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[2019] ZAGPJHC 180
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E v E; R v R; M v M (12583/17; 20739/18; 5954/18) [2019] ZAGPJHC 180; [2019] 3 All SA 519 (GJ); 2019 (5) SA 566 (GJ) (12 June 2019)
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NO: 12583/17
20739/18
5954/18
In
the matter between:
E
v
E
12583/2017
R
v
R
20739/2018
M
v
M
5954/2018
JUDGMENT
MAKUME
J
:
Background
[1]
The above matters were referred to the full court by the Judge
President of this Division pursuant to an order by Van Vuuren
AJ
dated the 20th September 2018. The order reads as follows:
“
The hearing of
the applications in the following cases are discontinued before me
and are referred to a full court of this division
under S.14 (1) (b)
of the Superior Court Act 10 of 2013:
E v E Case No.:
12583/2017
R v R Case No.:
20739/2018
M v M Case No.:
5954/2018”
[2]
All three applications were brought in terms of Rule 43 (1) of the
Uniform Rules of Court. The applicants sought relief
pendent lite
for interim maintenance, custody and contribution to costs
pending the finalisation of their divorce actions.
[3]
In his reasoning for referring these matters to be heard by the full
court as a court of first instance, Van Vuuren AJ says
that the
conflicting judgements in this division being that by Tsoka J in
Van
Beest Van Andel vs Van Beest Van Andel EP case number 27869/2007
(7th
October 2009) and that of Spilg J in
TS, R vs TS, T case number
28917/2016
(7th August 2017) have brought subrule 43(2) and (3)
into focus.
[4]
Subsequently, the Judge President issued a directive inviting
interested parties to apply to the full court to be admitted as
amicus curiae
. He also outlined further questions for
consideration by the full court.
The Amicus Curiae
[5]
Legal Aid South Africa and the Gauteng Family Law Forum applied to be
admitted as
amicus curiae.
[6]
Legal Aid South Africa is a statutory public entity established in
terms of Section 2(1) of the Legal Aid South Africa Act 39
of 2014.
The preamble to the Legal Aid Act describes its mandate in the
following terms: “To ensure access to justice and
the
realisation of the right of a person to have legal representation as
envisaged in the constitution and to render or make legal
aid and
legal advice available.”
[7]
Amongst the laws that require the State to provide legal assistance
to indigent persons through the services of legal aid is
the
Divorce
Act 70 of 1979
, the Children’s Act 38 of 2005, the
Matrimonial
Property Act 88 of 1984
and The
Civil Union Act 17 of 2006
.
Rule 43
applications fall within the ambit of matters in which the Legal Aid
Board provides legal assistance to indigent litigants.
[8]
Gauteng Family Law Forum (“The Forum”) is a voluntary
association of legal practitioners, attorneys, counsel and
academics
who specialise in family law matters which include, all matters
pertaining to children including maintenance, divorce
matters
including the maintenances of spouses, as well as domestic violence
matters.
[9]
A reading of the Forum’s Constitution and its code of conduct
endorses the fact that the subject matter raised in the
directive
falls squarely within the Forum’s knowledge and expertise.
[10]
It is common cause that the applications raise important questions
related to
Rule 43
applications in matrimonial matters. The outcome
of this application will directly impact the Forum mentioned and the
public.
[11]
The
amici
are admitted into these proceedings without
opposition. I am indebted to the
amici
for their invaluable
oral and written submissions.
The Parties
E
v E Case Number: 12583/2017
[12]
The Applicant sought an order
pendente lite,
that the
Respondent pays her interim spousal maintenance and a contribution
towards legal costs.
[13]
The Applicant’s founding papers comprise 86 pages, 34 of which
constitute the sworn statements. The Respondent’s
answering
affidavit stretches over 109 pages, plus a further 48 pages of
annexures, which makes a total of 157 pages.
R
v R Case Number: 20739/2018
[14]
The Applicant’s sworn statement comprises of 19 pages, to which
is attached 32 pages as annexures. The Respondent’s
answering
affidavit, together with annexures, comprises a total of 31 pages.
There he raises a point in
limine
that the Applicant’s
papers are prolix and not in compliance with the requirements of
Rule
43(2).
M
v M Case Number: 5954/2018
[15]
The Applicant sought an order in respect of maintenance
pendente
lite
for their minor child as well as contribution to legal
costs.
