About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
>>
2017
>>
[2017] ZAGPJHC 33
|
|
Mashele v Momentum Insurance and Another (15304/2016) [2017] ZAGPJHC 33 (2 March 2017)
THE
HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NO: 15304/2016
Reportable:
NO
Of
interest to other judges: NO
Revised
2
March 2017
In
the matter between:
NKOSINATHI
MASHELE
Applicant
And
MOMENTUM
INSURANCE
First
Respondent
HAPPY
NTHABISENG
POOE Second
Respondent
JUDGMENT
RATSHIBVUMO
AJ
:
1.
This is an application for specific performance whereby the applicant
seeks an order compelling the first respondent to honour
its
contractual obligations. On 02 September 2014, the applicant and the
first respondent concluded a contract in terms of which
the first
respondent provided short term insurance cover over the applicant’s
motor vehicle against loss or damage, in return
of him paying the
necessary monthly premiums. The applicant lodged a claim against the
first respondent following the damage to
the insured property which
according to him emanates from a motor collision he was involved in
on 16 November 2014. The second
respondent is the driver the other
motor vehicle that collided with his. The first respondent assessed
the claim and concluded
that it was uneconomical to have the motor
vehicle repaired. After a full assessment, the first respondent
repudiated the claim.
It is that decision that the applicant seeks to
reverse through this application. The order sought against the second
respondent
is in the alternative and will only be dealt with in the
event the main relief is not granted.
2.
Counsel for the first respondent adopted an approach that the matter
should have been dealt with by way of action since there
is dispute
of fact. This could perhaps explain why the affidavit deposed to on
behalf of the first respondent is very scanty. Save
for its preamble,
its content comprises merely of responses to the affidavit by the
applicant without stating anything outside
thereof. The heads of
argument comprising of just over two paged, prepared by the first
respondent’s counsel do nothing to
rescue the situation. It
appears from the affidavit filed for the first respondent that all
the allegations outside its knowledge
(including the collision) are
denied, putting the applicant to the proof. The existence of the
policy issued to the applicant under
policy no. MT22339470 is
admitted although the first respondent disputes that the applicant
complied with all the terms and conditions
thereof.
3.
Not every bare denial constitutes a dispute of fact. For the court to
conclude that there is a dispute of fact warranting oral
evidence,
first the dispute must be real, genuine or
bona
fide
, and second,
it should be one that cannot be decided on papers.
[1]
I now embark on a search for disputed facts. Without divulging much,
the first respondent’s affidavit refers to the signed
contract
and avers that the applicant failed to comply with his obligations
under claims. As to how he failed, no details are given.
[2]
The first respondent further refers to a letter “attached”
to the affidavit in which the applicant was informed “of
the
fact that the claim against the policy is rejected as a result of the
fact that the applicant did not meet his responsibilities
as agreed
upon in the agreement between the parties.”
[3]
Had this letter been attached as averred, I am hopeful it would have
been more helpful in that information on how the applicant
failed to
comply with his obligations could be included. When asked for this
letter, counsel for the first respondent indicated
that reference to
the letter was an error since no such letter was written to the
applicant.
4.
The question this court is seized with is whether the alleged dispute
of fact is about a collision having taken place or whether
the
applicant complied with his obligations emanating from the contract?
There is no dispute that the applicant paid the premiums
and that
such payments were up to date on the date of the collision. An
assessment report was attached by the first respondent
which appears
to be the basis of its repudiation of the claim.
[4]
From this report it appears a certain Ettiene (the assessor) was
appointed by the first respondent to compile an assessment report.
The assessor interviewed the applicant who gave him details of where
he was coming from when he was involved in an accident. The
applicant
was asked for information on “beacons and billings; consent
letter to obtain the police, hospital and tracker records;
contact
details of people to confirm his movements prior to the accident; PQ
for the Nokia phone he bought at Edgars after the
accident (this
after the applicant alleged that his phone was stolen on the night of
the accident); and copies of his bank statement).
The report does not
give reasons or why this information was relevant in order to
validate the claim, save to say it was a reasonable
request. The
applicant declined to give this information at the time of the
interview, holding a view that they were invading his
privacy asking
for information not relevant to the claim.
5.
It appears further from the assessment report that the applicant
informed the assessor that he was collected from the accident
scene
by his brother whose contact details were made available to him, but
he could not make contact with him. The assessor also
had access to
the police’ AR report where he obtained information on other
parties involved. He also made contact with “Johnny”
the
towing operator who towed the applicant’s motor vehicle after
the accident. He confirmed the accident to the assessor
and that on
his arrival at the scene he found the police and parties involved in
the accident. The lady who was involved in a collision
with the
applicant was also contacted. She confirmed the accident to the
assessor and that the accident was due to her fault.
