Member of the Executive Council: Health and Social Development, Gauteng Province v M obo M (2014/22984) [2018] ZAGPJHC 408 (21 May 2018)

80 Reportability
Municipal Law

Brief Summary

Appeal — Leave to appeal — Application for leave to appeal against dismissal of application for statement and debatement of municipal account — Applicant contending reasonable prospects of success and existence of conflicting judgments — Court finding no entitlement to debatement based on statutory duty under Local Government Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 — Application for leave to appeal dismissed with costs.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


The proceedings concerned an application for leave to appeal brought in the High Court of South Africa, Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg. The applicant sought leave to appeal to the Full Court of the Gauteng Local Division, alternatively to the Supreme Court of Appeal, against an earlier order dismissing its application for the statement and debatement of a municipal account.


The parties were The Body Corporate of Annper Heights as applicant and the City of Johannesburg as respondent. The application for leave to appeal followed the dismissal of the underlying application in which the applicant had sought an order directing the City to render a “full and precise statement” of amounts allegedly owing and to submit that account to debatement.


The general subject-matter of the dispute was whether the applicant was legally entitled, on the pleaded basis, to compel the municipality to provide and debate the municipal electricity account, particularly with reference to the applicant’s reliance on section 95(d) and (e) of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 as the asserted source of such entitlement.


2. Material Facts


The applicant launched motion proceedings seeking an order compelling the respondent municipality to deliver a full and precise statement of the amounts owing by the applicant to the respondent and to proceed to the debatement of that account.


It was common cause that the applicant’s entitlement to statement and debatement depended on whether its papers properly pleaded a relationship or duty that gives rise to such a remedy, as framed in the authorities relied upon by the respondent and accepted by the court.


The respondent raised a point in limine contending that the applicant had failed to plead the nature of the relationship between the parties that would entitle it to the remedy of statement and debatement of account. It relied on the requirements articulated in Absa Bank BPK v Janse van Rensburg 2002 (3) SA 701 (SCA) and the treatment of municipal accounts in Moila v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality [2017] SA 701 (SCA).


On the court’s assessment of the pleaded case, the applicant did not plead the existence of either a fiduciary relationship or a contractual obligation requiring the respondent to render and debate an account. The applicant’s case was instead, at best, an attempted reliance on an asserted statutory duty, by referencing section 95(d) and (e) of the Municipal Systems Act. The applicant pleaded that the respondent had duties to ensure accurate and verifiable metering systems and to ensure that persons liable for payments receive regular and accurate accounts indicating the basis of calculation.


The applicant further contended in the leave to appeal proceedings that the dismissal of the debatement remedy had the effect of closing the doors of court to it, a contention the court rejected on the basis that statutory mechanisms existed to dispute municipal accounts.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal questions were whether the applicant had demonstrated grounds for leave to appeal under section 17(1)(a) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013, namely whether the proposed appeal had reasonable prospects of success or whether there was some other compelling reason for the appeal to be heard, including the existence of conflicting judgments.


Closely linked to that enquiry was whether, on the pleaded case in the founding affidavit, the applicant had established an entitlement to the remedy of statement and debatement of account, and in particular whether reliance on section 95(d) and (e) of the Municipal Systems Act could constitute a statutory duty entitling the applicant to debatement.


The dispute primarily concerned the application of legal principles to pleaded facts, including a legal characterization of the pleaded relationship between the parties and whether the cited statutory provisions conferred the claimed remedy. The leave-to-appeal enquiry also required a value-infused assessment of whether there was a sound, rational basis to conclude that another court could reasonably reach a different conclusion on the record and applicable law.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court began by applying the statutory threshold for leave to appeal in section 17(1)(a) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013, which limits leave to situations where there are reasonable prospects of success or another compelling reason to hear the appeal.


In assessing prospects of success, the court referred to the standard articulated in S v Smith 2012 (1) SACR 567 (SCA), namely that “reasonable prospects” require a dispassionate determination that a court of appeal could reasonably reach a different conclusion, and that the prospects must be realistic rather than remote. The court emphasized that it is insufficient for a party to show only that the matter is arguable or not hopeless.


Turning to the underlying entitlement to statement and debatement, the court treated Absa Bank BPK v Janse van Rensburg 2002 (3) SA 701 (SCA) as establishing that a party seeking delivery and debatement of an account must prove one of three categories of relationship: a fiduciary relationship, a contractual obligation, or a statutory duty obliging the other party to deliver and debate an account. The court found that the applicant had not pleaded facts supporting the first two categories (fiduciary or contractual).


