Greenberg v Du Preez and Another (23302/2002) [2013] ZAGPJHC 67 (31 March 2013)

80 Reportability
Criminal Law

Brief Summary

Damages — Wrongful arrest and detention — Plaintiff claiming damages for wrongful arrest and detention by police officer — Arrest based on alleged breach of domestic violence protection order — Defendants asserting lawful arrest under section 40(1)(q) of the Criminal Procedure Act and section 3 of the Domestic Violence Act — Court finding that the first defendant's belief in the necessity of arrest was reasonable given the circumstances — Plaintiff's detention deemed lawful and claim for damages dismissed.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


This was a delictual damages action for wrongful arrest and detention, brought in the South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg. The plaintiff, Lionel Mervin Greenberg, sued Renier du Preez (a detective sergeant stationed at SAPS Edenvale at the time) as first defendant, and the Minister of Safety and Security as second defendant, for damages arising from the plaintiff’s arrest on 6 July 2000 and his subsequent deprivation of liberty until 7 July 2000.


The matter proceeded to trial after pleadings in which the defendants initially alleged that the arrest was effected on a warrant, alternatively that it was justified under section 40 of the Criminal Procedure Act. At the commencement of the trial, however, the defendants’ counsel disavowed reliance on section 40(1)(b) (Schedule 1 reasonable suspicion) and informed the court that the defence rested only on section 40(1)(q) of the Criminal Procedure Act read with section 3 of the Domestic Violence Act, namely arrest without a warrant on reasonable suspicion of an act of domestic violence constituting an offence with an element of violence.


The dispute concerned the lawfulness of the arrest and detention in circumstances linked to an acrimonious domestic relationship and an interim protection order obtained by the plaintiff’s former wife under the Domestic Violence Act. The quantum of damages for the established deprivation of liberty was also in issue.


2. Material Facts


It was common cause that the plaintiff and his former wife, Mrs Greenberg, had undergone a highly acrimonious divorce, and that the plaintiff had left the former common home around the end of April 2000. It was also common cause that on 9 June 2000 Mrs Greenberg obtained an interim protection order in terms of section 5(2) of the Domestic Violence Act against the plaintiff. The order prohibited him, among other things, from entering Mrs Greenberg’s residence (the former matrimonial home), entering her place of employment (at the residence), and from certain further forms of contact and conduct.


The events leading to police involvement arose on 5 July 2000 when the plaintiff was informed (via Ms Rose Malotane, the domestic worker at Mrs Greenberg’s residence) that the plaintiff and Mrs Greenberg’s minor son (almost 13 years old at the time) had disappeared from Mrs Greenberg’s residence. The plaintiff, accompanied by a co-worker, then went to assist in searching for the child. The plaintiff’s evidence was that he arrived in the vicinity of Mrs Greenberg’s residence with the intention not to enter the residence, but to enquire via the intercom and to search for the child, including in a park across the road.


A confrontation occurred outside Mrs Greenberg’s residence when Mrs Greenberg approached the gate to enter. The plaintiff was on the street next to his car and asked about the child’s whereabouts. A verbal altercation followed. A police officer, Sgt Richard Kgomo, attended on the scene. According to the plaintiff, Mrs Greenberg was hysterical and referred to a domestic violence interdict. The plaintiff stated that he remained calm and complied with Sgt Kgomo’s request to leave and to go to the Edenvale police station.


The court admitted, under the Law of Evidence Amendment Act, an affidavit by Sgt Kgomo. In material respects, the affidavit recorded that when he arrived at the scene Mrs Greenberg was shouting and crying and did not want the plaintiff there; the plaintiff was standing at his vehicle and said he was looking for the child; Sgt Kgomo asked the plaintiff to leave due to Mrs Greenberg’s emotional state; and while on the scene the plaintiff “never got aggressive or abusive”. The affidavit further recorded that, once at the police station, Mrs Greenberg opened a case against the plaintiff and that the dispute concerned the child.


At the Edenvale police station, the plaintiff and the first defendant gave differing versions of the plaintiff’s conduct inside the charge office. The first defendant testified he encountered a heated “screaming match” between the former spouses, that Mrs Greenberg was hysterical and the plaintiff was domineering and interruptive, and that he detained the plaintiff in the holding cells area because the plaintiff allegedly prevented Mrs Greenberg from giving her version. The plaintiff denied this and testified he was locked up without more soon after entering the charge office. The court preferred the first defendant’s version on this aspect, in light of the undisputed domestic quarrel and the emotional context.


