Ricoh South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Another v First Golden Stationers CC and Others (2015/26094) [2016] ZAGPJHC 409 (2 September 2016)

70 Reportability
Commercial Law

Brief Summary

Interdict — Fraudulent misrepresentation — Applicants sought interdict against respondents for making false representations to clients and unlawfully competing — Respondents opposed application, alleging abuse and hearsay — Court struck out substantial portions of applicants' affidavits as hearsay, leaving limited evidence — Remaining evidence insufficient to establish fraudulent conduct or misrepresentation — Application dismissed.

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[2016] ZAGPJHC 409
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Ricoh South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Another v First Golden Stationers CC and Others (2015/26094) [2016] ZAGPJHC 409 (2 September 2016)

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG LOCAL
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NUMBER
:
2015/26094
REPORTABLE: YES / NO
OF INTEREST TO OTHER
JUDGES: YES/NO
REVISED.
2/09/2016
In
the matter between:
RICOH
SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD

FIRST APPLICANT
NASHUA
LTD

SECOND APPLICANT
AND
FIRST
GOLDEN STATIONERS CC

FIRST RESPONDENT
KAMANGA,
FUNANI MAVIS

SECOND RESPONDENT
SMIT,
CHARMAIN

THIRD RESPONDENT
DAVE
MARTINS

FOURTH RESPONDENT
HERISTOVA,
JESSICA

FIFTH RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
WINDELL
J:
INTRODUCTION
[1] This is an
application for interdictory relief against the first to fifth
respondents.
[2] The application is
only opposed by the first and second respondents. There is no
indication that the third, fourth and fifth
respondents are aware of
the proceedings.
[3] In essence the
applicants seek an order prohibiting the respondents to make false
representations to the applicants’ clients
and prohibiting the
respondents from selling or attempting to sell any products to the
applicants’ clients. The applicants
allege that all five
respondents engaged in fraudulent conduct by making false
representations to the applicants’ clients,
and by using
confidential information of the applicants to unlawfully compete with
the applicants.
[4]
The first and second respondents contend that the application is an
abuse, is based entirely on hearsay evidence, and is an
attempt to
stifle lawful competition.
[5] Prior to the hearing
of this application, the first and second respondents brought an
application in terms of Uniform Rule 6
(15) to strike out certain
portions and annexures relating to the founding affidavit and
replying affidavit, which they averred
constituted hearsay evidence.
[6] It was clear that the
offending paragraphs were hearsay as the applicants relied on
“information” given to them
by “certain clients”.
This information is in essence the emails and documents attached to
the founding affidavit. Some
of the emails were referring to second
hand information conveyed to the authors of the emails by other
persons. The emails came
from unknown parties, none of whom signed
confirmatory affidavits as to the truth or correctness of the emails
or the context in
which it was sent or received.
[7] The court granted the
application and large portions of the founding and replying affidavit
were struck out.
THE PARTIES
[8]
The first applicant is
Ricoh South Africa (Pty) Ltd (“Ricoh”),
a company with limited liability duly incorporated, with its
principal business
at Bedfordview, Johannesburg. The second applicant
is Nashua Ltd (“Nashua”) a company with limited liability
duly incorporated,
with its principal business at Woodmead, Sandton.
[9]
The applicants are suppliers and service providers of office
automation equipment. This includes amongst others, the supply
of
office machines to do printing, copying, scanning and faxing of
documents. Apart from selling and renting machines to clients,
the
applicants also conduct maintenance and servicing of the machines in
accordance with the maintenance and service agreements
with the
clients. Part of the applicants service to their clients, is to
provide their clients, free of charge, the required toner
for their
machines. The applicants have their respective networks of
dealerships and authorized representatives through which the
toners
are distributed to its clients nationally and internationally.
[10]
The first respondent is
First Golden
Stationers CC (“First Golden”), a close corporation, with
its principal place of business at Leondale,
Germiston. First Golden
has only one member
namely the second respondent,
Funani Mavis Kamanga (“Kamanga”). First Golden
conducts business from Kamanga’s residential address.
[11]
First Golden’s business is supplying toner
and other items of stationery to businesses and to the public. First
Golden do
not run a warehouse or retail outlet and do not hold any
stock. In all instances orders are taken telephonically or via email
or
fax, and First Golden then “buy-to-order”. Invoices
are dispatched and delivery is only made once payment is done. The

