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[2015] ZAGPJHC 155
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Gerber v Road Accident Fund (11/3022) [2015] ZAGPJHC 155 (26 June 2015)
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Case
no:
11/3022
DATE:
26 JUNE 2015
In
the matter between:
GERBER,
J M
H
..........................................................................................................................
Plaintiff
And
ROAD
ACCIDENT
FUND
......................................................................................................
Defendant
JUDGMENT
KATHREE-SETILOANE
J:
[1]
The plaintiff, JMH Gerber claims damages from the
defendant arising out of bodily injuries sustained in a motor vehicle
collision
which occurred, on 13 February 2007 on the N3 Highway,
between the insured motor vehicle and the motor vehicle which
the
plaintiff was driving.
[2]
The determination of the issue of liability was separated from
quantum by agreement between the parties at the pre-trial hearing.
I
am, therefore, only required to deal with the question of negligence.
[3]
The following facts are common cause: The collision occurred on 13
February 2007 between a Scania Truck consisting of a horse
and a
double trailer (“the Scania”) which was driven by the
plaintiff, and a Toyota Hino (“the Hino”),
which was
driven by the insured driver Mr Matias Jacko Tshabalala (“the
insured driver”). The collision took place
on the N3 highway
north bound (traveling from Heidelberg towards Johannesburg)
shortly before the Leondale/Vosloorus off
ramp, when the Scania
collided with the Hino from behind. The Hino was carrying gas
bottles of varying sizes.
[4]
It is trite law that with a rear-end collision the driver who
collides with the rear of a vehicle in front of him is
prima
facie
negligent unless he can give an explanation indicating that he was
not negligent.
[1]
Thus, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it must follow that
such negligence was the cause of the collision.
[2]
The plaintiff contends that he was not negligent as he was confronted
by an emergency situation, when the gas bottles rolled off
the back
of the Hino onto the road, and he was required to take immediate
action to avoid it. The situation was further exacerbated,
on
the plaintiff’s version, because the Hino’s rear lights
were not functioning, and it did not have the signage required
in law
for the transportation of hazardous or dangerous goods. The plaintiff
urges the Court to draw certain inferences from the
proved facts, in
order to establish the absence of negligence on his part.
[5]
The plaintiff testified that he has no independent recollection of
the collision. This was not disputed by the defendant. However,
in so
far as the question of negligence is concerned, the plaintiff gave
the following pertinent testimony: The Scania is, with
electronic
equipment, speed regulated to 80 kilometres per hour. The standard
operating procedure for his employment as a truck
driver is that he
travels in the left hand lane with the Scania and proceeds to the
right hand lane in order to overtake slower
moving vehicles. The
plaintiff confirmed under cross-examination that when driving the
Scania, he cannot override its electronic
speed regulation. Needless
to say, the defendant did not seriously challenge this aspect of the
plaintiff’s evidence. Crucially,
in this regard, the defendant
failed to put a version to the plaintiff in relation to how the
collision between the Scania and
Hino occurred. Although the
plaintiff, in all likelihood, would not have been able to comment on
the defendant’s version,
it was essential for the defendant to
establish a version of events, because it was aware that the
plaintiff would be leading the
evidence of an expert witness, who
would need to consider and respond to the defendant’s version
of the collision.
[6]
Mr F Hanekom (“Hanekom”), a co-worker of the plaintiff at
the time of the collision testified on behalf of the plaintiff.
He
testified that on the evening of the accident in question, the
plaintiff was travelling in convoy with him, as they often do.
On
arriving at Karan Beef in Heidelberg, on that evening, they
off-loaded the cattle from their respective trucks. Since Hanekom
had
finished off-loading the cattle first, he left Karan Beef before the
plaintiff and travelled along the N3 highway towards Johannesburg.
Upon reaching Total Petroport, which is situated on both sides of the
Highway and is well lit, Hanekom noticed the Hino.
He saw the
Hino veering or swerving between the emergency lane and the white
line of the left lane. This was not challenged in
cross-examination.
As he approached and overtook the Hino, he noticed numerous gas
bottles on the back of the Hino, which were
precariously secured.
There were also no hazardous chemicals/dangerous goods signs on the
rear of the Hino. He noticed three adult
occupants in the cab of the
Hino, who appeared to be having a jovial and animated conversation.
