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[2019] ZAGPJHC 19
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M v P (1917/2018) [2019] ZAGPJHC 19 (1 February 2019)
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REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
(1)
NOT REPORTABLE
(2)
NOT OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES
(3)
REVISED
CASE
NO: 1917/2018
1/2/2019
In the matter between
M, T
P
Applicant
and
P, D M (previously
J)
Respondent
JUDGMENT
Van der Linde, J:
Introduction
[1] The applicant in this urgent application is the
father of a six year old son and the respondent is his mother.
I
heard oral submissions on 22 and 23 January 2019 aggregating more
than five hours and then, given the other matters in the urgent
court
that required attention, requested that Ms Ternent for the applicant
complete her reply by way of written submissions. Ordinarily
the
business of courts is conducted in the open, and this principle is
enshrined in s.34 of the Constitution, whereby everyone
has the right
to a “
public hearing”.
S.32
of the
Superior Courts
Act 10 of 2013
echoes that principle, and limits it only where a
court in “
special circumstances”
otherwise
directs.
[2] The open court principle implies that parties
are entitled to make their submissions orally, in open court;
they
cannot, barring special circumstances, be compelled to make their
submissions only in writing. In Transvaal Industrial Foods
Ltd v BMM
Process (Pty) Ltd,
1973 (1) SA 627
(A) Trollip, JA said at 628
(emphasis supplied):
“
I pause here to say that generally arguments for the
litigants in a trial should be delivered orally in open court and not
in writing
to the trial Judge in his chambers. For sec. 16 of the
Supreme Court Act, 59 of 1959, requires that 'all proceedings' in a
court
(i.e., including the final addresses of counsel) must be
carried on in open court, 'except in so far as any such court
may
in special cases otherwise direct'. The same is implicit in Rule
39 (10) of the Rules of Court, which says that, upon the cases
of
both sides in a trial being closed, the parties or their advocates
may 'address the court' in the order therein laid down.
Moreover,
for reasons that are too trite to be listed here, oral argument is
far more effective than the written substitute. Consequently,
neither the court nor the litigants should normally be deprived of
the benefit of oral argument in which counsel can fully indulge
their
forensic ability and persuasive skill in the interests of justice and
their clients. A trial court should, therefore, not
direct that the
arguments be delivered in writing
except in
special circumstances and then only after discussion with
counsel.”
[3] There was no objection from either counsel to
my request for Ms Ternent to complete her reply in writing.
Given the
pressing business of the urgent court, the time that had already been
allowed for the matter, the fact that Ms Ternent’s
estimate of
the duration in her practice note was one and a half to two hours,
and the fact that Ms de Wet, SC for the respondent
had estimated two
and a half hours (thus more than twice the estimated time had already
been allowed), I considered that a “
special case”
existed for the request.
[4] The understanding was that if the written
argument on behalf of the applicant contained new matter, the
respondent could respond to this in like manner. In the event, I
received forty five pages of additional written argument on behalf
of
the applicant and nine pages of written argument on behalf of the
respondent.
The
principal issue
[5] The parties were never married to each other
but they lived together from 2010 for some seven years. The
boy, P,
who turns seven in May this year, was born of that relationship. The
relationship ended in April 2017 when the respondent
became involved
in another relationship, with a Mr P. The two of them subsequently
married in 2018. The applicant has a son, K,
from a previous
relationship; he lives with his mother in Cape Town. The respondent
has no other children; Mr P has a boy, N, from
a previous
relationship, and although N is not his biological son, I accept that
Mr P treats him as such. N lives with the Respondent
and Mr P.
[6] There is no dispute between the applicant and
the respondent that the applicant has full parental rights
and
responsibilities as envisaged in terms of s.21 of the Children’s
Act 38 of 2005. The parties are also agreed that the
respondent
should be the primary care-giver, that P should live with her, and
that the applicant should have reasonable access
to P.
[7] What has caused the present dispute is the fact
that the respondent has moved from Gauteng where she lived
when she
and the applicant were together and P was born, down to Langebaan in
the Western Cape. The applicant contends that his
right to reasonable
access has been impeded by this move, and he asks an order that the
respondent be directed to move back to
Gauteng.
[8] It is common cause that the applicant is
currently unemployed but not of long term independent means, that
although the applicant was employed when they were together the
respondent was the breadwinner in their relationship, and that
the
respondent is now the breadwinner in her current marriage (she was
previously married but that marriage was terminated by the
death of
her husband). It is also common cause that the respondent, a
businesswoman, can and does conduct her businesses, which
are in
Gauteng, from Langebaan in the Western Cape. It is further
common cause that the applicant has a family support structure
in
Gauteng. In fact, his mother lives with him.
