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[2015] ZASCA 127
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Mayo NO v De Montlehu (20504/2014) [2015] ZASCA 127; 2016 (1) SA 36 (SCA) (23 September 2015)
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THE
SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT
Case
No: 20504/2014
DATE:
23 SEPTEMBER 2015
Reportable
In
the matter between:
HENRY
MAYO
NO
...............................................................................................
FIRST
.
APPELLANT
SUMAYA
ABDOOL GAFAAR KAHAMMISSA NO
...................................
SECOND
APPELLANT
MATOME
STANLEY MPHAHLELE
NO
........................................................
THIRD
APPELLANT
CHEVREAU
CONSTRUCTION (PTY)
LTD
...............................................
FOURTH
APPELLANT
STARSPAN
INVESTMENTS (PTY)
LTD
.........................................................
FIFTH
APPELLANT
And
ALAIN
RIVALZ CHEVREAU DE
MONTLEHU
......................................................
RESPONDENT
Neutral
citation:
Mayo NO v De Montlehu
(20504/14)
[2015] ZASCA 127
(23 September 2015)
Coram:
Bosielo
,
Leach,
Majiedt,
Willis
and Zondi
JJA
Heard: 31 August
2015
Delivered: 23
September 2015
Summary:
Section 366(2) of the old Companies Act 61 of 1973 does not
affect the applicability of the time period stipulated in
s
44(1)
of the
Insolvency Act 24 of 1936
– the respondent, as a
‘person aggrieved’ in terms of
s 151
of the old Companies
Act successfully objected where the time period was not complied
with.
ORDER
On
appeal from
:
Gauteng
Local Division
,
Johannesburg
(
Kathree-Setiloane
J sitting as the court
of first instance)
, judgment reported
sub
nom
De Montlehu
v
Mayo
2015 (3) SA 253
(GJ).
The
appeal is dismissed with costs, including the costs of two counsel.
JUDGMENT
Willis
JA (Bosielo, Leach, Majiedt and Zondi JJA concurring):
[1]
The respondent (Mr Chevreau De Montlehu) was the applicant in the
court a quo. He was the sole shareholder and director of the
fourth
appellant, Chevreau Construction (Pty) Ltd (the company in
liquidation) at the time of its winding-up. Mr Chevreau De Montlehu
brought an application to review the decision of the Master of the
High Court, Johannesburg, made at a special meeting of creditors
of
the company in liquidation on 5 October 2012 in terms of which the
Master admitted a claim by the fifth appellant, Starspan
Investments
(Pty) Ltd (Starspan) against the insolvent estate of the company in
liquidation in an amount of R1 577 432.70.
The court a quo
(Kathree-Setiloane J) set aside that decision and ordered the first,
second, third and fifth appellants to pay
the costs of the
application (the first, second and third appellants being the joint
liquidators of the company in liquidation).
The court a quo granted
leave to appeal to this court.
[2]
Prior to its winding-up, the company in liquidation had taken over
the completion of a partly built townhouse development, which
had
been a joint venture between Starspan and a close corporation known
as Milton Dales Projects CC. Commissions were payable to
an estate
agent both on the purchase price of stands sold and on the value of
the building contracts, which were an integral part
of the
development and were sold together with the stands.
[3]
On 10 March 2006, a contract was concluded between Starspan and the
company in liquidation in terms of which the company in
liquidation
undertook to complete the development. A dispute arose between
Starspan and the company in liquidation as to who was
liable for the
estate agent’s commission, Starspan contending that it was the
company in liquidation, and the company in
liquidation contending
that it was Starspan. An arbitration to determine the liability for
payment of the commission was commenced
before the winding–up
of the company in liquidation. Starspan claimed just over R1,5
million from the company in liquidation
in this regard. The
arbitration was not proceeded with.
[4]
The company in liquidation was wound up by way of a special
resolution adopted on 22 July 2011 and registered on 6 September
2011. The day-to-day administration of the company in
liquidation was thereafter undertaken by the first appellant. After
the appointment of the liquidators, and at a time when no creditors
had proved claims against the company in liquidation, the joint
liquidators launched an application to set aside the sales and
transfers of two immovable properties by the company in liquidation
to Zemprop CC (Zemprop) and Premium Hotel and Property Investments
(Pty) Ltd (HPI) respectively. In response, Mr Chevreau De Montlehu,
Zemprop and HPI brought a counter-application seeking a stay of the
winding-up of the company in liquidation in terms of s 354
of the
Companies Act 61 of 1973 (the old Companies Act) on the basis that
Starspan had not proved its claim, with the consequence
that the
company in liquidation, in fact, no longer appeared to be insolvent,
with no other creditors having submitted claims.
