Pure Event Gear CC v Oratilwe Consultants CC t/a Exclusive Management Services (2015/31003) [2016] ZAGPJHC 80 (29 April 2016)

80 Reportability
Insolvency Law

Brief Summary

Winding-up — Application for final winding-up — Debt due and payable — Applicant sought final winding-up of respondent based on an outstanding debt of R814,970.00 — Respondent admitted debt but contended it was not due and payable due to an alleged agreement regarding payment terms — Court found that the debt was due within a reasonable time from invoice presentation and rejected the respondent's claims regarding payment terms and trade usage — Application for winding-up granted.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


Introduction


The matter concerned an application for the final winding-up of a close corporation in the Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg. The applicant was Pure Event Gear CC, and the respondent was Oratilwe Consultants CC t/a Exclusive Management Services (Reg No: 2003/050904/23).


The proceedings were brought as a liquidation application in terms of section 69(1)(a) of the Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984, read with section 66(1) and item 9 of Schedule 5 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, as well as sections 344(f) and 345(1)(a)(i) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. The respondent opposed the relief sought.


The general subject-matter of the dispute was whether the applicant had established the statutory grounds for final winding-up, with the principal controversy being whether an admitted debt was due and payable when the liquidation proceedings were commenced, and whether the application was an abuse given an alleged bona fide dispute.


Material Facts


It was common cause that as at 1 June 2015, the respondent was indebted to the applicant in the amount of R814,970.00. It was also not in dispute that the most recent invoice debited by the applicant was dated 24 February 2014, and that the last payment by the respondent to the applicant was made on 4 June 2014.


The respondent admitted that the amount was owing, but disputed that it was due and payable at the time the applicant launched liquidation proceedings. The respondent’s case was that, by trade usage or an implied term of the parties’ contractual arrangement, the invoices would become payable only once the respondent had itself received payment from its clients for the relevant work or supplies.


The respondent further contended that the liquidation application constituted an abuse of process because, on its version, there was a bona fide dispute about the debt’s enforceability at the relevant time. It also opposed the application on the basis that it was not commercially insolvent, while conceding that the applicant had complied with procedural requirements, including service of the necessary notices on interested parties.


The court recorded that the respondent received notice in terms of section 69 of the Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984 on or about 15 July 2015, and that the respondent had not paid the demanded amount.


Legal Issues


The central legal question was whether, despite the respondent’s admission that the amount was owing, the debt was due and payable when the applicant commenced liquidation proceedings, given the respondent’s reliance on an alleged trade usage or implied term linking payment to the respondent’s receipt of funds from its clients.


A related question was whether the alleged dispute about when payment fell due constituted a basis to resist liquidation on the footing that the application was an abuse of process, and whether the statutory deeming provisions regarding inability to pay debts were engaged on the facts.


The dispute primarily concerned the application of legal principles of contractual interpretation and enforceability to the admitted indebtedness, and the consequent application of liquidation provisions to those facts, rather than a pure question of fact alone.


Court’s Reasoning


The court approached the respondent’s “pay-when-paid” contention by assessing whether it was a plausible contractual arrangement between the parties. The court considered it unlikely, as a matter of basic logic and commercial sense, that the applicant would have agreed to provide services and supply materials on terms that postponed payment until the respondent was paid by its clients. The court regarded that as producing an unbusinesslike outcome.


In rejecting the respondent’s construction, the court applied the interpretive principle articulated in Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA), namely that a sensible meaning is to be preferred to one that leads to insensible or unbusinesslike results or undermines the apparent purpose of the document. On that approach, the court concluded that the more sensible inference was that the parties contemplated payment within a reasonable time after invoices were presented.


On that basis, the court held that the amounts due became due and payable within a reasonable time from presentation of invoices, and it rejected the respondent’s argument that payment was only due once it received payment from its clients. The court accordingly found no merit in the contention that, although the amount was owing, it was not yet enforceable at the time of the liquidation application.


The court also rejected the respondent’s reliance on trade usage. It noted that, apart from the interpretive and commercial-sense difficulties with the alleged arrangement, the respondent tendered no evidence to substantiate the asserted trade usage. The court regarded the submission as unsustainable and observed, additionally, that acceptance of the contention would raise questions about the lack of correlation between invoices rendered and amounts paid.


Having found that the amount of R814,970.00 was owing, due, and payable when the liquidation proceedings were commenced, and noting that the respondent had not paid after notice in terms of section 69, the court held that the statutory deeming provisions that the respondent is unable to pay its debts became operative. The court was therefore satisfied that the applicant had established a case for final liquidation.


Outcome and Relief


The court granted an order placing the respondent under final winding-up.


The court ordered that the costs of the application would be costs in the winding-up of the respondent.


Cases Cited


Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA)


Legislation Cited


Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984 (section 69(1)(a); section 66(1))


Companies Act 71 of 2008 (item 9 of Schedule 5)


Companies Act 61 of 1973 (section 344(f); section 345(1)(a)(i))


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The court held that, although the respondent admitted the debt of R814,970.00 was owing, the respondent’s contention that it was not yet payable because payment depended on receipt of funds from its clients was rejected as commercially insensible and unsupported by evidence.


The court found that the proper inference was that the parties contemplated payment within a reasonable time after invoices were presented, with the result that the debt was due and payable when liquidation proceedings were commenced.


On the basis of non-payment after statutory notice, the court held that the relevant statutory deeming provisions regarding inability to pay debts were triggered, and the applicant had made out a case for final winding-up, with costs to be costs in the winding-up.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


A court construing a contractual arrangement will prefer a sensible meaning over an interpretation that produces insensible or unbusinesslike results, consistent with the interpretive approach articulated in Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA).


