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[2017] ZAGPJHC 382
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University of Johannesburg v Auckland Park Theological Seminary (Pty) Ltd and Others (39717/2012) [2017] ZAGPJHC 382 (10 March 2017)
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG
CASE NO: 39717/2012
10 March 2017
In the matter
between:
UNIVERSITYOF
JOHANNESBURG
Plaintiff
And
AUCKLAND PARK THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY
(PTY)
LTD
1
st
Defendant
WAMJAY
HOLDINGS INVESTMENTS (PTY)
LTD
2
nd
Defendant
REGISTRAR
OF DEEDS, JOHANNESBURG
3
rd
Defendant
THE
NATIONAL LEADERSHIP FORUM OF THE
APOSTOLIC
FAITH MISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA
4
th
Defendant
J U D G M E N T
VICTOR
J
:
[1]
The plaintiff is the University of
Johannesburg. The first defendant is Auckland
Park
Theological Seminary (Pty) Ltd (Theological Seminary)
and the second defendant is
Wamjay
Holdings Investments (Pty) Ltd (Wamjay). The first defendant is a
Christian based seminary and the second defendant is a
company
wishing to build a Muslim faith based school.
[2]
The University seeks an order that the Theological
College and Wamjay be evicted from portion 1 of Erf 809 Auckland Park
Township,
registration division IR, province of Gauteng situated 51
Richmond Avenue Auckland Park Johannesburg, (the property).
[3]
The University also seeks the cancellation of the registration of the
notarial long term lease agreement registered against
the Title Deed
with reference number K4963 of 1996.
[4]
The issue for determination in this matter is whether the Theological
College could cede the long term lease it had concluded
with the
university to Wamjay without the University’s consent, and
secondly whether the lease was in fact one capable of
being ceded and
the dispute between the parties was whether it fell into the category
delectus personae.
[5]
The
Theological
Seminary
and Wamjay claim that the
University’s claim be dismissed with costs and seeks an order
that the notarial long term lease
entered in by
Theological
Seminary
and the University
registered on by the Registrar of Deeds on 20 December 1996 under
number
K4963/1996
remain valid in all respects.
[6]
On 13 October 2011 the
Theological
Seminary
and Wamjay concluded a
written cession agreement whereby it ceded its rights in the long
lease to Wamjay and registered by the Registrar
of Deeds on 11 April
2012 under number K691/2012L, Annexure D2 to the counterclaim and
endorsed against the notarial long term
lease agreement remains valid
in all respects. The Theological College ceded only its rights to
Wamjay, not its obligations.
Material Background Facts
[7]
The University is the registered owner of the property. On
7 June 1993 the University and the Theological College
concluded a
written cooperation agreement in terms of which the parties would
cooperate where the University would cooperate in
respect of academic
courses.
[8] On 25 April 1996 the University
applied to the Minister of Education in terms of section 4 (2) of the
Rand Afrikaans University
Act 51 of 1966 for consent to let out
certain of its properties including the relevant property to outside
entities for a period
of thirty years for the purposes of
development. On the 18
th
of June 1996 the Minister granted
his approval in the following terms, and I quote:
‘
I
hereby grant permission for the Rand Afrikaans University to let
certain specified property, detailed drawings B1 to E1 for a
period
of thirty years for the purposes of developing these properties’
[9]
It bears mention that the details of the properties were not
specified except for that property which pertained to the Theological
College. The 6
th
of December 1996, that is some three years after the written
cooperation agreement, the University represented by Mr C.
Labuschagne
and the Theological College represented by Professor
Hattingh, concluded a notarial long term lease in respect of the
property.
The lease was registered against the title deed as
described. On 3 December 2007 the University gave the
Theological College
one year’s notice of termination of the
cooperation agreement with effect from 3 December 2008. It
would appear that
the intended cooperation did not fructify for a
number of reasons.
[10] The cooperation agreement, would
have involved the University providing higher education to the
students of the Theological
College, a symbiotic relationship, and it
would have provided an opportunity for the University to provide
seminary education to
the religious community at large.