toner is ordered from suppliers.
[12]
The fourth respondent is Dave Martins, and the fifth respondent is
Jessica Heristova. The applicants allege that the fourth
and fifth
respondents are employed by First Golden. Kamanga
stated,
under oath, that she has no knowledge of who the fourth and fifth
respondent are; has never employed them in any capacity,
nor had she
done any business with them, and neither she or First Golden can be
held accountable for any representations or alleged

misrepresentations made them.
[13] The third respondent
is Charmain Smit. Kamanga confirmed that the third respondent was
employed with First Golden for a period.
She took orders, created
invoices and ensured that payments were received. She was not on the
telesales side of the business and
her function was that of an
administrator and secretary. She left her employment at First Golden
in December 2014.
BACKGROUND FACTS
[14]
The applicants allege in their founding affidavit
that
during 2012 some of Ricoh’s clients complained that “another
company” contacts them on a regular basis and
attempts to sell
them toner for use in their office machines. This “other
company” will in some instances also tell
the clients that
Ricoh is unable to supply toner, or that Ricoh has sub-contracted
them to supply toner at a charge. The applicants
aver that in some
instances the respondents used the name of the applicants in the
first person (“
we at Ricoh; we at
Nashua
”) in its email messages to
create the impression to clients that the message that the clients
receive actually emanates from
the applicants’ offices.
[15] Ricoh investigated
the complaints and concluded that First Golden was the “other
company”.
[16] The applicants aver
that the respondents have intricate knowledge of what machines the
applicants’ clients use and that
they also have intricate
knowledge of the persons in the client’s organisations. It
therefore appears that the respondents
possess confidential
information of the applicants which they obtained in some way or
another.
[17] The allegations of
fraud and a scam are denied and First Golden avers that the real
intention of the applicants is to close
down a competitor under the
vague and misleading guise of some sort of unlawful activity.
[18] It is common cause
that Ricoh’s attorney of record sent a written demand to First
Golden’s attorneys on 9 November
2012, wherein it was demanded
that First Golden give a written undertaking to refrain from
contacting or soliciting their customers,
and to refrain from
representing that they are associated with or contacting the clients
on behalf of Ricoh. Kamanga replied with
a letter through her
attorneys, and stated that First Golden gets its clients from the
telephone directory and that they do not
know who Ricoh’s
customers are. In this letter Kamanga also denied making any false
presentations to any customers.
THE EVIDENCE
[19] As indicated
earlier, large portions of the applicant’s founding and
replying affidavit were struck out as it amounted
to hearsay. The
only allegations in the founding affidavit that remain in support of
the relief sought are the following paragraphs:
34.
BME Omnia

