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[2018] ZAGPJHC 117
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S v Ndziweni (SS149/2015) [2018] ZAGPJHC 117 (20 April 2018)
SAFLII
Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
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REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NO:
SS149/2015
In
the matter between:
THE
STATE
and
NDZIWENI:
LAWRENCE
ZAMILE
Accused
JUDGMENT
ON SENTENCE
OPPERMAN
j
[1]
I
have already handed down judgment in respect of the trial and the
conviction which followed upon it. This judgment deals with
the
evidence lead in respect of the appropriate sentence to be imposed.
The two judgments should be read together.
[2]
At
the hearing prior to conviction, an application was brought by the
State in terms of section 153(3)(a) of the Criminal Procedure
Act, 51
of 1977 (
the
CPA
),
which application was not opposed. The application was granted and it
was ordered that all persons whose presence was not necessary,
would
be excluded from the proceedings. The judgment on conviction was not
delivered in open court as this court was of the opinion
that the
identity of the complainants would be revealed. I have relaxed this
prohibition for purposes of this judgment, which relates
to
sentencing, to the extent set out herein.
[3]
This
Court has ordered that no person shall publish in any manner whatever
any information, which might reveal the identity of any
complainant
in these proceedings. Attention is drawn to the provisions of section
154(5) of the CPA, which makes the publication
of any information in
contravention of orders granted in terms of sections 153(3) and
154(2), an offence.
[4]
The
aforesaid order shall not prevent the publication of this judgment
relating to the sentencing of Mr Ndziweni, information relating
to
his name and personal particulars, the nature of the charges against
him (without disclosure of the identity of any individual
mentioned
in such charges), the plea, the verdict, the sentence and any facts
which do not disclose the identity of the complainants.
[5]
In
this judgment I will be referring to the victims as ‘
the
complainant
’
or ‘
the
victim’
.
This should not be construed as intending to convey any disrespect to
those who suffered at the hands of Mr Ndziweni but should
be seen as
an attempt by this court to protect the identity of those who were
brave enough to come to this court to seek justice.
[6]
On 29
June 2017, Mr Ndziweni was convicted by this Court on four (4) counts
of rape, three (3) counts of kidnapping, one (1) count
of attempted
kidnapping, four (4) counts of possession of unlicensed firearms,
five (5) counts of robbery with aggravating circumstances
and one (1)
count of attempted murder.
[7]
These
convictions attract the following minimum sentences in terms of the
Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 (‘
the
Act’
):
7.1.
Counts
2, 6, 10 and 13 – Section 51(2)(b)(i) – 10 years
imprisonment in respect of each count, even though the
evidence shows
more than one person raped the victim in count 6.
7.2.
Counts
1, 5, 9, 12 and 16 – Section 51(2)(a)(i) – 15 years
imprisonment.
7.3.
Counts
3, 7, 15 and 18 – Section 51(2)(c)(i) – 5 years
imprisonment per count.
7.4.
Counts
4, 8 and 11 – Section 51(2)(c)(i) – 5 years imprisonment
per count.
7.5.
Count
17 – Section 51(2)(c)(i) – 5 years imprisonment.
[8]
In
respect of count 6, the legal question which falls for determination
is whether the minimum sentence is indeed 10 years imprisonment
as
provided for in section 51(1)(b)(i), or life imprisonment, as
envisaged in section 51(1) read with part 1 of schedule 2, as
the
victim was raped more than once, whether by the accused or
co-perpetrator. In respect of such count, the evidence was that
the
victim was raped by both Mr Ndziweni and two other perpetrators.
[9]
In
S
v Mahlase
,
2013 JDR 2714 (SCA), the court held at para [9] that because the
co-perpetrator was not before the trial court and had not been
convicted of the rape, that it could therefore not be held that the
rape fell within the provisions of part 1 of schedule 2 of
the Act.
[10]
In
Cock
v S and Manuel v S
,
CA 108/2013 and CA 121/2014, Pickering J, (with whom Plasket, J and
Smith, J concurred), disagreed with the reasoning in
Mahlase
(supra)
but, of course, considered themselves bound by the SCA
pronouncement. They drew on their common law jurisdiction to
impose any sentence in excess of that minimum sentence and held that
when they exercise such jurisdiction, they were not bound
by
Mahlase
(supra) and its interpretation of the Act. They concluded that the
only appropriate sentence in that case was life imprisonment.