6.
According to the assessment report, the AR report also reflects that
the applicant had a female passenger in the motor vehicle,
contrary
to what he had told the assessor that he was alone. The assessor
contacted her and she confirmed over the phone having
been to the
scene of the accident after she was taken there. She denied that she
was a passenger though. She refused to give any
further information.
The assessor concluded the report with a recommendation that since
the applicant was given 48 hours to furnish
the documents referred to
above and he did not comply, the claim should be repudiated for
failing to comply with a reasonable request.
No repudiation letter
was given to the applicant. The only letter close to repudiation was
the one demanding that he should avail
certain documents within 48
hours.
7.
Against this background is the applicant’s affidavit which does
not only aver the motor collision, but he attaches to it
public
documents such as the AR report, the accident scene sketch plan,
copies of the charges sheet from the Protea Magistrate
Court and the
admission of guilt receipt – case no. 69/826/15. These public
documents confirm that a car accident took place
and police officers
from Protea Glen Police station opened the case as per Case no.
284/11/14 in which the applicant and the second
respondent were
involved. Police officers who attended to the incident are named in
the AR report. The copies of charge sheet reflect
that the second
respondent appeared in court on several occasions before she paid an
admission of guilt fine of R1000.00, related
to the incident of
driving a motor vehicle recklessly or negligently on the 16
th
November 2014.
8.
I am convinced that given the assessment report attached to the first
respondent’s affidavit, the applicant’s affidavit
and all
the annexures attached thereto; there is no real, genuine or bona
fide dispute of fact on whether the applicant was involved
in a
collision. In the alternative, should it be that there is, such
dispute is one that can easily be determined on filed papers.
9.
The next aspect which appears to be a genuine issue that gave rise to
the repudiation of the claim is whether the applicant complied
with
the reasonable request by the first respondent as contracted. After
initially refusing to furnish the documents requested,
the applicant
later made the following documents available to the first respondent:
an affidavit on a Vodacom letterhead that was
signed by the applicant
on 04 April 2015 in which he gives permission to Vodacom to avail all
the information on his cell phone
data to the first respondent; a
letter directed to tracker (Mix Telematics) dated 31 March 2015 in
which he gives tracker permission
to avail the tracking information
required by the respondent in respect of the insured motor vehicle;
ABSA bank statements and
a proof of purchase of a cell phone bought
by the applicant (invoices from Edgars store).
10.
An email from a certain Ben Badenhorst of the first respondent, dated
24 April 2015 acknowledges receipt of these document followed
by a
statement to the effect that they have identified the discrepancies
which they need to clarify and they would need to meet
him in person.
No further details were made as to what discrepancies were these or
how they impact on the claim. The affidavit
by the first respondent
does not divulge these either.
11.
The applicant avers that he complied with every reasonable request
from the first respondent. His initial view was that the
request for
the information he refused to give was not reasonable. The first
respondent held a different view. Without any reason
why the first
respondent needed the information requested (although this was
demanded) from the applicant, the court is not able
to find that such
a request is reasonable within the meaning of the contract. One would
expect that the information to be requested
would be reasonable if it
enabled the first respondent not only to verify that the insured
property was damaged, but also to help
in assessing the damage or the
costs.
12.
The court is not able to find how the bank statements of the
applicant would assist in assessing the claim since one would expect
it to have its own records of the applicant’s payments of the
premiums. The relevance of the proof of purchase of a new cell
phone
and tracker records can only be found if the court is guided thereto.
When the applicant had refused to give these to the
first applicant
and even pleaded in papers that these were irrelevant and the request
thereto unreasonable, the first respondent
had a duty to convince the
court as to why the same was seen as being reasonable, and it opted
not to.
13.
Had the applicant not complied with this request, the court would not
have any reason to fault him given the fact that the information
required appeared to be irrelevant given that the basis for the
relevance was not presented to court. The only possible reason
in the
demand by the first respondent could be to try and find a lie or
misrepresentation on the part of the applicant in a desperate
search
for a reason to repudiate a claim even in circumstances where there
appeared to be none. This could explain the demand for
a meeting with
the applicant in person to talk about the undisclosed discrepancies.
14.
