Linksfield Nursery CC and Another v Wickstrom and Others (34695/2014) [2015] ZAGPJHC 127 (8 July 2015)

80 Reportability
Land and Property Law

Brief Summary

Interdict — Final interdict — Applicants seeking to prevent Respondents from demolishing structures on leased property — Applicants alleging valid lease agreement with Provincial Government — Respondents claiming rights through a purported sale agreement — Court finding that Respondents lacked rights to the property as sale agreement was a nullity due to non-payment of purchase price — Final interdict granted in favor of Applicants.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


This was an application for final interdictory relief in the Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg. The applicants were Linksfield Nursery CC (the first applicant) and Ebenhaeser de Villiers (the second applicant, and sole member of the first applicant). The respondents were members of the Wickstrom family (first to fourth respondents), Basfour 3472 (Pty) Ltd (the fifth respondent), and Thinus Labuschagne (the sixth respondent).


The matter initially served in the Urgent Court on 19 September 2014, where only the sixth respondent entered an appearance to oppose. On that occasion, the court dismissed the application against the sixth respondent with costs, after the sixth respondent disassociated himself from the alleged conduct and described himself as merely a legal advisor/consultant. A rule nisi was granted against the remaining respondents and was extended several times to allow the filing of answering papers. The second respondent ultimately delivered an answering affidavit on behalf of the remaining respondents, the applicants replied, and the matter was enrolled in the ordinary motion court. The court recorded that it had already found the matter urgent on 19 September 2014.


The dispute concerned competing claims to be on, and to conduct operations at, a particular immovable property described as Portion 1, Rietfontein 61 IR, including whether the respondents were entitled to demolish structures and remove items on that property. Central to the dispute was the applicants’ reliance on an existing lease from the Gauteng Provincial Government, and the respondents’ reliance (in substance) on an alleged sale agreement between the Provincial Government and the fifth respondent.


2. Material Facts


The facts material to the court’s determination were described as largely not in dispute, and were set out as follows.


It was common cause that on 26 June 2001 the first applicant concluded a lease agreement with the Gauteng Provincial Government in respect of Portion 1, Rietfontein 61 IR. The leased premises were to be used for the business of a nursery. The lease was to run from 31 January 2002 to 31 December 2004, and thereafter continue on a monthly basis. The applicants were, at all relevant times, still in occupation of the property and contended that their occupation remained grounded in the lease continuing monthly.


During late 2001 to 2002, the second applicant and the second respondent concluded a verbal arrangement that resulted in an entity referred to as “Linksfield Nursery and Home Improvements CC” being operated as a partnership. The court recorded that the precise terms and purpose of this partnership arrangement were disputed. On the applicants’ version, the arrangement was aimed at running the nursery business consistently with the lease. On the second respondent’s version, he was entitled to improve the leased property (with the lessor’s consent) and he had plans drawn to erect a coffee shop, florist, and other buildings.


It was common cause that the partnership arrangement later ended and that the second applicant resigned from the entity through which the partnership business had been conducted. The second respondent thereafter continued to conduct business from the property as a coffee shop and florist, while the first applicant continued to operate the nursery. The court treated as material that the applicants had a lease-based right of occupation, whereas the respondents’ commercial activities occurred without a lease in their favour. The second respondent asserted that he erected structures from his own funds and with approval from the lessor.


Further factual disputes existed around the later deterioration of the parties’ relationship and the reasons for cessation of the coffee shop business. The applicants alleged that around 2008 the second respondent left the property (in the context of divorce proceedings involving the first and second respondents) and relinquished rights and obligations in the partnership, and that by 2010 the coffee shop and florist had closed for unknown reasons. The second respondent admitted closure in 2010 but attributed it to an alleged breakdown relating to a verbal sale arrangement and subsequent conflict. The court did not treat the contested motivations for closure as determinative of the interdict application.


A further central, and effectively determinative, set of facts related to an alleged purchase of the property. It was common cause that in 2008 the fifth respondent (with the second respondent as its sole director) concluded an agreement of sale with the Gauteng Provincial Government in terms of which the Provincial Government purported to sell to the fifth respondent the same property (Portion 1 of the Farm Rietfontein 61 IR, Extension 1). It was also not in dispute that this was the same property occupied by the first applicant under the lease which, at that stage, continued monthly.


