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[2017] ZAGPJHC 341
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Malesela Taihan Electric Cable (Pty) Ltd v Fidelity Security Services (Pty) Ltd (17193/2014) [2017] ZAGPJHC 341 (18 April 2017)
HIGH
COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Case
No:
17193/2014
Reportable
Of
interest to other judges
Revised.
In
the matter between:
MALESELA
TAIHAN ELECTRIC CABLE (PTY)
LTD
Plaintiff
and
FIDELITY
SECURITY SERVICES (PTY)
LTD
Defendant
Case
Summary
: Contract –
Specific performance - of obligation arising from contract for
provision of security services, to reimburse
loss due to theft where
gross negligence or involvement of security guards in theft can be
proven as cause of theft – security
guards proven to have been
complicit in and cause of theft of copper coils at manufacturer’s
premises.
Quantum
of loss due to theft determined with reference to primary source
documents in the form of stock sheets, waybills and test
certificates.
Exemption
or limitation of liability clause – security service provider
seeks to avoid liability in excess of limitation provided
for in
limitation clause – contract containing provision purporting to
exempt or limit security service provider’s
liability also in
respect of malicious, intentional, fraudulent, reckless or grossly
negligent acts of itself or of its security
guards expressly
prohibited by sub-regulation 9(3)(d) of Code of Conduct for Security
Service Providers read with s 28(2) of the
Private Security Industry
Regulation Act 56 of 2001 – limitation clause in contract
partially illegal – legislative
intent is to visit limitation
clause with nullity to the extent that it purports to limit security
provider’s liability for
the intentional or grossly negligent
acts of its security guards - limitation clause to that extent also
contrary to public policy
and unenforceable – illegal portion
severable from rest of contract.
Claim
for reimbursement of total extent of loss due to theft granted.
JUDGMENT
MEYER
J
[1]
The plaintiff, Malasela Taihan Electric Cable (Pty) Ltd (M-TEC), a
local cable and wire manufacturer, instituted an action against
the
defendant, Fidelity Security Services (Pty) Ltd (Fidelity), a
security services provider and registered in terms of the Private
Security Industry Regulation Act 56 of 2001, claiming the loss due to
theft of copper raw material from its premises during the
evening on
Sunday, 3 February 2013.
[2]
M-TEC’s claim is based on clause 9 of the contract that
Fidelity had concluded with it on 19 September 2012, for the
provision of security services at its premises (the contract), which
contractual provision reads thus:
‘
In
the event of any loss to M-TEC due to theft, either where gross
negligence or involvement on the part of any of the Supplier’s
[Fidelity’s] employees can be proven as being the cause of such
theft, the Supplier undertakes to reimburse M-TEC to the
full extent
of such loss….’
.
[3]
In terms of clause 9, M-TEC is also entitled to be compensated for
its loss due to negligence on the part of Fidelity’s
employees,
but then the contractually agreed limitation of liability on the part
of Fidelity in the sum of R 2 million per event
may find application,
a matter I need not decide. At a judicial pre-trial conference
held between the parties on 27-28 October
2015 before Wright J,
Fidelity admitted negligence on the part of its employees and, during
the course of the trial, also gross
negligence on their part.
[4]
In its plea Fidelity denied M-TEC’s averment that it was a term
of the contract that Fidelity should take all reasonable
steps to
prevent access to M-TEC’s premises of unauthorised persons and
prevent theft of material and/or equipment from its
premises.
But the purpose of the contract for the provision of security
services was to prevent loss to M-TEC,
inter
alia
, by means of theft. This
term is implied by law. Sub-regulation 8(3) of the Code of
Conduct for Security Service Providers
(the code of conduct), which
the Minister for Safety and Security prescribed, acting under
s 8 (1) Private Security Industry Regulation Act 56 of 2001 (the Act)
and published in Government Gazette 2491 of 28 February 2003 (GN
305
) provides that:
‘
Every
security service provider must endeavour to prevent crime,
effectively protect persons and property and refrain from conducting
him or herself in a manner which will or may in any manner whatsoever
further or encourage the commission of an offence or which
may
unlawfully endanger the safety or security of any person or
property.’
This
provision is binding on all security services providers by virtue of
s 28(2) of the Act, which provides that-
‘
[t]he
code of conduct is legally binding on all security service providers,
irrespective of whether they are registered with the
Authority or
not...’.
[5]
It is also in issue whether M-TEC’s ‘Security Procedures
Manual’ formed part of the contract as M-TEC contends.
Incorporated into the contract is ‘THE ATTACHED INSTRUCTIONS TO
CONTRACTORS ON COMPANY PREMISES’. M-Tec’s
security
procedures include M-TEC site specific procedures, such as: signing
in and out requirements in the security office
at the main gate
giving access to M-TEC’s premises, of each visitor entering or
leaving the premises, and for visitors to
be received by an M-TEC
employee; searching requirements of all vehicles entering and
exiting the premises; weighing in and
out requirements of all trucks
delivering raw materials or collecting manufactured goods at the
weighbridge where they are weighed
before raw materials are delivered
or manufactured products loaded and again before they leave the
premises. Fidelity, on
the other hand, contends that another
document, Fidelity ‘Site Instructions’, constituted the
site instructions part
of the contract and not the M-TEC Security
Procedures Manual.
[6]
The evidence of M-TEC’s present head of security,
Mr Dave Pretorius, and its head of security at the time, Mr
Danie Bosman, that the security guards who rendered security services
at M-TEC’s premises in terms of the contract, were
trained in
and operated in accordance with the M-TEC’s Security Procedures
Manual, and that these procedures were placed
on the site file, which
was kept in the security office to which the security guards had
access, has not been refuted by Fidelity.
This evidence
supports the conclusion that it was the M-TEC’s Security
Procedures Manual that was incorporated into the contract.
Furthermore, the Fidelity Site Instructions are not site-specific to
M-TEC’s premises. However, it is unnecessary for
me to
definitively decide this issue in the light of Fidelity’s
admission of negligence, and indeed of gross negligence,
on the part
of its security guards and the view I take of the actions of the
Fidelity guards on the occasion of the theft.
[7]
It is M-TEC’s case that Fidelity’s security guards not
only acted grossly negligently, but that they were involved
in and
indeed facilitated the theft, and that Fidelity was accordingly
liable to reimburse it to the full extent of the loss it
had suffered
due to the theft. Although Fidelity persisted in denying the
involvement of its security guards in the theft,
it hardly challenged
M-TEC’s witnesses who testified on the question of Fidelity’s
liability
vis-à-vis
M-TEC and it did not call any
witnesses to rebut M-TEC’s evidence on the question. It,
therefore, is not necessary to
refer in any detail to the evidence
presented on behalf of M-TEC on this question.