Dispute on the proper
interpretation of the words in the lease referring to Tertiary
Education
[11] The enquiry really commences with
a proper interpretation of the lease agreement. Towards 8.1 and
8.2 of the lease agreement
bears consideration. I quote the
clauses in question in Afrikaans as reflected in the lease under the
heading “
Gebruik van eiendom
” the following is
stated:
‘
8.1
Die H
uurterrein
sal gebruik word deur die huurder vir opvoedkundige godsdienstige en
aanverwante doeleindes,
die
oprigting van kampus vir onderwys, onderrig, navorsing, opleiding,
kantore en studentefasiliteite.
(my emphasis).
8.2
Die huurder het die reg om geboue, konstruksies, fasiliteite,
verbeterings en landskapering en strukture op te rig met die oog
op
die gebruik van die Huurterrein soos in klousule 8.1 van hierdie
ooreenkoms omskryf, en met dienverstande dat die boukonstruksie
en
ander planne ten aansien van sodanige geboue, konstruksies,
fasiliteite, verbeterings in landskappering en strukture eers aan
die
Registrateur (Bedryf) aan die verhuurder voorgelê moet vir sy
kommentaar en skriftelike goedkeuring. Gemelde goedkeuring
sal nie
onredelik deur die verhuurder geweier word nie.’
[12]
The University places great emphasis on the word ‘sal gebruik
word’ meaning ‘shall be used ’. The clause
goes on
to provide that it shall be used for higher education meaning
tertiary education. The University contends that there
is an
obligation on the Theological College to use the leased premises for
tertiary education. The university asserts that the
provisions of
Clause 8 are not to imposed in the alternative upon a proper
construction these obligations are cumulative.
Both parties
rely on dictionaries for the (meaning of the) word ‘kampus’.
The University relies on the
Nasionale
Woordeboek
,
Afrikaanse
Woordverklaring
, previously
Kenwoordeboek van Afrika
ans
for the definition of Kampus as ‘
universiteits-terrein
of
student-gemeenskap
.
The University also relies on the definition of student as ‘
iemand
wat ingeskryf is en klas loop aan ‘n universiteit of inrigting
vir hoë onderwys’
. And
in the
Afrikaanse Woordeboek
part 5 ‘
kampus’
is defined as
terrein tussen
,
rondom die akademiese geboue van n
universiteit of kollege waar die studente kan ontspan
.
2. ‘K
ompleks van hierdie geboue en
terreine wat gewoonlik as die setel of hoofdeel van die universiteit
beskou word.’
[13]
The University relies on the interpretation of the provisions of the
lease and as referred to in the definitions as being aimed
at the
principle that the Theological College could only the lease premises
for Tertiary education, religious and related purposes
and for the
establishment of a campus for education, tuition, research, offices
for training and student facilities.
[14]
It is common cause that Wamjay would use the premises to establish a
religious based school for primary and high school education.
In
other words it would not erect a university type educational
facility. Wamjay and the Theological College dispute the
interpretation
given to the words “campus, higher learning”,
and suggest that it could be equally applied to the intention of
Wamjay
to erect a school, in other words the word “campus”
could also be a school campus and that higher learning would also
encompass the senior part of the school.
[15] It is common cause between the
parties that the essential issue for interpretation is whether upon a
proper interpretation
of the lease agreement the rights were
personal, that is delectus personae. The Theological College
and Wamjay submit not
and that it was therefore entitled to cede the
rights to Wamjay. The Theological College asserts that its conduct
did not constitute
an unequivocal and direct intention to be no
longer bound to the lease, and therefore that conduct did not amount
to the repudiation
of the lease.
Delectus personae
[16]
The question of delectus personae has to be interpreted in the
context of the lease and the statutory framework. The preamble
to the
cooperation or academic agreement records that the Minister of
National Education at the time had given the consent contemplated
in
10B of the University’s Act 61 of 1955 for the agreement
between the University and the Theological Seminary for the training
of students.
[17]
This fact remains pivotal in assessing the nature of the relationship
between the University and the Theological College.
It is the
University’s submission that the cooperation agreement,
although not specifically referred to or acknowledged to
be such by
its various witnesses, it nonetheless was the forerunner to the lease
and therefore cannot be ignored. In particular
section 10
(B)(1) of the Act
and I quote:
‘
Agreements
regarding training of students:
1:
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any Law contained in
relation to the seat of the university, a council may
with the
consent of the Minister and subject to the provisions of sub-section
(2) enter into agreements in connection with the
training of students
with provincial, educational and other authorities or with the
council or governing body of an institution
whose purpose it is to
provide a division of higher education.”
