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[2017] ZAGPJHC 291
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Simmadari v S (A272/2013) [2017] ZAGPJHC 291 (13 October 2017)
SAFLII
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Certain
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA,
GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NO:
A272/2013
Not
reportable
Not
of interest to other judges
Revised.
13/10/2017
In the matter
between:
LESLEY MERVIN
SIMMADARI,
APPELLANT
and
THE
STATE
RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
MIA, AJ:
[1] The appellant was charged and
convicted, in the Regional Court, Johannesburg, on three charges:
1.
Count
one: kidnapping
2.
Counts
two and three: rape.
[2] The appellant
was sentenced to five years imprisonment on the charge of kidnapping
and fifteen years imprisonment for each of
the rape charges. The five
years’ imprisonment on the charge of kidnapping was ordered to
run concurrently with the first
term of fifteen years imprisonment on
the charge of rape. The effective term of imprisonment is thus a
period of thirty years direct
imprisonment. The appellant now appeals
against conviction and sentence with leave of the Court
a
quo
.
[3] The
complainant, P V was 20 years old when she commenced working for
Lesley Mervin Simmadari, the owner of an import
and
export company, as his personal assistant in 1993. I set out her
evidence in what follows. Three weeks after she commenced
her
employment she was required to accompany Mr. Simmadari to Lesotho on
a business trip. Upon their return from Lesotho on 22
May 1993, the
driver drove to Mr. Simmadari’s flat. Ms. V requested to be
taken home and was told the driver would take her
later that day. She
was afraid of Mr. Simmadari and waited. Later the driver left and
again she requested to go home. Mr. Simmadari
informed her he would
take her home himself. Mr. Simmadari’s two male friends were
still present drinking coffee. After they
left she took the cup which
she used to drink coffee to the kitchen.
[4] Mr. Simmadari
followed her. In the kitchen Mr. Simmadari took her hand and pulled
her to the room. She resisted and he picked
up and carried her over
his shoulder to the room. She was screaming and kicking. He threw her
onto the floor and kicked her in
her stomach and slapped her in her
face. He placed her on the bed and undressed her. Mr. Simmadari had a
firearm and threatened
to shoot her if she did not co-operate. It was
placed in her mouth initially. He undressed her and put his penis
inside her vagina
and had sexual intercourse with her. He ejaculated
on her stomach and then told her to lie on the bed next to the wall.
The fire
arm lay on a cabinet next to the bed. When she tried to
reach over to take the firearm, he hit her with the back of his arm.
She
lay facing the wall all night.
[5] The following
morning, the 23 May 1993, he told her to go to the bathroom to clean
herself. He would not allow her to lock the
door but kept his foot in
between the door and the door frame. The following day she could not
leave the flat as the door was locked.
She was forced to have sexual
intercourse with the appellant that day again. He ejaculated outside
her vagina and on her stomach
again. On the 24 May 1993, the driver
arrived to take them to the office. When they arrived at the office
the appellant told the
driver to take Ms. V home. On the way to her
home, she informed the driver of the rape that had taken place. He
cried when he heard
and could not believe the appellant was capable
of such conduct.
[6] Upon arriving
at home Ms. V found her mother ironing. She told her mother that she
had been raped. Her father was informed and
he returned home. They
proceeded to the Hillbrow Police Station to lay a charge. The
appellant was arrested. Ms. V was taken to
the doctor for treatment
and to complete the medical report required for the investigation.
She was given medication and her injuries
were noted. The medical
report noted she had a bite mark on her left arm just below her elbow
and bite marks and bruises on her
neck. The report also notes
that the hymen was torn and bruised. The fouchette and perineum were
bruised and the examination
was painful. Her mental state is recorded
as upset and withdrawn. Whilst vaginal smears were taken the results
show that no semen
was found on the samples.
[7] The appellant
did not dispute having sexual intercourse with the complainant on the
days in question namely 22 and 23 May 1993.
He maintained however
that the intercourse was consensual. He denied keeping the
complainant in the flat against her will and forcing
the complainant
to have sexual intercourse. He stated that the complainant initiated
the sexual intercourse and he was unable to
resist her advances. He
explained that he informed the complainant that he was married and
that he would not be able to commit
to marrying her. He stated that
he could not engage in sexual intercourse with her as he was married
and she would end up getting
married eventually. He however also
stated in his evidence that he commenced a relationship with the
complainant within days of
her commencing employment. He explained
that he collected money and kept large sums of money which she kept
for him. He loaned
her money which caused her to become possessive
over him. This resulted in her insisting on accompanying him to
Lesotho.