During
or about October 2012 the third respondent, representing the First
Respondent, conducted unlawful and fraudulent behavior
towards BME
Omnia Group (Pty) Ltd, a client of the first applicant.
35.
In this regard I
attach hereto a tax invoice issued by the first respondent dated 19
October 2012 in the amount of some R 51 290.00
for toner. From this
invoice it is clear that the first respondent has the specific
particulars of what machine it is for and also
the contact details of
the person in employ of the client. Also to this client the first
applicant normally provides toner free
of charge and they should
never have purchased or paid for any from the first respondent. I
attach a copy of this invoice with
number # 021221 hereto marked
“FA5”.
36.
In order to conduct
trade with Omnia, Omnia requested the first respondent to apply to
become a supplier of Omnia and in this regard
the first respondent
had to complete an application form, a copy of which I obtained from
Omnia attached hereto marked “FA6”.
37.
From this document the
particulars and addresses of the first respondent appears as well as
that of the first respondent’s
member, the second respondent.
Also on the document appear the particulars of the third respondent
and her identity number.
38.
I state from this that
it is accordingly clear who acts through and on behalf of the first
respondent and as a result I state that
the second and third
respondents on this basis have to also be subjected to the order as
prayed for in the notice of motion in
their personal capacities as in
addition to only the first respondent “
54.
AON SA
On or about 20
December 2012 the first defendant supplied toner to AON South Africa
(Pty) Ltd, a client of the first applicant,
in respect of toner for a
Gestetner MPC5501 machine. I attach hereto marked “FA11”
a copy of the invoice with number
#078321 in the amount of R 31
720.00 as well as proof of payment by the client attached hereto
marked “ FA12” .
55.
Thereafter and or
about 7 January 2013 the respondents attempted to again supply AON
with toner on the same unlawful and fraudulent
basis and issued a tax
invoice with number #078356 to AON in the amount of R 95 160.00 a
copy of which I attach hereto marked “FA13”
71.
Total SA
During January 2015,
clients of the first applicant again complained to the first
applicant about the unlawful conduct of the first
respondent.
72.
In this regard I
attach hereto marked FA16 a copy of an email message dated 16 January
2015 at 01h00 pm sent from Jessica Heristova
the fifth respondent to
Sphesile Sithole from Total SA.
73.
From this message it
appears that the fifth respondent fraudulently impersonates as being
contacting the client from the first applicant
where she states “We
at Ricoh have a shortage on these toners and we are only getting our
next shipment in October 2015.
First Golden is reliable supplier of
these toners and has enough in stock”.
74.
The fifth respondent’s
email signature then implies that she is a “secretary from Head
Office, Rich Machines, South
Africa”. This is a fraudulent
misrepresentation as there is no person by that name employed by the
first applicant”
75.
An invoice was then
issued dated 15 January 2015 to Total Ladysmith (Pty) Ltd from the
first respondent a copy of which is attached
hereto marked “FA17”
76.
Santam
The first respondent
also fraudulently targets the first applicant’s clients in
Namibia. In this regard I attaché hereto
marked “FA18”
a copy of an email message from the fifth respondent to Madrigale
Cloete from Santam Namibia dated 19
January 2015 at 4h42 pm.
78.
Public Service
Union
On 6 February 2015 at
10h04 am the fifth respondent sent an email message to Ms. Saara
Halweendo from the Public Service Union of
Namibia. A copy of this
email is attached marked “FA19”.
79.
Important to note in
that in this instance the fifth respondent impersonates to be from
“Ricoh Machines Windhoek, Namibia”.
Again in the same
fraudulent misrepresentations are made to these clients.
80.
In this instance Ms
Halweedo fell for the respondent’s fraud and the third
respondent sent an invoice to the first applicant’s
client. I
attach hereto marked FA 20 a copy of the invoice #008949 dated 9
February 2015 as well as marked FA21 a copy of the email
message from
the third respondent dated 9 February 2015 at 2h45 pm to which the
invoice was attached.”
90.
Department Arts
and Culture
I attach hereto marked
FA28 a copy of an email message dated 7 may 2015 under the hand of
the fifth respondent addressed to Nomsa
Rabotapi from the Department
of Arts and Culture.
91.
In this message the
fifth respondent again fraudulently representing to be acting on
behalf of the second applicant makes the false
statement similar to
the instances above.
[20] The answering
affidavit of Kamanga on her behalf, and on behalf of First Golden
revealed the following:
·
First Golden “cold calls”
all companies in South Africa to sell them goods, and does not have a
list of the applicants’
clients. Having regard to the fact that
the two applicants are the largest suppliers of toner in the country,
it is inevitable
that, from time to time, clients will be contacted
who are already clients of the applicants and who do not wish to do
business
with First Golden.
·
It is impossible for First Golden
to know who the applicants’ clients are, and Kamanga is not
privy to any confidential information
other than information which is
conveyed to First Golden and its employees by the clients who call
them or to whom they speak to
on the phone.
·
Many of the applicants’
alleged clients contact her as they are disgruntled with the level of
service and the turnaround times
in delivering toner. These clients
buy toner from First Golden notwithstanding and despite the fact that
they have might have service
level agreements in place with the
applicants.
·
First Golden also sources business
from various agents dealing in toner and some of these agents arrange
deals directly with the
clients. Kamanga then sent details of where
invoices must be sent and sends the invoices, receives payment and
arranges for delivery
of the goods. These agents are independent and
do not act for and on behalf of the First Golden. How they source
their business
and what representations are made by them is unknown
to her, and she cannot be held liable for their actions.
·
In many cases the orders are placed
directly or through agents who are ex-employees of the applicants
themselves, and therefore
are privy to information in relation to who
the correct people are to deal with at the so-called clients’
offices alternatively
are ex-employees who wish to divert business to
First Golden and away from the applicants as the result of the fact
that they have
grudges with the applicants.
·
First Golden’s invoices are
specific, they deal with the information as to the nature of the ink
for which toners are being
supplied as this is critical in order to
ensure that the correct toner is supplied, and this information is
gathered from the persons
who they deal with when the deal is being
done. The person being dealt with from the customer side is always
reflected on the invoice
and one would assume that, if any of these
so-called persons were disgruntled, or felt that they were being
misrepresented, a confirmatory
affidavit by them would have been
annexed to the founding affidavit instead of simply a series of
e-mails conveying second hand
and third hand information.
[21]
In their replying affidavit the applicants
attempted to change the cause of action to allege that First Golden
overcharged the customers
for such orders and in the circumstances
somehow acted unlawfully. This cause of action is made out in reply,
and is in any event
not a basis for an interdict as sought.
EVALUATION
[22] The remaining
paragraphs in the founding affidavit, after the hearsay evidence was
struck out, deal with six instances where
it is alleged that the
respondents acted in a fraudulent manner. In two of the instances the
third respondent (“Smit”)
is implicated, and in the
remaining four instances the fifth respondent (“Heristova”)
is implicated. The fourth respondent,
Dave Martins is not implicated
at all. I will deal with each of the six instances separately.
[23] In the first two
incidents regarding Omnia and AON, it is alleged by the applicants
that First Golden supplied toner to Omnia
and AON whom they allege
are the applicant’s clients. It is alleged that Smit
represented First Golden and that Smit engaged
in “unlawful and
fraudulent behavior” towards the applicant’s clients.
[24] Kamanga stated that
Smit was employed by First Golden during this period and that she was
responsible for taking orders and
creating invoices. First Golden
also admitted that it must have done some business with the Omnia
Group in October 2012 and with
AON during December 2012; but how such
business was secured and on what basis the orders were placed for
toner is unknown to them.
[25]
No confirmatory affidavits from Omnia or AON had been obtained
supporting the alleged impropriety and no particulars of Smit’s