[8]
On Sunday evening, 3 February 2013, Fidelity’s security guard
on duty in the security office, was Ms Eunice Nakedi.
Fidelity’s security guards, Messrs Njabulo Oliphant and Doctor
Matsiqui, were also on duty at M-TEC’s premises.
M-TEC
presented real evidence in the form of Closed Circuit Television
camera footage (the CCTV footage) that was taken during
the
occurrence of the theft at its premises by cameras positioned inside
the security office (the inside camera), outside the security
office
(the outside camera), on the fibre optic cable building, which
building is to the left of the main road that runs from the
main gate
inside M-TEC’s premises (the fibre optic camera).
[9]
The CCTV footage taken from the outside and the fibre optic cameras
show two eight-ton trucks without loads entering M-TEC’s
premises at approximately 18:30; the first one is a flatbed (without
panels) with a folded green canvass on it (the first truck)
and the
second one a white panelled truck (the second truck). The CCTV
footage taken from the inside office between 18h28
and 18h30 shows
four men entering the security office with hats pulled over their
faces, probably to conceal them from the camera.
Ms Nakedi
is seen interacting with them briefly and positioning her back to the
camera, probably to obscure the filling in
and signing process of the
visitor’s slips in the visitor’s book. Only two of
the men sign the visitor’s
book, or rather pretend to sign it.
Ms Nakedi also did not turn the visitor’s book around and
towards them in order
for them to fill in the visitors slips.
They left the security office when an M-TEC employee, Mr Botha,
entered the security
office. The same CCTV footage also shows
Ms Nakedi and Mr Oliphant frequently taking out their cell
phones. Mr
Oliphant is seen on his cell phone shortly before
the arrival of the culprits and Ms Nakedi is seen rushing to her cell
phone after
the entry and exit from the control room of Mr Botha.
[10]
An examination of the visitor’s book reveals that there are no
entries whatsoever around the time when the four culprits
entered
M-TEC’s premises (notwithstanding the security procedure
followed at M-TEC’s premises that each visitor must
complete
and sign a visitor’s slip). The ineluctable inference,
therefore, is that the entire signing process of the
visitors book
was a deliberate sham.
[11]
CCTV footage taken from the outside and fibre optic cameras show both
trucks driving down the main road inside M-TEC’s
premises in
the direction of the copper factory, which is beyond the weighbridge
and to the right of the main road, without stopping
at the
weighbridge (notwithstanding the security procedure followed at
M-TEC’s premises that all trucks must be weighed at
the
weighbridge when they enter M-TEC’s premises, and, if it is
outside business hours, as was the case when the two trucks
entered,
for the security guards to ensure that the trucks wait until the
weighbridge opens before allowing them entry or exit).
[12]
The copper factory is where M-TEC manufactures products for its
clients from copper raw materials – copper rod –
purchased locally and abroad. It purchases 7.9 mm copper rod
from Phalaborwa Mining Company, 7.9 mm copper rod from Zamefa
mine in
Zambia and 8 mm copper rod from Daewoo in Russia. It also uses
what is called ‘odd sizes’ - 10mm, 13
mm and 20 mm -
copper rod in its manufacturing processes. M-TEC receives the
copper rod from its suppliers wound up in coils,
each weighing
between 3.5 to 4.8 tons. The 8mm copper coils from Daewoo in
Russia are wrapped in clear plastic (the Daewoo
copper coils), the
7.9mm copper coils from Zamefa in Zambia are wrapped in plastic in
the same way as the Daewoo coils, except
that the plastic wrapping of
the Zamefa coils is black in colour (the Zamefa copper coils)
and the 7.9mm copper coils from
Phalaborwa Mining Company are not
wrapped in plastic, clear or otherwise, and the copper rod is held
together with vertical metal
straps with a thin band of cardboard
between the metal straps (the Phalaborwa copper coils). The
copper coils are off-loaded
in a designated area outside the copper
factory and then moved into a designated area inside the copper
factory with fork-lifts.
Due to their weight, it is only with
the use of forklifts that copper coils can be lifted and moved.
[13]
Mr Botha has been a die maker at M-TEC since 1980. Dies are
used in the manufacturing process of reducing the copper
rods into
wiring cable. Mr Botha testified that he had been called out to
M-TEC’s premises on the evening of 3 February
2013 to supply
the aluminium division with dies. CCTV footage taken from the
inside camera shows Mr Botha entering the security
office at about
19:21 and leaving it at 19:35. He testified that after he had
left the security office he first went to the
aluminium factory and
then to the copper factory to fetch the dies. The ‘die
shop’ is located inside the copper
factory. Before
entering the copper factory, he noticed the security guard, Mr
Oliphant, running up the main road from the
security office into his
direction. Mr Oliphant then accompanied Mr Botha into the
copper factory, and then proceeding to
push him with his shoulder in
an attempt, so Mr Botha perceived his actions, to steer him away from
the route he was walking on
his way to the die shop. Mr Botha
saw an eight-ton flatbed truck parked inside the copper factory.
There were two men
standing on either side on top of the flatbed of
the truck, busy covering three copper coils. Mr Botha testified
that the
three copper coils he had seen on top of the flatbed of the
truck were not wrapped in plastic, but were bare copper. Mr
Botha
enquired from Mr Oliphant what the truck was doing in the
copper factory. He responded that it was a ‘delivery’.
[14]
Mr Botha went into the die shop and while he was busy in there, Mr
Oliphant waited outside the door, but he left before Mr
Botha was
finished. On his way out of the copper factory, Mr Botha
noticed that the eight-ton flatbed truck was still inside
the copper
factory, but then with the copper coils on the back completely
covered with the green canvass. One of the men
sat on the
driver’s seat with his head on his arms on the steering wheel.
Mr Botha took a photograph of the truck,
which was admitted into
evidence. The photograph shows a flatbed truck from behind with
a load on it covered and wrapped
in green canvass and straps hanging
off the side, not yet fastened (Mr Botha’s photograph).
[15]
Before he left M-TEC’s premises, Mr Botha had returned to the
security office to book himself out. He also asked
Ms Nakedi
what the truck was doing inside the copper factory, and she twice
responded that it was ‘a copper delivery’.
CCTV
footage taken from the inside camera shows Mr Botha leaving the
security office at about 19.50. Ms Nakedi then took
out her
cell phone and walked into an adjacent office.
[16]
The same truck as the one depicted in Mr Botha’s photograph is
seen leaving M-TEC’s premises at 20h00 on the CCTV
footage
taken from both the fibre optic and outside cameras, but with the
straps now tightened. The only reasonable inference
that can be
drawn, therefore, is that the truck which Mr Botha had seen inside
the copper factory was indeed the first truck, which
on the CCTV
footage is seen entering M-TEC’s premises at 18.30 and leaving
it at 20.00.