Where a party relies on trade usage to establish a term affecting enforceability or timing of payment, the court may reject the contention if it is unsupported by evidence and if it yields a commercially implausible arrangement on the facts presented.


In liquidation proceedings based on inability to pay debts, an applicant must establish, on the court’s assessment of the facts and applicable principles, that the relevant indebtedness is not only owing but also due and payable at the time proceedings are commenced, and that the statutory mechanism for deeming inability to pay is engaged by non-payment following proper demand and notice under the applicable provisions.

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[2016] ZAGPJHC 80
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Pure Event Gear CC v Oratilwe Consultants CC t/a Exclusive Management Services (2015/31003) [2016] ZAGPJHC 80 (29 April 2016)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG
CASE NO: 2015/31003
DATE: 29 APRIL 2016
In the matter between:
PURE EVENT GEAR
CC
........................................................................................................
Applicant
And
ORATILWE CONSULTANTS CC t/a
EXCLUSIVE MANAGEMENT SERVICES
(REG NO:
2003/050904/23)
...................................................................................................
Respondent
JUDGMENT
ADAMS AJ:
[1]. This is an application for the
final winding – up of the respondent. The application is in
terms of the provisions of
section 69(1)(a) of the Close Corporation
Act 69 of 1984 (‘the Act’), read with section 66(1) and
item 9 of schedule
5 of the
Companies Act 71 of 2008
, as well as
section 344(f) and 345(1)(a)(i) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973.
[2] The main dispute between the
parties relates to whether a debt owing by the respondent to the
applicant was due and payable
at the time when the applicant
commenced liquidation proceedings against the respondent.
[3] As and at the 1st June 2015, the
respondent was indebted to the applicant in an amount of R814,970.00,
with the most recent
invoice debited by the applicant on the 24th of
February 2014 and the last payment having been made by the respondent
to the applicant
on the 4th June 2014.
[4] The respondent opposed the
application for its liquidation on the basis that, whilst it admits
that the aforesaid amount is
owing by it to the applicant, it denies
that the said sum was due and payable by the time the applicant
commenced liquidation proceedings.
The respondent relies for this
contention on a trade usage, alternatively, on an implied term in the
contractual arrangement between
the parties. The respondent claims
that there was an agreement in place between the parties that the
invoices rendered to the respondent
would only become due and payable
on receipt of payment by the respondent from its clients.
[5] The respondent also opposes the
application on the basis that it constitutes an abuse of the court
processes. There is a bona
fide dispute between the parties, as
alleged by the respondent, and despite this dispute, the applicant
launched the application
for liquidation.
[6] The respondent concedes that
procedurally the applicant has complied with the relevant legislative
and regulatory provisions,
notably those relating to the requisite
service of notices on interested parties. The application is opposed
on the basis that
the respondent is not commercially insolvent.
APPLYING THE PRINCIPLES TO THE FACTS
IN CASU
[7] All things considered and applying
basic logic, I find it hard to believe that the applicant would have
agreed to payment terms
as alleged by the respondent. It makes no
sense that the applicant would agree to an arrangement in terms of
which it would only
be paid for services rendered and materials
supplied to the respondent once the latter had been paid by its
clients for these services
rendered and materials supplied. This is
the most sensible interpretation. In that regard, I have had regard
to the following principle
enunciated in Natal Joint Municipal
Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality,
2012 (4) SA 593
(SCA): ‘A
sensible meaning is to be preferred to one that leads to insensible
or unbusinesslike results or undermines the
apparent purpose of the
document’.
[8] I am, therefore, of the view that
the amounts due to the applicant became due and payable by the
respondent to the applicant
within a reasonable time from the date on
which the invoices are presented to the respondent, and I reject, as
far – fetched
the respondent’s contention that payment is
only due once the respondent had received payment from its clients.
[9] The point is that, if one applies
the ‘sensible meaning’ approach, as against one which
leads to an unbusinesslike
result, the inescapable conclusion is that
the parties agreed that payment of accounts are due within a
reasonable time from the
date on which the invoices are presented.
[10] I therefore find that there is no
merit in the contention on behalf of the respondent that payment of
the amount claimed by
the applicant, although owing, was not due and
payable by the time the applicant commenced the liquidation
proceedings.
[11] For the same reasons, notably an
approach based on a sensible meaning of a contract, I reject the
respondent’s submission
that there was in place a trade usage
which supports the contention by the respondent that the amount was
not due and payable.
In any event, the respondent tenders no evidence
in support of this claim.
[12] The said submission is
unsustainable. In any event, if this contention is accepted, then it
begs the question why there is
no correlation between the invoices
rendered by the applicant and the amounts paid by the respondent.
[13] For all of these reasons, I am of
the view that by the time the applicant commenced the liquidation
proceedings, an amount
of R814,970.00 was owing, due and payable by
the respondent to the applicant. Despite notice on or about the 15th
July 2015 to
the respondent in terms of section 69 of the Act, the
respondent has to date not paid to the applicant the amount demanded.
The
deeming provisions to the effect that the respondent is unable to
pay its debts come into effect.
[14] I am therefore satisfied that the
applicant has made a case for the final liquidation of the
respondent.
ORDER
In the circumstances I make the
following order:
1. The respondent be and is hereby
placed under final winding up.
2. The cost of this application shall
be costs in the winding up of the respondent.
L ADAMS
Acting Judge of the High Court
Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg
HEARD ON: 26th April 2016
JUDGMENT DATE: 29 April 2016
FOR THE APPLICANT: 29th April 2016
Adv N Lombard
INSTRUCTED BY: Eugene Marais
Attorneys
FOR THE DEFENDANT: Adv L Keijser
INSTRUCTED BY: Seanego Attorneys