[5]
When the fact that no creditors had submitted any claims was pointed
out to the first appellant by Mr Chevreau De Montlehu,
the first
appellant, at the request of Starspan, convened a special meeting of
creditors of the company in liquidation for the
purpose of proving
claims. This meeting was convened on 5 October 2012, at which two
claims by Starspan were lodged. The first
was for R173 479.40, being
an amount of taxed costs awarded in the arbitration and R1 557
432.70, being the amount in dispute in
the arbitration. The Master
admitted both claims to proof at that meeting, despite Mr Chevreau De
Montlehu’s attorney, Mr
David Kahn, having attempted to object
to the admission of the claim for R1 577 432.70 on the basis that it
had been disputed and
that the arbitration to determine the claim was
pending. Counsel for Starspan in turn objected that Mr Chevreau De
Montlehu did
not have locus standi as a creditor with a claim that
had been proved (or as one of the other persons mentioned in
s 44(7)
of the
Insolvency Act 24 of 1936
). Ultimately, Starspan’s
claims were admitted. It was the admission of these claims that led
to the application in the court
a quo to review the Master’s
decision.
[6]
Although both the Master and the appellants contended in the papers
that as Mr Chevreau De Montlehu was not a creditor of the
company in
liquidation he had no locus standi to object to the claim of Starspan
Investments, it was fairly and correctly conceded
by counsel for the
appellants, that Mr Chevreau De Montlehu indeed qualifies as an
aggrieved person in terms of
s 151
of the
Insolvency Act. This
section reads as follows:
‘
151. Review
Subject
to the provisions of section
fifty-seven
any person aggrieved by any decision, ruling, order or taxation of
the Master or by a decision, ruling or order of an officer presiding
at a meeting of creditors may bring it under review by the court and
to that end may apply to the court by motion, after notice
to the
Master or to the presiding officer, as the case may be, and to any
person whose interests are affected: Provided that if
all or most of
the creditors are affected, notice to the trustee shall be deemed to
be notice to all such creditors; and provided
further that the court
shall not re-open any duly confirmed trustee's account otherwise than
as is provided in section
one hundred
and twelve
.’
The
concession by counsel for the appellants accords with the decision of
this court in
Francis
George Hill Family Trust v South African Reserve Bank
.
[1]
[7]
In support of the review, Mr Chevreau De Montlehu contended that the
special meeting of creditors of the company in liquidation
held on 5
October 2012 had been convened in order to defeat the aforesaid
counter-application to stay its winding-up and to ‘avoid
having
a disputed claim tested and proven in a fair and impartial manner’.
He further submitted that, as that meeting had
taken place more than
three months after the second meeting of creditors that was held on
11 May 2012,
s 44(1)
of the
Insolvency Act had
not been complied
with. That section provides:
‘
(1)
Any person or the representative of any person who has a liquidated
claim against an insolvent estate, the cause of which arose
before
the sequestration of that estate, may, at any time before the final
distribution of that estate in terms of section
one
hundred and thirteen
, but subject to
the provisions of section
one hundred
and four
, prove that claim in the
manner hereinafter provided: Provided that no claim shall be proved
against an estate after the expiration
of a period of three months as
from the conclusion of the second meeting of creditors of the estate,
except with leave of the Court
or the Master, and on payment of such
sum to cover the cost or any part thereof, occasioned by the late
proof of the claim, as
the Court or Master may direct.’
Relying
on this section, it was submitted by Mr Chevreau De Montlehu that the
proof of these claims was flawed as it had taken place
without the
leave of the Master or the court. Furthermore, there had been no
payment by Starspan of costs in relation thereto as
should have been
directed by the Master or the court.
[8]
The critical question in this case is whether the three-month
time-frame, as provided for in
s 44(1)
of the
Insolvency Act, applies
to companies in liquidation. The appellants’ assertion both in
the court a quo and in this court was that it did not. This
contention was based on the interpretation of
s 366(2)
of the old
Companies Act that it gave the Master, on the application of the
liquidator, a broad discretion to extend the time period
for the
proof of claims. Accordingly, so the argument went, there was no need
to obtain leave or pay costs in regard to the late
lodging of claims
against a company in liquidation as provided for in terms of s 44(1)
of the
Insolvency Act in
regard to sequestrated estates of natural
persons.