[7]
Hanekom testified further that, as a truck driver he received
training in the transportation of hazardous chemicals/dangerous
goods
and that the Hino did not, in his opinion, comply with the lawful
requirements for vehicles which are used to transport hazardous
chemicals/dangerous goods.
[3]
Hanekom pointed out that the Hino was required to have signage at the
back indicating “no open flames”, “no
cellphones”
and “no cigarettes”
[4]
,
as well as a fire extinguisher, but none were visible. He stated that
other than an assistant to the driver, passengers are not
allowed to
be transported in vehicles carrying hazardous chemicals such as gas
cylinders.
[5]
[8]
Not long after Hanekom had returned to the depot of his employer, he
was informed of the collision, and immediately drove
to the
scene of the collision. On surveying the scene of the collision, on
his return, he saw a gas bottle stuck underneath the
front axle and
silencer of the Scania, on the driver’s side. The tap of
the gas bottle pointed towards the silencer.
A short while before
Hanekom’s arrival at the scene of the collision, a fire which
engulfed the cab of the Scania had broken
out. By the time of his
arrival, however, the fire had already been dowsed and the plaintiff
had been transported by ambulance
to hospital. Hanekom spent
approximately two hours observing the scene of the collision. He
returned the following day and drew
a sketch plan. The sketch
plan indicates: (a) chip marks on the tar starting in the right lane
and proceeding into the left
lane; (b) other chip marks on the tar
starting in the left lane, and continuing in a forward motion along
the tar to the point
where the Scania came to a standstill; (c) four
tyre marks (yaw marks) in front of the chip marks in the right lane,
that travel
in a sharp curved direction from the right lane to the
left lane, and finally to the edge of the road; and (d) gas bottles
lying
on the island between the north and south bound Highways and
the left hand verge of the north bound Highway, close to where the
Hino finally overturned. Although Hanekom confirmed under
cross-examination that he did not see the collision, he denied that
that the rear lights of the Hino were functional, and that the gas
bottles were properly secured to it. He also denied the version
of
the insured driver, which was put to him during cross examination.
[9]
Mr Strydom (“Strydom”), an accident reconstruction expert
was called to testify on behalf of the plaintiff.
As required
by Rule 36(9) of the Uniform Rules of Court, he provided an expert
report in which he expressed an opinion on how the
collision may have
occurred. However, since he was present in court when both the
plaintiff and Hankom testified, he limited
his expert testimony to
the evidence which the plaintiff and Hanekom presented in court.
[6]
His expert testimony on the question of negligence was that: (a) the
chip marks on the road were caused by a hard object that had
bounced
and rolled on the tar; (b) the collision between the Scania and the
Hino took place in the right lane (as agreed between
Strydom and the
defendant’s expert, Mr Van Onsellen (“Onsellen”) in
their joint minute); (c) the chip marks and
the yaw-marks, properly
described, are in fact scrape marks which were caused by the gas
bottle, that was lodged under the front
axle of the Hino, being
pushed along in a forward direction; (d) the point where the
yaw-marks commenced, indicated the most probable
point of impact
between the Scania and the Hino; (e) the chip and scrape marks which
were caused by the gas bottle falling off
the Hino, commenced before
the point of collision; (f) the yaw-marks were also formed by the
Hino in an offside collision ie. a
collision that is not a straight
on direct collision, but rather a more serious side-swipe between two
vehicles.
[10]
The objective evidence of the photographs, which were taken at the
scene of the collision, confirm that there was an offside
collision
between the Hino and Scania. It is clear from the photgraphs
that the Hino has a distinct right rear dent with
the Scania’s
bulbar being distinctly pushed back towards the Scania’s body
on the left front. In Strydom’s
opinion, the damage to
the two vehicles indicate that the Scania had moved suddenly and
rapidly from left to right.
[11]
The insured driver testified on behalf of the defendant. I find
his evidence to be most unhelpful as he did not put forward
a version
of how the collision occurred. The material aspects of the insured
driver’s evidence were that he and his assistant
Mr Ngewenya
(“Ngwenya”) loaded gas bottles onto the back of the
Hino. The smaller bottles were stacked next to
each other as
well as on top of each other, in an upright position against the cab
of the Hino. The larger bottles were stacked
against the
smaller ones for support. The gas bottles were secured from left to
right with a rope (single) that ran once across
the larger bottles.