As to the third category, the applicant’s reliance on section 95(d) and (e) of the Municipal Systems Act was considered misplaced. The court regarded Moila v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality [2017] SA 701 (SCA) as directly dispositive on the point, because the SCA in Moila held that the statutory rights in section 95 (and related provisions) should not be conflated with a right to debate an account. The Moila judgment, as quoted, drew a clear distinction between the right to receive accounts and public-law rights to redress, replies, and corrective action, as opposed to a private-law right to compel debatement.


The applicant’s submission that refusing debatement effectively closed the court’s doors was rejected. The court reasoned that sections 95 and 102 of the Municipal Systems Act provide mechanisms to dispute municipal accounts. In this regard, the court relied on Moila’s observation that the statutory framework provides “accessible mechanisms” to query or verify accounts, appeal procedures, and complaint-handling with corrective action, and that municipal by-laws may govern much of what is in dispute.


Finally, the applicant invoked alleged conflicting judgments within the division as a “compelling reason” for leave. The court noted that it had been informed that the conflicting judgment was the subject of a petition to the Supreme Court of Appeal, but it nonetheless concluded that there was no compelling reason to grant leave in this matter and, in any event, that the legal principles in Absa and Moila were correctly applied and did not justify a different outcome.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court held that the applicant had no reasonable prospects of success on appeal and that there was no compelling reason to grant leave to appeal. The application for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed with costs.


Cases Cited


Absa Bank BPK v Janse van Rensburg 2002 (3) SA 701 (SCA)


Moila v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality [2017] SA 701 (SCA)


S v Smith 2012 (1) SACR 567 (SCA)


Legislation Cited


Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013, section 17(1)(a)


Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000, section 95(d)


Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000, section 95(e)


Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000, section 95(f)


Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000, section 95(g)


Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000, section 102


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The court found that the applicant had not pleaded a basis recognised in law for the remedy of statement and debatement of account, because it did not allege a fiduciary relationship or contractual obligation, and its reliance on section 95(d) and (e) of the Municipal Systems Act did not establish a statutory duty entitling it to debatement. The court further found that statutory mechanisms existed for disputing municipal accounts, and that the refusal of debatement did not amount to denying the applicant access to remedies. Applying section 17(1)(a) of the Superior Courts Act and the test in S v Smith, the court held that there were no reasonable prospects of success and no other compelling reason to entertain the appeal, and it dismissed the leave application with costs.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


A party seeking delivery and debatement of an account must, as a matter of law, establish a qualifying basis for that remedy, namely a fiduciary relationship, a contractual obligation, or a statutory duty obliging the other party to render and debate an account, as formulated in Absa Bank BPK v Janse van Rensburg 2002 (3) SA 701 (SCA).


The rights created by section 95 of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 concerning the provision of accounts, the accuracy of billing, and mechanisms for redress and corrective action are not coextensive with, and do not inherently confer, a private-law right to compel debatement of a municipal account, as treated in Moila v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality [2017] SA 701 (SCA).


Leave to appeal under section 17(1)(a) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 requires a judicial determination that the appeal would have reasonable prospects of success or that there is some other compelling reason to hear it. The “reasonable prospects” test requires more than arguability; it requires a sound and rational basis for concluding that another court could reasonably reach a different result, consistent with S v Smith 2012 (1) SACR 567 (SCA).

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[2018] ZAGPJHC 408
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Body Corporate of Annper Heights v City of Johannesburg (2017/38126) [2018] ZAGPJHC 408 (25 October 2018)

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG
CASE NUMBER: 2017/38126
(1) REPORTABLE: YES /
NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES /
NO
(3) REVISED.
SIGNATURE:
DATE:
25.10.18
In the matter between:
THE BODY CORPORATE OF ANNPER
HEIGHTS

Applicant
And
CITY OF
JOHANNESBURG

Respondent
JUDGMENT
WINDELL, J:
INTRODUCTION
[1]
This is an application for leave to appeal
to the Full Court of the Gauteng Local Division, alternatively to the
Supreme Court of
Appeal against the dismissal of an application for
the statement and debatement of an account. The grounds of appeal are
set out
in the application for leave to appeal filed on 28 September
2018.
[2]
The test for when leave to appeal should be
granted is set out in
section 17
(1)(a) of the
Superior Courts Act 10
of 2013
which provides as follows:

Leave to
appeal may only be given where the judge or judges concerned are of
the opinion that:-
(i)
The appeal would have reasonable prospect success; or
(ii)
There is some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard,
including conflicting
judgments on the matter under consideration.”
[3]
The applicant contends that the appeal has
reasonable prospects of success and that there is a compelling reason
why the appeal
should be heard as there are conflicting judgments on
this issue in this division. I was informed during the hearing of the
application
for leave to appeal that the conflicting judgment is
currently the subject of a petition to the SCA.
[4]
The applicant launched an application
against the respondent for the statement and debatement of its
municipal account. In the notice
of motion the applicant sought an
order firstly directing the respondent to render a full and precise
statement of amounts owing
by the applicant to the respondent and
secondly the debatement of such account.
[5]
Relying on
Absa
Bank BPK v Janse van Rensburg
2002 (3)
SA 701
(SCA) and
Moila v City of Tshwane
Metropolitan Municipality
[2017] SA 701
(SCA), the respondent raised a point
in
limine
namely that the applicant failed
to plead the nature of the relationship between the applicant and the
respondent which would entitle
the applicant to the statement and
debatement of its account.
[6]
In the
Absa
judgment, Brand JA held that in order to succeed in a claim for
delivery and debatement of an account, a party would have to prove

either one of the following categories of relationship: (1) the
existence of a fiduciary relationship between the parties; (2)
a
contractual obligation to do so; and (3) the existence of a statutory
duty obliging the other party to deliver and debate an
account. The
applicant in
casu
failed to plead the existence of a fiduciary relationship or a
contractual obligation. At best for the applicant it can be said
that
it attempted to plead the existence of a statutory duty by referring
to section 95 (d) and (e) of the Local Government Municipal
Systems
Act 32 of 2000 (“the Act”). At paragraph [3.4] of its
founding affidavit the applicant pleaded that the respondent
has the
power and duty in terms of s 95 (d) to take reasonable steps to
ensure that the consumption by individual users of electricity
is
measured through accurate and verifiable metering systems and in
terms of s 95 (e) to ensure that persons liable for payments,
receive
regular and accurate accounts that indicate the basis for calculating
the amounts due.
[7]
The reliance on s 95 (d) and (e) of the Act
as proof of the existence of a statutory duty entitling it to the
debatement of an account
is misplaced. The
Moila
decision which the respondent relied upon and which I referred to in
my judgment is in point. In
Moila
the SCA dealt with s 95 of the Act and found that s 95 of the Act
does not entitle a ratepayer to the debatement of a municipal

account. At par [10] the court held as follows:

The right
to debate an account is not be confused with the right to received
the same. The two are not coextensive. The rights of
those who are
liable for the payment of municipal services to receive accounts from
the relevant municipality is made clear in
section 95 and 102 of the
Local Government Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 (the LGMS).

Section
95(f) provides for public law rights for a person liable for the
payment of accounts for municipal services to receive ‘prompt

redress for inaccurate accounts’, not for any ‘debate’
thereof; s 95(g) for a right to ‘prompt replies’
to
complaints and to ‘corrective action’ but also no right
to a debate of accounts.
[8]
The applicant raised as a ground of appeal
that this court did not consider that the effect of its finding, that
the applicant was
not entitled to a debatement, effectively closed
the door of the court to the applicant. I disagree. Section 95 and
102 of the
Act provides for mechanisms to dispute a municipal
account. In
Moila
at
par [12] the court referred to it and stated as follows:
[12] The court a quo usefully
referred to those provisions of ss 95(f) and (g) of the LGMS, which
provide for ‘accessible
mechanisms’ respectively to
‘query or verify accounts’, ‘appeal procedures’
and the ‘dealing
with complaints’, together with
‘corrective action’. Much that could be in dispute is
governed by municipal by-laws.
As that court noted, the deceased
would not have been without equitable remedies if he had wished to
resort to them. His remedy
would have been to avail of his rights
under s 95 of the LGMS
[10]
In
S v Smith
2012 (1) SACR 567
(SCA) the court held that the test to be applied in
application for leave to appeal is as follows:

What the
test of reasonable prospects of success postulates is a dispassionate
decision, based on the facts and the law, that a
court of appeal
could reasonably arrive at a conclusion different to that of the
trial court. In order to succeed therefore, the
appellant must
convince this court on proper grounds that he has prospects of
success on appeal and that those prospects are not
remote but have a
realistic chance of succeeding. More is required to be established
than that there is a mere possibility of success,
that the case is
arguable on appeal or that the case cannot be categorised as
hopeless. There must, in other words, be a sound,
rational basis for
the conclusion that there are prospects of success on appeal.”
[11]
In my judgment I make reference to both the
Absa
and
Molia
judgments and applied the principles enunciated upon. There was no
reason to find that these two cases were wrongly decided.
[12]
I am satisfied that there are no prospects
of success on appeal and that there is no compelling reason to grant
leave. The application
for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs.
L WINDELL
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
Attorney
for applicant:
Arnold
Joseph Attorneys
Counsel
for applicant:
Advocate
C.D. Roux
Attorney
for respondent:
Selolo
Ramshilo Attorneys
Counsel
for respondent:
Advocate
P.J. Kok
Date
matter heard:
24
October 2018
Judgment
date:
25
October 2018