It was common cause that the first defendant detained the plaintiff in the holding cells area at SAPS Edenvale. The plaintiff’s unchallenged estimate was that detention commenced at approximately 20h15 on 6 July 2000, shortly after arrival at the police station. While the plaintiff was in the holding cells area, the first defendant obtained Mrs Greenberg’s sworn statement and she produced the interim protection order. The first defendant also testified that he telephoned Ms Malotane and that her information contradicted the plaintiff’s version. The first defendant consulted the station commander, Lt-Col Swart, and formed a prima facie view that the plaintiff had breached the interim protection order.


The first defendant conceded that the plaintiff’s arrest was without a warrant and testified that he arrested the plaintiff while he was still being detained in the holding cells area, based on Mrs Greenberg’s statement, the interim protection order, the plaintiff’s version, and the consultation with Lt-Col Swart. The plaintiff was therefore both detained at the police station and then placed under arrest while already confined.


As to duration and continuation of deprivation of liberty, the documentary entries showed that the arrest was recorded in the docket as 6 July 2000 at 22h30, and his release recorded as 7 July 2000 at 00h45. The plaintiff was released into the custody of Mr Peter Uko, following intervention with the station commander. The plaintiff then spent the remainder of the night at Mr Uko’s home under an arrangement described as custodial, and Mr Uko testified (unchallenged) that the plaintiff “was not a free man”. Mr Uko then took the plaintiff to the Germiston Magistrates’ Court the next morning, where the plaintiff was detained in court holding facilities until he appeared at about noon and was released.


The court identified the “inevitable conclusion” as being that the arrest and detention were unlawful in all the circumstances, and then turned to determine an appropriate damages award, taking into account relevant factors and comparative awards (including a previous award to the same plaintiff in a similar wrongful arrest matter).


3. Legal Issues


The central legal issue was whether the plaintiff’s arrest and deprivation of liberty were lawful, given that the defendants relied solely on section 40(1)(q) of the Criminal Procedure Act read with section 3 of the Domestic Violence Act as the statutory justification for a warrantless arrest.


This required the court to determine, as a matter of application of law to fact, whether the jurisdictional facts for an arrest under section 3 of the Domestic Violence Act (as incorporated by section 40(1)(q) of the Criminal Procedure Act) were present. In particular, the court had to decide whether the arrest occurred “at the scene of an incident of domestic violence” and whether the suspected offence was one containing an element of violence against the complainant.


A further issue (arising after the finding on unlawfulness) concerned quantum, namely what constituted an equitable damages award for the arrest and the period of deprivation of liberty in the circumstances of the case. This involved an evaluative assessment based on established factors relevant to damages for wrongful arrest and detention and comparison with previous awards.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court first addressed evidentiary matters relevant to the factual matrix. It exercised its discretion to admit the affidavit evidence of Sgt Kgomo under section 3(1)(c) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988, having regard to the listed statutory factors and concluding that admission was in the interests of justice. The court explained that the affidavit was tendered to corroborate the plaintiff’s account of events at Mrs Greenberg’s residence, that the probative value outweighed potential prejudice, and that the defendants could have called Mrs Greenberg to refute the evidence but did not do so. The court also considered that Sgt Kgomo was a police officer who attended in an official capacity and was not suggested to be connected to either side.


On the factual dispute about what occurred inside the charge office, the court preferred the first defendant’s version that a heated domestic quarrel was continuing and that the first defendant intervened in response to an out-of-control situation. This finding was tied to probability considerations and the context that the plaintiff was distressed about the missing child and Mrs Greenberg was hysterical.


However, the decisive question was not whether there was a domestic dispute or whether the first defendant had grounds for concern, but whether the statutory threshold for warrantless arrest under the Domestic Violence Act framework was met. The court emphasised that section 3 of the Domestic Violence Act authorises arrest without a warrant only in circumscribed circumstances, and treated compliance with those requirements as necessary jurisdictional facts.