A hazardous chemicals/dangerous goods sign was affixed the centre of
the support beams at the back of
the Hino. The rear lights of the
Hino were fully functional, and he was travelling in the left lane
when the collision occurred.
He suddenly saw lights in his side
mirror and felt a rear impact. The Hino veered to the left and exited
the road finally landing
on its roof. He denied travelling past
the Total Petroport. In addition to Ngwenya, his wife and three year
old child were
also seated in the cab of the Hino. The plaintiff and
his fiancé assisted the insured driver, and his family
immediately
after the collision. On the plaintiff’s return to
the Scania, its horse exploded and the plaintiff’s skin was
covered
in an ice-like substance.
[12]
As alluded to, the defendant led no evidence as to the manner in
which the Scania collided with the rear of the Hino. The insured
driver conceded under cross-examination that his wife and child were
not supposed to be in the Hino. More significantly, he conceded
that
due to the perilous manner in which the rope was fastened, if one gas
bottle was to slip out from under the rope, then the
rope would
loosen around the remaining gas bottles and enable them to slip out
and move about in the loading space of the Hino.
[7]
The insured driver also conceded that after the collision he closed
the valves of various gas bottles.
[8]
The insured driver said that he could not recall if the Hino was
fitted with fire extinguishers. When asked in cross examination
to
locate them in the photographs, he was unable to.
[13]
The insured driver was also unable to point, in the photographs, to
the hazardous/dangerous chemicals sign, which was allegedly
affixed
to the back of the Hino. Importantly, in this regard, the plaintiff
had requested from the defendant, in terms of Rule
35(3) of the
Uniform Rules,
[9]
documents relating to the insured driver’s qualifications to
transport hazardous chemicals/dangerous goods, and the Hino’s
registration, which permitted it to transport hazardous
chemicals/dangerous goods. The defendant responded by stating
that
it did not have the documents in its possession. However, under
the guise that they were irrelevant, the defendant made no attempt
to
obtain them. As demonstrated by the plaintiff, the requested
documents were highly relevant to the issues in dispute, but were
ultimately rendered unnecessary, by the testimony of the defendant’s
expert witness.
[14]
Ngwenya confirmed that he had travelled in the Hino with the insured
driver, and the insured driver’s wife and child.
His
testimony materially contradicted that of the insured driver in
respect to how the gas bottles were stacked and secured. He
said that
he first stacked the taller gas bottles against the cab of the Hino,
then the medium bottles and lastly the shortest
bottles. His
testimony in relation to the presence of a hazardous chemicals sign
above the left rear light of the Hino, materially
contradicted that
of the insured driver in relation to the the location of the
signage. Ngwenya indicated that the
front lights of the Hino
were functional, but could not say if the rear lights were working.
He also confirmed that he and
the insured driver’s wife were
having a very lively and jovial discussion, which caused the insured
driver to laugh heartily.
He could not recall if the Hino had
passed the Total Pertroport as he did not concentrate on the road. He
was certain, however,
that the collision took place in the left hand
lane. During cross-examination, Ngwenya testified that he could not
recall the gas
bottles having been stacked in the manner described by
the insured driver, but that the way in which he (Ngwenya) had
stacked them,
was as he had been trained to do.
[15]
Van Onsellen, an accident reconstruction expert, testified on behalf
of the defendant. He was of the opinion that the Hino
had an
inadequate structure for the transportation of gas bottles. It
was of great concern to him that the Hino did not have
a rear back
flap to stop the gas bottles from falling off. He found the two
support beams at the rear of the Hino to be completely
inadequate, as
there was ample space between the support beams and the base of the
Hino, where gas bottles could pass or fall through.
In
cross-examination Van Onsellen confirmed that, in his opinion,
various gas bottles fell of the back of Hino and onto the road.
[16]
As already pointed out, the plaintiff bears the
onus
to prove that he was not negligent. The Court may draw certain
inferences from the proved facts.
[10]
The evidence of the insured driver that the collision occurred in the
left lane is not supported by the objective evidence of where
the
yaw-marks commenced on the road. Importantly, in this regard,
it was not disputed by the defendant that the yaw-marks
commenced in
the right lane. Moreover, contrary to the eye witness testimony of
the insured driver and Ngwenya, the defendant’s
own expert (Van
Onsellen) is of the opinion that the collision took place in the
right lane. His evidence is consistent with that
of the plaintiff’s
expert witness Strydom. I accordingly reject the evidence of the
insured driver and Ngwenya that the collision
took place in the left
lane. Their version on this crucial aspect is overwhelmingly
improbable and simply untrue.