I pause to highlight that counsel for the first respondent zoomed
into possible misrepresentation by the applicant to the effect
that
he was alone in the motor vehicle at the time of the collision,
whereas the AR report reflected that there was a passenger.
This
aspect, and any further search for the misrepresentations on the part
of the applicant ignores the provisions of sec
1 Act 53
of 1998 (the
Short term Insurance Act) to the effect,
“
(1) (a) Notwithstanding anything to the
contrary contained in a short-term policy, whether entered into
before or after the commencement
of this Act, but subject to
subsection (2)-
(i)
the policy shall not be invalidated;
(ii)
the obligation of the short-term insurer thereunder shall not
be excluded or limited;
and
(iii)
the obligations of the policyholder shall not be increased
,
on account of any representation made to the
insurer which is not true,
or failure
to disclose information, whether or not the representation or
disclosure has been warranted to be true and correct,
unless
that representation or non-disclosure is such as to be likely to have
materially affected the assessment of the risk under
the policy
concerned at the time of its issue or at the time of any renewal or
variation thereof.
(b) The representation or non-disclosure shall be
regarded as material if a reasonable, prudent person would consider
that the particular
information constituting the representation or
which was not disclosed, as the case may be, should have been
correctly disclosed
to the short-term insurer so that the insurer
could form its own view as to the effect of such information on the
assessment of
the relevant risk. [Own emphasis].
15.
It is for this reason that Meyer AJ held in
Holley
v Auto & General Insurance Company Ltd
[5]
that
“
the fact that such information was not
disclosed in itself does not justify the repudiation of the
plaintiff’s claim.
The defendant bears the onus of
proving that the test for materiality as enacted in the amended
section 53(1) of the Short-Term
Insurance Act 53 of 1998 (“the
Short-Term Insurance Act&rdquo
;), was satisfied.”
Suppose
there was indeed a misrepresentation made by the applicant, the first
respondent would have to show that such misrepresentation
is such as
to be likely to have materially affected the assessment of the risk
under the policy concerned at the time of its issue
or at the time of
any renewal or variation thereof.
16.
When this provision was first introduced through the amendment of
sec
63
the now repealed 27 of 1943 (the Insurance Act); sec 63 (3) read,
“
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary
contained in any domestic policy or any document relating to such
policy, any such policy
issued before or after the commencement of
this Act, shall not be invalidated and the obligation of an insurer
thereunder shall
not be excluded or limited and the obligations of
the owner thereof shall not be increased, on account of any
representation made
to the insurer which is not true, whether or not
such representation has been warranted to be true, unless the
incorrectness of
such representation is of such a nature as to be
likely to have materially affected the assessment of the risk under
the said policy
at the time of issue or any reinstatement or renewal
thereof.”
The
objective of sec 63 (3) was explained by Kriegler AJA in
Qilingele
v South African Mutual Life Assurance Society
[6]
as
follows,
“
The object of the enactment is manifest,
namely to protect claimants under insurance contracts against
repudiations based on inconsequential
inaccuracies or trivial
misstatements in insurance proposals. An insurer’s right
to repudiate liability on the basis
of the untruth of a
representation made to it, whether elevated to a warranty or not, was
curtailed.”
17.
I refer to these authorities merely to deal with the failure on the
part of the first respondent to deal with the reasons for
the demand
of information the applicant initially refused to give and the impact
of the possible misrepresentation to the claim
if any. The refusal by
the applicant to comply with the demand for the information is in my
view a non-issue since the applicant
has since complied with it. I do
not suggest though that such a demand was a reasonable request.
18.
The last correspondence to the applicant before the repudiation of
his claim was a demand to furnish the information within
48 hours,
failure of which would result in the claim being repudiated. Of
course, such was not furnished within 48 hours, but in
about three to
four months later. There is no reason furnished as to why the first
respondent demanded compliance within such a
short and unreasonable
period of time. But it would appear from the totality of the evidence
that the first respondent hoped for
the applicant not to comply so it
could have a reason to repudiate the claim. It is noteworthy that the
only time limit provided
for in the contract is the 30 days within
which the claim should be lodged with the first respondent after the
incident.
19.
Just as the Supreme Court of Appeal
held in
Walker v
Sanlam LTD and Others
,
[7]
the claim of this nature is based on a contract as opposed to
delictual liability. The claim is therefore not calculated on the
loss suffered but the value of the property insured as per contract.
20.