alleged unlawful and fraudulent behavior were given. The applicants
only attached invoices that showed that First Golden supplied
toner
to Omnia and AON during October and December 2012, and that First
Golden applied to get onto the vendor roll of the BME Omnia
Group.
The correspondence emanating from Smit simply indicates that she
processed the invoices. There is nothing unlawful or fraudulent

therein and no inference of unlawful activity can be made under these
circumstances.
[26] In the four
remaining incidents involving Total SA, Santam, Public Service Union
and Department of Arts and Culture, the applicants
alleged that First
Golden, through the actions of the fifth respondent, Heristova, made
fraudulent representations to these clients
by stating that she is
from Ricoh and that “
Ricoh has a shortage on toners and that
First Golden is a reliable supplier of these toners and has enough in
stock”.
[27]
The representations in Heristova’s email are clearly false and
constitute a misrepresentation.
[28] In the instance of
Total SA, an email containing the above misrepresentations was sent
by Heristova to Sphesile Sithole at
Total SA on 16 January 2015. In
the instance of Public Service Union a similar email was sent by
Heristova to Saara Halweendo at
Public Service Union on 6 February
2015. In both instances First Golden issued invoices to Total and
Public Service Union with
an order after the emails from Heristova
were sent. The invoices were attached to the founding affidavit and
First Golden admitted
that the invoices belonged to them. No
confirmatory affidavits from Sithole at Total or from Halweendo at
Public Service Union
were however obtained.
[29] The applicants
conducted investigations into the alleged unlawful conduct of,
inter
alia,
First Golden and Kamanga. The outcome of this investigation
was not made available to the court. It seems as if the extent of the

investigation was a gathering of emails, which were attached to the
founding papers. The emails are unsubstantiated by any proper

information under oath, and none of the emails are supported by any
independent evidence to indicate that First Golden or Kamanga
engaged
in any fraudulent or unlawful conduct.
[30] In relation to the
annexures which constitute invoices from First Golden, there is a
factual dispute as to why those invoices
were disseminated. First
Golden stated that they source work from various agents and persons
who often obtain work on their own
behalf, and who then ask First
Golden to supply a quote to the client concerned. Kamanga contended
that this does not necessarily
imply that she and First Golden are
involved in any impropriety, as they simply supply a quote and
thereafter the quote is dispatched.
It is common cause that on every
quote where a payment was made, the goods were delivered.
[31] I am satisfied that
no case based on unlawful or fraudulent conduct has been made out
against First Golden and Kamanga.
[32]
In addition the applicants’ aim is to demonstrate that there
was an employee/employer relationship between First Golden
and
Heristova. If such a relationship is established, so they argue, the
fraudulent misrepresentation made by Heristova can be
attributed to
First Golden and Kamanga. The only attempt to link Heristova and
First Golden is the fact that after the misrepresentation
was made by
Heristova, orders were placed by Total SA and Public Service Union,
and quotations were dispatched from First Golden’s
office to
Total SA and Public Service Union. The court is asked to infer that
the invoices were dispatched as a result of the fraudulent

