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[2012] ZAGPJHC 299
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Niehaus v Minister of Justice And Constitutional Development and Others (46746/2010) [2012] ZAGPJHC 299 (4 September 2012)
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
SOUTH GAUTENG
HIGH COURT
JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NO 46746/2010
DATE:
04 SEPTEMBER 2012
In the matter
between
JOHANN GEORG
NIEHAUS
.........................................................................
APPLICANT
And
THE MINISTER OF
JUSTICE AND
CONSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT
......................................
FIRST
RESPONDENT
THE NATIONAL
DIRECTOR OF
PUBLIC
PROSECUTIONS
....................................................
SECOND
RESPONDENT
THE PROSECUTOR:
CASE 2SH155/2000
IN THE REGIONAL
COURT FOR THE REGION
OF THE SOUTHERN
TRANSVAAL HELD AT
JOHANNESBURG,
COURT 12
...............................................
THIRD
RESPONDENT
THE PRESIDING
MAGISTRATE: CASE 2SH155/2000
IN THE REGIONAL
COURT FOR THE REGION
OF THE SOUTHERN
TRANSVAAL HELD AT
JOHANNESBURG,
COURT 12
..........................................
FOURTH
RESPONDENT
J U
D G M E N T
WEPENER J:
[1] The applicant
brings an application for review and for an order to stop the
prosecution currently pending before a Regional
Magistrate in the
court for the Region of Southern Gauteng held at Johannesburg
alternatively, to review the judgment of the Regional
Magistrate, who
refused the applicant an acquittal pursuant to the provisions of
s
174
of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
(‘the CPA’)
and to declare the trial ‘unfair’.
[2] The first
respondent is the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development
in his official capacity. The second respondent
is the National
Director of Public Prosecutions in his official capacity. The third
respondent is the prosecutor in the court a
quo and the fourth
respondent is the presiding magistrate in the court below.
[3] Both first and
fourth respondents have filed notices in which they indicate that
they abide by the decision of this court.
[4] The applicant
filed a large number of documents from time to time, which documents
are sometimes difficult to place in perspective
as many ‘filing
notices’ with documents attached, which are not paginated, are
before us. Nevertheless, I will deal
with this matter on the basis of
the argument presented to us. I must add, that because the first and
fourth respondents failed
to file affidavits it is contended by the
applicant in heads of argument that their actions should be regarded
‘as having
abandoned’ opposition to the relief sought.
The argument was not advanced during the hearing. However, there is
no merit
in this submission. The fact that the Minister and the
Presiding Magistrate stay out of the fray and abide by the judgment
is,
in my view, most appropriate.
[5] There is also an
affidavit by Mr Dicker, a Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions for
South Gauteng in which he states that
the second and third
respondents oppose the application for the reasons set out in the
affidavit of the third respondent Mr Nel,
the prosecutor in the
matter. The second and third respondents filed their answering
affidavits out of time and ask for condonation
thereof. The applicant
opposed such condonation for reasons that are not clear and appear to
be technical. During argument the
opposition was abandoned and Mr
Steenkamp requested the court to take the complete record before it
into account.
[6] All material is
now before us and in so far as the applicant seeks condonation for
the filing of a voluminous supplementary
affidavit and the second and
third respondents seek condonation for the filing of an opposing
affidavit out of time, such was granted
during the hearing as it
would be in the interests of justice to hear the matter and to have
regard to all issues placed before
us (see Pangbourne Properties Ltd
v Pulse Moving CC 2010 JDR 1414 (GSJ)). There is a voluminous
supplementary affidavit filed by
the applicant who, by and large,
attacks the evidence of witnesses and I will not deal with each of
the allegations made by the
applicant but deal with them generally.