[16]
The Applicant’s sworn statement is concise, however, she
attached to it a copy of the particulars of claim in the divorce
action, besides other annexures. The Respondent filed a succinct
response comprising of 10 pages and 70 pages of annexures.
Judgement in two Parts
[17]
After hearing argument, this court reserved judgment. In doing so, it
expressed an intention to deliver judgment in two parts.
Firstly the
court would summarily deal with the relief the parties seek, by way
of a court order, so it does not frustrate the
speedy and expeditious
nature of these applications.
Then
the court would hand down a reasoned ruling addressing the questions
raised in the referral judgment. The court granted the
orders in
respect of the relief sought by each party on 7 December 2018, being
satisfied that the respective applicants made out
a case for the
relief set out in the respective applications. In this judgment, the
court addresses the issues raised in the referral
judgment.
Issues for Determination
[18]
In coming to a decision to refer these applications to the full
court, Van Vuuren AJ said that the parties have generally departed
from respectively delivering a statement in the nature of a
declaration and a reply in the nature of a plea, having regard to
sub-rules 43(2) and (3). It is that observation that prompted the
Judge President to direct that this full court hear submissions
to
dispose of the three applications, as well as to determine the
following issues:
i) While
Rule 43
applications generally require the submission of a succinct set of
papers, does the court have the discretion to permit the filling
of
applications that have departed from the strict provisions of
Rule
43(2)
and (3)?
ii) If the Court does
not have such a discretion, should the Practice Manual direct that
all
Rule 43
application conform to a specific form, particularly in
terms of length? Would the imposition of a restriction on the length
of
Rule 43
applications withstand constitutional muster?
iii) If the court does
have such a discretion, what are the factors to consider in order to
reasonably exercise this discretion?
Are these factors exhaustive?
[19]
Rule 43
as it presently reads provides an interim remedy to assist an
applicant to obtain relief speedily and expeditiously in respect of
the following:
a) interim care,
residency and contact with the children;
b) maintenance for a
spouse and or children;
c) the enforcement of
specified necessary payments such as bond repayments on a residential
property, municipal rates and taxes,
electricity consumption, school
fees, medical and clothing as well as relocation costs;
d) contribution towards
legal costs of the divorce action.
[20]
The Children’s Act, directs that the best interests of the
child is of paramount importance in every matter concerning
children.
Similarly Section 28 of the Constitution requires that a fair hearing
is observed and that the child’s best interests
are protected
in all proceedings concerning the child.
[21]
This court is called upon to deal with sub-rule 43(2) and (3) which
read as follows:
“
(2) The applicant
shall deliver a sworn statement in the nature of a declaration,
setting out the relief claimed and the grounds
thereof together with
a notice to the respondent as near as may be in accordance with Form
17 of the First Schedule. The statement
and notice shall be signed by
the applicant or his attorneys and shall give an address for service
within eight kilometres of the
office of the registrar and shall be
served by the sheriff.
(3) The Respondent shall
within ten days after receiving the Statement, deliver a sworn reply
in the nature of a plea, signed and
giving an address as aforesaid,
in default of which he shall be
ipso facto
barred.”
[22]
In answering the questions posed, it will be necessary also to
consider the effect of Rule 43(5). This rule provides:
“
(5) The court may
hear such evidence as it considers necessary and may dismiss the
application or make such order as it thinks fit
to ensure a just and
expeditious decision.
[23]
Rule 43 applications as presently structured, are a deviation from
normal motion proceedings in that the Rule does not make
provision
for a third set of affidavits. The applicant is confined to what is
set out in the founding affidavit, which must be
in the nature of a
declaration, setting out the relief claimed and on what grounds. On
receipt, the Respondent is required to file
an answering affidavit in
the nature of a plea. It is precisely this prohibition that causes
the Applicant to say more than what
is required, knowing very well
that there is no second opportunity to say more, which may in true
prompt the respondent to file
a lengthily answer.
[24]
The question that arises is how then, should parties deal with a
dispute of fact that arises from the Respondent’s answering
affidavit. In my view the answer lies in the provisions of Rule 43(5)
which gives the court a discretion to hear such evidence
as it
considers necessary. The applicant may seek leave to file a further
affidavit in terms of Rule 43(5), to dispute the Respondent’s
version as set out in his or her answering affidavit.