misrepresentations made by Heristova as a representative of First
Golden.
[33] Kamanga denied that
Heristova was ever employed by First Golden and stated that she has
no knowledge of who she is. Kamanga
further stated that she had never
done any business with her, and that First Golden cannot be held
accountable for any representations
or alleged misrepresentations
made by Heristova.
[34] The applicants did
not verify whether Heristova was actually in the employ of First
Golden and have simply made the assumption
based on their
investigation and collection of documentation which is over three
years old. There were not sufficient facts set
out by the applicants
to establish that Heristova was employed by First Golden and /or
Kamanga. There is however a link between
First Golden and Heristova
as the invoices and emails showed that after Heristova send an email
an invoice was dispatched from
First Golden. The question is whether
First Golden has a duty of care or is vicariously liable in relation
to the conduct of Heristova
in circumstances where her relationship
with First Golden is not clear, and where First Golden denied that
she was under their
control or in its employ.
Duty of care and
vicarious liability
[35]
The general principle of vicarious liability holds an employer
responsible for the wrongs committed by an employee during the
course
of employment. The courts have held that as long as the employee is
acting “within the course and scope of his/her
duties” or
is “engage with the affairs of his master”, that the
employer will be liable
[1]
.
[36]
The court stated that the rational of vicarious liability is to be
found in a range of underlined principles
[2]
.

An
important one is the desirability of affording claimants efficient
remedies for harm suffered. Another is the need to use legal
remedies
to incite employers to take active steps to prevent the employees
from harming members of the broader community. There
is a counter
availing principle to which is that damages should not be borne by
employers in all circumstances, but only in those
circumstances in
which it is fair to require them to do so”.
[37]
In
Absa
Bank Limited v Bond Equipment Pretoria (Pty) Ltd
[3]
,
the
court held the following:

The
master is not responsible for the private and personal acts of his
servant, unconnected with the latter’s employment,
even if done
during the time of his employment and with the permission of the
employer. The act causing damage must have been done
by the servant
in his capacity as servant and not as an independent individual.”
[38]
There is no evidence that Heristova has ever been employed by First
Golden. Kamanga gave a detailed explanation in her answering

affidavit in regards to agents and there was no basis laid down by
the applicants to find that First Golden had any control over
the
actions and conduct of Heristova. Applying the well-known principles
set down in
Plascon
Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd
[4]
,
and
in the absence of any contradictory evidence, the only reasonable
conclusion is that Heristova might have made the misrepresentations

in the furtherance of her own economic benefits, namely the earning
of potential commissions if deals were done. There is no evidence

that she acted on the authority or under the supervision of First
Golden or Kamanga. Kamanga in fact stated that the conduct and

behavior of Heristova may have been intended to defraud herself and
her business, as on at least one occasion the invoice rendered
was
fictitious and did not emanate from her office. I am satisfied that
First Golden cannot be expected to control the utterances
and
representations of persons who firstly they do not know, over whom
they have no control, and whom they do not employ in any
capacity.
This would be untenable and unfair. Whilst First Golden may have
benefited from the said representations to some extent,
this fact
alone cannot lead to the automatic inference that First Golden is
vicariously liable.
NOTICE OF MOTION
[39] The relief sought by
the applicants is set out in prayers 1 to 7 of the Notice of Motion.
The relief in prayers 3,4 and 5 were
abandoned on the day of the
hearing. The interdictory relief can be described as follows:
1.
Interdicting the respondents from making
false representations to clients of the applicants.
2.
Restraining the respondents from contacting
any of the applicants’ clients for the purpose of making an
attempt to sale or
supply printer toners to such clients.
3.
Costs of this application.
Prayer 1: The
interdict
[40] The applicants seek
an order interdicting the respondents from making false
representations to clients of the applicants.
[41] The requirements for
a final interdict are trite. The applicants must show: 1) A clear
right; 2) An injury actually committed
or reasonably apprehended; and
3) The absence of any other satisfactorily remedy available to the
applicant.
[42] As previously
indicated there is no evidence implicating First Golden and Kamanga.
There is also no evidence that Heristova
was in First Golden or
Kamanga’s employment or under their control, and First Golden
and Kamanga cannot be held responsible
for representations made by
her or any other independent agent. It is accordingly impossible for
First Golden and Kamanga to be
interdicted from making such
representations in circumstances where they have no control,
authority or influence over Heristova
or any other agent.
[43]
In the case of
Masstores
(Pty) Ltd v Pick ‘n Pay Retailers
[5]
,
the
Supreme Court of Appeal considered the burden of proof when
considering whether there has been an unlawful interference in an