[17]
Accepting the expert testimony that the collision took place in the
right lane, and that the structure of the Hino was completely
inadequate to transport gas bottles safely and securely, I find it
probable that one or more gas bottles would have come loose
from the
back of the Hino and fallen through the space between the beams and
the base of the Hino onto the road and in the path
of the Scania.
This would have created a sudden emergency situation which would have
required the plaintiff to take immediate action
to avoid the imminent
danger of the gas bottles in his path, without weighing up the
consequences of his actions
[11]
[12]
As opined by Strydom, the damage to the two vehicles indicate that
the Scania moved suddenly from left to right to avoid the falling
gas
bottles in its part.
[18]
The Hino was travelling in the right lane and the Scania in the left
lane. In the absence of the Hino indicating that it was
to proceed
into the left lane, the plaintiff was entitled to assume that the
Hino would remain in the right lane and that he could
safely overtake
the Hino whilst continuing to travel in the left lane.
[13]
It did not matter, to my mind, how close in proximity the Scania was
to the Hino when the gas bottles began to fall off the Hino.
Once the gas bottles began to fall off the Hino, the plaintiff was
faced with the imminent danger of gas bottles in his path, and
was
forced to take immediate action to avoid them by moving suddenly and
rapidly from the left lane into the right lane, thus causing
him to
collide into the rear of the Hino, which was travelling in the right
lane. In the event, I am unable to find that the plaintiff
was
negligent in colliding into the rear of the Hino.
[19]
I now turn to the question of whether the insured driver drove the
Hino in a manner that wrongfully caused damage
[14]
to the plaintiff. It is clear from the evidence of the
defendant’s expert witness that the manner in which the gas
bottles were secured and transported was wholly inadequate, and
provided no safeguards for other road users. Aware of the
danger of transporting gas bottles, it was reasonably expected of the
insured driver to exercise reasonable care and vigilance
when driving
the Hino and transporting the gas bottles. This he clearly failed to
do.
[20]
Hanekom testified that shortly before the collision, he saw the Hino
veering or swerving from side to side of the road, and
the insured
driver deep in an animated and jovial exchange with the other
occupants in the vehicle. This was not disputed by the
defendant. In
the absence of a version from the insured driver as to how the
collision occurred, I am compelled to infer from the
proved facts
that the insured driver drove the Hino recklessly and with complete
disregard that the gas bottles, which were precariously
secured at
the back, could as a direct result of his driving coupled with the
manner in which they were secured, come loose and
fall onto the road,
and into the direct path of other cars travelling behind him. Had the
insured driver taken reasonable care
and vigilance in keeping the
vehicle under control and securing the gas bottles, in the manner
required of him in terms of the
South African National Standard
(SANS) for the transportation of gas cyliners/bottles, the gas
bottles would not have fallen off
the back of the Hino into the
direct path of the Scania, and he could have avoided the Scania
colliding with the Hino. I am accordingly
of the view that the
collision was caused due to wrongful driving of the Hino by the
insured driver. The insured driver ought
reasonably, in all the
circumstances, to have foreseen the possibility of a collision with
the Scania, and should have taken all
reasonable steps to guard
against such an occurrence.
[21]
The defendant pleaded a
novus
actus interveniens.
The
main plea and the two alternatives upon which the
novus
actus interveniens
is
pleaded do not require consideration, as the defendant did not lead
any evidence on it. However, in so far as the defendant seeks
to rely
on the fact that the explosion occurred sometime after the collision,
and cannot, therefore, be causally connected to the
collision, I make
the following observations: The test to be applied in determining
legal causation has been described as "a
flexible one in which
factors such as reasonable foreseeability, directness, the absence or
presence of a novus actus interveniens,
legal policy, reasonability,
fairness and justice all play their part.”