[9] The applicant does not contend that he should
be P’s primary care-giver. He does not argue that the
private
school [….] where P has now been enrolled in Langebaan, is not
a good school, nor that P’s needs – special
as they are –
will not properly be cared for there. He does not argue that two
weekend visits per month – the respondent’s
tender from
the Bar - are inadequate, should the respondent be permitted to stay
down in Langebaan. He has some debate about the
costs of travelling
to achieve this, but that is an issue that is subsidiary to the
principal question which the applicant’s
application raises. It
is this.
[10]As a general proposition, all things being equal, is the parent
with access rights (aka known as visitation rights) entitled
to
insist that the other parent, the one who is the primary care-giver,
lives within such close proximity of the former, say one
to two hours
apart, that the visitation rights may be exercised more frequently
than they would be if the parents lived say five
hours apart?
[11]The applicant’s affirmative proposition founds on the
contention that it is in the interests of the minor child that
both
parents have as frequent as possible access to him; the respondent’s
contending proposition is that her right to make
a free choice as to
where she wishes to live with the minor child and raise him weighs
too, and may legitimately tip the scale
against unimpeded access by
the other parent. This knot must be cut, but first some prior
observations are apposite.
More
background
[12]The parties began living together in 2010 in Midrand. On 1
February 2011 the applicant was employed by the respondent’s
businesses as a property maintenance manager. On 30 May 2012 the boy
P was born. In June 2015 the parties moved to a house in Sandton
which was registered in both their names. In that year P began
attending a Montessori School in Sandton, where a speech impediment
was diagnosed.
[13]On 17 April 2017 the respondent left the common home and the
parties’ relationship terminated. In the next month, May,
P was
enrolled at [….] School to commence his Grade R year
there in 2018. In October 2017 the respondent and Mr P
became
engaged. It was in this time-frame that the applicant heard that the
respondent intended moving to Cape Town.
[14] In November 2017 an altercation led to the applicant laying an
assault charge against Mr P, and the respondent laying an assault
charge against the applicant.
[15] The parties managed to agree – through their attorneys –
access by the applicant to P over the December 2017/January
2018
holidays. When after this period of access the respondent had P in
the bath on 2 January 2018, he rubbed his penis. The respondent
over-reacted. She interrogated the boy, and inferred that the
applicant had sexually abused his own son. This led to a charge laid
against the applicant at the SAPS of sexual assault on P.
[16]Although the sexual assault charge was dropped, and never had any
factual foundation at all, the respondent denied the applicant
access
to P. The applicant then applied urgently to have contact restored.
The matter came before my colleague Kathree-Setiloane,
J who made an
order on 31 January 2018 whereby the applicant could have only
supervised access every weekend for three hours. Since
the respondent
had moved to the Cape in mid-2018 with P, this meant that P had to –
and did – fly up every weekend
to see his father (the
applicant) for three hours, and under supervision. This applied
for the rest of last year.
[17]My colleague also ordered that Dr RA Duchen, a forensic
psychologist, be directed to investigate what is in the best
interests
of P. The learned judge direct that this instruction was
not limited to the question whether he was subjected to any sexually
inappropriate
behaviour. The expert was also to investigate what
contact the applicant should have with P. When that order was made
the respondent
had not yet moved to the Cape with P. As said, that
only came mid-2018.
[18]The Duchen 124 page comprehensive report came out in August
2018. She found that there had been no sexually inappropriate
conduct
on the part of the applicant. She proposed too that while the
respondent is resident in the Cape, the applicant should
have
three-weekly contact with P, who should fly up for the weekend.
School holidays should be split between the parents.
[19]In November 2018 the applicant re-enrolled the application he
brought in January 2018, and on 4 December 2018 my colleague
Siwendu,
J made a holding order which bided the matter over to January 2019
when it came before me.
[20]This thumbnail history is incomplete without a reference to Mr P
and his job change. When the respondent and Mr P commenced
their
relationship in 2017, he was living and working in Nelspruit. On 1
January 2018 he started attending a skipper’s course
in the
Cape as he envisaged a business opportunity there. Dr Duchen
describes Mr P’s vocation as that he “builds and
repairs
things”. It would appear, considering pages 40 and 103 of Dr
Duchen’s report, that Mr P and Mr M share remarkably
similar
personality traits, some of the passages there used to describe the
two being verbatim the same.