Applying the statutory text, the court held that the requirements were not satisfied. It reasoned that the plaintiff’s arrest did not occur “at the scene of an incident of domestic violence”, and it was also not suggested that the offence the plaintiff was alleged to have committed contained “an element of violence” against Mrs Greenberg. On that basis, the court concluded that the arrest and detention were unlawful.


After finding unlawfulness, the court determined damages. It referred to a LAWSA summary of relevant factors influencing awards in wrongful arrest and deprivation of liberty matters, including the circumstances of the interference with liberty, the presence or absence of malice or improper motive, duration, social status, publicity, apology or explanation, and comparative awards adjusted for inflation. The court considered counsel’s references to prior awards and gave particular attention to an unreported decision involving the same plaintiff, where he had previously been unlawfully arrested at the same police station on a matrimonial issue and detained for approximately seventeen and a half hours, resulting in an award of R30 000.00 with High Court costs.


Having regard to all relevant factors in the present case and the comparative guidance provided by the earlier award to the plaintiff in a similar context, the court concluded that a similar award would be appropriate and equitable. On costs, the court determined that the plaintiff’s costs should be borne by the second defendant alone.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court held that the plaintiff’s arrest on 6 July 2000 and deprivation of liberty were unlawful.


Judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiff, with an award of R30 000.00 as damages for unlawful arrest and deprivation of liberty. The court further ordered that the second defendant (the Minister of Safety and Security) pay the plaintiff’s costs on the High Court scale, as between party and party.


Cases Cited


Greenberg v Minister of Safety & Security (WLD Case No 22263/03) (unreported).


Legislation Cited


Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1971, section 40(1)(b) and section 40(1)(q).


Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998, section 1, section 3, and section 5(2).


Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988, section 3(1)(c).


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The court found that the defendants’ reliance on section 40(1)(q) of the Criminal Procedure Act read with section 3 of the Domestic Violence Act could not justify the plaintiff’s warrantless arrest, because the statutory jurisdictional facts were not present. In particular, the arrest did not occur at the scene of an incident of domestic violence, and it was not suggested that the suspected offence contained an element of violence against Mrs Greenberg.


As a result, the court held that the plaintiff’s arrest and ensuing deprivation of liberty were unlawful and awarded damages of R30 000.00, together with a costs order against the second defendant on the party-and-party High Court scale.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The judgment applied the principle that statutory powers of arrest without warrant—particularly those tied to domestic violence policing—are circumscribed and may be exercised only when the jurisdictional facts specified by the empowering provisions are present. Where section 40(1)(q) of the Criminal Procedure Act is invoked through section 3 of the Domestic Violence Act, the arresting officer must act within the confines of those provisions, including the requirement that the arrest be effected at the scene of an incident of domestic violence and on reasonable suspicion of an offence containing an element of violence against the complainant.


The judgment further applied the evidentiary principle that hearsay may be admitted under section 3(1)(c) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988 where admission is in the interests of justice, taking into account the statutory factors and weighing probative value against prejudice.


On quantum for wrongful arrest and detention, the judgment applied the approach that damages are assessed with reference to recognised factors influencing the seriousness and impact of the deprivation of liberty, and with comparative regard to awards in previous cases, adjusted as appropriate, in order to arrive at an equitable sum in the circumstances.

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[2013] ZAGPJHC 67
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Greenberg v Du Preez and Another (23302/2002) [2013] ZAGPJHC 67 (31 March 2013)