[15]
In my view, had the plaintiff, on the version of the insured driver,
not exited the Scania prior to the explosion taking place,
there
would have been no debate on the issue of legal causation. Similarly,
If the plaintiff had exited the Scania and stepped
a few steps away
when the explosion occurred, and a wheel of the Scania came loose in
the explosion and struck the plaintiff, there
would be no debate as
to the cause of his injuries. In this regard, the evidence of Hanekom
demonstrates that the silencer and
turbo, which are located in close
proximity to each other, heats up to between 800 to 1400 degrees
celius. Van Onsellen is
of the opinion that the gas tank, which
was lodged in close proximity to the location of the silencer and
turbo, would have been
a contributing factor to the explosion
occurring. In my view, it is reasonable foreseeable that a gas
bottle, damaged as
it was, and lodged in the position it was, at the
time that the Scania came to a standstill, even if empty, would
have had
enough vapour to cause an ignition of gas and/or fuel to
cause the explosion.
[22]
The gas bottle ended up beneath the Scania as a direct consequence of
the wrongful driving of the Hino by the insured driver.
It
cannot, therefore, be said that the injuries suffered by the
plaintiff as a result of the delayed explosion was not causally
linked to the wrongful driving of the Hino. In the premises, I find
that the plaintiff’s injuries were caused as a result
of the
negligent and wrongful manner in which the insured driver drove the
Hino.
[23]
The defendant was aware, since 2014, that its own expert did not
support the version of the insured driver.
Notwithstanding such knowledge, the defendant persisted with its
opposition on the merits of this matter. Such conduct, in
my
view, is simply unreasonable. As a mark of the Court’s
displeasure at the defendant’s conduct in this matter, I
am
disposed to imposing a punitive costs order against the defendant. It
bears mentioning that the defendant pleaded that the plaintiff
attempted to remove the gas bottle from underneath the truck.
This plea was based on an
extra-curial
statement. If the defendant had
attempted to introduce this extra-curial statement, the plaintiff
would have had to rebut
the veracity of such extra-curial statement
through the evidence of Mrs E. Gerber. In anticipation of such
an attempt by
the defendant it was necessary for the plaintiff to
ensure the immediate availability of Mrs E. Gerber. Her
attendance at
Court was thus reasonably necessary.
[24]
In the result I make the following order:
1.
The Defendant is liable for 100% of the
Plaintiff’s burn and resultant injuries sustained as a
consequence of the collision
on 13 February 2007
2.
The Defendant is to pay the costs of the
Plaintiff on the scale as between attorney and client scale,
inclusive of:
2.1
the reservation fee of the Plaintiff’s
counsel for Monday 4 May 2015;
2.2
the reservation fee of the Plaintiff’s
expert witness, Mr Strydom, for Monday 4 May 2015;
2.3
the waiting time of the Plaintiff’s
Attorney for Monday 4 May 2015;
2.4
the travelling, accommodation and
subsistence costs of the Plaintiff and his necessary witnesses namely
Mr F Hanekom and Mrs E Gerber.
F
KATHREE-SETILOANE
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Counsel
for the plaintiff: Advocate C Thompson
Instructed
by: Schumann Van der Heever
Counsel
for the defendant: Advocate DLJ Ryneveldt
Instructed
by: Sishi Inc
Date
of hearing: 8 May 2015
Date
of judgment: 26 June 2015
[1]
H
B Kloppers
The
Law of Collision in South Africa
7
th
ed p78
[2]
Union
and South West Africa Insurance Co Ltd v Bezuidenhout
1982 (3) SA 957
(A) @ 966A – B
[3]
Hanekom,
who is an Afrikaans speaker, testified in English, for the
convenience of the Court. He found it difficult at times
to express himself fully. For instance, when he described the Hino
as being ‘unroadworthy’, what he in fact
wished to convey is that the Hino did not comply with
the lawful requirements for the transportation of hazardous
chemicals/dangerous goods.
[4]
See
SANS 10087-4
“
7.3
Warning notices
Each
vehicle shall display at least two notices that comply with the
requirements for PV1 signs (smoking prohibited), PV2 signs
(fire or
lights (or both) prohibited)) and PV3 signs (thoroughfare for
pedestrians prohibited) given in SANS 1186-1, one on each
side of
the vehicle, that are painted on or securely attached to the sides
of the vehicle, in letters of height at least 60 mm
in the case of
the word "DANGER" and of heights at least 30 mm in the
case of the remainder of the wording.”
[5]
See
SANS 10231
“
5.3
En route procedures
5.3.1
The driver shall not allow any passengers or unauthorized persons
to be in or on the vehicle at any stage during
the journey.”