[21]Mr P concluded a lease on 28 January 208 in respect of a
residence in Yzerfontein, some distance from Langebaan. On 20
February
2018 the respondent and Mr P’s mother left to organise
the house in Yzerfontein, and on 10 March 2018 the respondent and Mr
P married. There is some debate about precisely when the respondent
and P followed Mr P and moved down.
[22]The applicant’s case is that the respondent’s
decision to move to the Cape was not rational and not bona fide
because – principally – the notion that Mr P had a
legitimate job opportunity there is false. The applicant submits
that
although the respondent contends that Mr P received a business
opportunity in March 2018, in truth he only became alerted
to a
business opportunity in October 2018. Had the business opportunity in
fact been present when the respondent and Mr P settled,
in the Cape,
argues the applicant, Dr Duchen would have known about it. She did
not, according to the submission.
Factual
disputes
[23]If truth be told, submits the applicant, the move to the Cape was
driven by the desire of the respondent to make a life-style
change
and that was not justified, because P would in the result not see his
father as often as he would have, had the respondent
elected instead
to remain in Gauteng. But since the respondent’s version is
that her move was in fact driven by the business
opportunity for Mr
P, there is a factual dispute between the parties.
[24]There are also other factual disputes: for example, did the
applicant really block the respondent on his mobile phone; did
the
respondent commit a non-disclosure to the court on 31 January 2018 by
not advising the court that she had by then already formed
a firm
intention to relocate to the Cape; did Mr P have a real job
opportunity when the parties decided to relocate or was that
just a
ruse to camouflage their true motivation, which was that they were
driven to enjoy a lifestyle change?
[25]The parties’ heads of argument, and especially their
further written argument, analysed the probabilities one way or
the
other in an attempt to resolve some of these disputes. Ordinarily
such disputes cannot be resolved on affidavit, and such disputed
issues would have to go to evidence in one form or another, provided
of course the specific factual dispute is needed to be resolved
before the court can come to a resolution of the main issue in the
matter.
[26]
This is because motion proceedings are
not designed to resolve factual disputes. This proposition was put
thus by the Supreme Court
of Appeal in
National
Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma (573/08)
[2009]
ZASCA 1
(12 Jan 2009) at [26] (emphasis supplied):
“
Motion proceedings,
unless concerned with interim relief, are all about the resolution of
legal issues based on common cause facts.
Unless the circumstances
are special they cannot be used to resolve factual issues because
they are not designed to determine probabilities.
It is well
established under the Plascon-Evans rule that where in motion
proceedings disputes of fact arise on the affidavits,
a final order
can be granted only if the facts averred in the applicant's (Mr
Zuma’s) affidavits, which have been admitted
by the respondent
(the NDPP), together with the facts alleged by the latter, justify
such order.
It may be different
if the respondent’s version
consists
of bald or uncreditworthy denials, raises fictitious disputes of
fact, is palpably implausible, far-fetched or so clearly
untenable
that the court is justified in rejecting them merely on the papers.
The court below did not have regard to these propositions
and instead
decided the case on probabilities without rejecting the NDPP’s
version.”
[27]But in my view it is not necessary to resolve the factual
disputes, some insignificant and other less so, because the real
issue between the parties cuts through such disputes, for the
following reason.
[28] As already intimated, the applicant’s proposition comes
down to this: that since the respondent could conduct her business
from either the Cape or Gauteng, she should opt for Gauteng because
that is where the applicant lives. The applicant’s submissions
from the Bar did not go as far as to suggest that if he had to move
to say Durban because of a job opportunity there, the respondent
was
obliged to follow him because she could as easily conduct her
business from that location.
[29]Nor did his submissions cover the case where say Mr P in fact had
a legitimate business opportunity early on, but after a year
or two
it collapsed, and he and the respondent decided that he would not
pursue any other opportunities: on the applicant’s
case, would
the respondent then also be obliged to move back to Gauteng?
Discussion
[30] The course of the applicant’s submissions, I was referred
to cases where relocation decisions were reconsidered by courts.
Those decisions, generally, dealt with the requirements needed to be
satisfied before a decision would not be overruled by a court.
And
generally, they said that such a relocation decision – usually
to an overseas country – was required to have been
rationally
taken, and bona fide, meaning not simply to deny the other parent
his/her visitation rights to the minor child.