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE SOUTH GAUTENG HIGH COURT
(JOHANNESBURG)
Case No. 23302/2002
DATE: 31/03/2013
REPORTABLE
In
the matter between:
LIONEL MERVIN
GREENBERG
Plaintiff
and
RENIER DU
PREEZ
First Defendant
MINISTER OF
SAFETY AND SECURITY
Second Defendant
JUDGMENT
MEYER,
J
[1] The plaintiff claims damages in
this action for wrongful arrest and detention. The first defendant,
who was a detective sergeant
and stationed at the SAPS Edenvale at
the time, arrested him on 6 July 2000. It is the plaintiffs case that
he was also wrongfully
deprived of his liberty for a period of almost
sixteen hours, from about 8:15 pm on 6 July 2000 until about noon on
7 July 2000.
[2] The defendants in terms of their
plea aver that the plaintiff was arrested on a warrant and that such
arrest is thus lawful’
or in the alternative that he was
arrested by the first defendant in terms of section 40 of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1971,
since the first defendant
reasonably believed him to have committed an offence listed in
Schedule 1 of the said Act and was thus
entitled to arrest the
plaintiff without a warrant.’ At the commencement of the trial
the defendants' counsel disavowed any
reliance by the defendants on s
40(1 )(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act (‘the CPA’),
which provides that '[a] peace
officer may without warrant arrest any
person - ... whom he reasonably suspects of having committed an
offence referred to in Schedule
1, other than the offence of escaping
from lawful custody'. The defendants’ counsel informed the
court that the defendants
rely only on s 40(1 )(q) of the CPA read
with s 3 of the Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998 (‘the DVA’).
[3] S 40(1 )(q) of the CPA provides
that ‘[a] peace officer may without warrant arrest any person -
... who is reasonably
suspected of having committed an act of
domestic violence as contemplated in
section 1
of the
Domestic
Violence Act, 1998
, which constitutes an offence in respect of which
violence is an element.’
S 3
of the DVA provides that ‘[a]
peace officer may without warrant arrest any respondent at the scene
of an incident of domestic
violence whom he or she reasonably
suspects of having committed an offence containing an element of
violence against a complainant.’
[4] The plaintiff and his former wife,
Mrs Greenberg, went through a very acrimonious divorce. He left their
former common home
at about the end of April 2000. On 9 June 2000,
Mrs Greenberg obtained an interim protection order in terms of
s 5(2)
of the DVA against him. The plaintiff was in terms of the order
prohibited from entering their former matrimonial residence at
13
Cork Avenue, Marais Steyn Park, Edenvale (‘Mrs Greenberg’s
residence’); from entering her place of employment,
which was
at her residence; from preventing her or any child who ordinarily
lived at her residence from entering or remaining in
it; from
following her; from sending faxes to her attorney; and from leaving
messages on her answering machine.
[5] The plaintiff testified that Ms
Rose Malotane, who was employed as a domestic worker at Mrs
Greenberg’s residence, telephonically
informed him on 5 July
2000 at about 7.00 pm that the son of the plaintiff and of Mrs
Greenberg, who at that stage was almost thirteen
years old, had
disappeared from Mrs Greenberg’s residence. The plaintiff,
accompanied by a co-worker, Mr Madau, thereupon
went in search of
their son. The plaintiff met Mrs Malotane and her husband at a garage
from where Mrs Malotane had telephoned
him and where they had
arranged to meet. The garage was about 400 metres away from Mrs
Greenberg’s residence. The plaintiff
arrived at Mrs Greenberg’s
residence at about 7.15 pm. His intention was not to enter her
residence and merely to enquire
via the intercom system about the
disappearance of their son. He ran into a large open park situated
across the road from Mrs Greenberg’s
residence, calling the
name of their son to no avail. The plaintiff testified that his
‘...first point of departure was to
go and look for him in the
park immediately after (he) had picked up Mrs Malotane.’
[6] Mrs Greenberg approached the gate
that gives access to her residence from the street at a time when Mrs
Malotani opened it for
her and her husband to enter. The plaintiff
was standing on the street next to his car. He asked Mrs Greenberg
about the whereabouts
of their son. A verbal altercation ensued
between the two of them. A  police officer, Sgt Richard Kgomo,
arrived at the scene.
The plaintiff testified that MrsGreenberg was
‘hysterical and screaming’ saying that she had a domestic
violence interdict
and that the plaintiff should not be at her
residence. The plaintiff testified that he at all times remained calm
and standing
at his car. He explained to Sgt Kgomo that he was
looking for his son who had gone missing. Sgt Kgomo requested him to
leave and
to go to the Edenvale police station. The plaintiff
complied with his request.
[7] Having regard to the factors
listed in
s 3(1
)(c) of the
Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988
I was of the opinion that the plaintiffs application for the
admission of the affidavit evidence of Sgt Richard Kgomo regarding