[17]
The second truck, which is seen entering M-TEC’s premises at
18.30 without a load, is seen on the CCTV footage heading
to the main
gate from the direction of the copper plant and leaving M-TEC’s
premises at 20:46, 45 minutes after the first
one had left, also with
a load that was covered with a canvass. CCTV footage taken from
the fibre optic outside cameras shows
how the security guards allowed
both trucks to proceed out of the gate, without being weighed on the
weighbridge and without the
men entering the security office to
return their visitor’s slips (the normal security procedures
followed at M-TEC).
[18]
A delivery by trucks arrived shortly before midnight and M-TEC’s
security procedures was then properly followed.
The CCTV
footage shows that the trucks loaded with copper were permitted to
park just on the inside of the main gate and the drivers
duly signed
in as is reflected in the visitor’s book. The trucks had
to wait until the weighbridge was opened the next
morning at 07:00.
This further supports the evidence of Mr Bosman that the three
security guards on duty that evening knew M-TEC’s
security
procedures, but did not follow them in the case of the two trucks
which entered M-TEC’s premises that evening without
loads and
left with loads.
[19]
Ms Nakedi was interviewed by Mr Bosman and Mr Coetzee in the week
following the event. She denied any knowledge of any
persons
entering M-TEC’s premises during that Sunday evening. But
she broke out in tears and refused to answer any
further question
after she had been shown the CCTV footage. Mr Matshiqui was
also interviewed. He too initially denied
that the two trucks
entered M-TEC’s premises that evening, but thereafter stated
that he recalled one truck with one coil.
Mr Oliphant failed to
return to work since the theft.
[20]
Having watched the CCTV footage showing the involvement of the three
security guards, Fidelity’s Mr Sarel Coetzee, who
managed the
contract on its behalf, requested M-TEC’s Mr Danie Bosman to
testify at the disciplinary proceedings of the three
security guards.
On that occasion, he led Mr Bosman in evidence, using the same
CCTV footage shown at this trial, to establish
charges of breach of
procedures, gross negligence and involvement in the theft on their
part. They were dismissed upon conclusion
of the disciplinary
enquiry; Messrs Oliphant and Matsiqui on 25 April 2013 and Ms Nakedi
on 3 May 2013.
[21]
M-TEC has proven that Fidelity’s three security guards were
complicit in the theft. They acted in concert with
the four men
and allowed them to steal the copper coils. Had
they not permitted the two trucks to enter, not
facilitated their
entry into the copper factory and their exit out of the main gate
loaded with copper coils, M-TEC probably would
not have suffered any
loss. A simple refusal to allow them entry would probably have
been sufficient to prevent the theft.
Their breach of M-TEC’s
security procedures - ranging from the failure to require the men to
properly sign in, to ensure
that an M-TEC employee received them on
M-TEC’s premises, to search the trucks, to insist that the
trucks wait until the
weighbridge opened the next day prior to
entering or exiting the premises - compels the conclusion that their
actions caused the
theft. Their gross negligence and deliberate
involvement facilitated and made possible the theft and Fidelity, in
terms of
clause 9 of the contract, is thus liable ‘to the full
extent’ of any loss to M-TEC due to the theft.
[22]
Mr Botha’s evidence and the CCTV footage establish that three
coils were conveyed on the first truck and that they were
7.9 mm
Phalaborwa copper coils. Under cross-examination Mr Botha
conceded that it was difficult to, at a glance, distinguish
between
an 8 mm copper rod and a 7.9 mm one, but he remained confident in his
ability to easily distinguish between 7.9 mm, 13
mm and 20 mm copper
rods. The three copper coils which he had seen on the first
truck were not wrapped in plastic and they
accordingly originated
from the Phalaborwa Mining Company, which company does not supply
M-TEC with 8 mm, but 7.9 mm copper rods.
[23]
Mr Botha testified that he did not hear the operation of a forklift
during the time that he had spent in the copper factory
on the
evening in question. The forklifts used by M-TEC are noisy;
they have loud diesel engines and a warning ‘beep’
when
reversing. Had the copper coils been off-loaded from the
first truck after Mr Botha had seen them on his way to
the die shop
and before he again had seen the truck’s load covered on his
way out, he would have heard the noise of a forklift.
It is
also improbable that the men would have loaded three Phalaborwa
copper coils onto the first truck, just to off-load
them again, and
then to load copper coils from another manufacturer onto the truck
after Mr Botha had seen them uncovered and before
he had seen the
first truck’s load covered.
[24]
The CCTV footage taken from the fibre optic and outside cameras show
the first truck leaving M-TEC’s premises at 20:00.
It
travelled from the direction of the copper factory, straight past the
weighbridge and into the direction of the main gate.
Three
large cylindrical shapes can be seen underneath the canvass, which
are held down with three straps, one across each
large cylindrical
shape. M-TEC’s manager of the copper division, Mr Jansen
Booysen, testified that (although it might
be difficult for a lay
person) a person working at the copper factory on a daily basis for
many years like himself, is easily able
to identify the three shapes
underneath the canvass on CCTV footage as copper coils. He
pointed out the indentation in the
canvass in the hollow centre of
each coil. The inevitable conclusion, therefore, is that the
coils on the first truck were
three 7.9 mm Phalaborwa copper coils.
[25]
The next question is what was then conveyed on the second truck,
which, on the CCTV footage, is seen entering M-TEC’s
premises
at 18:30 and leaving it at 20:46. It is seen driving from the
direction of the copper factory, without its headlights
on, passing
the weighbridge without stopping, and, when it passes close to the
outside camera, three large cylindrical shapes,
resembling what is
seen on the first truck, can be seen underneath a black canvass.
The three large cylindrical shapes take
up the whole of the rear of
the truck. It is improbable that the items on the back of the
second truck would have been aluminium
coils which, from the
photographs admitted into evidence, are a lot smaller. The
aluminium coils are narrower and taller.
Photograph A1 in the D
series shows that it is possible to place two aluminium coils side by
side on a flatbed and almost two side
by side on a panelled eight-ton
truck. Furthermore, photographs A3 and A4 in the D series
show that when three aluminium
coils are lined up on the back of an
eight-ton truck the coil closest to the rear of the truck only
reaches the beginning of the
rear wheel axle. There is space
for almost two more aluminium coils. The situation is different
with copper coils.
Mr Booysen loaded a panelled eight-ton truck
with three copper coils. They filled the rear of the truck in
much the
same way as is shown on the CCTV footage in respect of
both trucks.