[11]
Where
appropriate, I too, will draw on my common law jurisdiction. The
minimum sentencing legislation is, after all, just that a
minimum
sentence that the legislature deemed appropriate, not the maximum.
[12]
In
S
v Vilakazi,
2009
(1) SACR 552
(SCA) Nugent, JA introduces the judgment with the
following observations:
“
[1]
Rape is a repulsive crime. It was rightly described by counsel in
this case as 'an invasion of the most private and intimate
zone of a
woman and strikes at the core of her personhood and dignity'. In
S
v Chapman
this court called it a 'humiliating, degrading and brutal invasion of
the privacy, the dignity and the person of the victim'
and went on to
say that
[w]omen
in this country . . . have a legitimate claim to walk peacefully on
the streets, to enjoy their shopping and their
entertainment, to go
and come from work, and to enjoy the peace and tranquility of their
homes without the fear, the apprehension
and the insecurity which
constantly diminishes the quality and enjoyment of their lives’.
[2]
Yet women in this country are still far from having that peace of
mind. According to a study on the epidemiology of rape 'the
evidence
points to the conclusion that women's right to give or withhold
consent to sexual intercourse is one of the most commonly
violated of
all human rights in South Africa'.
During
2007 as many as 36 190 reports of rape were made to the
police. Perhaps in some cases the report was false but the
figure is nonetheless staggering bearing in mind that rape is
notoriously under-reported. It is also notorious that relatively few
offenders are caught and convicted.”
[13]
Vilakazi
(supra) was
delivered on 3 September 2008. If the experience of the victims in
this case are anything to go by, it seems that, 9
years later, little
has changed for women in South Africa.
[14]
The
prescribed minimum sentences, may only be departed from:
‘
If
the sentencing court on consideration of the circumstances of the
particular case is satisfied that they render the prescribed
sentence
unjust in that it would be disproportionate to the crime, the
criminal and the needs of society, so that an injustice
would be done
by imposing that sentence, it is entitled to impose a lesser
sentence.”
see
S
v Malgas
,
2001 (1) SACR 469
(SCA) at para [25].
[15]
In
Vilakazi
(supra)
Nugent JA held as follows at paras [15] and [16]:
“
[15]
It is clear from the terms in which the test was framed in
Malgas
and endorsed in
Dodo
that it is incumbent upon a court in every case, before it imposes a
prescribed sentence, to assess, upon a consideration of all
the
circumstances of the particular case, whether the prescribed sentence
is indeed proportionate to the particular offence. The
Constitutional
Court made it clear that what is meant by the 'offence' in that
context (and that is the sense in which I will use
the term
throughout this judgment unless the context indicates otherwise)
consists
of all factors relevant to the nature and seriousness of the criminal
act itself, as well as all relevant personal and
other circumstances
relating to the offender which could have a bearing on the
seriousness of the offence and the culpability of
the offender.
If
a court is indeed satisfied that a lesser sentence is called for in a
particular case, thus justifying a departure from the prescribed
sentence, then it hardly needs saying that the court is bound to
impose that lesser sentence. That was also made clear in
Malgas,
which said that the relevant provision in the Act
vests
the sentencing court with the power, indeed the obligation, to
consider whether the particular circumstances of the case require
a
different sentence to be imposed. And a different sentence must be
imposed if the court is satisfied that substantial and compelling
circumstances exist which
'justify'
it.
[16]
It was submitted before us that in
Malgas
this court 'repeatedly emphasised' that the prescribed sentences must
be imposed as the norm and are to be departed from only as
an
exception. That is not what was said in
Malgas.
The submission was founded upon words selected from the judgment and
advanced out of their context. The court did not say, for
example, as
it was submitted that it did, that the prescribed sentences 'should
ordinarily be imposed'. What it said is that a
court must approach
the matter
'conscious
[of the fact] that the Legislature has ordained
[the prescribed sentence] as the sentence that should
ordinarily
and
in the absence of weighty justification
be imposed for the listed crimes in the specified circumstances’(the
emphasis in bold is mine). In the context of the judgment
as a whole,
and in particular the 'determinative test' that I referred to
earlier, it is clear that the effect of those qualifications
is that
any circumstances that would render the prescribed sentence
disproportionate to the offence would constitute the requisite
'weighty justification' for the imposition of a lesser sentence.”
