About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
>>
2015
>>
[2015] ZAGPJHC 241
|
|
Power Truck Hire (Pty) Limited v Fourie and Another (32581/15) [2015] ZAGPJHC 241 (21 October 2015)
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA,
GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG
CASE NO: 32581/15
DATE: 21 OCTOBER 2015
In the matter between:
POWER TRUCK HIRE (PTY)
LIMITED
.............................................................................
Applicant
And
DUANE
FOURIE
.........................................................................................................
First
Respondent
VALUE TRUCK
RRENTAL
...................................................................................
Second
Respondent
J U D G M E N T
MAKUME, J:
BACKGROUND FACTS
[1] This matter served before me in the
urgent court on the 30th September 2015 and in view of time
constraints I reserved judgment.
[2] In the application the Applicant
seeks an order interdicting and prohibiting the First Respondent
until the 30th June 2017 from
being employed by the Second
Respondent.
[3] The Applicant further seeks an
order interdicting and prohibiting the Second Respondent from
employing the First Respondent.
[4] The Applicant conducts business in
the renting out of vehicles and drivers to the corporate industrial
business. It is not
in dispute that the Second Respondent is a
competitor and conducts the same type of business as the Applicant.
[5] It is common cause that on the 31st
August 2011 the First Respondent signed a Service, Confidentiality
and Restraint Agreement
with the Applicant in terms of which he took
up employment with the Applicant as an executive director with effect
the 1st September
2011.
[6] The relevant clauses of the
Restraint of Trade and Confidentiality Agreement which the First
Respondent agreed to recorded inter
alia that:
6.1 during the course of his employment
with the Applicant First Respondent has acquired/will acquire
considerable knowledge and
know-how in and will learn of the
Applicant’s techniques relating to its business;
6.2 he will have access to the names of
clients with whom the Applicant does business as well as to the trade
secrets, strategic
plans and other confidential information
pertaining to the Applicant;
6.3 he acknowledged that the only
effective and reasonable manner in which the Applicant’s rights
in respect of the business
secrets and client connections can be
protected is by means of a restraint of trade covenant imposed on
him;
6.4 he undertook that he will not while
employed by the Applicant and for a period of 24 (twenty-four) months
after the termination
of his employment either for himself or as an
agent of anyone else persuade, induce, solicit, encourage or procure
any employee
of the Applicant to:
6.4.1 become employed by or interested
in any manner whether in any business, firm undertaking, company,
close corporation or other
entity or association of persons directly
or indirectly in competition with the business carried on by the
Applicant.
6.5 The restraint was reasonable in its
duration, area and scope of operation for the protection of the
direct and indirect proprietary
interests of the Applicant.
[7] On the 1st day of September 2013
the First Respondent entered into a contract of employment with a
company called Spartan Truck
Hire (Pty) Ltd (STH) as a sales and
marketing director. During September 2011 STH had purchased and
become a 100% owner of all
the shares in the Applicant (Power Truck
Hire (PTH)).
[8] The contract of employment that the
First Respondent concluded with Spartan Truck Hire whilst it
contained a confidentiality
clause, no restraint of trade agreement
was concluded. The confidentiality clause is located in clause 13.2
and reads as follows:
“13.2 For this reason in
particular you shall not while employed by the company or at any time
after the termination of your
employment with the company without the
written consent of the director disclose or divulge or cause to be
disclosed or divulged
to any third person nor use for gain for
yourself and shall use your best endeavours to prevent the disclosure
or publication of.”
[9] On the 1st of June 2015 the First
Respondent addressed a letter “To whom it may concern”
which reads as follows:
“I Duane Fourie herewith tender
my resignation as Managing Director of Power Truck Hire as from 1st
June 2015.”
[10] It is common cause that the First
Respondent’s last working day was the 30th June 2015. On the
2nd September 2015 the
First Respondent commenced employment with the
Second Respondent a competitor of the Applicant.
[11] On the 4th September 2015
Applicant’s attorneys addressed a letter to both the
Respondents calling upon the First Respondent
to stop working for the
Second Respondent and likewise that the Second Respondent should
terminate the employment of the First
Respondent.
[12] In reply the Respondents’
attorneys wrote to the Applicant’s attorneys on the 7th
September 2015 and said the following:
“4. On
4.1 31 August 2011 Duane signed a
Service, Confidentiality and Restraint Agreement with Power Truck
(the restraint agreement).
4.2 31 August 2013 Duane left the
employ of Power Truck (Pty) Ltd and joined Spartan Truck Hire (Pty)
Limited (Spartan Truck) and
enclose a copy of the agreement and refer
you in particular to paragraphs 7, 12, 18 and 22 which reads:
Place of Work
The usual place of work will be the
company offices Spartan but you may be requested within reason to
work elsewhere from time to
time. Your acceptance of employment with
the company shall constitute your agreement to work at any of the
company operations or
the operations of its associated company.”
“6. Duane had very little to do
with Power Truck rather than in a supervisory capacity although he
remained a director he
had relinquished control. During or about
August 2014 Duane was called into the office of Arnold Friedman who
is de facto the
managing director of both Spartan Truck and Power
Truck and he informed Duane that Duane was required to return to the
business
of Power Truck. In September 2014 Duane took up employment
with Power Truck as managing director and was paid by Power Truck.”
“13. From what is stated above
and without debating the validity of the restraint which you client
seeks to enforce we record:
13.1 there is no restraint of trade.”
PRINCIPAL SUBMISSIONS
[13] The Applicant submits that the
First Respondent is still bound by the Services, Confidentiality and
Restraint of Trade Agreement
that he signed on the 31st August 2011
despite the fact that he took up employment with Spartan Truck on the
1st September 2013.