[25]
The procedure envisaged in Rule 43 is not that of a normal
application commenced by way of notice of motion. It is a succinct
application, aimed at providing the applicant interim relief,
speedily and expeditiously (See:
Maree v Maree 1972 (1) 261 CPD at
264 A
).
The Approach of the
Courts to Date
[26]
In all the current applications, one or two respondents apply for the
dismissal of the application or for a punitive costs
order on the
basis of prolixity and failure to comply with the strict provisions
of Rule 43(2) and (3). The desirability of keeping
the costs of Rule
43 applications as low as possible has been emphasised in many
decided cases. In
Willies vs Willies 1973 (3) SA at 259 C-D
Fannin
J said:
In considering the
question before us it must not be ignored, I think, that the Rule 43
procedure was a novel procedure, a sort
of hybrid procedure, largely
of the nature of a motion or application (being commenced with a
notice supported by an affidavit)
but partly of the nature of an
action, in which a document “in the nature of a declaration”
has to be filed and in
which evidence can be led.”
[27]
In
Varkel vs Varkel
1967 (4) SA 129
© at 131 G-H,
Van
Winten J said: “rule 43 was devised and promulgated with the
object of providing an expeditious and inexpensive procedure
for
obtaining interim relief in matters relating to matrimonial disputes
pending or about to be instituted.”
[28]
The nub of the question to be answered is what interpretation of rule
43 will ensure a speedy and efficient resolution of the
application
while at the same time protecting the rights of women and children
who are prevalently vulnerable in Rule 43 applications?
Is the
interpretation in
TS, R vs TS,T
to be preferred over
that in
Van Beest Van Andel vs Van Beest Van Andel
, by Tsoka J
or
vice versa
?
[29]
In Van Andel, the Respondent opposed the application on the basis of
non- compliance with Rule 43 (2) in that the founding
affidavit was
not in the form of a declaration, it was unnecessarily long and
contained irrelevant facts and annexures. Surprisingly,
the
Respondent also filed a voluminous answering affidavit as well as a
counter-application. Both these documents did not comply
strictly
with Rule 43(2) and (3). Tsoka J held that the provisions of Rule 43
had to be strictly followed and thus dismissed both
the application
and the counter application.
[30]
In
TS v TS
, a judgment delivered on the 7th August 2017, some
eight years after Van Andel, Spilg J held that it was necessary for a
proper
determination of a Rule 43 application for a party to make
full and frank disclosure of their financial affairs, thus permitting
longer affidavits. He held that without proper financial disclosure
the court had little to work on than the product of competing
type
writers.
[31]
I now consider the extent to which the current applications comply
with Rule 43 (2) and (3) as interpreted in Van Andel.
R v R Case Number:
201739/2018
[32]
In
R v R Van Vuuren
AJ indicated that although the papers were
not as voluminous as in the other two matters, the Respondent in his
answer raised a
point in
limine
that the papers were prolix
and did not comply with Rule 43 (2).
[33]
The Respondent amongst others relies on the dicta in
Colman vs
Colman
1967 (1) SA 291
(1)
in advancing his point in
limine
.
It must be taken into consideration that Colman was decided in 1967.
Times have changed and the financial burden of spouses are
not the
same as it was in 1967. As Spilg J has warned, a one size fits all
approach cannot suffice and will never be in the best
interest of the
children. The length of an Applicant’s affidavit should not
disentitle her to relief. What is important is
whether the contents
of the affidavit and the annexures are relevant.
[34]
In his referral judgment, Van Vuuren AJ observed that the founding
affidavit is not voluminous. I agree. Both the affidavit
and the
annexures total 33 pages. The annexures are 22 pages. In my view,
such annexures are indispensable for purposes of making
out a case
for the relief the Applicant seeks.
[35]
In TS, Spilg J correctly found at paragraphs 62 and 63 as follows:
“
[62] While many
Rule 43 applications may not require more than a succinct set of
affidavits to enable a court to make a proper determination
that will
serve the best interest of the child, in my respectful view, a one-
size-fits-all approach to the sufficiency of evidence
that should be
placed before a court may in a given case have difficulty either in
passing constitutional scrutiny or being capable
of meeting the
requirements that the outcome will serve the child’s best
interests.