The court regarded the status of the sale as critical. The evidence before the court (including confirmation by the MEC of the Department of Infrastructure Development on 19 September 2014) was that the property was still owned by the Provincial Government. The court accepted the applicants’ case that the purported sale became a nullity because the fifth respondent failed to pay the purchase price, with the result that transfer did not occur and ownership remained with the Provincial Government.


The immediate factual trigger for the application was that, after vacating earlier, the first and second respondents returned in September 2014 and commenced demolishing structures on the property. The applicants alleged this interfered with access by customers, including broken paving stones in the driveway, causing ongoing loss to their nursery business.


3. Legal Issues


The court was required to determine whether the applicants were entitled to a final interdict against the first to fifth respondents preventing them from demolishing structures or removing items (fixed or unfixed) on the property, together with ancillary restorative relief.


The dispute primarily involved the application of established legal requirements for a final interdict to largely common-cause facts, together with a limited factual contest concerning the respondents’ asserted rights to the property (including whether the lease had terminated and whether the respondents could rely on the sale agreement). It also required a legal characterisation of the respondents’ conduct in relation to structures and items on the property, including the respondents’ contention that what was being demolished belonged to them.


In substance, the central questions were whether the applicants demonstrated a clear right to occupation, whether an injury had been committed or was reasonably apprehended, and whether there was no adequate alternative remedy; and, relatedly, whether the respondents could establish any better right to be on the property or to engage in the complained-of activities.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court approached the matter through the orthodox requirements for a final interdict, beginning with the requirement of a clear right.


On the clear-right enquiry, the court accepted that the applicants’ lease with the Gauteng Provincial Government existed, and that after the initial fixed term ended it continued on a monthly basis. Although the respondents asserted termination—either in December 2007 or pursuant to a termination notice dated 28 February 2013 (with termination said to take effect on 28 April 2013)—the court held that the applicants nevertheless remained in occupation beyond 28 April 2013 and continued to do so, and that there was nothing in the papers to show the lease had ceased to exist. The court concluded that the applicants remained monthly lessees and thus had a right to occupy the property.


In assessing whether the respondents could show a competing entitlement, the court evaluated the respondents’ reliance on the alleged agreement of sale concluded by the fifth respondent with the Provincial Government. The court accepted evidence that the property remained owned by the Provincial Government and treated the sale as having become a nullity due to non-payment of the purchase price. It found the second and fifth respondents to have been disingenuous and insufficiently frank, noting that the respondents’ affidavits did not meaningfully answer the central case that the purchase price had not been paid as required. On that basis, the court held that the respondents had failed to prove a better right to the property than the applicants, and that only the applicants had a right of occupation grounded in the existing monthly lease.


On the second requirement—injury committed or reasonably apprehended—the court held that the respondents’ return to the premises in September 2014 to commence demolition of structures constituted conduct that threatened the applicants’ lease-based rights and business operations. The applicants’ allegations of interference with customer access and ongoing business loss were treated as supporting the existence of actual or reasonably apprehended injury.


In addressing the respondents’ defence that they were breaking or removing what belonged to them, the court rejected this as “legally not correct” on the basis that fixtures had accrued to the owner of the land, namely the Provincial Government. In support of the standard for apprehended injury, the court relied on authority indicating that it is the threatened invasion of rights under a lease that may ground apprehended injury, without requiring proof of further consequences beyond that invasion.


On the third requirement—absence of an alternative adequate remedy—the court noted that the respondents did not engage substantively with this requirement in their papers. The court nonetheless considered whether damages would provide adequate redress and concluded they would not, pointing to evidence that the first respondent was insolvent and that the second respondent acted as director of the fifth respondent, a deregistered company. The court reasoned that pursuing damages would entail complex and protracted proceedings while the harm would continue, making interdictory and restorative relief appropriate.


The court also addressed, as a procedural and jurisdictional constraint, the position of the sixth respondent. Although the applicants filed a supplementary affidavit after the urgent hearing that purported to implicate the sixth respondent more centrally, the court stated that it should not have dealt with the sixth respondent in isolation on 19 September 2014 without affording the applicants an opportunity to reply, but held it lacked power to mero motu join the sixth respondent after the dismissal; accordingly, the earlier dismissal order in favour of the sixth respondent remained effective unless set aside.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court granted final relief against the first to fifth respondents.