The liability of the first respondent in case of a damage to the
insured property is incorporated in the agreement as follows,
“
Our responsibilities
:
We have the choice to settle your claim in any of the following ways:
·
Paying out cash to you,
·
Repairing the damage at the repairer
of our choice,
·
Replacing the item at a supplier of
our choice,
·
Any combination of the above.
Where any item claimed for is financed, we will first pay the finance
company. Where a claim is settled for lost or damaged items,
these
items become ours.
If we elect to repair, we will only do so up to
the maximum insured value noted on you schedule for the specific
section you are
claiming under”
[8]
The Insured Value
The insured value noted on your schedule is maximum amount we will
pay in the event of a claim, less the excess and any dual insurance,
betterment or any depreciation.
If the vehicle is financed, we will first ay the outstanding
settlement amount to the finance company up to the maximum amount
of
the insured value, excluding
·
Any early settlement penalties,
·
Additional finance charges,
·
Any arrear instalments and interest.
We will pay you the difference if the settlement amount is less than
the insured value, less the applicable excess and the charges
stated
above.
The insured value of your vehicle and its
accessories is determined by the Auto Dealers’ Guide…”
[9]
21.
From the above it is clear that once there was a claim lodged and,
the first respondent would be expected to take measures to
determine
if the insured item is indeed damaged and that it was not damaged
under the circumstances that are excluded in the contract.
[10]
In so doing, the first respondent may have to make reasonable request
to help it make such determinations. Where such a determination
requires personal and private information of the applicant, the first
respondent is obliged to inform the applicant how such information
is
relevant and necessary for any particular determination based on a
contract.
22.
From the contract, it is also clear that it is the responsibility of
the first respondent to determine the market value of the
insured
property, pay that amount (less all the charges reflected above if
any) to the financing company, and in this case, Mercedes
Benz
Financial Services. If the market value is above the amount owed, the
balance would have to be paid to the applicant. From
the Net Assess
document compiled by the first respondent and filed by the applicant,
the value is reflected as R405 000.00. I am
not sure if this is the
insured value or not. I have noted that the applicant’s counsel
indicated that the applicant accepts
the value determined by the
first respondent. The relief sought by the applicant confuses this
acceptance in that R455 576.73 is
claimed from the first respondent.
This appears to be the closing balance owed to Mercedes Benz
Financial Services as of 29 February
2016. A further R113 263.85 is
claimed as a reimbursement and there is no basis laid for this. The
order for specific performance
sought requires that the first
respondent complies with the contract entered into with the
applicant, and the order shall be in
those terms.
23. In the result, I make the following order.
The
first respondent is ordered to
23.1 determining the insured value of
the insured property as on the date of the damage using the
methodology agreed in the Insurance
Contract;
23.2 pay the amount of the insured
value (less the necessary and agreed charges) to Mercedes Benz
Financial Services within 30 days
of this order;
23.3 pay the balance, if any into the
applicant’s account.
The applicant is ordered to
23.4 hand over, deliver or make
available the damaged motor vehicle (insured property) in the
condition it was after the collision
within 15 days of this order,
failing which, the first respondent would be entitled to deduct its
value as per assessment report
from the insured value.
23.5 The first respondent is ordered
to pay the costs of this application.
_____________________
T.V.
RATSHIBVUMO
ACTING
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
Date
Heard: 30 February 2017
Reasons
Delivered: 02 March 2017
For
the Applicant: Adv. KM Mokotedi
Instructed
by: Nukeri Incorporated
Johannesburg
For
the First Respondent: Adv LK Van der Merwe
Instructed
by: DJ Swanepoel & Associates
Johannesburg
[1]
Plascon-Evans Paints LTD v Van Rebeeck Paints
(PTY) LTD
[1984] ZASCA 51
;
1984 (3) SA 623
(A) at p. 634H - 635A and
Miele et Cie GmbH & Co v Euro Electrical (PTY) LTD 1988 (2) SA
583 (A).
[2]
See p. 91 para 13 & 14 (Opposing Affidavit).
[3]
See p. 93 para 22 (Opposing Affidavit).
[4]
See p. 97, Annexure O titled “Reason for
referral”
[5]
(04/31731)
[2007] ZAGPHC 282
(1 October 2007)
[6]
1993 (1) SA 69
(A) at 74B
[7]
2009 (6) SA 224
(SCA)
.
[8]
See page 3 of the Insurance Contract under
“Claims”.
[9]
See page 19 of the Insurance Contract under
“Insured Value”
[10]
See page 21 of the Insurance Contract where
circumstances such as driving without a valid licence, driving under
the influence
of alcohol, etc. is excluded.