[63] The adjudication of
maintenance for children
pendente lite
involves establishing
the actual expenditure requirements that have been incurred
historically, establishing whether there is any
change and if so,
why.”
[36]
In
Du Preez 2009 v Du Preez (6) SA 28 TPD
it was stated as
follows regarding relevancy of information:
“
A misstatement
of one aspect of relevant information invariably will color other
aspects with the possible (or likely) result that
fairness will not
be done. Consequently I would assume there is a duty on applicants in
Rule 43 applications seeking equitable
redress to act with the utmost
good faith (uberrimae fides) and to disclose fully and all material
information regarding their
financial affairs. Any false disclosure
or material non-disclosure would mean that he or she is not before
the court with “clean
hands” and on that ground alone the
court will be justified in refusing relief.”
[37]
In the final analysis, it is interesting that ultimately the
Respondent concedes in his submission regarding the answer to
the
issue raised that: “
There are tremendous amounts of
applications wherein for instance contact and residence of minor
children is in dispute. As a result
of same many applications consist
of social workers reports and psychological reports. This must be
incorporated in the Rule 43
application which would no doubt make the
application voluminous.”
[38]
In conclusion the Respondent at paragraph 43 says that “
It
is my humble submission that each matter turns on its specific fact
however in matters in general in Rule 43 I am of the view
that there
should be no limitation to the papers filed and that should there be
irrelevant material inserted in such application
a Respondent and the
honourable court is able to consider application to strike out
irrelevant material.”
[39]
As regards the answer to the question whether a court should have a
discretion to allow papers to deviate from the strict provision
of
Rule 43(2) and (3), the Respondent proposes that this should not be
left to the discretion of the trial court but should be
allowed in
the Rule itself in order to avoid inconsistencies.
[40]
The Applicant is self-employed. The only way to prove her income and
of making a full and frank disclosure of her financial
position.is by
attaching her bank statements.
[41]
Therefore, the Respondent’s point in
limine
based on
prolixity is misplaced and stands to be dismissed.
M v M 5954/2018
[42]
In
M v M
, the referral court noted that the Applicant’s
sworn statement is concise, despite her attaching 33 pages of
documentary
evidence in addition to a copy of the particulars of
claim in the divorce action. The Respondent made this worse by filing
70 pages
of annexures to the 10 pages of his answering affidavit.
[43]
As in
R v R
the issue is not so much the number of pages or
annexures, it is whether same are relevant. The answer is to be found
in
William v William
1971 (2) SA 620
(O)
where
the issue of annexures was addressed. There the court said:
“
The language of
Rule 43 (3) does not show that an annexure to an answering affidavit
is an offending document. The Rule states that
the Respondent shall
deliver a sworn reply “in the nature of a plea”. Neither
does Rule 22 dealing with a plea forbid
the possibility of a document
being attached to a plea. An annexure forms part of the plea and I
can visualise the position where
such an annexure may not only
“clearly” and concisely state certain facts upon which
the Respondent relies in regard
to some aspect of his defence, but it
may also because of its official nature, put the whole matter beyond
any doubt, e.g. a Respondent’s
paysheet to prove his income
where he is employed by the South African Railways.”
[44]
Neither of the parties raised the issue of prolixity. What is of
importance is that the Respondent agrees that it is inconceivable
that a party in a Rule 43 application is able to set out all the
facts regarding his finances and issues pertaining to contact
and
residence of the minor children in a concise statement. The
Respondent makes the point that restricting the length of the
application and the annexures may in certain circumstances, prejudice
children and the parties themselves. The Respondent concedes
that a
Rule 43 application and the subsequent order carries tremendous
weight in divorce litigation. Accordingly, it is in the
interest of
justice and in the best interest of minor children to allow the
parties to file substantive but relevant affidavits
setting out the
basis upon which their relief is sought.
[45]
It is for that reason that in
M v M
, the court considered the
application on the basis of the papers filed and granted the 7
December 2018 order.
E v E Case Number:
12583/2017
[46]
The Applicant filed a notice to abide and has not filed heads of
argument.
This
is the one matter out of all three that seem to have caused the
referral judge to seek the intervention of the full court as
to the
correct applicability of Rule 43(2) and 43(3). The applicant’s
founding papers comprises 86 pages 34 of which is the
Rule 43(2)
sworn statement. The balance being 53 pages, is made up of annexures.