[31]That is understandable, because otherwise the best interests of
the child are not being served: the primary caregiver should
not, in
the interests of the minor, follow irrational whims by moving abroad.
Such a minor could otherwise be exposed to upheaval
that could rock
his/her emotional boat for years to come.
[32]In AC v KC (A389/08)[2008]ZAGPHC 369 (13 June 2008) the full
court dealt with an appeal against an order of a single judge.
There
the applicant mother applied for the court to substitute its consent
for that of the husband under s.18(5) of the Children’s
Act 38
of 2005 to remove the minor children with her to pursue a job
opportunity in Abu Dhabi. The court a quo granted the order.
The
appeal against that order was dismissed. The court accepted that the
decision, in those circumstances, had to be bona fide
and reasonable.
It also accepted that a court will not readily interfere with a bona
fide decision which the custodian parent regards
as reasonable.
[33]I was referred also, among others, to Godbeer v Godbeer,
2000 (3)
SA 976
(W). There Nugent, J (then) said at p982:
“
It was submitted that the terms in which the agreement is
framed is indicative of the fact that it was considered best that the
children should remain in this country. I do not think it reflects
any more than the circumstances which prevailed at the time the
agreement was concluded. The fact is that the applicant is the
custodian parent and primarily must decide upon the circumstances
in
which she and the children should live. While this Court is the upper
guardian of all minors and may insist in appropriate cases
upon
limiting the freedom of choice of the custodian, I do not think that
should be translated into this Court imposing its own
subjective
whims upon the children of the parties concerned. In Bailey's case at
136 the Court quoted the following extract from
the judgment of the
Court in Du Preez v Du Preez
1969 (3) SA 529
(D) at 532E - F,
apparently with approval:
'This is not to say that the opinion and desires of
the custodian parent are to be ignored or brushed aside, indeed, the
Court takes
upon itself a grave responsibility if it decides to
override the custodian parent's decision as to what is best in the
interests
of his child and will only do so after the most careful
consideration of all the circumstances, including the reasons for the
custodian
parent's decision and the emotions or impulses which have
contributed to it.'
In this case the applicant seems to me to have given careful
consideration to the matter. Whether the children will be better off
in this country or in the United Kingdom in the long term remains to
be seen. I do not think the decision made by the applicant
can be
faulted. It is a rational and well-balanced judgment as to what she
considers to be best for her and her children. She has
taken into
account the reduced access that the children will have to their
father and is willing to encourage as much contact as
possible in
accordance with their means.”
[34] I refer to this case for two purposes: first, to suggest,
respectfully, that the standard there laid down is one that applies
when the court has to decide whether to interfere in a refusal to
agree that a minor departs from or is to be removed from the
country.
I suggest that that is a move markedly more drastic than a move
within the country, to a place no more than two hours
by plane and
perhaps another one and a half hour on each side to provide for
logistics, away from the non-custodian parent’s
residence.
[35]The second reason for referring to that judgment is the deference
nonetheless accorded to the custodian parent’s right
to decide
the circumstances in which s/he and the children should live.
[36]As to the requirement that the decision should be bona fide, both
parties accepted that this means that the decider must not
have taken
the decision deliberately to foil the other parent’s rights in
relation to the child. In this case the question
would be whether the
respondent decided to move to the Cape deliberately to frustrate the
applicant’s access to P.
[37]In my view that hardly applies here. The respondent offers access
every second weekend, and offered to pay the transport costs
of one
of the two. But in this context Ms Ternent for the applicant stressed
s.31 of the Act. It provides (my emphasis):
“
31
Major decisions involving child
(1) (a) Before a person holding parental responsibilities and
rights in respect of a child takes any decision contemplated in
paragraph
(b) involving the child, that person must give due
consideration to any views and wishes expressed by the child, bearing
in mind
the child's age, maturity and stage of development.
(b) A decision referred to in paragraph (a) is any decision-
(i) in connection with a
matter listed in section 18 (3) (c);
(ii) affecting contact between the
child and a co-holder of parental responsibilities and rights;
(iii) regarding the assignment of
guardianship or care in respect of the child to another person in
terms of section
27; or
(iv) which is likely to significantly
change, or to have an adverse effect on, the child's living
conditions, education,
health, personal relations with a parent or
family member or, generally, the child's well-being.
(2) (a)
Before
a person holding parental
responsibilities and rights in respect of a child takes any decision
contemplated in paragraph (b), that
person must give due
consideration to any views and wishes expressed by any co-holder of
parental responsibilities and rights in
respect of the child.
