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[2017] ZAGPJHC 233
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Bennet v Minister of Police (04646/2015) [2017] ZAGPJHC 233 (24 August 2017)
SAFLII
Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
redacted from this document in compliance with the law
and
SAFLII
Policy
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA,
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE NO: 04646/2015
Not reportable
Not of interest to other judges
Revised. 4/8/2017
In the matter
between:
GXOTWA
SIPHIWE
BENNET
Plaintiff
and
MINISTER
OF
POLICE
Defendant
JUDGMENT
MIA, AJ
[1] The plaintiff
claimed the sum of R350 000 for an unlawful arrest. He was
arrested on 28 April 2014 at his home […]
Street, Mofolo North
and released on 30 April 2014. The defendant denied the arrest
and detention and put the plaintiff to
proof thereof.
[2] The plaintiff
averred that officers in the employ of the defendant caused false
charges to be laid against him of armed robbery
which led to his
arrest without a warrant when the complainant pointed him out as the
suspect in the armed robbery.
[3] At the
commencement of the trial the parties agreed that the defendant had
to begin as the burden of proof rested on the defendant
to prove that
the arrest was lawful.
[4] The first state
witness Constable Khazamula Chauke (Chauke) testified that he was a
police officer based at Moroka Police Station
for 9 years. He was
accompanied by his colleague Captain Mawelewele (Mawelewele) when
they received a call from the complainant,
John Motaung (Motaung).
Motaung was the complainant in a criminal case reported at Moroka
Police Station under case number 654/04/2014.
Motaung informed Chauke
and Mawelewele that he had knowledge of the whereabouts of the
suspect in his case and was in possession
of a point out note.
[5] He informed the
police officers he was at Cheapline garage. The police officers
proceeded to the garage where they found Motaung.
Motaung informed
them he could show them where the suspect in his case was and handed
the point out note to them. The point out
note reflected the case
number and the nature of the charge reported namely, armed robbery.
Mawelewele enquired from Motaung whether
he had indeed been robbed
and to this Motaung replied positively. The police officers
accompanied by Motaung proceeded to
the placed directed by Motaung,
where the suspect was reported to be.
[6] Upon arrival at
[...] Street, Mofolo North, a woman opened the door. Chauke and
Mawelewele introduced themselves and informed
the plaintiff that
Motaung had laid a charge against him. Motaung pointed out the
plaintiff as the person who robbed him.
The plaintiff’s
girlfriend was present as well but Motaung did not say anything about
her to Chauke at that stage. Chauke
read the plaintiff his rights and
then explained they would be taking him to Moroka police station.
They proceeded to Moroka police
station where they detained him until
his release.
[7] Chauke
confirmed that he and Mawelewele relied on the point out note to
accompany Motaung to effect the arrest. It follows that
their
suspicion was formed after perusing the form and after Mawelewele
questioned Motaung about whether the robbery occurred.
When the
police officers arrived at the plaintiff’s address Motaung
pointed out the plaintiff and again stated that the plaintiff
had
robbed him. These facts indicate that Chauke and Mawelewele relied on
the point out note and Motaung’ s identification
and
confirmation that the plaintiff had robbed him to conclude that an
offence had been committed when they arrested the plaintiff.
Chauke
confirmed that he did not act on the point out statement on p. 40 in
Bundle E as it was only completed after the arrest.
He acted upon the
point out note appearing at p10 in Bundle E. He confirmed that they
believed they were pursuing a charge of armed
robbery where the
complainant’s belongings were taken by force.
[8] The point out
note instructs members of the SAPS to assist the bearer of the note
to arrest the suspect if pointed out by the
bearer. The police
officer is then required to call the investigating officer. The note
informs the bearer that the investigation
is suspended until new
information is supplied to enable the investigating officer to follow
up on the investigation. Chauke
and Mawelewele were following
up on the information supplied by Motaung. They both testified that
they believed they were required
to act on the point out note and a
failure to do so would amount to a dereliction of their duties.
[9] Chauke did not have sight of the
docket before effecting the arrest and did not know the plaintiff
before the arrest. He testified
that he effected the arrest because
he acted on the pointing out note and believed it would have been a
dereliction of his duty
not to effect the arrest. He testified that
he believed he would have been subjected to disciplinary proceedings
and been dismissed
as a police officer if he did not effect the
arrest of a suspect in a serious offence, namely robbery. The
complainant had furnished
the case number and the charge and had
pointed out the offender to them in a charge of armed robbery.