[26]
When the CCTV footage taken from the outside camera of the second
truck leaving M-TEC’s premises is viewed, it is evident,
according to Mr Bosman and Mr Booysen, that there are three copper
coil-like shapes beneath the black canvass that covers them.
Furthermore, Mr Bosman testified that, in his experience, only copper
was ever stolen from M-TEC’s premises, and never aluminium
or
fibre optic cables. Aluminium is not as valuable as copper and
fibre optic cables are not valuable at all. In my
view, it is
therefore safe to accept that the men who entered M-TEC’s
premises on the evening in question, were there to
unlawfully enrich
themselves with copper and that they loaded three copper coils onto
each eight-ton truck.
[27]
Mr Booysen identified two of the copper coils stolen as Zamefa copper
coils. He testified that a load of Zamefa copper
coils had been
delivered at the copper factory on 28 January 2013. They
were placed in a straight line on the floor
inside the copper
factory, just outside the raw materials store. He described the
raw materials store as an area inside the
copper factory, which is
cordoned off with palisade fencing. The raw materials store has
two gates, one used for what he
called ‘the odd sizes’
(10 mm, 13 mm and 20 mm copper rod) and the other one for the 7.9 and
8 mm copper rods.
Mr Booysen testified that when he had left
M-TEC’s premises on Friday 1 February 2013, there were eight
Zamefa copper coils
on the floor. When he had been made aware
of the incident and possible copper theft on his return to work the
next week,
he inspected the raw materials store and immediately
noticed that two Zamefa copper coils – the first two in the
line of
eight Zamefa copper coils - were missing. The two
Zamefa copper coils were wrapped in black plastic and did not leave
M-TEC’s
premises on the first truck. They, therefore,
probably left M-TEC’s premises on the second truck. There
were
no further Zamefa copper coils reported or seen to be missing,
which means that the third copper coil on the second truck probably
was a Phalaborwa copper coil or a Daewoo copper coil.
[28]
Mr Booysen’s investigation shows that the third coil on the
second truck was probably also a Phalaborwa copper coil and
he
identified the exact four Phalaborwa copper coils that were probably
loaded onto the two trucks and driven out of M-TEC’s
premises
during the evening on 3 February 2013. He had reference to the
copper division’s stock sheets that were compiled
during the
November 2012 quarterly stock count (the November 2012 stock sheets),
the waybills of all copper raw materials delivered
to M-TEC’s
premises from the November 2012 stock count until the next stock
count that was done a few days after the incident,
on 8 February 2013
(the waybills), the stock sheets that were compiled during the stock
count on 8 February 2013 (the February
2013 stock sheets) and test
certificates that were issued by M-TEC to its customers in respect of
each product it manufactured,
for the period from the November 2012
stock count until beyond the date of the February 2013 stock count
(the test certificates).
[29]
By way of interpolation, it is necessary to refer to the evidence
relating to these source documents, their accuracy and reliability.
Mr Booysen testified that the November 2012 and February 2013 stock
sheets were reliable due to the meticulous way in which the
physical
stock counts are conducted quarterly and the verification by himself
of each entry made on the November 2012 and February
2013 stock
sheets. He was personally involved in the November 2012 stock
count. The copper coils were each listed on
a stock sheet, by
size and weight. The net weight of each copper coil, which was
entered onto the stock sheet by a planner,
was obtained from a tag
attached to each copper coil when it was manufactured, which also
contains further identification information
in the form of a ‘run’
and a ‘coil’ number and the date of production at the
mine. During the
two stock counts, Mr Booysen personally
verified all the net weights entered onto the stock sheets, item by
item, in the presence
of the planner who entered the information onto
the stock sheets. The stock sheets show which copper coils were
physically
in stock as at the November 2012 and February 2013 stock
takes.
[30]
Fidelity called Ms Barrett, an audit clerk, and Mr de Vos, a
chartered accountant, as its witnesses on the question of the
quantum
of M-TEC’s loss due to the theft. Ms Barrett is employed
by Mr de Vos, whom Fidelity called as an expert witness.
Ms
Barrett conceded that both stock counts were reliable. In the
summary of his expert evidence, Mr de Vos expressed the
opinion that
the 8 February 2013 stock count was accurate and reliable. But
when he testified, he expressed a reservation
about its reliability,
because the stock sheets only reflect the net weights of the copper
coils, and not also their run and coil
numbers. The
evidence, however, establishes that the absence of run and coil
numbers on the stock sheets did
not in any way detract from the
accuracy and reliability of the two stock counts and is not material
to the determination of the
quantum of M-TEC’s loss.
[31]
I have already mentioned that all trucks delivering raw materials or
collecting manufactured goods are required to be weighed
at the
weighbridge before raw materials are delivered or manufactured
products loaded and again before they leave M-TEC’s
premises.
Most of the waybills had a security stamp, and a date and time of
entry, and, those without such security stamp,
were confirmed by
delivery notes containing security stamps. Ms Barrett agreed
that a delivery note or waybill containing
a security stamp is a
reliable primary source document to indicate the movement of goods.
The waybills show the actual entry
of each copper coil onto M-TEC’s
premises during the period between the two stock counts.
[32]
A test certificate is a certificate of quality issued by M-TEC to its
customers with every despatch of manufactured goods (electrical
wires
and the like). The goods manufactured by M-TEC are required to
comply with SABS standards and other client-specific
specifications.
M-TEC, thus, provides its clients with a quality traceability
certificate for each manufactured product.
The certificate of
quality contains information relating to the manufactured product,
including its physical and electrical capabilities,
which is tested
in the laboratory during production by sample. At the same
time, the laboratory keeps a record of which manufactured
product
originated from which raw copper rod. M-TEC’s supervising
laboratory technician, Mr Anton Miller, who prepared
all the test
certificates during the relevant period, testified that when a copper
coil is taken from the raw materials store onto
the production floor,
the identity of the copper coil (run and coil numbers) is copied onto
‘a buff tag’ by the testers,
who were supervised by him.
His duties included ensuring the accuracy of the recordal of the run
and coil numbers from the
tag on the coil onto the buff tag.
The run and coil numbers of the raw materials from which the finished
products had been
manufactured, were recorded onto each test
certificate. Mr Booysen testified that this was done for
quality and traceability
purposes so that, in the event of a fault or
problem with a finished product, it could be traced back to the
original copper coil
from which the finished product was manufactured
and to its supplier. The test certificates, therefore, show
which of the
copper coils had been used in production during that
period.
[33]
Ms Barrett conceded that Mr Booysen’s determination of which
copper coils in stock had been used in production during
the relevant
period, was correct. It, however, transpired during further
cross-examination that she did not have reference
to the test
certificates. But, on the assumption that the test certificates
reliably recorded each copper coil that went
into production, she
conceded the correctness of Mr Booysen’s methodology in
ascertaining which copper coils had been used
in production.