contractual relationship, and expressly stated that the following
must be evident:
1.
That there is an unlawful act.
2.
That the unlawful act constitutes an
interference in the contractual relationship.
3.
The unlawful act was committed with some
sort of
dolus
.
[44] No details of the
applicants’ customers were provided. It is therefore impossible
to ascertain whether such clients have
in fact been interfered with,
and whether in fact the applicants have any proprietary interest
which is capable or deserving of
protection. The applicants have not
made available their contracts with their clients. The court can
therefore not ascertain if
the clients are prohibited from buying
from First Golden. The applicants simply made vague and sweeping
statements in regard to
some sort of right in relation to these
clients. There is therefore no evidence of an interference with a
contractual relationship
between the applicants and their customers.
[45] There is also no
evidence in support of the applicant’s allegation that First
Golden and Kamanga conducted any unlawful
act. Accordingly, there is
also no evidence of dolus. There is no reason in law or in fact why
First Golden and Kamanga would be
prohibited from doing business with
any of the applicants’ alleged clients.
[46] I agree with the
attorney of the respondents that the nature of the relief being
sought is similar to that of a party trying
to enforce a restraint of
trade against another party. Whilst in the present application there
is no contractual obligation for
First Golden and Kamanga not to deal
with the so-called clients of the Applicants, it helpful to observe
the comments of the Appellate
division in relation to the caution
which must be exercised when a restraint prohibits another party from
conducting its business
or earning a living.
[47]
In
Reddy
v Siemens Telecommunication
[6]
the
Supreme Court of Appeal dealt with a restraint of trade and the
following principles were set out:
[15]   “
The
court must make a value judgment with two principle policy
considerations in mind in determining the reasonableness of a
restraint.
The first is that the public interest requires that
parties should comply with their contractual obligations, a notion
expressed
by the maxim pacta servanda sunt. The second is that all
persons should in the interest of society be productive and be
permitted
to engage in trade and commerce or profession. Both
considerations reflect not only common law but also constitutional
values…..
[16]
In
applying these two principle considerations, a particular interest
must be examined. A restraint would be enforceable if it prevents
a
party after determination of his/her employment from partaking in
trade or commerce without a corresponding interest of the other
party
deserving of protection.”
[48] The interest between
the parties must be balanced. I agree with the attorney of the
respondents that the interests of First
Golden and Kamanga would be
severely prejudiced if the interdict is granted.
Prayer 2: The
restraint order
[49] The applicants seek
an order restraining the respondents from contacting any of the
applicants’ clients for the purpose
of selling, or attempting
to sell or to supply printer toners.
[50] Kamanga stated in
her answering affidavit that First Golden makes use of “cold
calling”, and from time to time
they will “cold call”
clients of the applicants. The applicants failed to make a list of
their clients available. The
order sought is too wide and will make
it impossible for First Golden to run its business. There is in any
event no contractual
basis made out in the founding affidavit upon
which the applicants’ clients cannot do business with the First
Golden. An
order to this effect would interfere with Kamanga’s
constitutional right to earn an income and to conduct her own
business,
and would be contrary to public policy.
[51] An order on these
terms would also be impractical and open to abuse by the applicants
who could at any stage contend or allege
that one of their clients
had been contacted for purpose of doing a sale and therefore hold the
respondents in contempt.
[52] The applicants had
failed to meet the requirements of a final interdict and that there
are no factual or legal basis to grant
such an order.
[53] In the result the
following order is made.
1. The application is
dismissed with costs.
L WINDELL
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT
Counsel
for applicants:

Adv.
J H De V Botha
Instructed
by:

Jordaan Attorneys
Attorney for 1st
and
2nd respondent:

Mr Rael Zimerman
Instructed by:

Taitz & Skikne Attorneys
Date of
hearing:

2
June 2016
Date of judgment:

2
September 2016
[1]
[1]
NK
v Minister of Safety and Security
[2]
Ad
par [21]
[3]
[4]
1984(3)
SA 623 (A)
[5]
[6]
[2006]
SCA 164