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[2014] ZAGPJHC 356
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Triumphy Safety Glass CC v Willoughby And Associates (2012/14899) [2014] ZAGPJHC 356 (28 November 2014)
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION
JOHANNESBURG
CASE NO. 2012/14899
DATE: 28 NOVEMBER 2014
In the matter between:
TRIUMPH SAFETY GLASS
CC
..........................................................
Plaintiff
And
WILLOUGHBY AND
ASSOCIATES
.................................
Excipient/Defendant
JUDGMENT
COOK AJ
[1] The plaintiff claims damages from
the defendant, its auditor for the financial years ended February
2007 to 2010, in an amount
of R2 003 166,50. The damages are said to
arise from a failure on the part of the defendant to have performed
its contractual
responsibilities in a proper and professional manner.
[2] The defendant takes exception to
the particulars of claim, asserting that the particulars are
excipiable in that they fail to
make out a proper cause of action
and, in the alternative, are vague and embarrassing. Ten grounds of
exception are traversed
in the defendant's notice of exception, one
of which (the ninth ground) was abandoned at the hearing.
[3] Although in terms of the notice of
exception it is asserted that no cause of action is disclosed, the
matter was argued on the
basis that the particulars are vague and
embarrassing.
[4] In the heads of argument on behalf
of the excipient, it is submitted that there are four categories to
the complaint. Firstly,
it is contended that the allegations in the
particulars are incompatible with the written agreement concluded
between the parties
(to which I shall refer as "the engagement
letter"). Secondly, the allegations are not consistent with the
statutory
obligations upon which reliance is placed by the plaintiff.
Thirdly, the allegations of fact are deficient in the sense that the
facts are neither clearly nor concisely stated, nor is it made clear
how the alleged breach of contract is causally related to
the failure
to detect the frauds and thefts which caused the loss. Fourthly, the
quantum of the damages claimed is not pleaded
with sufficient clarity
to facilitate an assessment of the damages.
[5] Summarised, the plaintiff's cause
of action is that:
5.1. the engagement letter was
concluded on 1 March 2006, in terms of which the defendant was
engaged to audit and report on the
plaintiff's annual financial
statements from time to time;
5.2. in so doing, the defendant was
required to perform its work in accordance with generally accepted
accounting practice or, in
the alternative, “in accordance with
International Quality control, auditing, review, other assurance and
related services
pronouncements”;
5.3. the defendant was required to
comply with the Audit Profession Act, 26 of 2005 and international
standards of auditing adopted
by the Independent Regulatory Board of
Auditors;
5.4. the defendant was required to
conduct the audit with the care and skill as might reasonably be
expected of a registered accountant
and auditor and of an auditor in
public practice;
5.5. the defendant was required to plan
and perform the audit, including the designing and performing of
audit procedures appropriate
for the purposes of obtaining sufficient
appropriate audit evidence to provide reasonable assurance of
detecting material misstatements
in the financial statements and
accounting records, including any material misstatements arising from
fraud or theft;
5.6. the defendant was to comply with
section 300 and 301 of the Companies Act, 61 of 1973 (“the 1973
Companies Act”);
5.7. the defendant was to examine
and/or evaluate material evidence supporting the material amounts and
material disclosures in
the financial statements; assess the
accounting principles used in significant estimates made by
management and evaluate the overall
financial statement presentation;
5.8. for the year ended 28 February
2007, the defendant reported in terms of section 301(1) of the 1973
Companies Act that the plaintiff's
financial statements fairly
present, in all material respects, the financial position of the
company at that time;
5.9. in forming its opinion, the
defendant accepted that the accounting records of the plaintiff
correctly reflected trade account
payments payable to creditors in an
amount of R711 181,00; that an amount of R626 248,79 was owed to a
particular creditor, TEK
Glass and that the amount allegedly owed to
TEK Glass represented 88% of the total amount owing to trade
creditors, thus representing
a material account balance;
5.10. the reflection of trade creditors
in the financial statements was false in that the trade creditors
were not owed an amount
of R711 181,00 and TEK Glass was not owed an
amount of R626 248,69. TEK Glass was, in fact, owed an amount of R329
415,29 and,
accordingly, the financial statements were materially
misstated in that the amount allegedly owed to TEK Glass was not
owed;
5.11. in performing the audit, the
defendant breached its obligations. It is alleged:
"9. The defendant in performing
the audit to which the said opinion relates, and in breach of its
obligations in terms of the
Agreement to the plaintiff and having
regard to the amount allegedly owed to TEK GLASS and trade creditors:
9.1 failed to perform sufficient and
appropriate audit procedures to verify and confirm that TEK GLASS was
in fact owed the amount
reflected in the plaintiff's accounting
records and supporting documents in that the defendant failed to,
interalia:
9.1.1. verify and confirm that the
accounting records and supporting documents of the plaintiff
correctly reflected the amount due
to TEK GLASS;
9.1.2. failed to verify and confirm
that amounts which were alleged to have been paid to TEK GLASS, were
in fact paid to TEK GLASS;
9.1.3. failed to uncover a fraud and/or
theft perpetrated by Naomi Slabbert ("Slabbert") who:
9.1.3.1. for the financial years of
2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010, prepared duplicate invoices allegedly
received from TEK GLASS;
9.1.3.2. for the financial years of
2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 duplicated payments made to TEK GLASS by
diverting amounts allegedly
due to TEK GLASS into Standard Bank
Account No.: 20584377 in respect of which Slabbert was the account
holder ("Slabbert's
personal Standard Bank account");
9.1.3.3. subsequently and on or about
the 20th July 2011 pleaded guilty to theft from the plaintiff of an
amount of R2.3 million
perpetrated during the financial years 2007,
2008, 2009 and 2010.
9.2 failed to investigate and/or
enquire into duplicate payments allegedly made to TEK GLASS from whom
all duplicate invoices were
received by plaintiff, in
circumstances where the defendant knew or ought to have
known that duplicate
payments were allegedly made to TEK GLASS and
duplicate invoices were received from TEK GLASS
by plaintiff;
9.3 failed to audit and report on
whether the plaintiffs annual financial statements fairly
represented, in all material respects,
the financial position, the
results of operations and the cash flows of the plaintiff, in
accordance with South African Statements
of Generally accepted
accounting practice, alternatively, the standards in that:
9.3.1. the defendant failed to design
and perform audit procedures appropriate in the circumstances for the
purpose of obtaining
sufficient appropriate audit
evidence;
9.3.2. the defendant failed to adopt
audit procedures to consider material account balances alternatively
the procedures adopted
to consider material account
balances were, in the prevailing circumstances, inappropriate;
9.3.3. the defendant failed to evaluate
whether the information furnished to it by plaintiff including the
accounting records and
supporting documents was sufficiently
reliable for the defendant's purposes;
9.3.4. failed to design tests of
controls and tests of details for selecting items for testing that
are effective for purposes of
meeting the audit procedure;
9.3.5. the defendant failed to perform
audit procedures to test the accounting records and supporting
documents through analysis,
review, re-performing
procedures and reconciling related types and applications of the same
information;
9.3.6. the defendant failed to examine
evidence supporting the material amounts and material disclosures in
the accounting records
and financial statements of
plaintiff;
9.3.7. the defendant failed to evaluate
the overall financial statement presentation.
9.4. failed to comply with the
Auditing
Profession Act 26 of 2005
, more particularly
Section 44
thereof, when
conducting the audit in that:
9.4.1. the defendant expressed an
unqualified opinion without considering the accounting records of the
plaintiff, more particularly,
failing to ensure that the
accounting records reflect and explain all its transactions,
records and all the plaintiffs
assets and liabilities correctly and
adequately or whether same exist at all;
9.4.2. the defendant failed to consider
all information and supporting documents which were clearly
necessary for the performance
of the defendant's duties.
9.5. failed to comply with the
standards. In this regard the above Honourable Court is referred to
paragraphs 9.3 to 9.3.7 above
which the plaintiff prays be read as if
specifically pleaded herein.
9.6. failed to conduct the audit in
compliance with the standards. In this regard the above Honourable
Court is referred to paragraphs
9.3 to 9.3.7 above which the
plaintiff prays be read as if specifically pleaded herein;
9.7. failed to conduct the audit with
the care and skill as might reasonably be expected of a registered
accountant, and/or auditor,
and/or chartered
accountant. In this regard the above Honourable Court is referred
to paragraphs 9.3
to 9.3.7 above which the plaintiff prays be read as
if specifically pleaded herein
9.8. failed to exercise the
professional care and skill required of an auditor in public
practice. In this regard the above Honourable
Court is referred to
paragraphs 9,3 to 9.3.7 above which the plaintiff prays
be read as if specifically pleaded herein.