Furthermore, Mr de Vos conceded that the test certificates were
reliable primary documents to determine stock
movement.
[34]
The November 2012 stock sheets (M-TEC’s copper coil stock on
hand as at the date of that stock count) plus the waybills
(all
incoming copper coils from the November 2012 until the February 2013
stock counts) show all the copper coils which M-TEC had
in stock and
further acquired as at 8 February 2013. The test certificates
show which of those copper coils were used in
production and the
February 2013 stock sheets show which of those copper coils were
still in stock as at 8 February 2013.
The copper coils, which
in terms of the waybills were delivered to M-TEC from the Nov 2012
until the February 2013 stock counts,
but not used in production in
terms of the test certificates and not in stock in terms of the
February 2013 stock sheets, according
to Mr Booysen, were missing,
not on M-TEC’s premises, and could only have been stolen.
They are, according to his determination,
three Daewoo copper coils
and 22 Phalaborwa copper coils.
[35]
Mr Booysen testified that when a copper coil is retrieved from the
raw materials store, it is always the last coil in that
is retrieved
and put into production first – last in, first out. This
is because of the limited space in the raw materials
store, the size
and weight of the copper coils and the impossibility of moving them
except with a forklift. When copper coils
are delivered, they
are stacked in the raw materials store in front of the copper coils
that have already been stacked there.
They are used first,
because of the impossibility of a forklift reaching the copper coils
that have been stacked behind them.
[36]
Mr Booysen identified that, of the missing copper coils, the last
four which had entered M-TEC’s premises, were delivered
on 22
and 23 January 2013. The total weight of these four coils,
together with the weight of the two missing Zamefa
copper coils, add
up to 25 767 kilograms or 25.767 tonnes. There were, according
to Mr Booysen, no incidents or reports of
theft of copper at M-TEC
during the two weeks preceding the weekend of 3 February 2013.
Also, Mr Danie Bosman, who reviewed
the CCTV footage, testified that
no further incident could be found during that period.
[37]
When she testified, Ms Barrett pointed out several inconsistencies
relating to stock movement and shortages between various
Excel
spreadsheets prepared by M-TEC’s costing division. She
also demonstrated variances between Excel spreadsheets
prepared by
the M-TEC’s costing division and the copper division’s
physical stock counts at the end of November 2012
and on 8 February
2013. She, however, conceded under cross-examination that
the accounting schedules and spreadsheets
analysed by her, may or may
not be correct depending on the extent to which they accorded with
the underlying reality. Ms Barrett
agreed that it was necessary for
accountants to verify accounting records with primary or source
documents and physical stock counts.
She agreed that accounting
records are wrong to the extent that they are not in line with
physical stock counts and source documents.
Ms Barrett conceded
that Mr Booysen’s determination of the missing stock from
M-TEC’s premises, is reliable.
Mr de Vos’ evidence
also identified inaccuracies and inconsistencies in the accounting
records of M-TEC, but took the matter
no further for Fidelity.
He did not undertake the actual stock counts, nor did he analyse the
waybills and test certificates.
[38]
Mr Booysen’s identification of the six copper coils that M-TEC
probably lost due to the theft at its premises on Sunday
evening, 3
February 2013, and his determination of M-TEC’s total net
weight copper loss must, in my view, be accepted.
His
determination has not in any way been refuted by the evidence
presented on behalf of Fidelity, is logical and accords with
the
probabilities. M-TEC has proved, on a balance or probabilities,
that the two Zamefa copper coils and the four Phalaborwa
copper coils
with a total net weight of 25.767 tonnes as identified by Mr Booysen,
are the six copper coils that were stolen from
M-TEC’s premises
on that evening.
[39]
M-TEC is claiming specific performance from Fidelity of its
obligation arising from clause 9 of the contract to reimburse its
loss due to the theft. Clause 9 thus affords M-TEC the right to
recover from Fidelity the loss which it has sustained because
of the theft, in other words, the amount by which its patrimony has
been diminished due to the theft should be restored to it.
The
quantum of its loss, therefore, is to be determined with reference to
the value of the 25.767 tons of raw copper rod on the
date of the
loss. The parties agreed that the reasonable market value of
the copper coil was R74,849.18 per ton (excl VAT)
on 3 February
2013. The multiplication of this amount by 25.767 tons, plus
VAT, amounts to R 2,198,648.25.
[40]
Relying on the further provision in clause 9 of the contract, which
stipulates that-
‘
[t]he
Supplier’s liability shall always and in all instances be
limited to and not exceed an amount of R2 000 000.00 (two
million
rand) per event and always subject to an aggregate for any period of
12 months commencing on the commencement date, of
R2 000 000.00 (two
million rand)’
,
Fidelity
seeks to avoid liability
vis-à-vis
M-TEC in excess of the R2 million
aggregate limitation (the limitation clause). M-TEC, on the
other hand, argues that the
limitation clause is invalid to the
extent that it limits or purports to limit Fidelity’s liability
for the intentional or
grossly negligent acts of its security guards
by virtue of the provisions of s 28 of the Act and sub-regulation
9(3)(d) of the code of conduct, which sub-regulation provides
that-
‘
[a]
security service
provider may not . . . make a contractual offer to or conclude a
contract with a client containing any term, condition
or provision
that . . . excludes, limits or purports to exclude or limit the legal
liability of the security service provider towards
the client in
respect of any malicious, intentional, fraudulent, reckless or
grossly negligent act of the security service provider,
his or her
security officers or other personnel, or any other person used by the
security service provider or recommended by him
or her to the
client’
,
or,
so it further argues, the limitation clause is to that extent
contrary to public policy and thus unenforceable
.
[41]
The prohibition contained in sub-regulation 9(3)(d) of the code of
conduct is by virtue of s 28(2) of the Act statutorily binding
on all
security service providers, including Fidelity. A contract
containing such an exemption or limitation of liability
provision is
expressly prohibited. The limitation clause in the contract
which Fidelity concluded with M-TEC violates the
provisions of
sub-regulation 9(3)(d) to the extent that it purports to limit
Fidelity’s liability towards M-TEC in respect
of malicious,
intentional, fraudulent, reckless or grossly negligent acts of itself
or of its security guards, and, therefore,
is partially illegal.
However, the Act or the code of conduct is silent on the question
what effect such a contravention
will have on the validity of the
contract or of the limitation clause.
[42]
There are many statutes which expressly provide that certain
contracts are void, such as the
Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981
,
but there are also many which do not contain such express statement.
A thing done contrary to the direct prohibition of
the law is
generally void and of no effect; the mere prohibition nullifies the
act. (See
Schierhout v Minister of Justice
1926 AD 99
at
109.) But, as was said by Boshoff JA in
Metro Western Cape
(Pty) Ltd v Ross
1986 (3) SA 181
(A) at 188G,
‘
.