[9]
The Master filed a report in response to Mr Chevreau De Montlehu’s
application, but did not oppose it. He said that at
the meeting on 5
October 2012 he had no difficulty ex facie the claim form, as in his
view, it accorded with the statutory requirements,
was a liquidated
claim and was, accordingly, approved. He has maintained this stance
and set out, in detail, his reasons for his
decision to admit the
claim of Starspan. Not only the Master, but also the appellants, have
alleged that the claim of Starspan
was lodged timeously and in
anticipation of the special meeting on 5 October 2012 and in
accordance with the provisions of
s 366(2)
of the old Companies Act.
[10]
In this court, counsel for the parties agreed that the case falls to
be decided by reference to a single issue: whether the
three-month
time-frame – and therefore the fixing of costs and thereafter
the payment thereof in respect of claims proved
outside of this
time-frame – as provided for in
s 44(1)
of the
Insolvency Act
applied
to companies in liquidation or not.
[11]
Sections 366(1)
and (2) of the old Companies Act provide:
‘
(1)
In the winding-up of a company by the Court and by
a creditors' voluntary winding-up -
(a)
the claims against the company shall be
proved at a meeting of creditors
mutatis
mutandis
in accordance with the
provisions relating to the proof of claims against an insolvent
estate under the law relating to insolvency;
(b)
a secured creditor shall be under the
same obligation to set a value upon his security as if he were
proving his claim against an
insolvent estate under the law relating
to insolvency, and the value of his vote shall be determined in the
same manner as is prescribed
under that law;
(c)
a secured creditor and the liquidator
shall, where the company is unable to pay its debts, have the same
right respectively to take
over the security as a secured creditor
and a trustee would have under the law relating to insolvency.
(2)
The Master may, on the application of the
liquidator, fix a time or times within which creditors of the company
are to prove their
claims or otherwise be excluded from the benefit
of any distribution under any account lodged with the Master before
those debts
are proved.’
[12]
In similar vein, s 339 of the old Companies Act provides that:
‘
In
the winding-up of a company unable to pay its debts the provisions of
the law relating to insolvency shall, in so far as they
are
applicable, be applied
mutatis mutandis
in respect of any
matter not specifically provided for by this Act.’
Counsel
for both sides agreed, however, that for purposes of this case, the
critical issue was the interpretation to be placed on
s 366, as s 339
obviously applies to provisions of the
Insolvency Act that
are not
otherwise covered by
s 366(2)
of the old Companies Act.
[13]
The question, therefore, is what precisely is affected by the
qualification ‘mutatis mutandis’ in s 366(1) of the
old
Companies Act. The appellants submitted that, insofar as the
applicability of
section 44(1)
of the
Insolvency Act was
concerned,
‘mutatis mutandis’ in
s 366(1)
of the old Companies Act
meant that the adoption and incorporation of the law of insolvency in
regard to natural persons applied
only to the
manner
of
proving claims and not the time periods within which this was to be
done. Accordingly, it was contended that the fixing of costs
by the
Master and the payment thereof by the creditor did not apply in the
case of companies in liquidation. Much, therefore, depends
on the
precise interpretation of the words ‘mutatis mutandis’.
[14]
In
South
African Fabrics Ltd v Millman No
[2]
Ogilvie Thompson CJ, illuminating the imperative nuance inherent in
the Latin expression, said that the words mean ‘subject
to the
necessary
alterations’
(my emphasis).
[3]
He
referred to
Touriel
v Minister of Internal Affairs, Southern Rhodesia
[4]
in which the following was said:
‘
The
question therefore, arises whether, in deciding as to the effect of
the expression
mutatis
mutandis
,
the test to be applied for the purpose of ascertaining in any
particular case what are “
mutanda
”
is “necessity” or “fitness”. I think the
answer to this question must be that necessity is the test,
and that
considerations of fitness are not sufficient to justify a change, as
a change which the expression
mutatis
mutandis
requires to be made, unless they are so cogent as to establish
necessity. If fitness in a less strict sense, i.e., fitness not
sufficient in degree to show necessity, were the test to be applied
for the purpose of ascertaining what changes are required in
order to
give due effect to “
mutatis
mutandis
”,
a wide field would be opened up for speculation in many cases where
this expression is used, and there would be room for
great
differences of opinion as to whether particular changes were, or were
not fitting; with the result that in the case of any
provision taken
from the context of one Act and applied for the purpose of another
“
mutatis
mutandis
”,
there would be serious risk of uncertainty as to how it was to be
construed in the context of the Act into which it had
been, so to
speak, transplanted.’