[16]
I am
called upon to apply my mind to whether the sentences ordained in the
Act are proportional to the particular offences of this
particular
case but also and implicit in this enquiry, whether I should draw
upon my common law jurisdiction and impose sentences
in
excess
of
such ordained sentences.
[17]
In
drawing upon my common law jurisdiction, the following general
principles have application and were restated in
S
v SMM
,
2013 (2) SACR 292
(SCA) at para [13] in the following terms:
‘
[13]
…….It is equally important to remind ourselves that
sentencing should always be considered and passed dispassionately,
objectively and upon a careful consideration of all relevant factors.
Public sentiment cannot be ignored, but it can never be permitted
to
displace the careful judgment and fine balancing that are involved in
arriving at an appropriate sentence. Courts must therefore
always
strive to arrive at a sentence which is just and fair to both the
victim and the perpetrator, has regard to the nature of
the crime and
takes account of the interests of society. Sentencing involves a very
high degree of responsibility which should
be carried out with
equanimity. As Corbett JA put it in
S
v Rabie
:
'A
judicial officer should not approach punishment in a spirit of anger
because, being human, that will make it difficult for him
to achieve
that delicate balance between the crime, the criminal and the
interests of society which his task and the objects of
punishment
demand of him. Nor should he strive after severity; nor, on the other
hand, surrender to misplaced pity. While not flinching
from firmness,
where firmness is called for, he should approach his task with a
humane and compassionate understanding of
human frailties and
the pressures of society which contribute to criminality.'
And
further at para [14]
[14]
Our country is plainly facing a crisis of epidemic proportions in
respect of rape, particularly of young children. The rape
statistics
induce a sense of shock and disbelief. The concomitant violence in
many rape incidents engenders resentment, anger and
outrage.
Government has introduced various programmes to stem the tide, but
the sexual abuse of particularly women and children
continues
unabated. In
S
v RO
I referred to this extremely worrying social malaise, to the latest
statistics at that time in respect of sexual abuse of children
and
also to the disturbingly increasing phenomenon of sexual abuse within
the family context. If anything, the picture looks
even
gloomier now, three years down the line. The public is rightly
outraged by this rampant scourge. There is consequently increasing
pressure on our courts to impose harsher sentences primarily, as far
as the public is concerned, to exact retribution and to deter
further
criminal conduct. It is trite that retribution is but one of the
objectives of sentencing. It is also trite that in certain
cases
retribution will play a more prominent role than the other sentencing
objectives. But one cannot only sentence to satisfy
public demand for
revenge — the other sentencing objectives, including
rehabilitation, can never be discarded altogether,
in order to attain
a balanced, effective sentence. The much-quoted
Zinn
dictum
remains the leading authority on the topic. Rumpff JA's well-known
reference to the triad of factors warranting consideration
in
sentencing, namely the offender, the crime and the interests of
society, epitomises the very essence of a balanced, effective
sentence which meets all the sentencing objectives. More than 40
years ago Schreiner JA had the following to say about the balance
which has to be struck:
'While
the deterrent effect of punishment has remained as important as ever,
it is, I think, correct to say that the retributive
aspect has tended
to yield ground to the aspects of prevention and correction. That is
no doubt a good thing. But the element of
retribution, historically
important, is by no means absent from the modern approach. It is not
wrong that the natural indignation
of interested persons and of the
community at large should receive some recognition in the sentences
that Courts impose, and it
is not irrelevant to bear in mind that if
sentences for serious crimes are too lenient, the administration of
justice may fall
into disrepute and injured persons may incline to
take the law into their own hands.’
[18]
Taking
the above principles into account I apply them to this case.
[19]
This
matter was postponed on many an occasion to procure a pre-sentencing
report which was, finally, obtained. In summarising Mr
Ndziweni’s
personal circumstances, I draw generously from such report which has,
by agreement with the prosecution, been
received as evidence. The
state recorded its reservations in respect of two features being that
Mr Ndziweni suffers from an illness
and that the report suggests
implementation of section 276 (1)(b) of the CPA.
[20]
Mr
Ndziweni has no previous convictions. He was born on […] 1977
and is thus currently 41 years of age. Although not married,
he has
three children from two different partners. Two children, aged 14 and
15 years of age, from one partner, reside with their
maternal
grandmother in the Eastern Cape. Their biological mother, from whom
he separated in 2007, resides in Johannesburg. His
third child, who
is 8 years of age, is under the care of his biological mother who
resides in the Eastern Cape. Prior to his arrest,
he was working,
earning R250 per day. He supported his children financially.