9.9. failed to plan and perform the
audit so as to provide reasonable assurance of detecting material
misstatements in the financial
statements and
accounting records, including any material misstatements arising from
theft and/or fraud.
In this regard the above Honourable Court is
referred to paragraphs 9.3 to 9.3.7 above which
the plaintiff
prays be read as if specifically pleaded herein.
9.10. failed to comply with
sections
300
and
301
of the old Companies Act in that:
9.10.1. the defendant failed to satisfy
itself that proper accounting records as required by the old
Companies Act were being kept
by the company;
9.10.2. the defendant failed to obtain
all the information and explanations which were necessary for the
purpose of carrying out
its duties;
9.10.3. the defendant failed to satisfy
itself that the annual financial statements are in agreement with
the plaintiff's accounting
records;
9.10.4. the defendant failed to examine
such of the accounting records (and supporting documents) of the
company and failed to
carry out such tests in respect of
such records in order to satisfy itself that the annual financial
statements fairly
represent the financial position of the company and
the results of its operations";
5.12. but for its failures, the
defendant would have established or uncovered the fraud or theft
perpetrated by Slabbert; would
have uncovered the duplicate invoices
which purported to be from TEK Glass and the duplicate payments which
were purportedly made
to TEK Glass (particularly as the amount due to
TEK Glass represented a material balance); would have realised the
accounting records
and supporting documents of the plaintiff did not
correctly reflect the amounts due to TEK Glass and would have
realised that the
amount reflected in the financial statements did
not correctly reflect the amounts owing to trade creditors;
5.13. had the defendant performed its
obligations in the manner required and as specifically pleaded, it
would have detected the
fraud or theft of Slabbert and, accordingly,
would have communicated or reported these facts to the plaintiff's
directors, thereby
exposing the theft or fraud of Slabbert and
thereby preventing the occurrence of further thefts or frauds in the
ensuing financial
years;
5.14. accordingly, the losses sustained
in the subsequent financial years would have been prevented;
5.15. the losses sustained by the
plaintiff flow naturally and generally from the defendant's breaches
and amount to R2 003 165,50
made up of the amount of R2 300 000
(being the admitted value of the theft or fraud by Slabbert), less
the amount of R296 833,50
which was the loss sustained during the
year ended February 2007. (In other words, the loss sustained and
claimed amounts to the
aggregate losses over the ensuing financial
years.)
[6] The starting point in an enquiry of
this nature, according to the excipient’s submission, is to
consider what a pleading
ought to contain; and this is addressed in
rule 18 of the Uniform Rules of Court. The complaint in this matter
is that there was
not compliance with sub-rules (4) and (10), which
provide:
"(4) Every pleading shall contain
a clear and concise statement of the material facts upon which the
pleader relies for his
claim, defence or answer to any pleading, as
the case may be, with sufficient particularity to enable the opposite
party to reply
thereto. …
(10) A plaintiff suing for damages
shall set them out in such manner as will enable the defendant
reasonably to assess the quantum
thereof: …"
[7] I accept that rule 18 informs us
what assertions a pleading ought to contain. However, I am here
concerned with an exception.
Rule 23 allows for an exception to be
taken to a pleading which is vague and embarrassing, provided the
offending party has been
given an opportunity to remove the cause of
complaint. Such an opportunity was given in this matter.
[8] With reference to the well-known
and often cited decisions in Jowell v Bramwell-Jones
1998 (1) SA 836
(W); Trope v South African Reserve Bank
1992 (3) SA 208
(T) (on
appeal:
[1993] ZASCA 54
;
1993 (3) SA 264
(A)); Levitan v Newhaven Holiday Enterprises
CC
1991 (2) SA 297
(C); Nasionale Aardappel Kooperasie Bpk v
PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2001(2) SA 790 (T) and others, the learned
authors of Erasmus:
Superior Court Practice at B1-154/155, set out
the applicable principles, thus:
"An exception that a pleading is
vague and embarrassing is not directed at a particular paragraph
within a cause of action:
it goes to the whole cause of action, which
must be demonstrated to be vague and embarrassing. The exception is
intended to cover
the case where, although a cause of action appears
in the summons there is some defect or incompleteness in the manner
in which
it is set out, which results in embarrassment to the
defendant. An exception that a pleading is vague and embarrassing
strikes
at the formulation of the cause of action and not its legal
validity.