. . this rule is not inflexible or inexorable. Although a
contract is in violation of a statute it will not be declared
void
unless such was the intention of the Legislature and this is
nonetheless the rule in the case of a contract in violation of
a
statute which imposes a criminal sanction. The legislative
intent not to render void a contract may be inferred from general
rules of interpretation. Each case must be dealt with in the
light of its own language, scope and object and the consequences
in
relation to justice and convenience of adopting one view rather than
the other. In the case of
Standard
Bank v Estate Van Rhyn
1925
AD 266
SOLOMON JA at 274 stated the position as follows:
“
what
we have to get at is the intention of the Legislature, and, if we are
satisfied in any case that the Legislature did not intend
to render
the act invalid, we should not be justified in holding that it was.
As
Voet
(1.3.16)
puts it – ‘but that which is done contrary to law is not
ipso jure
null
and void, where the law is content with a penalty laid down against
those who contravene it’. Then after giving some
instances in
illustration of this principle, he proceeds: ‘The reason
of all this I take to be that in these and the
like cases greater
inconveniences and impropriety would result from the rescission of
what was done, than would follow of the act
itself done contrary to
the law.’”
See
also
Swart v Smuts
1971 (1) SA 819
(A) at 829C and
Dhlamini
en ‘n Ander v Protea Assurance Co Ltd
1974
(4) SA 906
(A) at 913H-914C.’
[43]
The relevant legislative instruments must be interpreted in
accordance with the established principles of interpretation (see
Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality
2012
(4) SA 593
(SCA) para 18;
Bothma-Batho Transport (Edms) Bpk v S
Bothma & Seun Transport (Edms) Bpk
2014 (2) SA 494
(SCA) para
12). Section 39(2) of the Constitution also enjoins a court to
‘promote the spirit, purport and objects
of the Bill of Rights’
when interpreting any legislation.
[44]
In
Wille’s Principles of South African Law
9
th
Ed Francois du Bois et al, at 761, the learned authors refer to the
following factors which the courts have considered relevant
in
ascertaining the legislative intent not to render void a contract:
‘
The
legislative intent not to render void a contract may be inferred from
general rules of statutory interpretation. In this
regard, the
courts have considered the following factors to be relevant:
the subject matter of the prohibition; its purpose
in the context of
the legislation; the remedies, if any, provided in the event of a
breach of the prohibition; the nature of the
mischief which the
prohibition was designed to remedy or avoid; and any cognizable
impropriety or inconvenience that might flow
from a finding of
invalidity. Where the purpose of the prohibition is merely to
protect the Revenue, the inclination will
be to uphold the validity
of the contract; so too where ‘greater inconveniences and
impropriety would result from the rescission
of what was done, than
would follow the act itself done contrary to the law’. On
the other hand, where recognition
of the validity of the contract
would bring about, or give legal sanction to, the very situation
which the legislature seeks to
prevent, the inclination will be the
other way.’
(Footnotes
omitted.)
[45]
I now turn to a consideration of the context and purpose of the Act
and the code of conduct in the light of these principles.
It
is instructive for purposes of the present enquiry, what the
Constitutional Court stated at the outset of its judgment in
Loureiro
v Imvula Quality Protection (Pty) Ltd
2014 (3) SA 394
(CC), a case concerning the contractual liability and
vicarious delictual liability of a security service provider for the
wrongful
and negligent act of its security guard:
‘
[1]
The founding values of our Constitution include human dignity, the
advancement of human rights and freedoms and the rule of
law.
The Bill of Rights recognises the rights to life, freedom and
security of the person, freedom from all forms of violence,
privacy
and not to be arbitrarily deprived of property. And the
preamble to the Constitution calls for our people to be protected.
Our police service is mandated
'to
prevent, combat and investigate crime, to maintain public order, to
protect and secure the inhabitants of the Republic and their
property, and to uphold and enforce the law'.
[2]
Yet, there is a disturbingly dark side to the often-stated miracle of
our constitutional democracy. South Africa is plagued
by crime —
often viciously violent, sometimes sophisticated and organised, often
ridiculously random, but always audacious
and contemptuous of the
values we are supposed to believe in and the human rights enshrined
in our Constitution — perhaps
not unlike other young
democracies. More than 16 000 murders were reported to have taken
place in the 2012/2013 year — almost
45 a day — and
almost 106 000 armed robberies. Many of our people live behind
high walls and electrified fences; others
rely on the communities
around them for security; and many are mercilessly exposed to the
cruelty of crime.
[3]
The South African Police Service is not always perceived to be
capable of meeting its constitutional mandate. Hence, the private
security industry is a large and powerful feature of South Africa's
crime-control terrain. While it should and could not be a substitute
for state services, it fulfils functions that once fell within the
exclusive domain of the police. This is in part because
of our
history. From the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s the apartheid
regime concentrated policing activities on state security
and
maintaining political control, and so the private security industry
increasingly played a role in protecting private individuals'
safety
and security.’
[46]
The private security industry is extensively involved in
crime
prevention in this country; in protecting people’s safety and
security and their property from theft or damage.
The private
security industry, as it was held in
Loureia
,
‘fulfils functions that once fell within the exclusive domain
of the police’.
The adequate protection of the
constitutionally entrenched rights to life and security of the person
as well as the right not to
be deprived of property, is fundamental
to the well-being and to the social and economic development of every
person
.
[47]
The Act commenced on 14 February 2002.
According to the long title, its scope and purpose is ‘[t]
o
provide for the regulation of the private security industry’
and ‘for that purpose to establish a regulatory authority
. . .
and to provide for matters connected therewith.’ The Act
is prefaced with a preamble that reads thus:
‘
WHEREAS
the adequate protection of fundamental rights to life and security of
the person as well as the right not to be deprived
of property, is
fundamental to the well-being and to the social and economic
development of every person;
AND
WHEREAS security service providers and the private security industry
in general play an important role in protecting and safeguarding
the
aforesaid rights;
AND
WHEREAS every citizen has the right to freely choose an occupation,
including the occupation of a security service provider;
AND
WHEREAS it is necessary to achieve and maintain a trustworthy and
legitimate private security industry which acts in terms of
the
principles contained in the Constitution and other applicable law,
and is capable of ensuring that there is greater safety
and security
in the country;
BE
IT ENACTED THEREFORE by the Parliament of the Republic of South
Africa: -’
[48]
The objects of the regulatory authority are set out in s 3. Its
primary objects are to regulate and to exercise effective
control
over the practice of the occupation of security service providers in
the public and national interest and the interests
of the private
security industry itself, and for that purpose
inter alia
to:
promote a legitimate private security industry, which acts in
terms of the principles contained in the Constitution and
other
applicable law (s 3(a)) and is characterized by professionalism,
accountability (s 3(c)), trustworthiness (s 3(e)) and efficiency
in
and responsibility with regard to the rendering of security services
(s 3(g)); ensure that all security service providers
act in the
public and national interest in the rendering of security services (s
3(b)); protect the interests of the users of security
services (s
3(o)); promote high standards in the training of security service
providers and prospective security service providers
(s 3(j)); and
determine and enforce minimum standards of occupational conduct in
respect of security service providers’ (s
3(f)).