Motaung confirmed the identity
of the plaintiff and that the
plaintiff had robbed him.
[10] Further
questioning by the defence indicated that at the time of the arrest,
Chauke was not fully aware of the details of the
docket and was not
aware that the complainant had reported that he was robbed at
gunpoint, he was only aware that it was an armed
robbery. He was also
not aware that the complainant had initially reported that the
suspect was unknown to him. It later transpired
that the plaintiff
and Motaung had met as they were in love with the same woman and the
plaintiff has requested Motaung to stop
pursuing the woman. Chauke
was not aware that the State declined to prosecute the matter due to
insufficient evidence of the robbery.
The State based its decision on
information that Motaung said he did not know the suspect who robbed
him whilst it later transpired
there were statements and affidavits
indicating that Motaung and the plaintiff had previous contact and
Motaung was the ex- boyfriend
of the plaintiff’s girlfriend.
The State was in possession of a protection order the ex- girlfriend
sought against Motaung.
[11] The second
witness called to prove the lawfulness of the arrest was Mawelewele.
Mawelewele is also a police officer who
has been in the South
African Police Service for 31 years. Mawelewele corroborated
the evidence of Chauke regarding the arrest.
He received a
phone call on the sector phone from Motaung. Motaung indicated he
laid charges of armed robbery and was in
a position to point out
where the suspect was. He questioned Motaung about the robbery,
namely whether he had in fact been
robbed. Motaung confirmed this and
that the suspect was in Mofolo North. Mawelewele corroborated the
version of Chauke that they
arrived at the address, that Motaung
pointed the plaintiff out indicating that the plaintiff robbed him.
They introduced themselves
as police officers. Chauke explained his
rights and informed the plaintiff he was under arrest. They conveyed
the plaintiff to
Moroka police station where he was detained in the
cells. His constitutional rights were read to him and a copy was
given to him.
[12] Mawelewele
testified regarding the conditions in the cells. He recalled that
they were normal and in fair condition. There
were clean blankets,
the food was good, the utensils were clean, and the toilet was clean.
Mawelewele was referred to p.1 of Bundle
E. He confirmed that the
complainant was JM Motaung. He testified that he had no authority to
give police bail to the plaintiff
after the arrest in view of the
seriousness of the offence. The matter was to go to court for the
determination of bail.
[13] When
questioned regarding the purpose of the arrest Mawelewele responded
that he believed it was to bring the suspect to court.
When asked
about the aspects to consider when arresting a person he indicated
that the arrestor had to consider whether a crime
had been committed
or not and to consider the information available or at the arrestor’s
disposal. He testified that he based
his arrest on information that
the suspect committed armed robbery, as informed by Motaung, and the
information contained on the
point out note. He believed the
suspect was unknown to Motaung as indicated in the point out note,
but he believed that Motaung
could point the suspect out. He was not
aware of any statement which indicated that the suspect was known to
Motaung. Mawelewele
explained that he questioned Motaung about the
point out note. When it was put to him that he should have commenced
a preliminary
investigation before effecting the arrest he deferred
this investigation to the investigating officer to investigate
further aspects
of the offence and indicated he was satisfied he had
information to effect an arrest based on the seriousness of the
offence.
[14] When
challenged about having valid grounds to arrest the plaintiff,
Mawelewele expressed the view that the point out note afforded
valid
grounds to effect an arrest. He was asked whether he liaised with the
investigating officer and he explained that the investigating
officer
was not on duty. He agreed that the point out note required him to
liaise with the investigating officer but after the
arrest was
effected. The defence called no further witnesses.
[15] The plaintiff
testified that on 28 April 2014 at about 19h00, the police arrived at
his place, with Motaung. His girlfriend
Kediemetse Oliphant
opened the door. The complainant, Motaung, pointed him out. The
police arrested him and took him to Moroka
police station. He was
detained until his release on 30 April 2014 without appearing in
court. His girlfriend was arrested later
the same day, when she
followed him to the police station to serve a protection order on
Motaung. Upon her arrival at Moroka police
station and while serving
the protection order, Motaung informed Chauke that she was also a
suspect. She was arrested immediately
even though she had been left
behind when the police arrested the plaintiff at his place of
residence when she opened the door.