It interdicted the first, second, third, fourth and fifth respondents (and persons in their employment or contracted by them) from demolishing any structure and/or removing any items fixed or unfixed on the property (Portion 1, Rietfontein 61 IR).


It further ordered the respondents to repair the damage done on the property or to bear the fair and reasonable costs of fixing or restoring such damage, and ordered the respondents to return all items unlawfully removed by them or their employees from the property.


As to costs, the court ordered the second to fifth respondents to pay the costs of the application on a party-and-party scale. The dismissal of the application against the sixth respondent with costs (made on 19 September 2014) was noted by the court as still standing.


Cases Cited


V & A Waterfront Properties (Pty) Ltd and Another v Helicopter & Marine Services (Pty) Ltd and Others 2006 (1) SA 252 (SCA)


Legislation Cited


No legislation was expressly cited in the judgment.


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were expressly cited in the judgment.


Held


The applicants, as continuing monthly lessees in occupation under a lease with the Gauteng Provincial Government, established a clear right to occupy the property and to be protected against unlawful interference with that occupation. The respondents failed to establish any better right to the property, and their reliance on an alleged sale to the fifth respondent did not displace the applicants’ rights, particularly given that the property remained owned by the Provincial Government and the purchase price had not been paid.


The respondents’ conduct in returning to the property and commencing demolition constituted an actual or reasonably apprehended injury to the applicants’ lease-based rights and business operations. Given the respondents’ financial and corporate circumstances and the ongoing nature of the harm, damages were not an adequate alternative remedy. A final interdict and ancillary restorative relief were therefore warranted against the first to fifth respondents, with costs ordered against the second to fifth respondents.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


A final interdict requires proof of (i) a clear right, (ii) an injury actually committed or reasonably apprehended, and (iii) the absence of an adequate alternative remedy. The court applied these requirements to determine whether lease-based occupational rights warranted final protection against interference.


A continuing lease that, by its terms, persists month-to-month after the fixed term, may sustain a lessee’s clear right to occupation where there is no adequate proof that the lease has been lawfully terminated and brought to an end. Competing assertions of entitlement must be substantiated by a demonstrable better right, failing which the lessee’s established occupational right prevails.


In the context of lease rights, a threatened invasion of rights under the lease may constitute reasonably apprehended injury sufficient for interdictory relief, without requiring proof of further contingencies beyond the threatened infringement of the right itself (as supported by the cited authority).


Where a damages claim is likely to be ineffective or inadequate—having regard to factors such as insolvency, deregistration, and the prospect of complex and prolonged proceedings in circumstances of ongoing harm—interdictory relief may be appropriate because an ordinary damages remedy will not provide similar protection or timely redress.

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[2015] ZAGPJHC 127
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Linksfield Nursery CC and Another v Wickstrom and Others (34695/2014) [2015] ZAGPJHC 127 (8 July 2015)