[21]
The
probation officer, Ms Sekoba, interviewed Mr Ndziweni’s sister
who reported that their mother had abandoned them at an
early age as
a result of which they were raised by their maternal grandmother as
well as by extended family members. She opined
that both she and Mr
Ndziweni suffer from anger issues as a result of lack of parental
love, care and support during their formative
years. She said that he
presented with negative behaviour from an early age and that he is an
aggressive and violent person who
has a tendency of involving himself
in physical fights. Mr Ndziweni’s sister was very emotional
during the interview and
indicated that it pained her not to be on
good terms with her brother, he being the only close family member
that she has.
[22]
Mr
Ndziweni told Ms Sekoba that he had completed grade 10 but had
dropped out of school following the death of his maternal
grandmother.
His sister disputed this. She contended that Mr Ndziweni
had dropped out of school during grade 4 due to rebellious behaviour.
[23]
Mr
Ndziweni did not testify in mitigation of his sentence. The state
relied on 3 victim impact reports which similarly, were received
into
evidence by agreement between the parties.
[24]
My
judgment in respect of the conviction of Mr Ndziweni contains an
evaluation of the circumstances in which the offences were committed.
I have considered them in arriving at a decision whether the
sentences I intend imposing are proportional to the minimum
prescribed
sentences and I do not again repeat such circumstances
herein.
[25]
The
circumstances I had regard to in relation to considering the
proportionality of the minimum sentences, were also considered
in
exercising my general criminal jurisdiction.
[26]
I
highlight some of the material facts I have considered in respect of
the specific counts:
Counts 1 - 3
[27]
Mr
Ndziweni, and him only, ordered the complainant into the bathroom and
threatened to shoot her. In order to keep her subdued,
he placed the
gun on the rim of the bath whilst he raped her. He did not use a
condom thereby increasing the risk of pregnancy
and the transmission
of disease. In this judgment I will mention whether or not a condom
was used when a victim was raped. When
I do so it should be
understood that in respect of such victim, I find, as a fact, that
the failure to have done so, increased
the risk of pregnancy and the
transmission of disease.
[28]
No
victim impact report could be obtained for the complainant as she had
left the country and her destination is unknown.
Counts 4 - 7
[29]
The
complainant was accosted by two knife wielding assailants, one of
whom was wearing a balaclava. She was then raped on no less
than 5
occasions by 3 perpetrators. In her victim impact statement it is
recorded how petrified she was the first 8 months following
the
ordeal. She was fortunate to have a very supportive family. She
expressed the wish that Mr Ndziweni be sent to prison ‘
for
ever so that some other women will be safe from his dirty doings
’.
Counts 8 to 10
[30]
Mr
Ndziweni raped the complainant at knife point without the use of a
condom. The offence had devastating consequences for this
complainant. The victim impact report reveals that she decided to
resign from her job as she felt that she was being gossiped about
and
she was being ridiculed. She resorted to the excessive consumption of
alcohol. She suffered from anxiety, still experiences
much
anger and has suicidal thoughts. Those around her where she stayed
made fun of the crime perpetrated upon her and she feels
trapped
within this unsympathetic and cruel home environment. She
wrote: ‘
I
wish God can make decision about him about all dirty thing that he
did if he can rot in jail it fine he deserve it.’
Counts 11 - 14
[31]
This
complainant too was raped without a condom at gun point however,
prior to raping her, Mr Ndziweni had announced that when he
was done
raping her, he would kill her because if he did not do so, she would
go to the police, come back to the place under the
bridge with the
police. Mr Ndziweni might well have executed his heinous plan had he
not been disturbed by the ringing of the passer
by’s phone. One
shudders to think what might have happened had the complainant not
rolled away from the spot where she had
been lying and where the shot
had been fired. The victim impact report reveals that she has become
extremely fearful and distrusting
of men. She says she cannot walk
the streets without fear any more. She expressed the wish that he be
imprisoned for the rest of
his life to prevent him from doing the
same thing to her.
Counts 15 - 17
[32]
Mr
Ndziweni was possessed of a stick and his co-perpetrator, with a gun.
In this case too, the complainant was saved from the unthinkable
by
the actions of a third party, the pamphlet distributor. The
complainant was unwilling to co-operate in the production of a victim
impact report as she wanted to put this entire incident behind her.
[33]
The
emotional impact the offences had on the victims, their families,
their relationships and their lives is profound. These offences
caused much emotional distress and damage.