[16] The plaintiff
testified that his girlfriend was arrested based on the same
allegations in Moroka case number 654/04/14 that
she and the
plaintiff robbed the plaintiff of his cell phone using a firearm.
[17] The plaintiff
described the conditions in the cells as appalling. The sponge he
slept on was full of dust. There were no blankets
for him. He had to
ask a police officer Constable Baloyi for assistance. This officer
took him to the blanket room to fetch a blanket.
The cells had a
terrible odour and smelt like urine. The water was cold, the windows
were broken, and the blankets were dirty and
smelt bad. The food was
of a poor quality. He said he received three slices of dry bread in
the morning and nothing for lunch.
At 16h00 they received pap and
meat. They were not taken to court the next day which was a Tuesday.
He testified that his health
was affected as a result. He could not
explain how the conditions in the cell affected his health and no
expert evidence was led
to prove how his health had deteriorated and
how his period of imprisonment had caused a subsequent deterioration
in his health.
No medical or other reports were tendered
supporting his statements regarding a deterioration in his health
either.
[18] The plaintiff
testified that he believed the reason he was arrested was because the
complainant was proposing love to his girlfriend,
who was Motaung’s
ex-girlfriend. Motaung sought to eliminate him as a competitor in the
affections of Kediemetse Oliphant.
This had led to the false charge
of robbery being laid against him. He testified further that Ms
Oliphant had instituted a civil
claim against the defendant which was
settled for R120 000.00 but despite her claim being on the same
merits for armed robbery
under the same case number Moroka case no
654/04/14 her case was settled and his case was not settled. He
expressed dissatisfaction
at this position.
[19] The plaintiff in his particulars
of claim averred that :
“
3.
On
or about 28
th
of April 2014 at or about 19h00 and at near house number […]
Street, Mofolo North, officers in the employ of the Defendant
wrongfully and maliciously set the law in motion by laying a false
charge of armed robbery with Moroka SAPS.
4……
5.
As a result of the members’ aforesaid conduct, the Plaintiff
was unlawfully arrested without a warrant of arrest on the
28
th
of April 2014 at 19h00 by members of the South African Police on a
charge of armed robbery. ”
[20] In considering
whether the plaintiff’s arrest was unlawful the evidence is
considered in light of
sections 39
and
40
(1)(b) of the
Criminal
Procedure Act 51 of 1977
per
Minister
of Safety and Security and another v Swart
2012(2) SCA 226 where the Court per Bosielo JA held:
“
[19]
It is well established that the onus rests on the arresting officer
to prove the lawfulness of the arrest. This is so because,
as Rabie
CJ stated in
Minister
of Law and Order and Others v Hurley and Another
1986 (3) SA 568
(A) at 589E – F:
'An
arrest constitutes an interference with the liberty of the
individual concerned, and it therefore seems fair and just to
require that the person who arrested or caused the arrest of another
person should bear the
onus
of proving that his action was
justified in law.'
[20]
It is furthermore trite that the reasonableness of the suspicion of
any arresting officer acting under s 40(1)
(b)
must be approached objectively. The question is whether
any reasonable person, confronted with the same set of facts,
would
form a suspicion that a person has committed a sch 1 offence. (
Mvu
v Minister of Safety and Security
2009
(2) SACR 291
(GSJ)
(2009
(6) SA 82).)
[21]
In order to succeed in their defence the defendant is required to
establish certain facts to justify the arrest. In
Duncan
v Minister of Law and Order
1986
(2) SA 805
(A)
the
jurisdictional facts for
a
s 40(1)
(b)
defence
set
out at 818H – J
are that (i) the arrestor must be a peace officer; (ii)
the arrestor must entertain a suspicion; (iii) the suspicion
must be
that the suspect (the arrestee) committed an offence referred to in
Schedule 1; and (iv) the suspicion must rest on reasonable
grounds.
See also
Minister
of Safety and Security v Sekhoto and another
2011(5) SA 367(SCA). Once the aforementioned jurisdictional facts are
present the discretion whether or not to arrest arises. The
police
officer is not obliged to effect an arrest. This was made clear in
relation to section 43 in
Groenewald
v Minister of Justice
1973 (3) SA 877
(A).