the events at Mrs Greenberg’s residence should be granted in
the interests of justice, and it was accordingly so admitted.
There
was no suggestion that Sgt Kgomo was known to the plaintiff or to the
defendant. He was the police officer who in his official
capacity
attended at Mrs Greenberg’s residence upon him having ‘...
received a complaint of a missing person at 13
Cork Ave, Marais Steyn
Park.’ The nature of the evidence contained in his affidavit is
an account of the events that transpired
in his presence and of the
official actions which he took. The purpose for which the affidavit
evidence was tendered was to corroborate
the account of the
plaintiff. The probative value of the affidavit evidence outweighed
any prejudice to the defendant which the
admission thereof might have
entailed. The affidavit evidence was in material respects
corroborated by the evidence of the plaintiff,
who was extensively
cross-examined on behalf of the defendant, and the defendant was at
liberty to call Mrs Greenberg as a witness
if it wished to refute the
evidence of the plaintiff or any of the allegations made in the
affidavit of Sgt Kgomo. I was informed
by the plaintiffs counsel that
the reason why Sgt Kgomo could not be called as a witness was because
he was on leave. Having regard
to the quantum of damages involved in
any potential award in this matter if the plaintiff was to be
successful, I could well understand
why the plaintiff did not apply
for a postponement of the trial in order to secure the attendance of
Sgt Kgomo as a witness before
he had closed his case.
[8] It is inter alia stated in the
affidavit of Sgt Kgomo that he attended at Mrs
Greenberg’s residence at about
20:00 having received a complaint of a missing person
at the complainant’s residence.
Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the affidavit read as follows:
'When I arrived at the scene I found
Mrs. Greenberg shouting and crying. She told me that she didn’t
want her husband Mr.
Greenberg there. Mr Greenberg was standing at
his vehicle and didn't say anything. I asked him what the problem was
and he said
that he was looking for his child. I told him that he
must leave, because of his wife’s emotional state. He then just
left
without his child and came to the police station.
While I was on the scene Mr. Greenberg
never got aggressive or abusive. When they arrived at the police
station Mrs Greenberg opened
a case against her husband. I then had
to leave for complaints outside. They were fighting about the child.'
[9] Mr Greenberg testified that while
he was inside the client service centre or charge office of the
Edenvale police station Mrs
Greenberg also arrived. The plaintiff and
the first defendant testified about the events that transpired at the
police station.
Mrs Greenberg was not called as a witness.
[10] The first defendant testified
that he came across a heated argument between the plaintiff and Mrs
Greenberg when he walked
into the charge office. It appears that it
was a continuation of the argument that had erupted between them
outside Mrs Greenberg’s
residence. The first defendant
testified that ‘there was a screaming match’ between the
two of them. She was talking
about a protection order and he about
their son that was missing. A uniformed police officer was trying to
attend to them to no
avail. The first defendant considered it
appropriate for him to intervene and he then attempted to establish
what the problem was
between them. Mrs Greenberg was, according to
the first defendant, hysterical and the plaintiff was domineering.
The first defendant
testified that whenever Mrs Greenberg tried to
furnish him with her version the plaintiff interrupted and did not
give her an opportunity
to speak. This, according to the first
defendant, is why he decided to detain the plaintiff in the holding
cells area. The plaintiff
denied that he conducted himself in the way
alleged by the first defendant. The first defendant, according to the
plaintiff, merely
locked him up in the holding cells area without
more soon after he had entered the charge office.
[11] I find the evidence of the first
defendant to be more probable on this aspect of the case, especially
in the light of the undisputed
domestic quarrel between the two
former spouses that clearly got out of control to such an extent that
the first defendant, who
did not know them, considered it appropriate
to intervene as well as their emotional states, the plaintiff being
very concerned
about their son’s disappearance and Mrs
Greenberg being hysterical.
[12] It is common cause that the first
defendant detained the plaintiff in the holding cells area of the
Edenvale police station.
The plaintiffs unchallenged time estimation
is that his detention commenced at about 8:15 pm, which was soon
after their arrival
at the police station. The first defendant
testified that while the plaintiff was kept in detention in the
holding cells area he
obtained the version and sworn statement of Mrs
Greenberg. She also produced the interim protection order. Her
assumption was that
the plaintiff acted in breach of the interim
protection order by having followed her, because he, in the company
of two other males,
was standing outside her residence soon after her
arrival. The first defendant testified that he also telephoned Mrs
Malotane.
She, according to the first defendant, contradicted the
version of the plaintiff. She informed the first defendant that the
plaintiff
arrived at Mrs Greenberg’s residence after she had
telephonically told the plaintiff that her services had been
terminated
because of a charge that Mrs Malotane had laid against the
plaintiffs father. I interpolate to mention that it is common cause
that Mrs Malotane accompanied by the plaintiff laid a charge against
Mrs Greenberg’s father in connection with his alleged
conduct
vis-a-vis the son of the plaintiff and Mrs Greenberg earlier on the
same day. The first defendant testified that Mrs Malotane
also
informed him that the son of the plaintiff and Mrs Greenberg
disappeared during the domestic dispute that ensued between the

