premises, it is ordered that:
ORDER
1.
The 1
st
to 3
rd
intervening
parties are allowed to intervene.
2.
The 1
st
to 6
th
respondent,
the 1
st
and 2
nd
intervening parties and all those occupying the property by, through
or under them, are evicted from the property situated at […]
F. Street, Bellevue, Johannesburg more fully described as Erven […]
and […] Bellevue, Registration Division I.R.
Gauteng
(hereinafter referred to as the “
property
”).
3.
The 1
st
to 6
th
respondent,
the 1
st
and 2
nd
intervening parties and all those occupying the property by, through
or under them are ordered to vacate the property on or before
30 June
2019.
4.
In
the event that the 1
st
to 6
th
respondent,
the 1
st
and 2
nd
intervening parties and all those occupying the property by, through
or under them do not vacate the property on 30 June 2019 the
Sheriff
of the Court or his lawfully appointed Deputy is authorised and
directed to evict them from the property on 2 July 2019.
5.
All the respondents and the intervening parties
shall pay the costs of the application, including the costs of the
application in
terms of section 4(2) of the Prevention of Illegal
Eviction from Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998, jointly and
severally,
the one paying the other to be absolved, provided that the
liability of the 4
th
and 6
th
respondents is only limited to the unopposed costs.
________________________________________
L.T.
MODIBA
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
APPEARANCES
Counsel
for the Applicant: C Van der Merwe
Instructed
by: Vermaak & Partners Inc
For
the 1
st
, 2
nd
, 3
rd
, 5
th
Respondents
and the Intervening Parties: R D De Beer
(Liberty
Fighters Network official)
[1]
Act 50 of 1999.
[2]
Soffiantini v Mould
1956 (4) SA 150
at 154H,
Plascon-Evans
Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd
[1984] ZASCA 51
;
1984 (3) SA 623
(A) at 634-635 and
Wightman
t/a JW Construction v Headfour (Pty) Ltd and Another
2008 (3) SA 371 (SCA)
[3]
Rule 6 (12),
Luna Meubels
Vervaardigers (Edms) Bpk v Makin and Another (t/a Makins Furniture
Manufacturers)
1977 (4) SA
135
(W)
[4]
20
th
Century Fox Film Corp v Black Films
1982
(3) 582 (W) at 586
[5]
Teaca Properties (Pty) Ltd
and Others v John Banza and Others
(2017/36741) [2018] ZAGPJHC 72 (9 February 2018)
[6]
Nyathi and Others v Tenitor
Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others
2015 JDR 1296 (GJ)
[7]
Theart and Another v
Minnaar NO; Senekal v Winskor
174 (Pty) Ltd
2010 (3) SA 327
(SCA) at para 12. See also
Unlawful
Occupiers, School Site v City of Johannesburg
2005 (4) SA 199
(SCA)
([2005]
2 All SA 108)
para 24
[8]
City of Johannesburg
Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd
and Another
2012 (2) SA
104
(CC) at para 27.
[9]
See
Teaca
at paras 25 and 33.
[10]
Ganes and Another v Telecom
Namibia Ltd
2004 (3) SA
615
(SCA) at para 19. Also see
Eskom
v Soweto City Council
1992
(2) SA 703
(W) at 705C-J).
[11]
Section
221 (1) and (2),
Companies Act 71 of 2008
. See also
section 18
(1), Civil Proceedings Evidence Act 25 of 1965.
[12]
Goudini Chrome (Pty) Ltd v
MCC Contracts (Pty) Ltd
[1992] ZASCA 208
;
1993
(1) SA 77
(A) at 82. See also
R
v Nhlanhla
1960 (3) SA 568
(T) at 570D-H.
[13]
Ndlovu v Ngcobo; Bekker and
another v Jika 2003 (1) 113 (SCA) AT [19], Nyathi (supra) and Teaca
(supra).
[14]
Act 10 of 2013.