Where a pleading both fails to comply
with the provisions of rule 18 and is vague and embarrassing, the
defendant has a choice of
remedies: he or she may either bring an
application in terms of rule 30 to have the pleading set aside as an
irregular step, or
raise an exception in terms of rule 23(1). The
remedies, however, are based on separate and distinct complaints
requiring different
adjudication. The crucial distinction between
this rule and rule 30 are (a) an exception that a pleading is vague
and embarrassing
can only be taken when the vagueness and
embarrassment strikes at the root of the cause of action as pleaded;
whereas (b) rule
30 may be invoked to strike out the claim pleaded
when individual averments do not contain sufficient particularity; it
is not
necessary that the failure to plead material facts goes to the
root of the cause of action.
An exception that a pleading is vague
and embarrassing will not be allowed unless the excipient will be
seriously prejudiced if
the offending allegations were not expunged.
The effect of this is that the exception can be taken only if the
vagueness relates
to the cause of action. Such embarrassment may
occur where the admission of one of two sets of contradictory
allegations in the
plaintiff's particulars of claim or declaration,
destroys the plaintiff's cause of action. In other words, averments
in a pleading
which are contradictory and which are not pleaded in
the alternative are patently vague and embarrassing.
The test applicable in deciding
exceptions on vagueness and embarrassment arising out of lack of
particularity can be summed up
as follows:
(a) In each case a court is obliged
first of all to consider whether the pleading does lack particularity
to an extent amounting
to vagueness. Where a statement is vague it
is either meaningless or capable of more than one meaning. To put it
at its simplest:
the reader must be unable to distil from the
statement a clear, single meaning.
(b) If there is vagueness in this sense
the court is then obliged to undertake a quantitative analysis of
such embarrassment as
the excipient can show is caused to him or her
by the vagueness complained of.
(c) In each case an ad hoc ruling must
be made as to whether the embarrassment is so serious as to cause
prejudice to the excipient
if he or she is compelled to plead to the
pleading in the form to which he or she objects. A point may be of
the utmost importance
in one case, and the omission thereof may give
rise to vagueness and embarrassment, but the same point may, in
another case, be
only a minor detail.
(d) The ultimate test as to whether or
not the exception should be upheld is whether the excipient is
prejudiced.
(e) The onus is on the excipient to
show both vagueness amounting to embarrassment and embarrassment
amounting to prejudice.
(f) The excipient must make out his or
her case for embarrassment by reference to the pleadings alone …
… The summons is also vague and
embarrassing if there is inconsistency amounting to contradiction
between ... or between
the summons and the document relied upon as
the basis of the claim; ... or where a pleading contains averments
which are contradictory
and which are not pleaded in the alternative.
…"
[9] I was referred by the excipient to
the unreported judgment of Blieden J in this Division in the matter
between Baird's Renaissance
(Pty) Ltd v PKF (Johannesburg) Inc., a
decision in point, which addressed a lack of particularity in a cause
of action against
the plaintiff's statutory auditor.
[10] The judgment of Blieden J is, with
respect, not only useful for its summary of the principles applicable
to determining whether
or not a pleading is vague and embarrassing,
but it also sets out succinctly the role and duties of the statutory
auditor. In paragraph
[19] the learned Judge held:
"[19] It is apparent from this
summary of the role and duties of an auditor that unless the auditor
knows the details of the
fraud alternatively theft or
“misappropriation”, and what those defalcations entail,
and how he could reasonably have
prevented them by applying
reasonable auditing procedures, he cannot plead to the case. It is
essential that these facts be pleaded."
[11] Upon this passage, the excipient
placed much reliance.
[12] I do not, however, read the
passage as encroaching upon the distinction between facta probanda
and facta probantia, and reiterate
that it is the facta probanda that
are required to be pleaded, clearly and concisely and "with
sufficient particularity to
enable the opposite party to reply
thereto". The distinction between the ability to reply to a
pleading and to present one's
case at trial must be observed, bearing
in mind that the rules provide for particulars to be provided for
trial purposes.
The first ground of exception
[13] The first complaint relates to
differences between the formulation of the particulars of claim and
the terms of the engagement
letter. A number of instances of this
are pleaded in the defendant's exception.