(b) A decision referred to in paragraph (a) is any decision which
is
likely to change significantly
, or to have a
significant adverse effect on, the co-holder's exercise of parental
responsibilities and rights in respect of the
child.”
[38]For the applicant it was argued that the decision to move to the
Cape was one that qualifies under s.31(2)(b) of the Act, and
so the
respondent should have, but did not, have given due consideration to
the applicant’s views and wishes before her move.
Assuming –
without deciding - that the applicant’s exercise of parental
responsibilities are “
likely to change significantly”
by the respondent’ s move to the Cape; and assuming –
again without deciding – that in this case the respondent
did
not give the applicant’s views and wishes “
before”
she took the decision: in J v J,
2008 (6) SA 30
(CPD) a full court
held (at 43 F – D) that a failure to have taken the other
parent’s views into account, does not
invalidate the decision.
The decision remains subject to review, the standard being the best
interests of the minor child. Compare
s.28(2) of the Constitution.
[39]As to the reasonableness of the decision, it seems to me that the
enquiry there too must focus on the well-being of the minor
child. Dr
Duchen’s report is comprehensive. To begin, she is eminently
qualified to express an opinion that will assist the
court. Her
report shows that she considered the fact that the parents were
living apart. She considered the background of the parties.
She
interacted with both parties, their mothers, Mr P, and above, with
Philp. She examined the history of P’s care from the
separate
perspectives of both parents, and their individual concerns.
[40]She consulted Mr P and performed psychometric testing of him. She
consulted the respondent’ smother and performed psychometric
testing of her. She interviewed P. She performed what she calls
“interactional analysis” of the parents and P. After
her
comprehensive analysis, she concluded as follows.
[41]P was not the victim of sexual abuse, but the respondent –
sincere and hyper-vigilant but inaccurate - believed that
he was. P
must remain in the respondent’s primary care in the Cape and
shared residency, irrespective of the relocation,
will not be in P’s
best interests.
[42]Dr Duchen considered that the applicant should have access to P
every third weekend. I raised with Ms de Wet in argument whether
every second weekend would not be in P’s better interests, and
she agreed.
[43]As I see it, when all is said and done, P is but five hours away
by plane. No-one suggests that, whilst the applicant is a
good and
caring father to P, the respondent is not a wonderfully caring mother
who is more than able financially to afford P the
safety, security
and creature comforts that would offer security for a boy of tender
years. No-one suggests seriously that P is
unhappy where he now
lives. The Duchen report suggests the contrary. The only concern
ultimately raised in the application is whether
P will be prejudiced
for having to see the applicant less, now that he lives in the Cape.
[44]There is of course no doubt that access during the week is absent
when the visiting parent and the primary caregiver live apart,
whereas otherwise that might not be so. But that could potentially
apply in any event should the applicant land a job which keeps
him
occupied for more than nine to five, even if the parents live in the
same city. It is only now that the applicant is unemployed
that he
would have had full access to P during the week to attend his
extra-murals, had the parents lived in the same city. And
I have
little doubt that the applicant will be continuously on the look-out
for employment opportunities, given his limited financial
resources.
[45]But I do not see that a case has been made out for this court to
interfere with the respondent’s decision to live in
the Cape. I
do not view the decision as being irrational, given that she has a
right to decide where to live with P, given her
new live as a married
women with a husband who wishes to pursue a vocation in the Cape
area, given that her ability to continue
being the financial core of
the family remains unaffected by it and, finally, given that P is
being accommodated in an upmarket
private school that will fully
cater for his needs.
[46]As will have been evident, I do not accept either that a case has
been made out that the respondent moved to the Cape deliberately
to
curtail the applicant’s access to P. Such a proposition is
inconsistent with her offer that the applicant sees P alternate
weekends, and her offer to pay for (one weekend of) the applicant’s
air tickets and accommodation, including that of his
other son, Kyle.
Conclusion
[47] It follows that in my view this court ought not to direct the
respondent to move back to Gauteng. Access every second weekend
ought
to be allowed. I think too that the respondent should pay for it,
because from the get-go she was the breadwinner between
the two. This
part of the order below may be revisited should the applicant land a
job and a steady income because, after all,
if he goes down to Cape
Town he will be seeing Kyle as well.
[48]I am inclined to agree with the notion that each school holiday
should, at least for the rest of this year, be split between
the
parents. This may be revisited at the end of the year, for 2020, to
see if it would benefit all parties, especially P, if he
spends
alternate holidays (in full) with the other parent. For the rest, the
order below was not really contentious.