[5]
In
Touriel
the court also referred to
Cape
Provincial Administration v Xabanisa
[6]
in
which it was made clear that the words ‘mutatis mutandis’
mean that the necessary changes must be required: it does
not merely
permit them.
[7]
[15]
Against this background of authority, the strictness of meaning which
is to be given to the meaning of ‘mutatis mutandis’,
has
the consequence that the fixed time period provided for in
s 44(1)
of
the
Insolvency Act, and
therefore the fixing of costs by the Master
and the payment thereof by the creditor should apply both in the case
of sequestration
and the liquidation of a company.
[16]
Both in this court and the court a quo, the appellants placed
considerable reliance on the unreported judgment of Flemming
J in
Stone
& Stewart v Master of the Supreme Court
[8]
in which it was held that the three month time limit in
s 44(1)
of
the
Insolvency Act did
not apply by reason of the provisions of
s
366(2)
of the old Companies Act. The Master also relied on this case
in support of his approach to the matter. The court a quo
disagreed
with the correctness of Flemming J’s judgment,
finding support for her views in
Trans-Drakensberg
Bank Ltd v the Master, Pietermaritzburg
[9]
and
Barlows
Tractor Co Ltd v Townsend.
[10]
These
two cases did not deal specifically with the applicability or
otherwise of
s 44(1)
of the
Insolvency Act by
reason of the
provisions of
s 366(2)
of the old Companies Act and its predecessor.
I shall, however, revert to the relevance of these cases later.
[17]
The appellants also relied on a case decided after the judgment in
the court a quo,
Logan
NO & others v BHP Billiton & others
,
[11]
in which Rossouw AJ expressly disagreed with the court a quo’s
judgment and supported the correctness of Flemming J’s
judgment
in
Stone
& Stewart.
[18]
The court a quo found that the reasoning in
Stone &
Stewart
was wrong and that s 366(2) of the old Companies Act did
not, in the case of companies in liquidation, push aside the
time-period
in
s 44(1)
of the
Insolvency Act. I
agree.
A
plain reading of
s 366(2)
of the old Companies Act does not affect
the applicability of the three-month time period in s 44(1) of the
old Companies Act and
the issues that arise therefrom. Neither in
logic nor in the grammar of the respective provisions, is there a
reason why the three-month
time period, together with the fixing of
costs and the payment thereof by a late creditor, should not apply
alongside the discretionary
power granted in terms of s 366(2).
In both instances, the lodging of claims needs momentum driven by the
factor of time.
[19]
Were the three-month period not to apply, then in the absence of a
time period being fixed by the Master in terms of s 366(2),
there would be no formal time period within which creditors would be
required to lodge and prove their claims. The risk of
tardiness, if not inertia, would be ever present. Clearly, this would
not be in the interest either of the creditors or the general
public.
The three-month period stipulated in
s 44(1)
of the
Insolvency Act
relating
to the proof of claims thus remains the benchmark in both
sequestrations and liquidations.
Section 366(2)
does not, therefore,
affect the applicability of
s 44(1)
of the
Insolvency Act to
companies in liquidation. In the view of Meskin in
Insolvency
Law,
s
366(2)
affects the applicability of
s104(1)
of the
Insolvency
Act
>.
[12]
The same view is held by Professor RC Williams in the title,
‘
Companies’
,
based on the text of the late Professor M S Blackman, in
LAWSA
.
[13]
[20]
Section 104
of the
Insolvency Act reads
as follows:
‘
(1)
Subject to the provisions of
section 95
(2) and
section 98A
(3), a
creditor of an insolvent estate who has not proved a claim against
that estate before the date upon which the trustee of
that estate
submitted to the Master a plan of distribution in that estate, shall
not be entitled to share in the distribution of
assets brought up for
distribution in that plan: Provided that the Master may, at any time
before the confirmation of the said
plan permit any such creditor who
has proved his claim after the said date to share in the distribution
of the said assets, if
the Master is satisfied that the creditor has
a reasonable excuse for the delay in proving his claim.