[6]
Holtzhauzen
v Roodt
1997 (4) SA 766
(W)
“
Fifth,
the opinion offered to the Court must be proved by admissible
evidence, either facts within the
personal
knowledge of the expert or on the basis of facts proven by others.”
[7]
See
SANS 10231
“
8.1
Cargo securement
Cargo
securement shall be in accordance with SANS 10187 to minimize the
risk of spillage in the event of the vehicle overturning
or any
other incident.”
See
SANS 10187-8
“
9
Stowage of gas cylinders
9.1
Gas cylinders shall be carried upright in racks fitted on the
vehicle, or in lift-on-off cribs or frames.
9.2
If gas cylinders are carried individually, they shall be well
secured by straps or chains to prevent any movement in
the load
space, which could cause damage to the cylinders themselves, or to
other load items.”
[8]
See
SANS 10187-8
“
9.3
The valves of gas containers shall be protected by fittings such as
surrounding rings or caps.”
See
SANS 10087-4
“
5.4.7
Protection of valves and accessories 5.4.7.1 All valves
and accessories should be
safeguarded
against interference and accidental damage.”
See
SANS 10231
“
8.1
Cargo securement
Cargo
securement shall be in accordance with SANS 10187 to minimize the
risk of spillage in the event of the vehicle overturning
or any
other incident.”
[9]
Page
148 to 151 of Bundle 2 of 2 (Index to Notices)
[10]
R
v Blom
1939 AD 188
@ 202-203:
“
In
reasoning by inference there are two cardinal rules of logic which
cannot be ignored: (1) The inference sought to be drawn
must be
consistent with all the proved facts. If it is not, the inference
cannot be drawn. (2) The proved facts should be such
that they
exclude every reasonable inference from them save the one sought to
be drawn.”
Ocean
Accident and Guarantee Corporation Ltd v Koch
1963
(4) SA 147
(A) @ 159B-D
“
As
to the balancing of probabilities, I agree with the remarks of
SELKE, J, in
Govan v Skidmore
,
1952 (1) SA 732
(N) at p. 734, namely “. . . in finding facts
or making inferences in a civil case, it seems to me that one may,
as Wigmore
conveys in his work on Evidence, 3rd ed., para. 32, by
balancing probabilities select a conclusion which seems to be the
more
natural, or plausible, conclusion from amongst several
conceivable ones, even though that conclusion be not the only
reasonable
one”. I need hardly add that “plausible”
is not here used in its bad sense of “specious”, but in
the connotation which is conveyed by words such as acceptable,
credible, suitable. (Oxford Dictionary, and Websters’s
International Dictionary).”
[11]
R
v Cawood
1944
GWL 50
@
54
“
A
man who, by another’s want of care, finds himself in a
position of imminent danger, cannot be
held
guilty of negligence merely because in that emergency he does not
act in the best way to avoid the danger.”
Thornton
v Fisher
1929
AD 398
@
412
“
In
judging the action of the motorist or a pedestrian faced with sudden
emergency due allowance must be made for a possible error
of
judgment.”
[12]
Goode
v SA Mutual Fire & General Insurance Co. Ltd
1979
(4) SA 301
(W)
@ 306G
[13]
Compare:
Jacobs
v Road Accident Fund
(A402/2008)
[2011] ZAGPPHC 121 (13 June 2011)
“
A
driver is entitled to assume that those who are travelling in the
opposite direction will continue in their course and that
they will
not suddenly and inopportunely turn across the line of traffic. This
assumption may continue until it is shown that
there is a clear
intention to the contrary.
See
also :
Van
Staden v Stocks
,
1936
AD 18
;
Rustenburg
v Otto
,
1974
(2) SA 268
(C)
;
Old
Mutual Fire and General Insurance Co of Rhodesia (PVT) LTD and
Others v Britz and Another
1976
(2) SA 650
(RAD).
[14]
Section
3 of the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1997
“
3
Object of Fund
The
object of the Fund shall be the payment of compensation in
accordance with this Act for loss or damage wrongfully caused by
the
driving of motor vehicles.”
[15]
Standard
Chartered Bank of Canada v Nedperm Bank Ltd
[1994] ZASCA 146
;
1994
(4) SA 747
(A) at 764I - 765B