[18]
Professor O’Brien testified that this would have benefitted
both the University and the Theological College. Sub-section
2
of section 10 (B)(1) of the Act also provides that any agreement
entered into in terms of subsection 1 shall observe the guidelines
prescribed by the joint statute. In terms of section 10 of the
University’s Act a person can only be registered as
a student
of the University if she has obtained the equivalent of a matric
certificate or has in terms of that section been exempted
from the
matric certificate.
[19] The University submits that this
of itself suggests that any activity on the leased site would really
pertain to students who
are in the category of post-matric. The
recordals in the cooperation agreement are as follows: That the
purpose of the agreement
is to achieve levels of higher education,
and I quote:
“
Tussenin
universiteit en ‘n inrigting met die oog op opleiding vir ‘n
graad, diploma of sertifikaat van die universiteit
.”
[20] Section 4 (2) of the Rand
Afrikaans University Act, now repealed but relevant at the time,
states the following:
‘
The
University shall not without the approval of the Minister let, sell,
exchange or otherwise alienate its immovable property or
grant to any
person any real right therein or sue servitude thereon. The
University emphasizes the words in section 4 (2)
of the grant to any
person of any real right therein.’
[21]
Of course it is common cause that a lot of work went into obtaining
the s 4 (2) consent in the sense that the Theological College
initially wanted to purchase the property. When it was evident
that the Minister would not agree to that, a long term lease
of
ninety nine years was sought and that did not, according to the
University find favour with the Minister, and the lease was
approved
for a period of thirty years to be extended.
[22] Of importance is the terms of the
request addressed to the Minister, and I quote:
“
The
Theological College of the Apostolic Faith Mission of South Africa:
The Apostolic Faith Mission of South Africa urgently
needs property
in the vicinity of our University to build their Theological
College. The students will come from multicultural
backgrounds
and the college will be responsible for the training of all Pastors
of the Apostolic Faith Mission of South Africa.
They have
identified property owned by our University as the most suitable
site. We would like to extend a helping hand to
them by letting
this property over a period of thirty years.”
[23]
The Minister consented. It is the case of the Theological
College and Wamjay that because of the general nature of the
consent,
the Minister was not specifically consenting to the Theological
College, but really to a wide range of stakeholders.
In my view
the letter addressed to the Minister and the subsequent consent
cannot be ignored. Quite clearly the words “to
help a
lending hand” to the Theological College does go some way to
suggest that the lease was specifically aimed at the
Theological
College, and therefore the Minister’s consent cannot be read in
isolation. The consent must be read with
the request that
preceded it.
[24] The University relies on the
limitation on transfer of rights, such as those found in
Cosira
Developments (Pty) Ltd v Sam Lubbe Investments CC t/a Lubbe
Construction & Others
2011 (6) SA 331
(GSJ) [19] a judgment
by Van Oosten J, relating to circumstances where the sale of land was
to have a particular purpose in that
the land was to advance black
economic empowerment, which precluded a further sale without a
council resolution. The University
argued that this by analogy
is the case it relies on.
Material Contextual Facts
[25]
It has become accepted that in interpreting any document such as this
lease, the principles in
Natal Joint
Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality
2012
(4) SA 593
(SCA) must followed. Where the meaning of a lease may be
vague, unclear or does not give business efficacy to the lease it is
appropriate
to consider the context. Before moving onto the Law, it
is important to look at the material contextual facts. These are
largely
common cause. The witnesses that testified were Mr Karel
Labuschagne, Professor Jean Du Plessis who testified by way of a
video
link from Australia and Ms Keet from the University regarding
the circumstances after the conclusion of the agreement, and in
particular
how the lease was carried out by the parties.
[26]
The witness Mr Labuschagne testified that he was a member of the
Bates Ontwikkeling Kommittee, and that the University had
at that
time decided to embark on a process of development of its various
properties in Auckland Park. It was clear that
the piece of
land that the Theological College occupied at that time was too
small. They intended to build a college on the land.
[27]
The Theological College made a request and motivated the need for
property to the University. The motivation was partly on
the basis
that the University should favourably consider their application and
Mr Labuschagne testified that whilst he was aware
of the existence of
the cooperation agreement, he had not seen or read the cooperation
agreement and treated them as two separate
agreements. However
he was aware of the relationship at the time of the academic
cooperation between the Theological College
and the University, and
it made sense that if the Theological College required extra land
that the University should assist.