SAFLII
Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
redacted from this document in compliance with the law
and
SAFLII
Policy
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG
CASE NO: 34695/2014
DATE: 08 JULY 2015
In the matter between:
LINKSFIELD NURSERY
CC
........................................................................................
First
Applicant
EBENHAESER DE
VILLIERS
..................................................................................
Second
Applicant
And
AMANDA
WICKSTROM
...........................................................................................
First
Respondent
JAMES ANTHONY
WICKSTROM
......................................................................
Second
Respondent
SASHA
WICKSTROM
..............................................................................................
Third
Respondent
NICHOLIS
WICKSTROM
….................................................................................
Fourth
Respondent
BASFOUR 3472 (PTY)
LTD
.......................................................................................
Fifth
Respondent
THINUS
LABUSCHAGNE
…....................................................................................
Sixth
Respondent
JUDGMENT
MAKUME, J:
[1] In this matter the Applicants seek
a final interdict against the Respondents interdicting them from
demolishing any structure
and/or removing any items fixed or unfixed
on property described as Portion 1 situate at Rietfontein 61 IR (the
property) and other
ancillary relief. The Respondents are opposing
the granting of the final order.
[2] This matter served before me in the
Urgent Court on Friday the 19th September 2014. On that occasion only
the Sixth Respondent
entered appearance to oppose the application and
filed a very brief affidavit in which he disassociated himself from
the alleged
actions complained of in the Applicants’ founding
affidavit. The Sixth Respondent said that he was only a legal advisor
and
consultant of the Respondents. The Sixth Respondent requested
that the application against him be dismissed with costs.
[3] Applicants’ counsel did not
at that stage ask that Applicants be given an opportunity to consider
the Sixth Respondent’s
answering affidavit. In the absence of
any contrary evidence I granted the Sixth Respondent’s request
and dismissed the application
against the Sixth Respondent with
costs.
[4] Shortly after granting the rule
nisi the Applicant filed an extensive supplementary affidavit in
which he dealt with the Sixth
Respondent’s involvement in the
business affairs of the First, Second and Fifth Respondents. The
affidavit clearly placed
the Sixth Respondent at the centre of the
happenings of the 17th and the 18th September 2014. Despite the
application having been
dismissed against him the Sixth Respondent
filed a further answering affidavit which did not take the matter any
further.
[5] It is my well-considered view that
I should not have dealt with the Sixth Respondent’s matter in
isolation and without
having granted the Applicants an opportunity to
reply thereto. I do not have the power to mero motu join the Sixth
Respondent in
this application. My order still stands until set
aside.
[6] The rule nisi was extended several
times to afford the Respondents an opportunity to file their
answering affidavit. The Second
Respondent eventually filed an
answering affidavit on behalf of himself and the other remaining
Respondents. The Applicants subsequently
delivered their reply and
the matter was set down for hearing in the normal motion court roll.
I must mention that I had already
found on the 19th September 2014
that the matter was urgent.
BACKGROUND FACTS
[7] The facts giving rise to this
application and which have a bearing on the question to be decided
are largely not in dispute.
I will narrate them as closely as
possible as they emerge from the papers before me.
[8] The Second Applicant is the sole
member of the First Applicant. He is duly authorised to depose to
this affidavit on behalf
of the First Applicant.
[9] On the 26th day of June 2001 and at
Johannesburg the First Applicant entered into a lease agreement with
the Gauteng Provincial
Government in terms of which the Provincial
Government leased to the First Applicant Portion 1 situate at
Rietfontein 61 IR (the
property). The property was to be used by the
First Applicant for purposes of conducting the business of a nursery.
It was a further
term of the agreement that it was to run from the
31st January 2002 until the 31st December 2004 whereafter it would
continue and
remain valid on a monthly basis. The Applicants are as
at date hereof still in occupation of the property by virtue of that
lease
agreement.
[10] During the latter part of 2001
into 2002 Second Applicant and the Second Respondent entered into a
verbal agreement whereby
they established an entity known as
Linksfield Nursery and Home Improvements CC as a partnership. The
precise terms and purpose
of that partnership are in dispute. The
Second Applicant says the purpose was to run a nursery business in
accordance with clause
5 of the lease agreement with the Provincial
Government. The Second Respondent James Wickstrom says that the
partnership agreement
entailed that he could of his own
improve the leased property with the
consent of the lessor for this purpose he had plans drawn up to erect
a coffee shop, a florist
as well as other buildings.
[11] It is common cause that after some
time the partnership was dissolved when the Second Applicant resigned
from the entity that
had been set up to conduct the partnership
business. The Second Respondent it would seem continued to conduct
business for his
own account as a coffee shop and florist from the
same property. In other words the First Applicant conducted a nursery
business
on the property for which he had a lease agreement whilst
the Second and First Respondents conducted business of a coffee shop
and florist on the property without a lease agreement. The Second
Respondent had out of his own funds erected structures from which
he
conducted his business. He says he did get the approval of the lessor
to do the improvements.
[12] The Applicant alleges that they
continued their businesses in this fashion until during the year
2008, when Second Respondent
walked out of the property and
relinquished all his rights and obligations in the partnership.
Applicant says this was at the time
when First and Second Respondents
were engaged in divorce proceedings. He says further that in the year
2010 the coffee shop and
florist were closed. He does not know why.
[13] The Second Respondent whilst
admitting that he closed the coffee shop in the year 2010 says the
reason was that the Second
Applicant reneged on an earlier verbal
agreement to sell to him the nursery business.
He says that thereafter their
relationship soured in that the Second Applicant started to undermine
his business by interfering
with his customers. He would for instance
lock the gates leading into the property whilst the Respondents’
customers were
still on the premises. He concludes by saying that
after numerous fights he was forced to leave the business.
[14] It is further common cause that
during the year 2008 the Fifth Respondent whose sole director is the
Second Respondent concluded
an agreement of sale with the Gauteng
Provincial Government in terms of which the Provincial Government
sold to the Fifth Respondent
the property which in the deed of sale
is described as Portion 1 of the Farm Rietfontein 61 IR (Extension 1)
held by virtue of
Title Deed No 7/1998.
[15] It is not in dispute that the
property that was being sold by the Provincial Government to the
Fifth Respondent is the same
property on which the First Applicant
had a lease agreement which was still running albeit on a monthly
basis.
[16] The salient terms of the deed of
sale are the following:
“(3) PURCHASE PRICE
The Purchase Price for the property is
the amount of R18 700 000,00 (Eighteen Million Seven Hundred Thousand
Rand) excluding Value
Added Tax.
(4) TERMS OF PAYMENT
The Purchase Price shall be payable as
set out hereunder into the undermentioned bank account namely:
ABSA BANK ACCOUNT NAME:
ACCOUNT NUMBER: 40…………
BRANCH: G……………………
BRANCH CODE: 63…………
(9) SUSPENSIVE CONDITIONS
This agreement is subject to the
following suspensive conditions and in the event of the failure of
any of these conditions this
agreement shall be of no force and
effect:
9.1 The Purchaser shall furnish to the
Seller a bank guarantee in respect of the sum of R21 318 000,00
(Twenty One Million Three
Hundred and Eighteen Thousand Rand) within
180 (One Hundred and Eighty) days of signature of this deed of sale
expressed to be
payable on the date of transfer of the property into
the name of the Purchaser.
9.2 The signature by the Seller to the
Resolution marked “B” hereto and
9.3 The division of the land in respect
of Portion 1 of the farm Rietfontein IR as referred to in the
Resolution annexed hereto
marked B and referred to in paragraph 10.2
above.
(10) BREACH
In the event of the Purchaser
committing any breach of any of the provisions of this agreement and
failing to remedy same within
14 (Fourteen) days of having been given
written notice calling upon the Purchaser to do so, the Seller shall
be entitled; without
prejudice to any other rights which it may have
at law and/or in terms hereof to:
10.1 Cancel this agreement and claim
from the Purchaser such damages as the Seller may have sustained and
pending the determination
of such damages (whether by agreement
and/or by a court of law) to retain on account thereof all monies
paid by the Purchaser on
account of the purchase price or
10.2 Claim immediate payment of the
whole of the purchase price and costs and fulfilment of all the terms
and conditions hereof
whether or not the due date for performance
shall otherwise have arrived
[17] The present status of the property
is that it is still owned by the Provincial Government. The purported
sale as pleaded by
the Second Respondent became a nullity when Fifth
Respondent failed to pay the purchase price. This evidence that the
property
is still owned by the Provincial Government was confirmed by
the MEC of the Department of Infrastructure Development on the 19th