In these circumstances, and in order to understand the basis of the
review, as there are
long narratives of occurrences in the court
below and evidence of what witnesses or the prosecutor or the
magistrate said from
time to time, with no specific conclusions
regarding thereto, we called on Mr Steenkamp, appearing on behalf of
the applicant,
to indicate clearly what the issues are which he
intends arguing. During argument Mr Steenkamp, confirmed that which
he stated
in his amended practice note dated 25 July 2012. In it, it
is stated:
‘7 State of
trial in regional Court:
1 The State closed
its case
2 The
accused/applicant has been found not guilty and acquitted on 58
(fifty eight) counts of the charge sheet in terms of
section 174
of
the
Criminal Procedure Act whereon
the state tendered no evidence
3 The state is in
possession of all the applicant’s files that it seized and
removed. The applicant/accused is in a predicament
to proceed with
its defence as the state is in possession of all his files and notes.
The applicant/accused is required to conduct
and proceed with his
defence on the copies of the docket that was supplied by the state to
the defence. Full legal argument will
be presented at the hearing of
this application if required.
4 The State is in
contempt of an order of the High Court Of South Africa (Transvaal
Provincial Division) under case number 36143/99
and persists therein.
5 The trial court
has apparently attached no value to the said order of the said High
Court.
6 The Law Society of
the Transvaal (Law Society of the Northern Provinces) is in contempt
of an order of the trial court to furnish
copies of documents in its
possession that can prove the innocence of the accused/applicant and
persists therein.
7 Only one expert,
Deleeuw Swart, a chartered accountant employed by the Law Society of
the Transvaal (Law Society of the Northern
Provinces) testified in a
trial within a trial in the case. He testified that he conducted an
investigation specifically towards
fraud and theft. He testified that
the accused/applicant has done nothing wrong and is therefore
innocent. The trial court apparently
refused to take his testimony in
consideration when it refused the accused’s/applicant’s
second application under
section 174
of the
Criminal Procedure Act.
It
is the accused’s/applicant’s view that it is unfair
and detrimental to the administration of justice to recall Swart
to
repeat his testimony. Full legal argument will be presented at the
hearing if required.
8 The state
witnesses contradicted themselves in testimony and where more than
one was called on the same charge they contradicted
each other on
material aspects.
9 The state did not
specify which witness was called on which charge.
10 Most of the
complainants distanced themselves from the charge sheet.
11 The second and
third respondents did not react to the applicant’s request for
a court date in terms of the Practice Manual
of this Honourable
Court.’
[7] Also in the
heads of argument one finds the following:
‘2 The
application is furthermore, also being supported by a fully
summarised evaluation of the facts as they were submitted
by the
prosecuting authority during the trial of the matter, this once again
in the view of the applicant does not support any
of the allegations
in the charge sheet and with reference to the particular charges in
mind at all.
4 It must be
emphasized herein that during the trial a number of state witnesses
were called, as well as an independent auditor
attached to the law
society who in principle was supposed to be a complainant who has
testified that after further investigations
it was found that the
applicant has done nothing wrong and is therefore innocent of the
charges against him. It is in this light
and status of the matter
that the honourable court a quo refused to dismiss the matter wholly
against the applicant. It must be
born in mind once again that this
evidence was wholly undisputed by the prosecuting authority. It is
the view of the applicant
that the honourable magistrate should have
in the interest of justice and common fairness dismissed all the
charges as they stood
against the accused.’
[8] From the above
it is clear that there is an attack on the veracity of the witnesses’
evidence and the evaluation of the
evidence by the presiding
magistrate.
[9] Indeed, during
the hearing, Mr Steenkamp further limited the argument in support of
the review to an argument that the continuation
of the trial would be
unfair by virtue of the cumulative effect of the following issues:
1. The age of the
applicant, he now being 62 years of age;
2. The fact that the
trial commenced 13 years ago – but that is incorrect as the
matter commenced in 2002. The matter has
been before the courts for
10 years;
3. That there was no
prima facie case at the end of the State case which required an
answer by the applicant;
4. A witness, Mr
Swart, said in evidence that he could find no untoward conduct on the
part of the applicant;
5. The prosecutor
stated that he did not oppose the discharge of the applicant;
6. The prosecutor
did not oppose the review proceedings launched by the applicant.