[49]
The Minister for Safety and Security, must, in terms of s 28(1),
prescribe a code of conduct for security service providers,
which, in
terms of s 28(3)(a), ‘must contain rules that security service
providers must obey in order to promote, achieve
and maintain . . .
‘[a] trustworthy and professional private security industry
which acts in terms of the law applicable
to the members of the
industry’, . . . ‘[c]ompliance by security service
providers with a set of minimum standards
of conduct which is
necessary to realise the objects of the Authority’ . . . and .
. . ‘[c]ompliance by security providers
with their obligations
towards the State, the Authority, consumers of security services, the
public and the private security industry
in general …’,
and, in terms of s 28(4)(a), must be drawn up ‘ . . . with due
regard to . . . the objects of
the Authority’.
[50]
A code of conduct has been prescribed. Sub-regulation 9(3)(d)
of the code of conduct contains the prohibition on exemption
and
limitation clauses that exempts or limits the liability of a security
service provider for the acts referred to in the sub-regulation.
The procedures for the enforcement of the code of conduct by the
regulatory authority are contained in the ‘Improper Conduct
Enquiries Regulations’, which regulations are by virtue of
regulation 30 incorporated in the code of conduct. A
contravention
or the failure to comply with a provision of the Act or
of the code of conduct, in terms of sub-regulation 24(1), constitutes
improper
conduct. A security service provider who is found
guilty of improper conduct is liable to any penalty contemplated in
regulation
25, which penalties are a warning or reprimand, suspension
of registration as a security service provider for a period not
exceeding
six months, withdrawal of registration as security service
provider, a fine not exceeding R10 000, publication of appropriate
details
of the conviction of improper conduct and any penalty
imposed, or any combination of the penalties. Regulation 28
provides
for a criminal sanction. It reads as follows:
‘
Any
person who commits improper conduct in terms of this Code, is guilty
of an offence and on conviction liable to a fine or to
imprisonment
for a period not exceeding 24 months, or to both a fine and such
imprisonment.’
[51]
The prohibition in sub-regulation 9(3)(d) is directed not at the
conclusion of contracts for the provision of security services
by
private security providers with their clients, but at the inclusion
of an exemption or limitation clause that excludes or limits
the
liability of the security provider towards its client in respect of
malicious, intentional, fraudulent, reckless or grossly
negligent
acts of itself, its security officers and the other persons listed in
the sub-regulation. The Act, in its preamble,
acknowledges the
important role which the private security industry in general plays
in the protection and safeguarding of the
fundamental rights to life
and security of persons and the right not to be deprived of their
property. The legislative intent
is to achieve and maintain a
trustworthy and legitimate private security industry that protects
and safeguards these fundamental
rights and can ensure greater safety
and security in the country. The legislature intended these
objectives to be achieved
and maintained through the establishment of
a regulatory authority that regulates and controls the practice of
the occupation of
security service providers and through the Minister
for Safety and Security prescribing a code of conduct binding upon
them
inter alia
with a set of minimum standards of conduct
aimed at realising the objectives of the regulatory authority,
including those of protecting
the interests of the users of security
services, high standards in training and of a private security
industry which acts in terms
of the principles contained in the
Constitution and other applicable law, is characterized by
professionalism, accountability,
trustworthiness, is efficient and
responsible and acts in the public and national interest in rendering
security services.
[52]
The sub-regulation 9(3)(d) prohibition against the inclusion of
certain exemption and limitation clauses in contracts concluded
by
security service providers with their clients, is a measure aimed at
realising and maintaining these statutory objectives.
The
nature of the mischief which the prohibition is designed to avoid is
for a security service provider, through its own malicious,
intentional, fraudulent, reckless or grossly negligent acts, or those
of its security officers or of the other persons referred
to, not to
adequately protect and safeguard the fundamental rights to life and
security of the person and the right not be deprived
of property.
A security service provider is employed to adequately protect and
safeguard these fundamental rights, for reward.
[53]
Having regard to the legislative intent as it appears from what has
been said above, the limitation clause in the contract
between
Fidelity and M-TEC must be visited with nullity
to
the extent that it purports to limit Fidelity’s liability for
the intentional or grossly negligent acts of its security
guards
.
Legal sanction will otherwise be given to the very situation which
the legislature wishes to prevent. (See
Pottie v Kotze
1954
(3) SA 719
(A) at 726-727.) An interpretation that the
legislative intent is not invalidity, would detract from the adequate
protection
and safeguarding of the fundamental rights to life and
security of persons and the right not to be deprived of their
property.
On the contrary, it would permit the security service
providers, who are employed for reward, to infringe those fundamental
rights,
through their own intentional and grossly negligent acts or
those of their security guards, without civil liability. That
would undermine the purpose of the legislation, several of the
objects of the regulatory authority, and it would undermine both
the
trustworthiness and legitimacy of the private security industry.
Security service providers would be
disincentivized from undertaking proper screening and exercising
proper control of their security
guards. The users of security
services would be exposed to a situation where those who protect them
for reward, might, without
civil liability, cause them harm.
The purpose of sub-regulation 9(3)(d), on a proper
construction of the Act, is not sufficiently served by the penalties
prescribed
for improper conduct.
[54]
I am further of the view that public policy also demands that the
limitation clause be held unenforceable
to the
extent that it purports to limit Fidelity’s liability for the
intentional or grossly negligent acts of its security
guards
.
In considering whether the law should recognise the existence of a
legal duty not to cause harm on the part of a security
guard for the
purpose of delictual liability, the Constitutional Court, in
Loureiro
, said the following:
‘
[56]
There are ample public-policy reasons in favour of imposing
liability. The constitutional rights to personal safety and
protection from theft of or damage to one's property are compelling
normative considerations. There is a great public interest
in
making sure that private security companies and their guards, in
assuming the role of crime prevention for remuneration,
succeed in
thwarting avoidable harm. If they are too easily insulated from
claims for these harms because of mistakes on
their side, they would
have little incentive to conduct themselves in a way that avoids
causing harm. And policy objectives
(such as the deterrent
effect of liability) underpin one of the purposes of imposing
delictual liability. The convictions
of the community as
to policy and law clearly motivate for liability to be imposed.’