September 2014.
[18] The Second and Fifth Respondents
have been disingenuous and not frank with the truth. Second
Respondent went about in circles
in trying to explain why transfer of
the property had not taken place even going as far as blaming it on
the maladministration
within the Provincial Government. However at no
stage and nowhere in his affidavit does the Second Respondent tell
the court that
the purchase price was paid into the “suspect
banking account mentioned in the deed of sale. As I see it the
version of the
Respondents did not even attempt to answer the central
case made by the Applicants but they sought to envelope this whole
matter
in a fog which distorts the truth.
[19] In my view the above facts set the
matrix for the consideration of the issue which is dispositive of the
present application,
that issue is appropriately captured in the
Applicants’ heads in the following words:
“ The Applicant maintains that
the Respondents do not have any rights to engage in any building
activities or operations at
the nursery or even be on the property.
The Applicant submits that there is a valid lease agreement in effect
that precludes the
Respondents from having any right to the property.
The First to Fifth Respondents appear to argue that they have a right
to the
property by virtue of an agreement of sale entered into
between Basfour and the Gauteng Provincial Government. Our submission
is
that the Respondents have failed to show any real or personal
rights to the property.”
CLEAR RIGHT OF THE APPLICANTS
[20] The first requisite to be
established by the Applicants in order to succeed in being granted a
final order is a clear right.
[21] The Respondents admit that the
Applicants entered into a lease agreement with the Gauteng Provincial
Government which ran from
the 31st January 2002 until the 31st
December 2004. The Respondents’ case is that the lease
agreement terminated in December
2007 alternatively that it came to
an end on the 28th April 2013 in accordance with the notice of
termination addressed to the
Applicants by the Gauteng Provincial
Government dated the 28th February 2013.
[22] It is so that notwithstanding the
said letter the Applicants remained in occupation of the property
beyond the 28th April 2013
and is still in occupation. The Applicants
remain monthly lessees in accordance with clause 1 of the lease
agreement dated 26 June
2001. There is nothing in the papers before
me to suggest that the lease agreement ceased to exist.
[23] The Respondent has failed to prove
a better right over the property than the Applicants. It is only the
Applicants who have
a right to occupation of the property in terms of
an existing monthly lease.
AN INJURY ACTUALLY COMMITTED OR IS
REASONABLY
APPREHENDED
[24] It is trite law that in order to
succeed with an application for a final interdict an injury actually
committed or reasonably
apprehended must be proved
[25] The evidence in this matter
reveals that the First and Second Respondents vacated the property in
the year 2010 leaving the
Applicants to continue running the nursery
business. They returned in September 2014 to commence demolishing of
structures built
on the property. The Applicants say that the action
of the Respondents is preventing his customers from accessing the
nursery as
there are broken paving stones in the driveway as a result
he is losing business every moment that customers fail to access the