[14] It is asserted that the plaintiffs
allegations which I have set out in paragraph 5.5 above are
inconsistent with the engagement
letter because it provides for
reasonable assurance that “fair presentation” is achieved
and that it is specifically
recorded that significant irregularity
may not necessarily be detected. Another example is the assertion in
paragraph 5.8 of the
particulars of claim to the effect that the
defendant undertook to examine or evaluate material evidence
supporting the material
amounts and material disclosures in the
financial statements, whereas the engagement letter provides that the
audit will include
the examination, on a test basis, of evidence
supporting the amounts and the disclosures in the financial
statements.
[15] The distinctions between the
pleaded case and the express wording of the engagement letter are
more matters of emphasis than
material discrepancy. To the extent
that the plaintiff overstates the express wording of the engagement
letter, this must be viewed
in the context, firstly, of the pleaded
case and, secondly, the full terms of the engagement letter. The
opening assertions in
paragraph 5 of the particulars are to the
effect that the obligations pleaded arise from the "material
express, alternatively
tacit, further alternatively, implied terms"
(of the engagement letter). In pleading its case, the plaintiff
relies not only
on the engagement letter, but the obligations that
arise from the duty of an auditor to comply with generally accepted
accounting
practice, generally accepted auditing standards,
international standards, to the extent to which they apply, the
professional duty
of care and skill owed by an auditor in public
practice and compliance with statutes such as the
Auditing Profession
Act and
the old Companies Act. Moreover, in the engagement letter, it
is recorded that the letter does not seek to limit the defendant’s
professional responsibilities “below the standards that are
expected of [the] profession”.
[16] Whether or not the plaintiff is
correct in its assertions about the obligations that arise from these
sources, is a matter
for determination at the trial, not a matter for
determination at the exception stage.
[17] In any event, to the extent that
there are discrepancies between the engagement letter and the pleaded
allegations - which
I accept there are - they are not of such a
nature that the defendant is embarrassed to the extent that it is
unable to plead to
the assertions. I do not consider that an
exception is warranted.
The second ground of exception
[18] The second ground of exception is
on a similar basis. The complaint is that the alleged breach does not
accord with the pleaded
obligation. It seems to me that the emphasis
of the breach is on the alleged failure to perform sufficient and
appropriate audit
procedures. On my quantitative analysis of such
embarrassment as there may be, I do not consider that an exception is
warranted.
The third ground of exception
[19] The third ground of exception is
something of a hybrid ground. In part, the complaint is that the
plaintiff alleges that the
defendant failed to uncover a fraud or
theft perpetrated by Slabbert, whereas detection of fraud or theft is
not an obligation
assumed by the defendant. As far as this complaint
goes, I think it is wrong to read clause 9.1.3 of the particulars of
claim
in isolation. That allegation must be read in the context of
paragraph 9 as a whole. The further aspect of this ground of
complaint
relates to a lack of particularity. It is contended that
the plaintiff failed to allege details of the duplicate payments made
to TEK Glass and that it failed to allege details of the theft from
the plaintiff of the amount of R2,3 million. The complaint
is,
also, that particulars are not given of the losses sustained in each
of the financial years 2008, 2009 and 2010.
[20] There are two answers to the
latter aspects of the complaint. Firstly, the kind of particularity
sought by the defendant is
a matter that can be addressed by way of a
request for further particulars for trial. Secondly, the complaint
relates to details
of the quantification of the damages sustained
and, it seems to me, such a complaint should have been addressed by
way of rule
30, calling for compliance with Rule 18(10). What is
known to the defendant is that over the course of four financial
years, duplicate
invoices were created and payments made pursuant to
those invoices, which payments were made to Slabbert's bank account.
The aggregate
of these payments is the amount of R2,3 million.
Whilst it is arguable that greater particularity could well have been
provided
in the particulars of claim, in assessing the magnitude of
the deficiency in particularity, I do not consider it sufficient to
justify the taking of an exception. The complaint does not strike at
the root of the cause of action.
[21] The decision in Baird’s
Renaissance is clearly distinguishable from this matter in that in
Baird no facts were pleaded
concerning the manner in which the frauds
were perpetrated. Here, there are the allegations about the
fabrication of duplicate
invoices in relation to the creditor, TEK,
and allegations about payments made pursuant to those invoices into
Slabbert’s
account. That was the modus. In Baird, no modus was
pleaded.
