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[2016] ZAGPJHC 80
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Pure Event Gear CC v Oratilwe Consultants CC t/a Exclusive Management Services (2015/31003) [2016] ZAGPJHC 80 (29 April 2016)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG
CASE NO: 2015/31003
DATE: 29 APRIL 2016
In the matter between:
PURE EVENT GEAR
CC
........................................................................................................
Applicant
And
ORATILWE CONSULTANTS CC t/a
EXCLUSIVE MANAGEMENT SERVICES
(REG NO:
2003/050904/23)
...................................................................................................
Respondent
JUDGMENT
ADAMS AJ:
[1]. This is an application for the
final winding – up of the respondent. The application is in
terms of the provisions of
section 69(1)(a) of the Close Corporation
Act 69 of 1984 (‘the Act’), read with section 66(1) and
item 9 of schedule
5 of the
Companies Act 71 of 2008
, as well as
section 344(f) and 345(1)(a)(i) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973.
[2] The main dispute between the
parties relates to whether a debt owing by the respondent to the
applicant was due and payable
at the time when the applicant
commenced liquidation proceedings against the respondent.
[3] As and at the 1st June 2015, the
respondent was indebted to the applicant in an amount of R814,970.00,
with the most recent
invoice debited by the applicant on the 24th of
February 2014 and the last payment having been made by the respondent
to the applicant
on the 4th June 2014.
[4] The respondent opposed the
application for its liquidation on the basis that, whilst it admits
that the aforesaid amount is
owing by it to the applicant, it denies
that the said sum was due and payable by the time the applicant
commenced liquidation proceedings.
The respondent relies for this
contention on a trade usage, alternatively, on an implied term in the
contractual arrangement between
the parties. The respondent claims
that there was an agreement in place between the parties that the
invoices rendered to the respondent
would only become due and payable
on receipt of payment by the respondent from its clients.
[5] The respondent also opposes the
application on the basis that it constitutes an abuse of the court
processes. There is a bona
fide dispute between the parties, as
alleged by the respondent, and despite this dispute, the applicant
launched the application
for liquidation.
[6] The respondent concedes that
procedurally the applicant has complied with the relevant legislative
and regulatory provisions,
notably those relating to the requisite
service of notices on interested parties. The application is opposed
on the basis that
the respondent is not commercially insolvent.
APPLYING THE PRINCIPLES TO THE FACTS
IN CASU
[7] All things considered and applying
basic logic, I find it hard to believe that the applicant would have
agreed to payment terms
as alleged by the respondent. It makes no
sense that the applicant would agree to an arrangement in terms of
which it would only
be paid for services rendered and materials
supplied to the respondent once the latter had been paid by its
clients for these services
rendered and materials supplied. This is
the most sensible interpretation. In that regard, I have had regard
to the following principle
enunciated in Natal Joint Municipal
Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality,
2012 (4) SA 593
(SCA): ‘A
sensible meaning is to be preferred to one that leads to insensible
or unbusinesslike results or undermines the
apparent purpose of the
document’.
[8] I am, therefore, of the view that
the amounts due to the applicant became due and payable by the
respondent to the applicant
within a reasonable time from the date on
which the invoices are presented to the respondent, and I reject, as
far – fetched
the respondent’s contention that payment is
only due once the respondent had received payment from its clients.
[9] The point is that, if one applies
the ‘sensible meaning’ approach, as against one which
leads to an unbusinesslike
result, the inescapable conclusion is that
the parties agreed that payment of accounts are due within a
reasonable time from the
date on which the invoices are presented.
[10] I therefore find that there is no
merit in the contention on behalf of the respondent that payment of
the amount claimed by
the applicant, although owing, was not due and
payable by the time the applicant commenced the liquidation
proceedings.
[11] For the same reasons, notably an
approach based on a sensible meaning of a contract, I reject the
respondent’s submission
that there was in place a trade usage
which supports the contention by the respondent that the amount was
not due and payable.
In any event, the respondent tenders no evidence
in support of this claim.
[12] The said submission is
unsustainable. In any event, if this contention is accepted, then it
begs the question why there is
no correlation between the invoices
rendered by the applicant and the amounts paid by the respondent.
[13] For all of these reasons, I am of
the view that by the time the applicant commenced the liquidation
proceedings, an amount
of R814,970.00 was owing, due and payable by
the respondent to the applicant. Despite notice on or about the 15th
July 2015 to
the respondent in terms of section 69 of the Act, the
respondent has to date not paid to the applicant the amount demanded.
The
deeming provisions to the effect that the respondent is unable to
pay its debts come into effect.
[14] I am therefore satisfied that the
applicant has made a case for the final liquidation of the
respondent.
ORDER
In the circumstances I make the
following order:
1. The respondent be and is hereby
placed under final winding up.
2. The cost of this application shall
be costs in the winding up of the respondent.
L ADAMS
Acting Judge of the High Court
Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg
HEARD ON: 26th April 2016
JUDGMENT DATE: 29 April 2016
FOR THE APPLICANT: 29th April 2016
Adv N Lombard
INSTRUCTED BY: Eugene Marais
Attorneys
FOR THE DEFENDANT: Adv L Keijser
INSTRUCTED BY: Seanego Attorneys