[28]
The negotiations were done in the spirit of cooperation, but when it
came to negotiating on price it was clear that it was
an arm’s
length negotiation and that no concessions were made or indulgences
were granted to the Theological College on the
basis that it was a
religious institution. It is clear from the correspondence at
the time that the agreed price was lower
than market value, but the
parties finally agreed on a consideration sum of R700 000.00 as
a once off payment.
[29]
Both Mr Labuschagne and Professor Du Plessis confirmed that the
University was aware that the Theological College intended
to effect
a development of approximately of R10 million on the property, and
this was a source of debate between the parties. The
University was
disinclined to commit to reimbursing the Theological College at the
end of the lease for the improvements.
[30] It is permissible for contextual
facts to be considered when interpreting the lease agreement. The
University relied on the
recent judgment of the Supreme Court of
Appeal in
Unica Iron And Steel (Pty) Ltd and Another V Mirchandani
2016 (2) SA 307
(SCA) 313 where Leach JA referring to the dictum of
Lewis JJA in
North East Finance (Pty) Ltd v Standard Bank of South
Africa Ltd
2013 (5) SA 1
(SCA held:
'The
court asked to construe a contract must ascertain what the parties
intended their contract to mean. That requires a consideration
of the
words used by them and the contract as a whole and, whether or not
there is any possible ambiguity in their meaning, the
court must
consider the factual matrix (or context) in which the contract was
concluded.'
[31]
The University points to the correspondence of the Theological
College, in particular that of Professor Kuipers. He addressed
correspondence to the University over a considerable length of time.
This emphasises a personal dimension to the lease and that
it was
personal to the Theological College and not to any other third
party. Reference is made to the letter of Kuipers dated
5 June
1995 where he makes reference to the
ooreenkoms
wat tussen ons twee inrigtings bestaan
on
at least four separate occasions and of course that related to an
attempt to solicit the best possible price for his college.
[32]
In his letter of 4 August Mr Kuipers speaks of the fact that the
first defendant is in ‘
verwantskap
(partnership)
met u instituut
’.
In addition, he refers to the University and the Theological Seminary
as ‘
akademiese vennote’
.
On 16 October 1995 Mr Labuschagne had requested from Professor
Hattingh that the college present the plaintiff with an
‘
uitvoerbaarheid studie rondom u
ruimte behoefte
’.
[33]
In response, on 8 January 1996 Kuipers delivered a comprehensive
proposal to which were attached plans reflecting the development
of
the project. In paragraph 2 of the letter Kuipers on behalf of the
college agreed to the rezoning of its own premises from residential
1
to ‘
onderwys
,
opleiding en verwante doeleindes’
.
In addition it was also at the insistence of the Theological College
that the ‘
vergunnings gebruik’
for the purposes of ‘
godsdiens
onderrig en opleiding en aanverwante doeleindes’
was inserted in Clause 8.1 of the lease.
[34]
It is on that basis that the University relies on the personal aspect
of this lease, not only on its own understanding, but
upon a proper
interpretation of the context corroborated by the correspondence
emanating from the Theological College.
[35] The principle of context is
highly relevant in this matter. In particular the dictum of
Harms JA in
KPMG Chartered Accountants SA v Securefin Ltd
(2009) (4) SA 399
(SCA) [39] where he stated:
“
Context is
everything.”
[36]
It is important to note that the witnesses for the University were
consistent in their evidence and there was no contradiction
that the
relationship between the University and the Theological Seminary was
personal in its nature between them having regard
to the
relationship. In fact, no contradictory version was put to Mr
Labuschagne on this aspect, and the evidence stands
uncontroverted
and unchallenged.
[37]
Professor O’Brien testified about the real commercial benefit
to the University and that evidence was unchallenged and
stands
uncontroverted. The evidence of Professor Du Plessis again
pointed to the relationship aspect of the parties and his
evidence
accorded with the documentary evidence that was put to him.
[38]
The University placed reliance on the principle in our Law that a
right of a personal nature cannot be ceded. In this regard
see The
Law of Cession by Susan Scott 2
nd
Edition at page 202. See also the English Law in this regard, see
Anson’s Law of Contract 28
th
Edition, Treitel the Law of Contract 13
th
Edition and Cheshire GC, Fifoot CHS and Furmston MP, The Law of
Contract 10
th
Edition at page 466 at paragraph 37.