In reply, the Respondent would not be outdone
and went a step further
by filing a lengthy answering affidavit comprising of 109 pages and
48 pages of annexures, making his response
a total of 157 pages.
[47]
The Applicant claims maintenance for herself as well as contribution
to legal costs. The Respondent contends that the Applicant
is
employed and should be able to maintain herself as well as to pay for
her legal fees.
[48]
In addressing the issue whether the application as well as the reply
thereto meets the requirements of Rule 43(2) and (3),
the Respondent
is at one with the argument raised in
R v R
and
M v M
.
The respondent makes the point that the only limitation to annexures
and their content is that they must be admissible and relevant
in
terms of the rules of evidence.
[49]
Having found that the content of the applicant’s affidavit and
annexures were relevant and that she made out a case for
the relief
sought, the court granted the order of 7th December 2018.
[50]
I now consider the legal questions raised by the referral court.
Questions Referred for
Consideration
[51]
In
Eke v Parsons
2016 (3) SA 37
(CC)
it was
stated that “the object of court rules is twofold. The first is
to ensure a fair trial or hearing. The second is to
secure the
inexpensive and expeditious completion of litigation and to further
the administration of justice.” It is against
this backdrop
that the issues before this court are considered.
Question
6(a): “Does the court have the discretion to permit the filing
of
applications that have departed from the strict provisions
of Rule 43 (2) and (3)”
[52]
This question should not be confused with the discretion that a court
has in terms of Rule 43 (5). The question relates to
the founding and
answering affidavits. All the parties including the
amici,
agree
that the court does not have such a discretion unless it decides to
call for further evidence in terms of Rule 43 (5). As
already stated,
the common view expressed by all the parties is that there should be
no limitation to the number of pages filed
for as long as what is
contained in the affidavit and the annexures thereto is relevant and
admissible as evidence.
[53]
The Gauteng Family Law Foundation submitted that this question ought
to be determined bearing in mind constitutional considerations
in
respect of the right to a fair hearing as entrenched in Section 34 of
the Constitution.
[54]
Relying on TS, Legal Aid South Africa supports the view that there
should be no limitation to the length or content of the
founding and
answering affidavit. Concerning this, Spilg J said:
“
While many rule 43
applications may not require more than a succinct set of affidavits
to enable a court to make a proper determination
that will serve the
best interest of the child, a one-size-fits-all approach to the
sufficiency of evidence that should be placed
before a court may in a
given case have difficulty passing either constitutional scrutiny or
be capable of meeting the requirements
that the outcome will serve
the child’s best interest.”
[55]
All the parties and the amici are
ad idem
that a practice
directive be issued requiring the parties in all opposed divorce
matters to complete and submit a detailed financial
disclosure form
(“the disclosure form”) attached hereto. The disclosure
form must be completed under oath. They propose
that the disclosure
form must either be filed within 20 days of service of the notice of
intention to defend, alternatively, that
it be filed as an annexure
to the parties’ respective rule 43 affidavits.
[56]
The benefit of making it mandatory to file a financial disclosure
form is that firstly, the parties will not need to file lengthy
affidavits to make or defend their case. Secondly, parties will be
forced to be transparent with each other and with the court
at the
inception of the divorce action. This makes early settlement
possible.
[57]
Financial disclosure will place the court hearing the application in
a better position to decide the matter in a manner that
does justice
to the parties and takes care of the best interests of the minor
children.
Question
6(b): “If the court does have such a discretion what are
factors to
consider in order to reasonably exercise this
discretion are these factors
exhaustive”
[58]
In terms of Rule 43(5), the court does have a discretion to call for
further evidence despite the limitations imposed by Rule
43(2) and
(3). The problem with the present Rule 43(2) and (3) is that
invariably, in most instances, the Respondent will raise
issues that
the Applicant is unable to respond to due to the restriction, unless
the court allows the Applicant to utilise Rule
43(5). This process
will result in conflicting practices as it has already happened in a
number of cases and as highlighted by
Spilg J in TS.
[59]
Applicant should have an automatic right to file a replying
affidavit, otherwise she has no way of responding to allegations
that
are set out in the Respondent’s answering affidavit.