plaintiff and Mrs Greenberg after the plaintiff had arrived at her
residence. The first defendant testified that Mrs Malotane was
not
prepared to make a statement in this matter since she had already
deposed to one earlier that afternoon. The first defendant’s

evidence in this regard is consistent with the entry that he made in
the investigation diary on 6 July 2000 at 22:10. The first
defendant
testified that he also consulted the station commander, Lt - Col
Swart, about the matter. He testified that he formed
the prima facie
view that the plaintiff had acted in breach of the Interim Protection
Order that was produced.
[13] The first defendant testified
that he arrested the plaintiff while he was still being detained in
the holding cells area. He
conceded that the arrest of the plaintiff
was without a warrant. He testified that he arrested him based on the
sworn statement
of Mrs Greenberg; the interim protection order that
she produced; the plaintiffs version, which, in the words of the
first defendant,
‘had no back-up’; and after consultation
with Lt - Col Swart. The first defendant testified that he never
received
formal training relating to the provisions of the DVA and
that he, at that stage, did not deal with domestic violence cases.
The
first defendant testified that he arrested the plaintiff for
having violated an interim protection order when he, according to Mrs

Greenberg, followed her home.
[14] I accept that the first
defendant's evidence about what he was informed by Mrs Greenberg and
by Mrs Malotane was not tendered
to establish the truth thereof, but
to explain the basis upon which he formed the view that the plaintiff
had acted in breach of
the interim protection order. The probative
value of the information that Mrs Greenberg and Mrs Malotane
furnished to him obviously
depends upon their credibility and they
were not called as witnesses. The defendants also did not apply for
such evidence to be
admitted in terms of s 3(1 )(c) of the
Law of
Evidence Amendment Act. The
defendants did not call any witness to
gainsay the account of the plaintiff about the events that had
transpired prior to the plaintiff
and Mrs Greenberg arriving at the
Edenvale police station. The plaintiffs evidence that he did not act
in contravention of the
interim protection order has in certain
material respects been corroborated by the affidavit evidence of Sgt
Kgomo.
[15] The evidence of the plaintiff
that his release on warning or on bail was initially refused despite
the endeavours of his attorney,
Mr Gary Hirscowitz, and of his
counsel, Mr Laurentz Barrett, and that it was only through the
intervention of a Mr Peter Uko, who
discussed the matter
telephonically with the station commander, Lt - Col Swart, that he
was ultimately released into the custody
of Mr Uko during the early
morning hours on 7 July 2000, is more probable. It is consistent with
the entries made in the official
registers and with the unchallenged
evidence of Mr Uco.
[16] The date and time of the
plaintiffs arrest that was recorded in the docket was 6 July 2000 at
10:30. The date and time of his
release that was recorded in the
investigation diary was 7 July 2000 at 0:45. His release from the
holding cells area accordingly
only occurred two hours and fifteen
minutes after he had been arrested. The release on warning document
A972617 that was issued
at the time records that the plaintiff was
released on warning and warned to appear before the Magistrate’s
Court at Germiston
at 9:00 am on 7 July 2000 ‘on a charge of
intimidation However, the following was also recorded in the
investigation diary:
'Die verdagte word vrygelaat op J127
A972617 en geplaas in die toesig van Peter Ugo;
Mnr Hugo neem voile verantwoordelik
vir die beskuldigde VB 311/07/2000 verwys.'
[17] The plaintiff testified that he
was released into the custody of Mr Uko at about 12.30 am on 7 July
2000 and that he thereafter
spent the rest of the night at the home
of Mr Uko. He testified that his liberty was curtailed and he was not
free to go to his
own home. Mr Uko took him to the Magistrates’
Court in the morning. The evidence of Mr Uko, who for 24 years served
on the
town Council of Edenvale and its successors and also several
times as deputy mayor and as mayor, is unchallenged. He was married