[8] The Court
a quo
analysed
the evidence and found inconsistencies in both the complainant and
the appellant’s evidence. The Court
a quo
however
was mindful of the cautionary rule applicable to the complainant’s
evidence in view of her being a single
witness and in considering the
evidence applied the caution applicable and accepted the
complainant’s version. The Court
a quo
found that the
complainant was a new employee; she was young and naïve and had
commenced employment for only three weeks.
She had testified that she
was afraid of the appellant. She had requested to go home. There were
two big men surrounding her who
prevented her escape upon her arrival
in Johannesburg after her ordeal in Lesotho. The appellant had
initially informed her that
the driver would take her home and later
indicated he would take her home. This did not materialize. Instead,
she was held against
her will in the flat. The two men remained
behind after the driver left and prevented her from leaving. The door
was locked further
preventing her escape. The following day the two
men returned preventing her escape. She was forced to have sexual
intercourse
with the appellant on both occasions.
AD
CONVICTION
[9] Ms. Lekgothoane
appearing for the appellant submitted that the State had failed to
prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and
the Court
a
quo
erred in finding the appellant
guilty on all three counts. Further she submitted that the magistrate
did not apply the cautionary
rule to the appellant as a single
witness. She submitted the complaint’s evidence did not meet
the requirement required of
a single witness in that it was required
to be satisfactory in all respects and without contradiction. The
complainant’s
evidence was not satisfactory as there were
contradictions which were not minor but spoke to the core of what
occurred regarding
what happened and where it occurred, so she
submitted.
[10] Ms.
Lekgothoane submitted further that the medical evidence in the J88
and the evidence of the complainant contradicted each
other namely
that she had love bites on her neck and that she was sodomised. She
submitted that the complainant was not truthful
about what occurred.
She submitted that the Court
a quo
was
not clear in its judgment regarding what it found to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. This, so she submitted, further reinforced
the view
that the state had not proved it’s case beyond reasonable doubt
as the Court
a quo
did
not indicate what it found to be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
[11] She submitted
further that the appellant denied raping the complainant and the
Court
a quo
erred in not accepting the appellant’s version as reasonably
possibly true. Rather, she further submitted, the Court expected
the
appellant to prove his innocence. She submitted that the method
and reasoning used by the Court
a quo
was incorrect. She submitted further
that the Court
a quo
descended
into the arena and cross examined the appellant and convicted the
appellant without applying its mind to the facts of
the case and the
law relating to the case. In view hereof, she submitted that the
appeal ought to succeed. Further that the Court
a
quo
was not convinced by the
complainant’s evidence and thus ought to have given the
appellant the benefit of the doubt and acquitted
him.
[12] The powers of a Court to
interfere on appeal with the facts of the trial court are limited.
With regard to the conviction the
Court held in
S v Hadebe
1997(2) SACR 641 (SCA) 645 e-f
“
...
In
the absence of demonstrable and material misdirection by the
trial Court, its findings of fact are presumed to be
correct and will
only be disregarded if the recorded evidence proves them to be
clearly wrong
”
[13]
I have considered the record and reasons of the trial court. The
magistrate commences his judgement by indicating how he intends
dealing with the judgment and uses a recognised formula
[1]
to analyse the evidence. He specifically reminds himself about the
cautionary rule
[2]
in
section 208
of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
. He finds
contradictions in both the complainant as well as the appellant’s
evidence. Ultimately he finds that the complainant
was a young naïve
new employee who was not capable of seducing a man twice her age as
testified by the appellant. Further
the Court
a
quo
found
that it was unlikely that the sexually inexperienced 20 year old
complainant would be capable of seducing the
appellant within days of
commencing employment. The appellant testified that a relationship
commenced a few days after the complainant
commenced employment.
Finally, the independently verifiable medical evidence reflected in
the J88 reflecting the torn hymen and
bruising correctly persuaded
the Court
a
quo
to find that the sexual intercourse was not consensual.