(2)
A creditor of an insolvent estate who proved a claim against that
estate after the date upon which the trustee submitted to
the Master
a plan of distribution in that estate and who was not permitted to
share in the distribution of assets under that plan,
in terms of
subsection (1), shall be entitled to be awarded under any further
plan of distribution submitted to the Master after
the proof of his
claim, the amount which would have been awarded to him under the
previous plan of distribution, if he had proved
his claim prior to
the submission of that plan to the Master: Provided that the Master
is satisfied that the creditor had a reasonable
excuse for the delay
in proving his claim; and provided further that any creditor who was
aware that proceedings had been instituted
under section
twenty-six
,
twenty-nine
,
thirty
or
thirty-one
and who
delayed proving his claim until the court had given judgment in those
proceedings, shall not be entitled to share in the
distribution of
any money or the proceeds of any property recovered as a result of
such proceedings.
(3)
If
any creditor
has under subsection (1) of
section 32
taken proceedings to recover
the value of property or a right under
section 25
(4), to set aside
any disposition of or dealing with property under
section 26
,
29
,
30
or
31
or for the recovery of damages or a penalty under
section 31
,
no creditor who was not a party to the proceedings shall derive any
benefit from any moneys or from the proceeds of any property
recovered as a result of such proceedings before the claim and costs
of every creditor who was a party to such proceedings have
been paid
in full.’
[21]
In
Woodley
v Guardian Assurance Company of SA Ltd
,
[14]
in relation to the provision, similar to
s 366(2)
of the old
Companies Act contained in s 182 of its predecessor (the
Companies Act 46 of 1926), Colman J said:
‘
The
winding-up of a company unable to pay its debts is something closely
akin to the winding-up of the estate of an insolvent individual.
There are some different requirements which flow from the fundamental
difference between a company and an individual: those are
specifically provided for in the Companies Act’.
[15]
[22]
Accordingly, it may be useful to refer to Meskin in
Insolvency
Law
where the learned author said the
following:
‘
The
liquidator may apply to the Master to fix a time or times within
which creditors are to prove their claims in order to participate
in
a distribution under a particular account lodged with the Master
before such proof. The purpose here is not to prevent proof
of a
claim after the time fixed by the Master; it is to prevent the
holding up of distribution under such an account as a result
of proof
of claims after lodgment thereof: the intention is to nullify an
attempt by a creditor to delay proving his claim until
a lodged
account shows that a distribution is to occur. Thus, if the Master
fixes a time, claims may be proved before and after
such time
(subject to compliance with the requirements for late proof), but
once an account is lodged with him, claims proved after
such time are
excluded from the distribution under such account if they were proved
after such lodgment.
A
time fixed by the Master may be extended by him; and accordingly he
may consider on its merits an objection to an account which
is in
effect an application for such extension for the purpose,
not
of proving a claim
,
but of enabling a claim which is proved late to participate in the
distribution.
In
the light of the provisions of section 366(2) of the Companies
Act, the proviso to
section 104(1)
of the
Insolvency Act has
no
application in the winding-up.’
[16]
(Own
emphasis, footnotes omitted.)
A
similar explanation is provided in Henochsberg
on
the Companies Act
.
[17]
[23]
In other words, as Mr Hoffman, counsel for the respondent submitted,
s 366(2) relates to participation in a distribution under
a
particular account and not to the late proof of claims in
general.
[18]
Therein lay the
rationale for s 366(2) of the old Companies Act. Indeed the very
difference in the process of participating in
and benefitting from a
distribution explains why s 366(2) of the old Companies Act was
enacted.
[24]
Further support for this conclusion as to the purpose of s 366(2) is
to be found in
Trans-Drakensberg
Bank Ltd
,
which explained the purpose of s 179(2) of the Companies Act 46 of
1926, the predecessor to s 366(2).
[19]
Van Heerden AJ said:
‘
Sec.
179(2) does not prevent s creditor from proving a claim after the
date fixed by the Master nor does it exclude from the benefit
of
distribution certain debts proved after the date fixed by the Master.