[39] Although those authors really
deal with assignments in the nature of the personal right it applies
to the cession of long leases
as well. Selikowitz J in
Goodwin
Stable Trust v Duohex (Pty) Ltd
1998 (4) SA 606
(C) 617 states
the following, I quote:
‘
The
restriction on cession imposed by the delectus persona concept is
simply a manifestation of the general principle that the cession
should not disadvantage the debtor.’
[40] On behalf of the Theological
College and Wamjay great emphasis was placed on the norm and in a
very helpful analysis the interpretation
of Law in regard to the
contract. The reliance on
Novartis SA (Pty) Ltd v Maphil
Trading (Pty) Ltd
2016 (1) SA 518
(SCA)
paragraphs 24 to 31 is as
follows:
‘
The
argument of Novartis, as I understand it, is that interpretation is
an entirely objective process: in deciding what a contract
means, a
court must have regard to the words used and construe them
objectively.’
[41]
If a document was intended to provide a complete memorial of a jural
act, evidence may not contradict and or modify its meaning.
In
this regard the Theological College and Wamjay submit that the
contract is perfectly clear and that there is nothing that is
vague
and confusing. The contract of itself is quite clear on the
nature of the lease, and that it is not to be interpreted
based on
its wording as making provision for a right in
delectus
persona
.
[42]
In the event that the court does accept that context may be testified
about, the Theological College and Wamjay then rely on
the passage in
Endumeni
.
This case provides that a sensible and business like result would
mean that the Theological College was perfectly entitled to
cede the
lease to Wamjay and therefore, whether the court allows the
background context or not, the Theological College points
out that
the words of the document are relevant and that the parties expressed
their contractual intentions. They submit that context
should not
deviate from the intentions as expressed, particularly because the
document itself was a complete memorial of the jural
acts which the
parties intended.
[43]
However, it is quite clear that the document itself went through a
long process of negotiation. In fact it was many months,
almost
a year in extent. It is also clear that Professor Du Plessis
made it clear that he did not want the Theological College
to sublet,
because that would bring unapproved parties into the University
environment. In particular at some stage as a fundraising
mechanism
there was talk that the Theological College would allow a BP Petrol
Station to be erected. The University under no circumstances
wanted
such a situation to arise.
[44] The definition of
delectus
persona
is dealt with in LAWSA at page 30 as follows:
“
A
delectus persona is a right which may not be ceded without the
consent of the debtor if the performance the debtor is to render
to
the proposed cessionary would differ in character from the
performance of the debtor is to render to his or her current
creditor.
The identity of the creditor, that is the delectus
personae, thus becomes decisive.”
[45]
In this case it is quite clear that the long debate leading up to the
conclusion of the lease did emphasize the personality
of the
creditor, that is the Theological College, and that when the college
wanted to go outside and incorporate for example the
BP Garage, this
aspect became decisive in the negotiation.
[46]
The evidence led by the Theological College was that of Mr Thalia and
that of Ms Keet. It is quite clear that Mr Thalia could
not testify
to the circumstances surrounding the conclusion of the long lease and
therefore in interpreting the context, his evidence
was not helpful,
save and except that, he gave his evidence honestly and without
embellishment, but could not unfortunately provide
any light on the
question of the
delectus persona
surrounding the lease.
[47]
The evidence of Ms Keet could also not deal with the circumstances
surrounding the conclusion of the lease agreement, but did
deal very
fully with the conduct of the parties after the conclusion of the
lease. It is common cause that the property was
sold to an
entity and that ultimately the property was sold back to the
University.
[48]
The entity to which the property was sold was a developer. It
had in fact developed accommodation for the University
students in an
adjoining erf known as the Sophia residence.
[49]
It is the case for the Theological College and Wamjay that to give
sensible commercial effect to a long lease it would be artificial
to
suggest that the permission of the owner of the property was
necessary, in particular it is an urban lease where no such
permission
is necessary.
[50]
The Theological College therefore challenges the University’s
submission that in concluding the cession agreement between
it and
Wamjay constituted a repudiation of the lease and therefore relies on
a, the precise meaning of what a repudiation means.