[60]
Lastly, the fact that there is no appeal against a Rule 43 order
imposes further restrictions on a party unless that party
specifically utilises Rule 43 (6), which is not there for the simple
taking. Rule 43 (6) may only be used where there has been
a change in
circumstances.
Question
6 (c): “If the court does not have such a discretion, should
the practice
manual request that all Rule 43 applications
prescribe to a specific form,
particularly in terms of length?
Would the imposition of a restriction on the
length of a Rule
43 application withstands constitutional scrutiny”?.
[61]
The answer to this question is simple and has already been alluded to
in developing the answer to question 6(a) above. It is
imperative,
constitutional and practically necessary to amend the practice manual
so as to permit Rule 43 applications being filed
without
restrictions. This will allow optimization of the best interest of
minor children, but will also be fair and promote transparency
by all
parties.
[62]
It is not uncommon for the parties to seek to ventilate the issues in
the trial action in the Rule 43 application, causing
the affidavits
to become replete with allegations and counter allegations that
rarely bear relevance to the issues the Rule 43
application. This
practice often results in long and irrelevant affidavits. Where this
happens the court may, penalise one or both
of the parties with an
adverse order as to costs. The lifting that this judgment proposes
should not become a license to parties
to express and advance views
and opinions that bear no relevance to the issues before the court.
[63]
The proposed financial disclosure form may present confidentiality
issues. To avoid this, the form should be filed separate
from the
affidavits, remain confidential, and only used by the parties and the
court for the purpose of the Rule 43 application
and the divorce. In
TS, Spilg J recommends that the formulation of a standardised
financial disclosure form which must he
completed at an early stage
in the proceedings appears to be more properly a matter to be
addressed in the rules in order to secure
uniformity. He proposes
that whilst awaiting amendments to the rules that Rule 43 (5) be
invoked. While I agree to this proposal,
until the Rules are amended,
amending the practice directive as proposed in this judgment is the
most expedient way of implementing
this procedure in this division.
[64]
Accordingly, I propose the following order:
ORDER
1. On receipt of the Rule
43(2) and 43(3) affidavits, the Judge allocated to hear the matter
shall, if he or she deems it appropriate,
issue a directive to the
parties in terms of Rule 43(5) calling on the Applicant and/ or the
Respondent to file (a) supplementary
affidavit(s) making a full and
frank disclosure of their financial and other relevant circumstances
to the court and to the other
party.
2. The affidavits
referred to above must be accompanied by a financial disclosure form,
annexed hereto, which must be filed seven
days before the date of
hearing.
3. Affidavits filed in
terms of Rule 43(2) and (3) shall only contain material or averments
relevant to the issues for consideration.
It shall not be competent
for a court to dismiss an application in terms of Rule 43, only on
the basis of prolixity. If the court
finds that the papers filed by a
party contain irrelevant material, the court only has the power to
strike off the irrelevant and
inadmissible material from the
affidavit in question, and make an appropriate cost order.
4. It is proposed that
the Judge President amends the Practice Directive to give effect to
this judgment and order.
It
is so ordered.
______________________________________
For Makume J
I
agree.
___________________________________
For Kollapen J
I
agree.
________________________________________________________
Modiba J
APPEARANCES
Adv
L Segal SC with Adv E Webber and S Kangyangara Instructed by:
Christelis Artemides Attorneys
For
Gauteng Family Law Forum (Amicus)
Adv
N Skibi with Adv M Steenkamp and Attorney S Kekana Instructed by:
Legal Aid of South Africa (Amicus)
Adv
R Williams
Instructed
by: Jennifer Scholtz
For
the Applicant in EvE
Adv
P Bosman
Instructed
by: Brand Potgieter Inc
For
the Respondent in EvE
Adv
K Pillay SC with N Lombard Instructed by: Kim Meikle Attorneys
For
the Applicant in RvR
Adv
A E Willcox
Instructed
by: Yousha Tayob Attorneys
For
the Respondent in RvR
Adv
G Kinghorn
Instructed
by: L Freysen Attorneys For
the
Applicant in M v M
Adv
A E Willcox
Instructed
by: MacGillivray Poll
For
the Respondent in MvM
Date of hearing: 03
DECEMBER 2018
Date
of judgment: 12 JUNE 2019
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