Debts proved after the date fixed by the Master can still
share under
a distribution under an account lodged with the Master after such
debts were proved. In other words, it is not so much
the date fixed
by the Master that is of importance as regards sharing in a certain
distribution but rather the date when an account
is lodged with the
Master
’
.
[20]
[25]
Similar considerations and explanations were given in
Barlow’s
Tractor
.
[21]
In that case Harms JA, delivering a separate concurring
judgment said:
‘
The
provision [s 366(2)] does not prevent a creditor from proving his
claim after the date fixed by the Master. Nor does it disentitle
a
creditor of the benefit under the next account lodged. He is only
excluded from the benefit of a distribution under an account
lodged
before proof.’
[22]
[26]
Section 366(2) therefore affects a creditor’s right to benefit
under a distribution and does not affect the time for
the proof of
creditor’s claims: the issues relating to the fixing of costs
and thereafter the payment thereof by creditors
seeking to prove late
claims remain unaffected thereby. The court a quo accordingly
correctly relied on these cases in drawing
its conclusions. As
mentioned earlier, the three-month period stipulated in
s 44(1)
of
the
Insolvency Act relating
to the proof of claims is the benchmark
in both sequestrations and liquidations. Therefore, apart from the
proof thereof, the Master
must fix costs for a late claim and there
must then be payment in respect thereof in order for such a late
claim against a company
in liquidation to be valid. The appeal cannot
succeed.
[27]
The parties on both sides agreed that, regardless of the outcome in
the case, the costs of two counsel should be allowed. This
case has
dealt with important and intricate questions of law that justify the
costs of two counsel.
[28]
The following order is made:
The
appeal is dismissed with costs, including the costs of two counsel.
N P
Willis
Judge
of Appeal
A
PPEARANCES:
For the
Appellant:
A Subel SC (with him L Hollander)
Instructed by:
Darryl Furman & Associates, Johannesburg
Matsepes
Incorporated
, Bloemfontein
For the
Respondent:
GI Hoffman SC (with him S Kuny)
Instructed by:
David Kahn & Associates Inc, Johannesburg
Symington
& De Kok, Bloemfontein
[1]
Francis
George Hill Family Trust v South African Reserve Bank & others
[1992]
ZASCA 50
;
1992 (3) SA 91
(A) especially at 98F-101E.
[2]
South
African Fabrics Ltd v Millman N
O
&
another
1972
(4) SA 592 (A).
[3]
Ibid
at 600C-D. See also
Big
Ben Soap Industries Ltd v Commissioner for Inland Revenue
1949 (1) SA 740
(A) at 751.
[4]
Touriel
v Minister of Internal Affairs, Southern Rhodesia
1946
AD 535.
[5]
Ibid
at 545.
[6]
Cape
Provincial Administration v Xabanisa
1941
AD 203
at 211. Cited in
Touriel
at 545.
[7]
Ibid
at 211.
[8]
Stone
& Stewart v Master of the Supreme Court
(TPD)
(Unreported Case No 8828/27 of 18 August 1987).
[9]
Trans-Drakensberg
Bank Ltd & another v The Master, Pietermaritzburg
1966
(1) SA 821
(N), especially at 824H-826D.
[10]
Barlows
Tractor Co Ltd v Townsend
[1996] ZASCA 3
;
1996
(2) SA 869
(A).
[11]
Logan
NO & others v BHP Billiton Energy Coal & others
[2015] ZAGPJHC 160. I note that the plaintiff in that matter
ought to have been cited as ‘Wishart NO’ and not
‘Logan
NO’.
[12]
P A M Magid et al (eds)
Meskin’s
Insolvency Law and its operation in winding-up
(June 2014 - Service Issue 42) para 9.5.
[13]
4(3)
LAWSA
2 ed para 60.
[14]
Woodley
v Guardian Assurance Co of SA Ltd
1976
(1) SA 758
(W).
[15]
Ibid
a
t
763E - F.
[16]
Magid above para 9.5 (Issue 8, p9-18 to 9-19).
[17]
B
Galgut et al (eds)
Henochsberg
on the Companies Act 61 of 1973
(June
2011 – Service Issue 33) at 787. I note that the publication
was previously edited by the late Justice P M Meskin.
[18]
See
also
Meskin’s
Insolvency Law
op cit
.
[19]
At
824H - 825E.
[20]
At
824H.
[21]
At
885B-C.
[22]
Id.