[51] In this regard the Theological
College referred to the leading case on repudiation. See
Datacolor
International (Pty) Ltd v Intamarket (Pty) Ltd
[2000] ZASCA 82
;
2001 (2) SA 284
(SCA) paragraph 16 to 18 where Nienaber JA states the
following:
‘
Where
one party to a contract without lawful grounds indicate to the other
party in words or by conduct a deliberate and unequivocal
intention
no longer to be bound by the contract, is said to repudiate the
contract. The test is not subjective but objective.
The
perception is that of a reasonable person placed in the position of
the aggrieved party and whether such a notional reasonable
person
would conclude that proper performance in accordance with the true
interpretation of the agreement will not be forthcoming.
A
repudiation is not likely presumed. The conduct must be clear
and unequivocal and it must be, it must stand objective analysis
and
it cannot be equated with any other feasible hypothesis, and the
party alleging the repudiation must prove that the conduct
of the
other party amounts to a repudiation of the agreement.’
[52]
In this regard the Theological College relies on the fact that the
University sold the property in question albeit for a brief
period,
subject of course to the lease, and therefore if the lease was
personal to it, it certainly would have not embarked upon
the conduct
that I have referred to. In addition, the Theological College submits
that if the court finds that the conduct was
a breach rather than a
repudiation of the lease, then the University was not entitled to
cancel the lease since it did not put
the Theological College or
Wamjay in
mora
as required by the
lex commissorium
in Clause 11 of the lease before it was entitled to cancel.
[53]
The University submits that the breach was of such a fundamental
nature that there was no need to comply with putting the Theological
College in
mora
.
[54]
In conclusion, it is therefore necessary for this court to assess
whether the factual matrix and context is such that the clauses
in
question, that is Clauses 8.1 and 8.2 amount to a lease, which is
governed by the principle of delectus persona. In my
view
having regard to the extensive debate prior to the conclusion of the
lease, the undisputed evidence of the correspondence
emanating from
Mr Kuiper on behalf of the theological College, I find that the lease
is indeed one which was personal to the Theological
College.
[55]
In addition it is also quite clear that the conduct in selling off
the property to the various developers in respect of this
particular
property really relates to aspects relevant to the University and its
operation. By virtue of the fact that there
was already a
residential property the Sophia Residence next to the property in
question it is consistent with the University’s
goal to keep
control over the developments on its premises.
[56]
Although specific stakeholders were not named in the general consent
by the Minister, it is also relevant to note that what
was envisaged
according to the plan to be sold to stakeholders was a site for a
sport centre. The Theological College submitted
that the sport
centre would indeed be relevant to the University but importantly
would be available to the general public. The
argument applies to the
shopping centres. What can’t be overlooked is the fact that
those facilities would be relevant to
the general operations of the
university.
[57]
In addition, neither party was able to show that the general consent
of the Minister was for the purposes of expanding not
only the
commercial aspect for the University and that it would acquire money
for selling the properties, but also the Theological
College was
unable to demonstrate that the intended sales would be for a purpose
unrelated to the convenience of the University
and its staff.
[58]
In my view therefore the University has made out a case that the
lease was one of delectus persona and that it is accordingly
entitled
to the relief that it seeks.
[59]
A Draft Order has been prepared and marked X. It is handwritten.
[60]
Prior to the conclusion of the trial it was brought to my attention
that there was an agreed Draft Order in respect of the
litigation
between the University and the fourth defendant and that there was an
agreed Draft Order that they wish me to make an
Order of Court.
The Order that I would make is the
following:
[1] The agreed
Draft Order marked X in respect of the fourth defendant is made an
Order of Court.
[2] The first and
second defendants and all persons occupying through or under them are
evicted from Portion 1 of Earth 809 Auckland
Park Township
registration division IR Province of Gauteng held under title deed
T9764/209 situated at 51 Richmond Avenue Auckland
Park Johannesburg,
and they shall vacate the property by 30 November 2016.
[3] That the third
defendant is ordered to cancel the registration of the notarial long
term lease agreement with registered reference
number K4963/1996
registered against the title deed of Portion 1 of Earth 809 Auckland
Park Township registration division IR Province
of Gauteng held under
title deed T9764/2009 situated at 51 Richmond Avenue Auckland Park
Johannesburg.
[4] The first and
second defendant’s counterclaim is dismissed with costs.
M VICTOR
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION
COUNSEL
FOR THE APPLICANT
INSTRUCTED
BY
COUNSEL
FOR THE RESPONDENTS
INSTRUCTED
BY