[14] In contrast
the appellant’s evidence differed with regard to the
complainant’s terms of employment being three
weeks versus two
months. The Court accepted that the complainant had only been
employed for three weeks. The power relationship
inherent in the age
difference as well as the employer-employee relationship did not
support the appellant’s version. This
was reaffirmed by the
complainant’s evidence that she was afraid of the appellant.
[15] The Court
a
quo
was also influenced by the
credibility of the appellant in relation to his evidence regarding
his age. He appeared to be unable
to furnish responses regarding his
age spontaneously. His responses regarding the three names he
purported to hold also suggested
mala
fides
and it appeared that he was
already serving a sentence in this regard. He had changed his
identity allegedly and testified that
it was possible to do so at a
cost. The Court
a quo
expressed
surprise and incredulity that a mature person could not take
responsibility for his own actions in the sexual encounter
with the
complainant. If indeed it was consensual then it would follow that
both parties would have participated equally. The appellant’s
suggestion during evidence was that the complainant had initiated the
sexual engagement, led the engagement and that he was a passive
role
player throughout. This version defied reality in the Court
a
quo’s
view and was rejected.
[16] In
S v Shackell
2001 (2)
SACR 185
SCA at para [30], Brand JA held:
“
It is a
trite principle that in criminal proceedings the prosecution must
prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and that a
mere
preponderance of probabilities is not enough. Equally trite is the
observation that, in view of this standard of proof in
a criminal
case, a Court does not have to be convinced that every detail of an
accused's version is true. If the accused's version
is reasonably
possibly true in substance the Court must decide the matter on
the acceptance of that version. Of course it
is permissible to test
the accused's version against the inherent probabilities. But it
cannot be rejected merely because it is
improbable; it can only be
rejected on the basis of inherent probabilities if it can be said to
be so improbable that it cannot
reasonably possibly be true.”
[17] I am of the
view that the Court
a quo
considered the appellant’s version on the basis suggested by
Brand JA in
Shackell
above. The Court found that the appellant’s version was not
reasonably possibly true in view of the inconsistencies in the
appellant’s version. The first being his inability to recall
his age which suggested that he was making up his version as
he went
along. He contradicted himself with regard to the time the
complainant worked at the company. Whilst individual aspects
of the
appellant’s evidence on their own do not appear to
discount the appellant’s version, however when considered
in
totality the appellant’s version was clearly so fanciful and
improbable that it cannot possibly be true.
[18] I am unable to find that the
Court
a quo
misdirected itself on the record with regard to
the conviction. It applied the cautionary rule to the evidence of the
complainant.
Whilst there were inconsistencies in the complainant’s
evidence these were minor inconsistencies. The independently
verifiable
evidence namely, the medical report, was consistent to the
extent that it reflected tears in the hymen which would be consistent
with the complainant’s evidence that this was her first sexual
experience and non-consensual. The absence of semen is understandable
in light of the complainant’s evidence that the appellant
withdrew and ejaculated on her stomach on both occasions.
The
Court
a quo
accepted that the Khan brother’s assisted
the appellant in preventing the complainant from escaping and the
locked door prevented
her further escape as did the threat of the
firearm and the physical assault and threat of harm. On perusal of
the record there
was no misdirection by the Court
a quo.
The
version of the appellant was correctly rejected when the Court
a
quo
found that it could not have been reasonably possibly true in
view of the inherent inconsistencies highlighted above.
AD
SENTENCE
[19] Counsel for
the appellant submitted that the Court
a
quo
completely ignored the element of
mercy which is a hallmark of civilization and enlightened
administration of justice. She submitted
that this important
principle ought not to be overlooked lest the Court be reduced to the
level of the criminal. She highlighted
that true mercy ought not to
be mistaken for softness, weakness or maudlin sympathy for the
criminal. She submitted that justice
must be done and that there
should not be an over reaching so that justice felt like a sledge
hammer where mercy was absent. She
submitted further that sentencing
was individualized and referred to the decision in
S
v Mako
2005 (2) 223 ECD where the Court
at p 228 at para [10] per Plasket highlighted that:
“
[10]
Secondly, one cannot lose sight of the individualised nature of
the sentencing process and it is irregular
to sacrifice the accused
on the altar of deterrence: In
R
v Mzwakala
6
Schreiner JA stated that 'even where a crime is very grievous
in its effects or possible effects it is not proper to disregard
the history and circumstances of the accused and the subjective
aspect of the crime' and in S v Sobandla
7
.