nursing premises.
[26] The Respondents’ defence is
that what he is breaking belongs to him is legally not correct for in
terms of the law such
fixtures have now accrued to the owner of the
land being the Gauteng Provincial Government. His Lordship Howie P
writing for the
majority in the matter of V & A Waterfront
Properties (Pty) Ltd and Another v Helicopter & Marine Services
(Pty) Ltd and
Others
2006 (1) SA 252
(SCA) at page 258 paragraph [23]
says the following:
“[23] In the present case
therefore the threatened invasion of the first appellant’s
rights under the lease constituted
proof of reasonably apprehended
injury. It was not necessary for the appellant's success to show that
the Helicopter was unairworthy
or what the chances were of a fatal or
destructive crash."
NO OTHER ALTERNATIVE REMEDY
[27] The Respondents chose not to deal
with this requirement and rested their case on the first and second
requirements of a final
interdict. The alternative remedy must:
(a) be adequate in the circumstances;
(b) be ordinary and reasonable;
(c) be a legal remedy;
(d) grant similar protection.
[28] In general an applicant will not
obtain an interdict if he can obtain adequate redress through an
award of damages. Evidence
is that the First Respondent is an
insolvent. The Second Respondent was at the time acting as a Director
of the Fifth Respondent
a deregistered company. It is clear that to
wait to prove damages against the Respondents will involve complex
and worn out proceedings
whilst in the meantime the injury will be
perpetuating.
[29] I am satisfied that the Applicants
have succeeded in proving the third requirement for a final interdict
against First to Fifth
Respondents subject to what I have earlier
alluded to in respect of the Sixth Respondent. I accordingly make the
following final
order:
(a) The First, Second, Third, Fourth
and Fifth Respondents or any person in their employment or contracted
by them are interdicted
from demolishing any structure and/or
removing any items fixed or unfixed on the property described as
Portion 1 situate at Rietfontein
61 IR (the property).
(b) The Respondents are ordered to
repair or to bear the fair and reasonable costs of fixing or
restoring damage done on the property.
(c) The Respondents are ordered to
return all items unlawfully removed by them or their employees from
the property, by them.
(d) The Second to Fifth Respondents are
ordered to pay the costs of the application on a party and party
scale.
DATED at JOHANNESBURG on this the 8th
day of JULY 2015.
M A MAKUME
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH
AFRICA
GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
DATE OF HEARING 13th April 2015
DATE OF JUDGMENT 8th July 2015
FOR THE APPLICANTS ADV P A WAYBURNE
INSTRUCTED BY LARRY MARKS ATTORNEYS
SCS House, No 77 - 5th Avenue
Alberton
Tel: (087) 351 6532
Ref: Mr L Marks/OLM/D128
FOR THE RESPONDENTS ADV S VAN
ASWEGEN
INSTRUCTED BY T SMIT ATTORNEYS
Boksburg