Costs
[49]Costs became an issue. The applicant sought the costs of the
initial application, as well as the subsequent proceedings. He
submitted that, should this court not direct the respondent to return
to Gauteng, each should pay his/her own costs in respect
of the
subsequent proceedings, i.e. after the order of 31 January 2018.
[50]I believe the applicant should get the costs of the initial
proceedings and their execution because, ultimately, he was
vindicated
by the Duchen report and by what the respondent now
accepts. She certainly overreacted, at a price for the applicant and,
inevitably,
for P. I am disinclined to make a special order.
[51] As to the subsequent proceedings, I do not believe it is fair to
view the two protagonists in terms of winners and losers.
I believe
it is fair to make no order on the proceedings that were launched on
19 November 2018, and that ultimately culminated
in this judgment.
[52] In the result I make the following order:
(a) The applicant’s application dated 15
November 2018 is dismissed.
(b) The applicant and the respondent retain full
parental responsibilities and rights with regard to P Tyrel
M (“P”)
as contemplated in s.18(2) of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005.
(c) P will reside with the respondent, who
will be his primary caregiver.
(d) The applicant will be entitled to exercise
contact with P at all reasonable times upon prior arrangement
with
the respondent. In addition, the applicant will be entitled to have
access to P as follows.
i.
Every alternate weekend in Cape Town or Langebaan, at the
applicant’s
election, from Fridays at 16h00 to Sundays at 18h00, and the
applicant will collect him from and return him to
the respondent.
ii.
The respondent shall provide reasonable accommodation in
Cape Town or
Langebaan for the applicant, P, and the applicant’s son Kyle M
during such weekends, which accommodation the
respondent shall
select.
iii.
The parties may by agreement substitute for the above access,
from
time to time, a weekend in Johannesburg for P.
iv.
The respondent is to pay for the reasonable return air fare
for the
applicant or for P, as the case may be, on the above weekends.
v.
P will spend half of each school holiday for the remainder
of 2019
with the applicant and the respondent respectively, which school
holiday arrangement is to be reviewed at the end of 2019
for 2020.
vi.
The respondent will facilitate contact between the applicant
and P on
P’s birthdays.
vii.
P will spend the weekend closest to the relevant parent’s
birthday with that parent on the basis that the primary alternate
weekend arrangement referred to above will be adjusted to accommodate
this arrangement, the principle being that P will spend each
alternative weekend with the applicant unless the parents agree
otherwise
in writing.
viii.
P will spend the weekend closest to the relevant parent’s
Father’s Day or Mother’s Day with that parent on the
basis that the primary alternate weekend arrangement referred
to
above will be adjusted to accommodate this arrangement, the principle
being that P will spend each alternative weekend with
the applicant
unless the parents agree otherwise in writing.
ix.
Public holidays will be shared equally between the parents,
subject
to whatever reasonable arrangement can be made in the circumstances.
x.
P will alternate Christmas and Easter between the parents.
(e) The costs of the application since its
inception up to and including the receipt of the report of Dr R
Duchen,
and its subsequent consideration, and the taking of
instructions in respect of it, including all reserved costs, are to
be paid
by the respondent.
(f) No order as to costs is made in
respect of all costs incurred subsequent to the date identified
in
the previous paragraph.
WHG van der
Linde
Judge, High
Court
Johannesburg
Date heard: 25 January
2019
Date judgment: 1
February 2019
Counsel
for the Applicant
Adv.
PV Ternent
Instructed
by
Kim
Meikle Attorney
Applicant’s
attorney
80-13
th
Street
Parkhurst
Johannesburg
Tel:
011 327 3343/6
Tel:
011 086 689 6171
Email:
kimmiekl@mweb.co.za
Ref:
Mr R. Brown/nlh
Counsel
for the Respondent
Adv.
A de Wet, SC
Instructed
by
Beukes
&Sonja Nel Attorneys
Respondent’s
attorneys
17
Athlone Avenue
Dalview
Brakpan
Tell:
011 740 744 0477
Fax
: 011 740 9837
Email:beukes1@legalone.co.za
Email:litigation2@legalone.co.za
Ref:
Mrs Nel/Michelle/J4460/J 561
C/o
Jacques Swanepoel Attorneys
17
Schreiner Chambers
94
Pritchard Street Cnr Kruis
Johannesburg