Howie
AJA held as follows where a magistrate had imposed an exemplary
sentence in an effort to act as a deterrent:
‘
Essentially
what the trial Court had in mind was, in the interests of the
community, a sentence which would deter others who might,
given
the prevalence referred to, contemplate similar serious criminal
conduct. Having regard to all the facts of the present matter,
however, it seems to me that appellant's counsel . . . was right in
contending, in effect, that appellant was sacrificed on the
altar of
deterrence, thus resulting in his receiving an unduly severe
sentence. Where this occurs in the quest for an exemplary
sentence, a
trial Court exercises its discretion improperly or unreasonably.' “
[20]
Ms.
Lekgothoane submitted that the Court
a
quo
erred
in not exercising its discretionary power to impose a lesser
sentence. She submitted that even where the appellant is legally
represented there was an obligation on the Court to establish whether
substantial and compelling circumstances existed which justified
the
imposition of a lesser sentence. She referred to
S
v Gagu
2006 (1) SACR 457
(SCA) as authority for the principle that the
magistrate must establish facts necessary for imposing sentence.
She submitted
that whilst there was no prescript regarding what was
substantial and compelling it was now trite that the traditional
factors
ordinarily taken into account could amount to substantial and
compelling factors.
[21]
Ms.
Lekgothoane
referred
to the decision in
S
v Bull and Another, S v Chavulla and other
2001 (2) SACR 681
SCA where the Court at 694 warned against
harsh sentences as follows:
“
[22]
This Court has repeatedly warned against excessively long sentences
being imposed by trial Courts in an attempt to circumvent
the premature release of prisoners by the executive branch of
government.”
[22] She submitted
that the Court
a quo
over emphasized the interests of society over the personal
circumstances of the appellant where the appellant was an elderly
person
aged 58 years old, suffering with high blood pressure since
his incarceration. The Court
a quo
had
failed to consider that the appellant became permanently paralysed
whilst in prison since 2009 and was a diabetic. The Court
had further
failed to take into account the period that the appellant had spent
in prison awaiting trial. This period she submitted
ought to have
been factored into the time period when the term of imprisonment was
considered. She submitted thus that the
above factors taken
cumulatively amounted to substantial and compelling circumstances
which justified a deviation from the minimum
prescribed sentences.
[23] Mr Serepe
appearing for the state submitted that this Court ought to consider
that the offences were serious and that the sentences
were justified
under the circumstances.
[24]
The offences took place in 1993. The trial commenced in 2009. The
charge sheet makes no reference to the Criminal Law Amendment
Act,
Act 105 of 1997. In view hereof the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
and the Magistrates Court Act 32 of 1994 find application. The
Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997
does not find retrospective
application. The magistrate’s jurisdiction for rape an offence
committed in 1993 was guided by
Section 92(1)(a) of the Magistrates
Court Act 32 of 1994 which provided that:
“
(1)
Save as otherwise in this Act or in any other law specially provided,
the Court, whenever it may punish a person for an offence−
(a)
by
imprisonment, may impose a sentence of imprisonment for a period not
exceeding twelve months, where the Court is not the Court
of a
regional division, or not exceeding
ten
years, where the Court is the Court of a regional division”.
(my
emphasis)
The
section was amended by section 61 of the Magistrates Lower Courts Act
120 of 1993 which was assented to on 9 July 1993 to provided
that:
“
[
doja32y1944s92
]
92 Limits
of jurisdiction in the matter of punishments
(1)
Save as otherwise in this Act or in any other law specially provided,
the Court, whenever it may punish a person for an offence-
(a)
by
imprisonment, may impose a sentence of imprisonment for a period not
exceeding
three years
,
where the Court is not the Court of a regional division, or not
exceeding
15
years
,
where the Court is the Court of a regional division; “
(my
emphasis)
The
increased penal jurisdiction was not applicable at the time the
offence occurred. It was however applicable when the trial commenced
in 2009. Whilst it does not amount to application of a new law.