to the plaintiffs sister prior to May 1999. At about 10.00 pm on 6
July 2000 he received a telephone call from the plaintiffs sister

seeking his assistance, because her brother, the plaintiff, had been
arrested. He went to the Edenvale police station and after
much
discussion and well after midnight the station commander, Lt - Col
Swart, instructed the police officers to release the plaintiff
into
his custody. The instructions which Mr Uko received from Lt - Col
Swart and the undertaking that he gave to Lt - Col Swart
were that he
would be responsible to detain the plaintiff and to ensure that he is
handed over to the Clerk of the Court the next
morning at 8.30 am. Mr
Uko and the plaintiff arrived at Mr Uko’s house at about 1.30 -
2.00 am where the plaintiff spent
the night. The plaintiff, according
to Mr Uko, 'was not a free man.’ Mr Uko recalled that upon
their arrival at his house
he said to the plaintiff welcome to my
prison.' This was also the testimony of the plaintiff. Mr Uko
testified that he duly took
the plaintiff to the Magistrates’
Court the next morning where he handed the plaintiff over into the
custody of the clerk
of the court. The plaintiff testified that he
was thereafter locked up and detained in the ‘interview cells’
at the
Germiston Magistrates’ Court from where he was moved to
a cell which adjoins the court in which he appeared at about noon

when he was released on warning or in his words on 'free bail’.
[18] The inevitable conclusion is that
the arrest and detention of the plaintiff were unlawful in all the
circumstances.
S 3
of the Domestic Violence Act authorises the arrest
of a person without a warrant in circumscribed circumstances. The
jurisdictional
facts which must exist before an arrest without a
warrant is authorised in terms of that section were not met in this
instance.
The arrest of the plaintiff did not take place 'at the
scene of an incident of domestic violence’ nor was it suggested
that
the offence which the plaintiff was alleged to have committed
contained ‘an element of violence against’ Mrs Greenberg.
[19] Having so concluded it remains to
determine the quantum of damages that should be awarded to the
plaintiff as a consequence
of the defendants’ unlawful conduct.
LAWSA Vol 20 Part 1 1st Reissue para 320 contains a useful and
concise summary of factors
which may have an influence on the award
to be made in cases of wrongful arrest and deprivation of liberty.
They include:

...the circumstances under
which the interference with liberty took place, the absence or
presence of malice or an improper motive
on the part of the
defendant, the duration of the restriction of liberty, the social
status of the plaintiff, the degree of publicity
afforded the
deprivation of liberty, and whether the defendant apologized for or
gave a satisfactory explanation as to what took
place. In addition,
awards in previous cases, allowing for inflation, must be
considered.' Footnotes omitted.
[20] Counsel referred me to various
awards made in previous cases. The unreported judgment of
Mokgoatleng, J is notable. It is a
matter in which the present
plaintiff was unlawfully arrested on 18 August 2000 at the same
police station in Edenvale also in
relation to a matrimonial issue
between him and Mrs Greenberg concerning their son and he was
detained at the police station for
a period of about seventeen and a
half hours. He was awarded an amount of R30 000.00 and High Court
costs. See: Greenberg v Minister
of Safety & Security (WLD Case
No 22263/03).
[21] Having regard to all the relevant
factors in this case and the previous award made to the plaintiff in
relation to his wrongful
arrest and detention soon after his arrest
and the deprivation of his liberty in this instance, I am of the view
that an appropriate
and equitable award would be a similar one than
the one awarded to him by Mokgoatleng J. The plaintiffs costs should
in my view
be paid by the second defendant alone.
[22] In the result I make the
following order:
1. The second defendant is ordered to
pay to the plaintiff the sum of R30 000.00 in damages in respect of
his unlawful arrest on
6 July 2000 and deprivation of his liberty.
2. The second defendant is ordered to
pay the plaintiffs costs on the High Court scale as between party and
party.
P.A. MEYER
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
31 March 2013
Date
of hearing: 29 January - 1 February 2013
Plaintiffs
counsel: Adv MD Saladino
Plaintiffs
attorneys: Larry Marks Attorneys, Johannesburg
Defendants’
counsel: Adv DW Joubert
Defendants’
attorneys:State Attorney, Johannesburg