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[2018] ZAGPJHC 408
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Body Corporate of Annper Heights v City of Johannesburg (2017/38126) [2018] ZAGPJHC 408 (25 October 2018)
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG
CASE NUMBER: 2017/38126
(1) REPORTABLE: YES /
NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES /
NO
(3) REVISED.
SIGNATURE:
DATE:
25.10.18
In the matter between:
THE BODY CORPORATE OF ANNPER
HEIGHTS
Applicant
And
CITY OF
JOHANNESBURG
Respondent
JUDGMENT
WINDELL, J:
INTRODUCTION
[1]
This is an application for leave to appeal
to the Full Court of the Gauteng Local Division, alternatively to the
Supreme Court of
Appeal against the dismissal of an application for
the statement and debatement of an account. The grounds of appeal are
set out
in the application for leave to appeal filed on 28 September
2018.
[2]
The test for when leave to appeal should be
granted is set out in
section 17
(1)(a) of the
Superior Courts Act 10
of 2013
which provides as follows:
“
Leave to
appeal may only be given where the judge or judges concerned are of
the opinion that:-
(i)
The appeal would have reasonable prospect success; or
(ii)
There is some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard,
including conflicting
judgments on the matter under consideration.”
[3]
The applicant contends that the appeal has
reasonable prospects of success and that there is a compelling reason
why the appeal
should be heard as there are conflicting judgments on
this issue in this division. I was informed during the hearing of the
application
for leave to appeal that the conflicting judgment is
currently the subject of a petition to the SCA.
[4]
The applicant launched an application
against the respondent for the statement and debatement of its
municipal account. In the notice
of motion the applicant sought an
order firstly directing the respondent to render a full and precise
statement of amounts owing
by the applicant to the respondent and
secondly the debatement of such account.
[5]
Relying on
Absa
Bank BPK v Janse van Rensburg
2002 (3)
SA 701
(SCA) and
Moila v City of Tshwane
Metropolitan Municipality
[2017] SA 701
(SCA), the respondent raised a point
in
limine
namely that the applicant failed
to plead the nature of the relationship between the applicant and the
respondent which would entitle
the applicant to the statement and
debatement of its account.
[6]
In the
Absa
judgment, Brand JA held that in order to succeed in a claim for
delivery and debatement of an account, a party would have to prove
either one of the following categories of relationship: (1) the
existence of a fiduciary relationship between the parties; (2)
a
contractual obligation to do so; and (3) the existence of a statutory
duty obliging the other party to deliver and debate an
account. The
applicant in
casu
failed to plead the existence of a fiduciary relationship or a
contractual obligation. At best for the applicant it can be said
that
it attempted to plead the existence of a statutory duty by referring
to section 95 (d) and (e) of the Local Government Municipal
Systems
Act 32 of 2000 (“the Act”). At paragraph [3.4] of its
founding affidavit the applicant pleaded that the respondent
has the
power and duty in terms of s 95 (d) to take reasonable steps to
ensure that the consumption by individual users of electricity
is
measured through accurate and verifiable metering systems and in
terms of s 95 (e) to ensure that persons liable for payments,
receive
regular and accurate accounts that indicate the basis for calculating
the amounts due.
[7]
The reliance on s 95 (d) and (e) of the Act
as proof of the existence of a statutory duty entitling it to the
debatement of an account
is misplaced. The
Moila
decision which the respondent relied upon and which I referred to in
my judgment is in point. In
Moila
the SCA dealt with s 95 of the Act and found that s 95 of the Act
does not entitle a ratepayer to the debatement of a municipal
account. At par [10] the court held as follows:
“
The right
to debate an account is not be confused with the right to received
the same. The two are not coextensive. The rights of
those who are
liable for the payment of municipal services to receive accounts from
the relevant municipality is made clear in
section 95 and 102 of the
Local Government Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 (the LGMS).
…
Section
95(f) provides for public law rights for a person liable for the
payment of accounts for municipal services to receive ‘prompt
redress for inaccurate accounts’, not for any ‘debate’
thereof; s 95(g) for a right to ‘prompt replies’
to
complaints and to ‘corrective action’ but also no right
to a debate of accounts.
[8]
The applicant raised as a ground of appeal
that this court did not consider that the effect of its finding, that
the applicant was
not entitled to a debatement, effectively closed
the door of the court to the applicant. I disagree. Section 95 and
102 of the
Act provides for mechanisms to dispute a municipal
account. In
Moila
at
par [12] the court referred to it and stated as follows:
[12] The court a quo usefully
referred to those provisions of ss 95(f) and (g) of the LGMS, which
provide for ‘accessible
mechanisms’ respectively to
‘query or verify accounts’, ‘appeal procedures’
and the ‘dealing
with complaints’, together with
‘corrective action’. Much that could be in dispute is
governed by municipal by-laws.
As that court noted, the deceased
would not have been without equitable remedies if he had wished to
resort to them. His remedy
would have been to avail of his rights
under s 95 of the LGMS
[10]
In
S v Smith
2012 (1) SACR 567
(SCA) the court held that the test to be applied in
application for leave to appeal is as follows:
“
What the
test of reasonable prospects of success postulates is a dispassionate
decision, based on the facts and the law, that a
court of appeal
could reasonably arrive at a conclusion different to that of the
trial court. In order to succeed therefore, the
appellant must
convince this court on proper grounds that he has prospects of
success on appeal and that those prospects are not
remote but have a
realistic chance of succeeding. More is required to be established
than that there is a mere possibility of success,
that the case is
arguable on appeal or that the case cannot be categorised as
hopeless. There must, in other words, be a sound,
rational basis for
the conclusion that there are prospects of success on appeal.”
[11]
In my judgment I make reference to both the
Absa
and
Molia
judgments and applied the principles enunciated upon. There was no
reason to find that these two cases were wrongly decided.
[12]
I am satisfied that there are no prospects
of success on appeal and that there is no compelling reason to grant
leave. The application
for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs.
L WINDELL
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
Attorney
for applicant:
Arnold
Joseph Attorneys
Counsel
for applicant:
Advocate
C.D. Roux
Attorney
for respondent:
Selolo
Ramshilo Attorneys
Counsel
for respondent:
Advocate
P.J. Kok
Date
matter heard:
24
October 2018
Judgment
date:
25
October 2018