[34]
The
behaviour of the accused and his co-perpetrator shows lack of respect
for the complainants’ physical integrity, freedom
of movement
and human dignity. He has offered no explanation for this barbaric
behaviour.
[35]
The
offences forming the subject of this trial were committed over a
period of one and a half years, starting 25 December 2012 and
ending
on 20 May 2014. During this time Mr Ndziweni had time to reflect on
his heinous deeds and to change his life. He did not.
Instead he
continued to inflict unspeakable acts of injury and humiliation upon
his victims. He lay in waiting, like a hyena, pouncing
on the
vulnerable and then taking them to his lair. These women were all
trying to eke out a living by walking early in the morning
or late at
night to and from their place of employment to provide for their
families.
[36]
The
courts are duty bound to send a clear message to other potential
rapists that the courts are determined to protect the equality,
dignity and freedom of all women, and we shall show no mercy to those
who invade these rights, see S v
Chapman
(supra) at 345D.
[37]
Mr
Ndziweni’s rehabilitation prospects are slim. He is a serial
sexual predator who has made life hell for so many people
for so long
that he evidently lacks the capacity for mercy that he now seeks. He
has no insight into his wrongdoing, has shown
no remorse and persists
with his innocence post conviction, despite the overwhelming evidence
against him.
[38]
That
he grew up in a disadvantaged community and in circumstances which
were characterised by violence, stands uncontroverted. His
sister,
who grew up under the same circumstances, however, managed to walk a
different road. His relocation to Hillbrow during
1997 appears to
have introduced him to a lifestyle of criminal activities. An
unfortunate turning point. That Mr Ndziweni was dealt
an unfair hand
stands undisputed but none of this can justify the callous, ruthless
and cruel treatment he meted out to his victims.
[39]
Much
emphasis was placed on the fact that almost 4 years have lapsed since
the date of arrest of Mr Ndziweni, being the 24
th
of June 2014. Although it is undoubtedly so that under the correct
circumstances this fact alone could have qualified for a finding
that
substantial and compelling circumstances were present which would
have entitled this court to deviate from the minimum sentences
applicable, this case is not such a case. It also does not follow as
a matter of course that the sentences should be reduced with
mathematical precision having regard to the amount of time spent
incarcerated awaiting trial. I hold the view that the minimum
sentences in the circumstances of this case are not unjust and are
not disproportionate to the crimes committed.
[40]
Life
sentence is the most severe sentence, which a court can impose. It
endures for the length of the natural life of the offender.
Whether
it is an appropriate sentence, particularly in respect of its
proportionality to the particular circumstances of a case,
requires
careful consideration. This I have done and I am unable to find that
there are any substantial and compelling circumstances
present which
would warrant a deviation from the minimum sentences applicable.
Applying this finding then to the 5 separate incidents,
chronologically with reference to the date of the offences:
25 December 2012 – Counts 1-3
[41]
The
rape count (count 2) attracts a minimum sentence of 10 years
imprisonment, the robbery with aggravating circumstances count
(count
1) a period of 15 years imprisonment and the possession of a fire-arm
count (count 3) a period of 5 years. In my view, an
appropriate
sentence would be one in which the 5 year period were to run
concurrently with the 15 year period.
27 June 2013 – Counts 4 - 7
[42]
The
rape count (count 6) attracts a minimum sentence of 10 years
imprisonment, the robbery with aggravating circumstances count
(count
5) a period of 15 years imprisonment, the possession of a fire-arm
count (count 7) a period of 5 years and the kidnapping
charge (count
4) a period of 5 years. In my view, an appropriate sentence would be
one in which the 5 year period in respect of
count 7, were to run
concurrently with the 15 year period in respect of count 5.
[43]
In
respect of the gang rape to which the complainant was subjected, I
draw on my common law jurisdiction as I hold the view that
the
sentence of 10 years is wholly inappropriate. In my view, a life
sentence is warranted.
16 December 2013 – Counts 8 -
10
[44]
The
rape count (count 10) attracts a minimum sentence of 10 years
imprisonment, the robbery with aggravating circumstances count
(count
9) a period of 15 years imprisonment and the kidnapping charge (count
8) a period of 5 years. In my view, an appropriate
sentence would be
one in which the 5 year period in respect of count 8, were to run
concurrently with the 10 year period in respect
of count 9.