[14] The First Respondent argues that
when he entered into agreement of employment with Spartan Truck Hire
on 1st September 2013
this resulted in the termination of his
contractual obligation with the Applicant and accordingly that when
he took up employment
with the Second Respondent on the 2nd September
2015 a period of 24 months as envisaged in clause13.3.3 of the
restraint agreement
had lapsed and that accordingly he was free to
take up employment with any competitor of the Applicant.
THE ISSUES
[15] In the view that I hold what is in
issue before me is whether the restraint of trade agreement that the
First Respondent signed
on the 31st August 2011 was operative as on
the 1st June 2015 or the 2nd September 2015. A finding that the
restraint agreement
seized operating against the First Respondent in
September 2013 will be dispositive of all the issues in this
application.
THE LEGAL PRINCIPLES
[16] It is trite law that principles
applicable to the determination of final relief sought on motion are
well established that
is that motion proceedings are principally for
the resolution of legal issues and are not geared to deal with
factual disputes
(see Cadac (Pty) Ltd v Webber Stephen Products 2011
All SA Reports 343 (SCA)).
[17] The dispute in this application is
to be found in the fact that the Applicant contends that the First
Respondent’s employment
continued in terms of the service
agreement until the 30th June 2015. This is disputed by the First
Respondent. This dispute is
incapable of being resolved on the
papers. On that basis alone the Applicant’s application should
be dismissed.
[18] There are two employment
agreements in issue in this matter. The Applicant contends that
during September in the year 2013
the First Respondent became
employed as a director of both STH and the Applicant until October
2014 when he the First Respondent
returned to his previous employment
with the Applicant.
[19] The First Respondent says that
when he was recalled to the Applicant’s employment after having
spent 13 months with STH
his employment was not governed by any
written agreement.
[20] There are two clauses in the
agreement entered into between the Applicant and the First Respondent
during August 2011 that
are worth considering in determining whether
the employment was terminated when First Respondent entered into a
new agreement with
STH. I deal with them hereunder.
CLAUSE 11 TERMINATION
“11.1 Notwithstanding 10 or any
other provisions of this agreement this agreement (and the employment
relationship embodied
herein) may be terminated summarily by the
company:-
11.2 In any circumstances justifying
such termination at common law.”
CLAUSE 17 GENERAL
“17.1 This agreement constitutes
the sole record of the agreement between the parties in regard to the
subject matter thereof
and supersedes, overrides and replaces all
prior agreements.
17.2 Neither party shall be bound by
any express or implied term, representation, warranty, promise or the
like not recorded herein.”
[21] In this matter the Applicant and
the First Respondent in agreeing to First Respondent taking up new
employment with Spartan
Truck Hire (STH) acted within the perimeters
of clause 11.2 of their agreement and brought about a termination of
that agreement
under circumstances justifying such termination at
common law. My conclusion in this regard is informed by what is
contained in
paragraph 7 of the founding affidavit wherein the
Applicant says the following:
“7.7 The Applicant grew at a
rapid pace and we saw the First Respondent as an integrated part of
the group with massive sales
and marketing.
7.8 As a result First Respondent was
given a further directorship in the STH on the basis of his
outstanding performance. He became
director of sales and marketing
for STH and the Applicant. I emphasise that the First Respondent was
employed as a director of
both STH and the Applicant. His
directorship of STH commenced in September 2013.”
[22] Clause 17 of the agreement is in
conflict with and does not support what the Applicant says in
paragraph 7.8 wherein it is
said that the First Respondent was
employed as a director of both STH and the Applicant. This
allegation is not in writing as
required in section 17.
[23] A reading of the letter of
appointment addressed to the First Respondent dated the 1st September
2013 sets out in clear terms
the First Respondent’s duties and
terms of his new position. There is nowhere in that agreement or
letter of appointment
where it is stated that the First Respondent is
appointed in dual capacities as a Sales and Marketing Director of STH
as well as
the Applicant and in my view in the absence of such
appointment not being in writing it is null and void.
[24] When the First Respondent accepted
his appointment as a Sales and Marketing Director of STH it was added
that the letter of
appointment supersedes any other verbal or written
agreement entered into. This clause could only refer to the agreement
signed
in August 2011.
[25] When the First Respondent took up
appointment with STH it was at a higher remuneration than what he was
being paid whilst in
the employment of the Applicant. Annexure “AA2”
on page 220 of the papers indicates further that the First Respondent
became engaged by STH on the 1st September 2013.
[26] When the time came to recall the
First Respondent from STH back to the Applicant’s employment
this was done verbally
there was no indication or evidence that when
he returned to Applicant’s employment it was specifically
agreed to revive
the terms of the 2011 agreement and in the absence
of which it is my conclusion that that agreement lapsed in August
2013 when
the First Respondent signed a new agreement with STH.
[27] In view of my findings I do not
deem it necessary to deal with the rest of the issues raised in the
affidavits as I regard
this finding as being dispositive of the
application.
[28] I accordingly make the following
order:
1. The application is dismissed.
2. The Applicant is ordered to pay the
costs of this application which shall include the costs consequent
upon the employment of
senior counsel.
DATED at JOHANNESBURG on this the
21st day of OCTOBER 2015.
M A MAKUME
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH
AFRICA
GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
FOR APPLICANT Miltz SC
INSTRUCTED BY Saint Grove Attorneys
Johannesburg
Tel: (011) 486-4456/9
FOR RESPONDENTS Adv A Subel SC
INSTRUCTED BY Fluxmans Attorneys
Rosebank, Johannesburg
Tel: (011) 328-1841
DATE OF HEARING 30th September 2015
DATE OF JUDGMENT 21st October 2015