The fourth ground of exception
[22] As I read this complaint, it is
that the allegation in the particulars of claim is vague in the sense
that it is ambiguous.
Reading the pleading as a whole, I am not
persuaded of the ambiguity contended for by the defendant. The
plaintiff asserts that
the defendant failed to make the necessary
enquiries when it knew or ought to have known of the duplicate
payments. As I understand
the averment, the defendant ought to have
known because of the materiality of the matter.
[23] Accordingly, this ground of
exception cannot succeed
The fifth ground of exception
[24] In this ground of exception, the
plaintiff is taken to task for a number of expressions used by it in
its particulars of claim,
it being contended that the expressions are
vague and ambiguous. Many instances are asserted and I do not
propose to address them
in any detail. It seems to me that
sufficient meaning can be gleaned from the language used by the
plaintiff to enable the defendant
to plead to these assertions and to
the extent that greater particularity is required, such can be sought
in due course by way
of a request for particulars for trial.
Importantly, the engagement letter records the undertaking to perform
such tests as are
considered necessary and that the audit is designed
to provide reasonable assurance of detecting errors and
irregularities. The
allegations made are consonant with these
undertakings.
The sixth ground of exception
[25] The complaint articulated under
the sixth ground of exception is that the allegations in the
particulars of claim relying upon
obligations imposed by the
Auditing
Profession Act go
beyond the provisions of the Act itself. Whilst I
recognise some substance in the complaint, it seems to me that the
defendant
is being somewhat pedantic and I am not persuaded that
there is real prejudice or embarrassment such as to justify upholding
an
exception on this ground.
The seventh ground of exception
[26] The seventh ground of exception is
to the effect that the alleged breach of the agreement is a breach of
an obligation not
undertaken by the defendant in terms of the
engagement letter. The point is made that the detection of fraud or
theft is not an
obligation assumed by the defendant in terms of the
engagement letter. I agree with that contention, but I do not agree
that the
plaintiff seeks to make out that case. The assertion goes
to the planning and performance of the audit which the plaintiff
contends
was deficient and that had it not been so these material
misstatements in the financial statements would have been detected.
That,
ultimately, will be a matter to be resolved by evidence at the
trial. I do not see this as a valid ground of exception.
The eighth ground of exception
[27] This ground is similar to the
sixth ground of exception, save that in this instance it is asserted
that the obligations pleaded
do not accord with the obligations
imposed by the provisions of sections 300 and 301 of the 1973
Companies Act.
[28] The complaint lies against the
assertion that the defendant failed to "obtain all the
information and explanations which
were necessary for the purpose of
carrying out its duties". I confess I have some difficulty with
the formulation of the
exception, which strikes me as somewhat vague,
but nevertheless section 300(f) of the 1973 Companies Act imposes a
duty on an auditor
"to obtain all the information and
explanations which to the best of his knowledge and belief are
necessary for the purposes
of carrying out his duties". I have
grave difficulty in seeing how the formulation of the plaintiff,
although not verbatim,
can be construed as causing any embarrassment
or prejudice. There is no merit in this ground of exception.
The tenth ground of exception
[29] This ground relates to the lack of
detail concerning the quantification of the damages.I agree that the
formulation is somewhat
sketchy.The assertion is that Slabbert
perpetrated theft or fraud to the extent of R2,3 million. An amount
falls to be deducted
from the amount of R2.3 million as it relates to
losses sustained during the year ended February 2007. The defendant
cannot be
held responsibility for those losses as it was the first
year that it performed the audit - but the plaintiff seeks to hold
the
defendant responsible for the subsequent losses because it did
not detect the defalcations during the 2007 year. The claim is made
up of the aggregate amount of R2,3 million less the losses during
2007. It seems to me that further particularity should be provided
relating to the quantification of the damages, but I do not see this
as a basis for an exception. As I have said, this is a complaint
which could have been addressed by recourse to rule 30 and, in any
event, is a matter that can be addressed at the time that the
defendant seeks particulars for trial.
[30] In the result, the exception is
dismissed with costs.
A O COOK, SC
Acting Judge of the High Court
Heard: 8 September 2014
Judgment delivered: 28 November
2014
Appearances:
For Excipient: A Govender
For Plaintiff: D L Williams