28 February 2014 – Counts 11
- 15
[45]
The
rape count (count 13) attracts a minimum sentence of 10 years
imprisonment, the robbery with aggravating circumstances count
(count
12) a period of 15 years imprisonment, the kidnapping charge (count
11) a period of 5 years, the attempted murder (count
14) 10 years and
the possession of a fire-arm (count 15) a period of 5 years. In my
view, an appropriate sentence would be one
in which the 5 year period
in respect of count 15, were to run concurrently with the 15 year
period in respect of count 12.
20 May 2014 – Counts 16 - 18
[46]
The
robbery with aggravating circumstances count (count 16) attracts a
minimum sentence of 15 years imprisonment, the kidnapping
charge
(count 11) a period of 5 years. The attempted murder count (count 17)
has no minimum sentencing provision applicable and
in terms of my
general criminal jurisdiction I consider 10 years imprisonment to be
appropriate. The possession of a fire-arm (count
18) attracts a
minimum period of 5 years imprisonment. In my view, an appropriate
sentence would be one in which the 5 year period
in respect of count
18, were to run concurrently with the 15 year period in respect of
count 16.
[47]
In
the result I make the following order:
47.1.
Counts
1 - 3
47.1.1.
Count
1 – Robbery with aggravating circumstances - the accused
is sentenced to 15 years imprisonment.
47.1.2.
Count
2 – rape - the accused is sentenced to 10 years imprisonment.
47.1.3.
Count
3 – Possession of unlicensed fire-arm – the accused is
sentenced to 5 years imprisonment.
47.1.4.
The
sentence imposed in respect of count 3 is to run concurrently with
the sentence imposed in respect of count 1.
47.1.5.
The
effective sentence in respect of counts 1, 2 and 3 is thus 25 years
imprisonment.
47.2.
Counts
4 - 7
47.2.1.
Count
4 – Kidnapping - the accused is sentenced to 5 years
imprisonment.
47.2.2.
Count
5 – Robbery with aggravating circumstances - the accused is
sentenced to 15 years imprisonment.
47.2.3.
Count
6 – Rape – the accused is sentenced to life imprisonment.
47.2.4.
Count
7 – Possession of an unlicensed fire-arm – the accused is
sentenced to 5 years imprisonment.
47.3.
Counts
11 - 15
47.3.1.
Count
11 – Kidnapping - the accused is sentenced to 5 years
imprisonment.
47.3.2.
Count
12 – Robbery with aggravating circumstances - the accused is
sentenced to 15 years imprisonment.
47.3.3.
Count
13 – rape – the accused is sentenced to 5 years
imprisonment.
47.3.4.
Count
14 – Attempted murder – the accused is sentenced to 10
years imprisonment.
47.3.5.
Count
15 – Possession of unlicensed fire-arm – the accused is
sentenced to 5 years imprisonment.
47.3.6.
The
sentence imposed in respect of count 15 is to run concurrently with
the sentence imposed in respect of count 12.
47.3.7.
The
sentence imposed in respect of count 11 is to run concurrently with
the sentence imposed in respect of count 13.
47.3.8.
The
effective sentence in respect of counts 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 is 35
years imprisonment.
47.4.
Counts
16 - 18
47.4.1.
Count
16 – Robbery with aggravating circumstances - the accused
is sentenced to 15 years imprisonment.
47.4.2.
Count
17 – Attempted kidnapping - the accused is sentenced to 5 years
imprisonment.
47.4.3.
Count
18 – Possession of unlicensed fire-arm – the accused is
sentenced to 5 years imprisonment.
47.4.4.
The
sentence imposed in respect of count 18 is to run concurrently with
the sentence imposed in respect of count 16.
47.4.5.
The
effective sentence in respect of counts 16, 17 and 18 is thus 20
years imprisonment.
47.5.
The
accused’s name is to be entered into the National Register for
Sex Offenders as contemplated in terms of section 42 of
the Sexual
Offences Act, in terms of section 50(2)(a)(i) of the Sexual Offences
Act.
47.6.
The
accused is declared unfit to possess a firearm as contemplated in
terms of section 103 of Act 60 of 2000.
___________________________
I
OPPERMAN
Judge
of the High Court
Gauteng
Local Division, Johannesburg
Heard:
15 January 2018, 13 March 2018, 27 March 2018 and 20 April 2018
Judgment
delivered: 20 April 2018
Appearances:
The
State: Adv Kowlas
For
the Accused: Adv Bosiki