I am persuaded by the view expressed by Mokgoro J in
Veldman
v Director of Public Prosecutions, Witwatesrand Local Division,
2007(3) SA 210 (CC) at [37] that:
“ …
to
retrospectively
apply a new law, such as s 92(1)
(a)
,
during the course of the trial, and thereby to expose an accused
person to a more severe sentence, undermines the rule of
law and
violates an accused person's right to a fair trial under s 35(3) of
the Constitution”
.
And
at [38]
“
The
unfairness derives from the uncertainty created by the retrospective
application of the amended s 92(1)
(a)
during the course of the trial, which exposes the applicant to a
sentence more severe than that which was competent when he tendered
his plea. Whether the applicant deserved a lighter or heavier
sentence is also not at issue in this matter. The crime committed
is
heinous, no doubt, and a conviction could have carried a life
sentence had the applicant been arraigned before the High Court.
The
seriousness of the offence itself should have served as an indicator
that the applicant should have been arraigned before the
High Court.
It may be that from the perspective of the community and in view of
the facts of this case, the applicant's sentence
of 15 years was
too lenient and for that reason
not
unfair. However, the guarantee of the right to a fair trial applies
in all criminal trials, notwithstanding the heinous nature
of the
offence.”
To the extent that
the sentence imposed was fifteen years imprisonment the Court
a
quo
exceeded the sentencing
jurisdiction applicable at the time the offence was committed and
this amounted to a misdirection. The
delay in prosecution
between 1993 and 2009 has not been attributed to the appellant.
[25]
In
S
v Rabie
1975 (4) SA 855
(A) at 857 the Court set out the following guiding
principles with regard to interference with a sentence on appeal:
“
1.
In every appeal against sentence, whether imposed by a magistrate or
a Judge, the Court hearing the appeal –
(a)
should
be guided by the principle that punishment is
“
pre-eminently
a matter for the discretion of the trial Court”;
and
(b)
should be careful not to erode such discretion: hence the further
principle that the sentence should only be altered if the
discretion
has not been “judicially and properly exercised”.
(2)
The test under (b) is whether the sentence is vitiated by
irregularity or misdirection or is disturbingly inappropriate.”
[26] In view of the
misdirection of the Court
a quo
with
regard to sentencing it is appropriate to interfere with the
sentence. Whilst the submissions of Ms. Lekgothoane are
kept in
mind, Courts are expected to send a clear message that behavior such
as that of the appellant will not be tolerated. Women
deserve equal
protection of the law in their daily lives. Conduct such as that of
the appellant where the complainant was initially
kept against her
will by her employer, and then physically attacked, threatened with a
firearm and forced to have sexual intercourse
must be met with the
full force and effect of the law. This Court is mindful of the
seminal decision often referred to
S v
Chapman
[1997] ZASCA 45
;
1997 (2) SACR 3
(SCA)
at p 5
A-D where the Court noted
“
Rape
is a very serious offence, constituting as it does a humiliating,
degrading and brutal invasion of the privacy, the dignity
and the
person of the victim
.
The
rights to dignity, to privacy and the integrity of every person are
basic to the ethos of the Constitution….
Women
in this country are entitled to the protection of these rights. They
have a legitimate claim to walk peacefully on the streets,
to enjoy
their shopping and their entertainment, to go and come from work, and
to enjoy the peace and tranquillity of their homes
without the fear,
the apprehension and the insecurity which constantly diminishes the
quality and enjoyment of their lives.”
[27] This Court is also mindful of the
rising number of offences which may suggest that it is not wise to
move away from the pre-ordained
sentence. In
DPP, North Gauteng v
Tabethe
2011 (2) SACR 567
(SCA) 577 G-I, the Court 14 years later
noted that:
“
Rape
of women and young children has become cancerous in our society. It
is a crime which threatens the very foundation of our nascent
democracy, which is founded on protection and promotion of the values
of human dignity, equality and the advancement of human rights
and
freedoms. It is such a serious crime that it evokes strong
feelings of revulsion and outrage amongst all right-thinking
and
self-respecting members of society. Our Courts have an obligation to
impose sentences for such a crime — particularly
where it
involves young, innocent, defenceless and vulnerable girls — of
the kind which reflects the natural outrage and
revulsion felt
by law-abiding members of society. A failure to do so would
regrettably have the effect of eroding the public
confidence in the
criminal justice system. Regrettably, the Court below omitted to pay
attention to these important considerations.