[22]
Once the jurisdictional requirements are met the police officer may
exercise a discretion to arrest the person. In
Minister
of Safety and Security v Sekhoto and another
2011(5) SA 367(SCA) Harms DP notes at paragraph [29]
“
[29]
As far as s 40(1)
(b)
is concerned, Van Heerden JA said the following in
Duncan
(at 818H – J):
'If
the jurisdictional requirements are satisfied, the peace officer
may invoke the power conferred by the subsection, i.e.,
he may
arrest the suspect. In other words, he then has a discretion as to
whether or not to exercise that power (cf
Holgate-Mohammed
v Duke
[1984] 1 All ER 1054
(HL) at 1057). No doubt the discretion must be
properly exercised. But the grounds on which the exercise of such a
discretion can
be questioned are narrowly circumscribed…..'”
[23] The
exercise of the discretion would be improper if the police officer
exercised the discretion for an unintended purpose.
If the police
effected the arrest out of malice, to punish a detainee or to deprive
the detainee of his freedom or to influence
the arrestee’s
conduct or another’s conduct, this would amount to an improper
exercise of the discretion. At paragraph
[32] of
Minister of
Safety and Security v Sekhoto and another,
(
above)
Harms
DP refers to three questions to be posed:
“
the
three
Castorina
questions formulated for determining the legality of an arrest
without a warrant by Woolf LJ:
30
(a)
did the arresting officer suspect that the person arrested was guilty
of the offence;
(b)
were there reasonable grounds for that suspicion; and
(c)
did the officer exercise his discretion to make the arrest in
accordance with
Wednesbury
principles?”
Harms DP notes that
two of the three questions are akin to three of the four
jurisdictional facts to be proved by the defence.
Of relevance
is whether the discretion was exercised in accordance
with
the
Wednesbury
principles', which is a reference to the judgment of Greene MR
in
Associated
Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation
[1948] 1 KB 223
(CA) ([1947]
2 All ER 680).
[24] Harms DP
goes on to explain that the Wednesbury principles
are no different
from those formulated by Innes ACJ in
Shidiack v Union
Government
1912 AD 642
where the court there stated:
“
Now
it is settled law that where a matter is left to the discretion or
the determination of a public officer, and where his discretion
has
been
bona
fide
exercised or his judgment
bona
fide
expressed, the Court will not interfere with the result. Not
being a judicial functionary no appeal or review in the ordinary
sense would lie; and if he has duly and honestly applied himself to
the question which has been left to his discretion, it is impossible
for a Court of Law either to make him change his mind or to
substitute its conclusion for his own. . . . There are circumstances
in which interference would be possible and right. If for instance
such an officer had acted
mala
fide
or from ulterior and improper motives, if he had not applied his mind
to the matter or exercised his discretion at all, or if he
had
disregarded the express provisions of a statute — in such cases
the Court might grant relief. But it would be unable
to interfere
with a due and honest exercise of discretion, even if it considered
the decision inequitable or wrong.'
[25]
Harms DP noted however that the above
dictum
of Innes ACJ predates the Bill of Rights and explained that it thus
required reconsideration. The Bill of Rights required
that the
exercise of discretion must also be objectively rational
[1]
.
In
Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association of SA and Another: In re Ex parte President
of the Republic of South Africa and Others
[2000] ZACC 1
;
2000
(2) SA 674
(CC)
Chaskalson
P said the following:
“
'It
is a requirement of the rule of law that the exercise of public power
by the Executive and other functionaries should not be
arbitrary. Decisions must be rationally related to the purpose
for which the power was given, otherwise they are in effect
arbitrary
and inconsistent with this requirement. It follows that in order to
pass constitutional scrutiny the exercise of public
power by the
Executive and other functionaries must, at least, comply with this
requirement. If it does not, it falls short of
the standards demanded
by our Constitution for such action. “
[26]
Once the jurisdictional requirements are met the discretion exercised
in the power to arrest must meet the requirement that
it is
rationally related to the purpose for which the power was given. This
calls for an objective enquiry.
[27]
In
the present matter the police officers were responding to the call of
Motaung, the complainant, who had a point out note.
Motaung
reported he had seen the suspect in his case, an armed robbery
matter. They responded to the call and proceeded to Motaung.