(Footnotes
omitted.)
[55]
It now needs to be considered whether the illegal portion of the
limitation clause is severable from the rest of the agreement.
As the learned authors in
Wille’s Principles of South
African Law
(supra) at 771 state:
‘
Whether
the portions of an agreement are severable or not depends in the
first instance on the probable intention of the parties
as appears
in, or can be inferred from, the terms of the contract as a whole.
Since the intention of the parties in this
regard is seldom clearly
expressed, the courts have devised certain guidelines to assist in
arriving at such intention, including
the following: Is there
an express or implied interlocking of the portions of the agreement,
or are they sufficiently distinct
and independent of each other to
render them both grammatically and notionally severable? Does
the elimination of the illegal
portion materially affect the nature
or object of the contract? Does the illegal promise constitute
the whole or main consideration
for the promise sought to be
enforced, or is it merely of a subsidiary character? Most
important of all, would the parties
have been prepared to conclude
the agreement had it not contained the illegal portion?
(Footnotes
omitted.)
[56]
The intention of the parties regarding the severability of illegal or
unenforceable provisions is not clearly expressed in
the contract.
Importantly, voidness of the whole contract is a matter that is
neither raised on the pleadings nor did any
one of the parties
contend that the illegal portion is not severable from the rest of
the contract. Ms Oost, who is the Group
Legal Manager of
Fidelity, testified that the limitation clause in question is
included in all the contracts which Fidelity concludes
with its
clients to ensure that Fidelity has sufficient insurance cover in
place and that the amount which Fidelity pays for insurance
cover is
factored into its pricing of its security services. But it was
not suggested by Ms Oost that the insurance which
Fidelity has in
place is either insufficient to cover M-TEC’s claim or that
Fidelity would have charged M-TEC more for the
security services had
the parties not included the illegal portion of the limitation clause
into their contract, nor was evidence
presented regarding any
increased insurance premiums that Fidelity would have had to pay and
of the effect that would have had
on the pricing of its security
services in this instance.
[57]
The illegal portion is sufficiently distinct and independent of the
rest of the contract to render them grammatically and notionally
severable. Its elimination does not affect the nature or object
of the contract for the provision of security services nor
does it
constitute the consideration for Fidelity’s obligation sought
to be enforced. I also take into consideration
that an
exemption clause, which is partially contrary to public policy, will
be confined to the bounds of what is permissible rather
than
invalidated. (See
(Wells v South African Alumenite Company
1927 AD 69
at 72-3;
Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom
2002
(6) SA 21
(SCA) para 13.) As appears from what has been said
above, I am unable to conclude that the parties would not have been
prepared
to conclude the agreement had it not contained the illegal
portion in the limitation clause. The probable intention of the
parties, as can be inferred from the terms of the contract and
contextually, was that the illegal portion of the limitation clause
is severable from the rest of the contract.
[58]
A further issue is the date from which interest is to run.
M-TEC argues
that Fidelity is liable to pay
interest from 19 February 2013 to date of final payment at the
rate of 15.5% per annum.
19 February 2013, so M-TEC contends,
is the date when its written demand dated that day, was sent to and
received by Fidelity.
It is recorded in the minutes of the
judicial pre-trial conference that Fidelity denies that M-TEC’s
letter dated 19 February
2013 constitutes a letter of demand as
contemplated in
s 2A(2)(a)
of the
Prescribed Rate of Interest Act 55
of 1975
, which provides that interest shall run ‘from the date
on which payment of the debt is claimed by the service on the debtor
of a demand or summons, whichever date is the earlier’.
It is further recorded that Fidelity admits that the letter
was
received by it on 19 February 2013 and, if the letter is held to
constitute a demand for the purpose of
s 2A(2)(a)
of the
Prescribed
Rate of Interest Act, that
interest will run on the amount of
‘damages’ proved by M-TEC, if any, at the rate of 15.5%
from 19 February 2013 to
date of payment, despite the change in the
prescribed rate during 2014. This concession about the interest
rate is sound.
The
rate prescribed at the time when interest begins to run governs the
calculation of interest and does not vary if the prescribed
rate is
adjusted in the interim.
(See
Davehill (Pty) Ltd v Community
Development Board
1988 (1) SA 290
(A)
at 33G-302A.)
[59]
I agree with M-TEC’s contention that the letter dated 19
February 2013 indeed constitutes a demand as envisaged in
s 2A(2)(a)
of the
Prescribed Rate of Interest Act. The
letter is entitled
‘claim for copper theft from December 2012 to February 2013’
and it notified Fidelity that ‘[b]
ased on the attached
internal security reports M-TEC herewith claim for four possible
incidences of copper theft’.
It
specifies the lost tonnage and Rand amount of M TEC’s
claim, in the instance of the copper theft on Sunday 3 February
2013,
an amount of R1,512,324.97. It further notifies Fidelity that
because the losses were directly related to the actions
of Fidelity’s
security guards on M-TEC’s premises, it did not intend claiming
from its insurance company.
[60]
Fidelity also understood the letter to be a demand. In
response, its Claims Manager, Mr Des Momsen, wrote to M-TEC on
26
April 2013,
inter alia
stating-
‘
.
. .
It is
important for you to grasp that this is not from your perspective an
insurance claim. You have embarked on a course
of civil legal
action and as such there are wide ranging interested parties and time
consuming processes.’
And-
‘
.
. . As discussed, our insurers have been notified and as such our
rights have been ceded to this party.’
When
Ms Oost testified, she too conceded that M-TEC’s letter was
understood by Fidelity to be a demand and the commencement
of civil
legal action.
[61]
Finally, the matter of costs. M-TEC seeks a punitive costs
order against Fidelity. In all the circumstances
of this
case, however, I am of the view that a deviation from the ordinary
rule that the successful party is awarded costs as between
party and
party, is not warranted. This judgment, so Fidelity’s
counsel informed me, is not only of importance to the
present
litigants, but also of considerable importance to the private
security industry.
[62]
In the result the following order is made:
(a) The defendant is to pay to the
plaintiff the amount of R2, 198, 648.25 plus interest thereon at the
rate of 15.5% per annum
a tempore morae
from
19
February 2013 to date of final payment.
(b) The defendant
is to pay the plaintiff’s costs of suit.
P.A.
MEYER
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
Date
of hearing: 09 – 17 February 2017
Date
of judgment: 18 April 2017
Plaintiff’s
counsel:
A J d’Oliveira
Instructed
by: Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr Inc, Sandown, Sandton
Defendant’s
counsel: A Mooij
Instructed
by: Blake Bester De Wet & Jordaan Inc, Johannesburg