In fact, it is clear to
me that the Court below accorded undue weight to the respondent's
personal circumstances and paid scant
regard to the seriousness of
the offence and the broader interests of society. It appears to
me that the learned judge in
the Court below inadvertently allowed
maudlin sympathy for the respondent to cloud his better judgment. The
result is a sentence
which is disturbingly disproportionate to the
seriousness of the offence. Any crime that threatens the wellbeing of
society deserves
a severe punishment”.
[28] Further having
regard to the record, it is evident however that the period in
custody does not feature in the Court
a
quo’s
determination of sentence.
The Court
a quo
considered various factors and appears to have considered the
personal circumstances of the appellant as placed on record by the
legal representative against the aggravating circumstances by
directing that the sentence on count one run concurrently with the
sentence on count two. This appears to have taken into account the
appellant’s medical condition and reflects some mercy
on the
part of the Court
a quo
.
The appellant was serving a term of imprisonment at the time and was
due for parole. A non-custodial or suspended sentence or
correctional
supervision as sentence was however not appropriate under the
circumstances. The record reflects that the appellant
complained
about not receiving adequate care whilst in custody to the extent
that he requested an order that the Court grant an
order for
euthanasia which was initially granted per error. The Court
a
quo
had not been aware that it was
granting such an order and subsequently revoked such order.
[29] The record
indicated that the appellant has prostrate problems and uses adult
diapers which are seldom changed, according to
the appellant. He
reported not eating regularly at prison as he is not assisted and
there is no support for his condition. A Probation
Officer’s
report was clearly necessary to investigate the concerns raised and
to determine the care received. In view of
the health care concerns
raised it is not clear why the appellant is not receiving the care
required or whether he is indeed receiving
the care required but is
unable to reconcile himself with the conviction and circumstances he
now finds himself in and seeks to
find a way out. A new identity was
the solution to his previous predicament, however in prison this is
no longer a possibility.
A Probation Officer’s report and
medical reports would also confirm how best to manage his health
concerns such as his diabetic
and blood pressure conditions and the
care available in the correctional facility and the support
available.
[30] The Court
a
quo
did not request such reports
and considered a lengthy term of imprisonment. I am of the view that
the failure to request such
report resulted in the appellant’s
personal circumstances not being fully and properly considered
without the benefit
of this information. The Court at some stage
stood the matter down to address this matter with the prison
authorities; however
the record does not reflect what the outcome of
such discussions were. The Court however correctly considered
that a lengthy
term of imprisonment was appropriate.
[30] Having regard
to the record, I am of the view that the absence of a Probation
Officers report in circumstances such as the
present where the
appellant presented with so many health concerns amounted to
misdirection by the Court
a quo
as did the imposition of a sentence which was beyond the Court’s
jurisdiction applicable at the time the particular offence
was
committed. The particular presiding officer has since retired and
this may well have played a role in seeking to expedite the
finalisation of the matter which had run for four years already.
In view of the misdirection it is appropriate to interfere
with the
sentence. I propose that the offending portions of the sentence be
set aside and be replaced with an appropriate order
in respect of
counts 2 and 3.
[31] In the circumstances, I propose
that the following order be made:
1.
The
appeal against conviction is dismissed.
2.
The
appeal against sentence succeeds.
3.
The
sentence handed down by the magistrate on count 2 and 3 is set aside,
and is substituted by the following sentence which would
have been a
competent sentence to impose- On counts 2 and 3 the accused is
sentenced to 10 years imprisonment on each count. The
five years
imposed on count one are ordered to run concurrently with the 10 year
sentence imposed on count 2, resulting in an effective
sentence of
twenty years.
_____________________
S C Mia
Acting Judge of the High Court,
Johannesburg
I agree and it is so ordered
_____________________
D Mlambo
Judge President of the High Court,
Johannesburg
Appearances:
On behalf of the applicant : Adv SP
Lekgothoane
Instructed by: Legal Aid Board
On behalf of the respondent : Adv J
Serepo
Instructed by : DPP
Date of hearing: 9 0ctober 2017
Date of judgment: 13 October 2017
[1]
Record
p247, line 1 IFILARO
[2]
Record
p 251,line 21