Both
police officers testified that they relied on the authority of the
point out note and Motaung’s pointing out of the
plaintiff and
confirmation that this person had robbed him. The person pointed out
was a suspect in an armed robbery reported at
Moroka police station
under
case
no 654/04/14
.
The question is whether the arrest was objectively justified and
reasonable under the circumstances.
[28]
In considering the conduct of
Chauke
and Mawelewele in light of the jurisdictional requirements it is
clear that both police officers were peace officers. They
testified
that based on the information contained in the point out note they
entertained a suspicion that the plaintiff committed
a serious
offence. The offence of robbery is contained in schedule one. Armed
robbery being a schedule six offence is more serious
an offence.
However the basic requirement being the element of robbery required
of schedule one is met. This suspicion
was based on the
point out note based on a case opened at Moroka police station and
the complainant confirming that he had been
robbed by the plaintiff.
Having regard to the point out note that there was a charge of
robbery and Motaung pointing out
the plaintiff and confirming the
plaintiff had robbed him, it was not unreasonable for the
police officers to arrest the
plaintiff. Mawelewele asked
Motaung if he was sure that the complainant was indeed the person who
robbed him and he confirmed
that it was indeed him. It was thus
reasonable for the police officers to form the objective view that
the complainant was
the suspect in a serious criminal offence and
that he posed a danger and was to be arrested.
[29] Mr Sethunya
appearing for the plaintiff argued that
Section 40
(1) (b) of the
Criminal Procedure Act provides
that an arrest may be justified, only
if the jurisdictional factors have been alleged and proved. He argued
further that where
an offence does not form part of Schedule 1 the
arrest and detention must be regarded as unlawful. In this regard he
relied on
the decision of Kgoele J, a decision of the North West High
Court in
Jan Willem Frederick Kleynhans
v
Minister
of Police and Constable Gift Joseph Merafe Case No 1517/12
(reported
on SAFLII)
.
The
matter before the North West High Court emanated from an arrest
of a student alleged to have been involved in a “hit
and run”
collision. The student was arrested during the initial investigation
and subsequently sued the Minister of Police
and the arresting
officer. The court expressed reservations about the arrest as the
matter was still being investigated and there
appeared to be no need
to effect an arrest to secure the student’s attendance at court
where there were other means of securing
attendance and whilst the
matter was being investigated. The above matter is distinguishable
from the matter
in casu
in
view of the seriousness of the charge
in
casu,
namely robbery as well as the
facts that were at the police officers disposal.
[30] Mr Sethunya
argued in the alternative that the police acted on an unreasonable
suspicion. This test he submitted was an objective
test. He referred
to the test set out in
Lindile Mbotya v
Minister of Police
(unreported) and
Minister of Police v Gadisi
(unreported).
I have already addressed the question of reasonableness and on
the facts
in casu
found it was objectively reasonable for the police officers to
act as they did. The submissions with regard to there being
no
reasonable suspicion as they deferred further investigation to the
investigating officer do not sustain the argument
that
there was no reasonable suspicion.
[31] In
Minister
of Safety and Security v Sekhoto and another,(above)
Harms DP at para [42] states:
“
While
it is clearly established that the power to arrest may be exercised
only for the purpose of bringing the suspect to justice,
the arrest
is only one step in that process. Once an arrest has been effected,
the peace officer must bring the arrestee before
a court as soon as
reasonably possible; and at least within 48 hours, depending on court
hours. Once that has been done, the authority
to detain, that is
inherent in the power to arrest, is exhausted. The authority to
detain the suspect further is then within the
discretion of the
court.”
[32] Once the
plaintiff was brought to court it became evident it seems to the
prosecutor that there were no grounds to detain him
which resulted in
his release. The state had no authority to detain the plaintiff and
had no grounds on which to request a court
to detain the plaintiff
further.
[33] Mr Sethunya
argued that the decision of Baqwa J, which the defence relied on in
argument was distinguishable from the present
matter, on the basis
that the plaintiff was arrested for rape which he argued is a
schedule 1 offence unlike the present matter
which is a schedule 6
offence. Further he argued when the complainant gave her statement
she said she did not know the assailant
but could identify him if she
saw him again, whilst in this matter the suspect was unknown to the
complainant. In
Papa Kgapola v
Minister of Police(
unreported
),
the investigating officer and complainant testified whilst in the
present matter both the investigating officer and complainant
did not
testify despite the investigating officer being available. Mr
Sethunya argued that the court should draw an adverse
inference from
the defendant’s failure to call the investigating officer. He
relied on the unreported decision
Meshack
Malinga v Minister of Police
(unreported). I have indicated earlier that robbery falls
under schedule 1. Thus I regard armed robbery as affording
the police
the necessary jurisdiction to act.
[34] He argued
further that the decision of
Papa
Kgapola v Minister of Police
(unreported)
was not correctly decided by Baqwa J. Mr Sethunya argued that
the Court did not give due consideration to the
origin and legal
status of the point out note and accepted that the arrestor could
consider the point out note separately before
the arrest and
then investigate. This resulted in an arrest being made on the point
out note alone without the docket. This
position he submitted was in
direct conflict with legislation and the test for justification. What
was required was an investigation
of the plaintiff, Papa Kgapola
namely, a preliminary investigation to consider whether the arrest
was necessary.
[35] The plaintiff,
Mr Kgapola was released after the DNA result proved negative. He
argued an investigation before the arrest would
have spared Mr
Kgapola the loss of freedom as a result of the incarceration
and spared him the violation of his right to
freedom, dignity and
security. He argued the end result proved how the point out
note can be abused and be elevated to the
status of a warrant of
arrest as occurred
in casu
.
This does not take into account the further pointing out by Motaung
and the confirmation that he had been robbed by the plaintiff.
I am
satisfied that the jurisdictional requirements were met
in
casu.
The plaintiff has legal remedies
against Motaung if there indeed was no incident between him and
Motaung should he elect to utilise
same.
[36] The facts
which presented before Baqwa J are similar only in respect of the
point out note. The use of the point out
note by police
officers assists in the fight against crime. Police officers
are required to exercise their discretion as
functionaries. This
discretion must meet the criteria that it be rational and
related to the purpose for they exercise such
discretion objectively.
The point out note contains information which directs their attention
or enables them to formulate a decision.
This does not mean that they
do not exercise a discretion or that the 'point out note' replaced
their decision making as suggested
by Mr Sethunya. The charge of
armed robbery on which the plaintiff was arrested is a serious
charge.
[37] A negative inference cannot be
drawn from the investigating officer or complainant not being called
as suggested. This is especially
so where the complainant has not
been joined in the present action. The defendant bore the
burden of proof to show that the
arrest was lawful. It has done so
satisfactorily. The onus thus shifts to the plaintiff.
[38] The plaintiff
failed to prove that the defendant caused the charge to be laid and
set the law into motion. There is no evidence
that indicates Motaung
was employed by the defendant at the time. The police officers
appeared to be acting to support the security
of the complainant who
appeared to be a member of the public. There was evidence that the
plaintiff’s girlfriend had sought
a protection order against
Motaung. The evidence suggests that the plaintiff at some point
approached Motaung and requested that
he leave the plaintiff and Ms.
Oliphant alone. Mr Sethunya consistently submitted that the
issues were the same. This is
not the basis on which the plaintiff
can prove its case. It also ignores that the facts presented to the
State were possibly that
Ms Oliphant was the plaintiff and known
to Motaung. She could not have been the unknown suspect
referred to by Motaung.
The serving of the protection order ought to
have alerted the police to Motaung’s possible nefarious motive
in requesting
Oliphant’s arrest. The facts are clearly
distinguishable. This possibly accounts for the different
approach by
the State rather than suggestions of professional bias.
[39] Having considered all the facts
and the submissions made by counsel in the matter I am of the view
that the police acted reasonably
in the circumstances in terms of
section 39
and
section 40
of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
.
ORDER
[40] In view of the above the
following order is made:
1.
The
plaintiffs claim is dismissed with costs.
_________________________________________________
S C MIA
ACTING JUDGE OF THE
HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
Appearances:
On behalf of the applicant
:
Adv.
M.J. Sethunya
Instructed by
:
T.S. Thantsha
Attorneys
On behalf of the respondent
:
Adv. H
Kajee
Instructed
by
: The State Attorney
Date of
hearing
: 24 – 26 May
2017
Date of judgment
:
24 August 2017
[1]
This was
held by Chaskalson P. in
Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association of SA and Another: In re Ex parte President
of the Republic of South Africa and Others
[2000] ZACC 1
;
2000
(2) SA 674
(CC)
.