[10] The application
is brought under, inter alia, the following circumstances:
1. The matter has
been protracted and has been heard from time to time over a period of
some years. The applicant has appeared more
than ninety eight times
since his arrest.
2. The investigation
file of the counts against the accused consists of some thirteen
lever arch files.
3. The matter was
postponed from time to time as a result of a bail application brought
by the applicant.
4. Delays were
caused as a result of an appeal against an order for return of
documents.
5. Applications for
further and better particulars were brought by the applicant.
6. Extensive cross
examination of State witnesses took place.
7. Various
applications were brought by the applicant after the close of the
State’s case, including this review.
8. It is common
knowledge that there is an absence of a running roll in the
magistrates’ court, which hampers the expedient
finalisation of
cases.
9. A delay occurred
as a result of an application launched by the applicant for a
separation of trials and the unavailability of
the attorney appearing
for the applicant.
10. Delays occurred
because of illness of various parties participating in the trial.
11. Twenty one of
the appearances occurred prior to the commencement of the trial of
the applicant.
12. It took 4 years
for the State to close it’s case.
[11] Some
postponements were at the State’s request for, inter alia, the
tracing of State witnesses as well as a number of
inevitable
postponements occurred due to illness and an operation undergone by
the third respondent. Obviously a large number of
postponements were
due to the court days having come to an end. Be that as it may, the
State’s case was closed during September
2006 and the applicant
sought a discharge pursuant to the provisions of
s 174
of the CPA.
This was partially successful but refused regarding the majority of
counts against the applicant. The applicant brought
a second
application for a discharge during 2009. During the time since 2006
when the State’s case was closed, the applicant
also approached
the National Director of Public Prosecutions to stop the proceedings
against him. These representations were unsuccessful.
The delays that
occurred since 2006 were all as a result of the conduct and actions
by the applicant. Neither his age nor the delays
can support the
argument that the applicant is not receiving a fair trial.
[12] Nothing turns
on this issue particularly as the State’s case has been closed
and the further conduct of the matter is
in the hands of the
applicant.
[13] As set out
before, the review is, in the main, based on the allegations that the
magistrate should have discharged the applicant.
The reasons
therefore, it is argued in the heads of argument (although not
seriously advanced before us), were that documents seized
and used
against the applicant should not have been used as a result of an
order of the North Gauteng Provincial Division which
ordered the
return of the documents. However, the order issued by Roux J has been
appealed against in the sense that a notice of
application for leave
to appeal has been filed. The filing of a notice of application for
leave to appeal suspends the operation
of the order of Roux J.
[14] Thereafter
these documents were kept by a representative of the second
respondent, Mr G Nel. During 2001, the following arrangement
was
made:
‘[37] AD
PARAGRAPH 9.4:
At that stage the
appeal against the order to return the seized documents was already
noted and the documents were already in storage
at our offices. It is
trite law that the filing of a notice for an application for leave to
appeal suspends the operation of a
court order. I was not involved in
dealing with the appeal itself. Shortly after I received the matter
for prosecution a meeting
was called between myself, Mr Steenkamp,
the Applicant, Agrella’s attorney, the curator for Agrella and
a female DSO investigator.
At the stage the investigation had been
completed and all the relevant statements and documents were already
in the investigation
file/docket. This meeting took place if memory
serves me well in 2001. The original purpose of the meeting was to
allow Agrella’s
curator access to the documents (pending the
appeal against the court order) in the presence of all the parties.
For this purpose
I arranged that the documents, contained in various
boxes, be brought to my office. However, I then used the opportunity
to discuss
the position relating to the documents with the parties
present. I informed the parties that I have been informed that there
were
problems in obtaining the record of the proceedings for the
purposes of the appeal. As an interim measure I suggested that all
the parties could have controlled access to the documents which were
at that stage kept at our offices in Visagie Street, Pretoria.
There
was no objection to this arrangement by any of the parties. The boxes
with documents were again removed from my office after
the meeting.
As stated previously, I deny perusing, using or copying of the
documents at any stage. However, during the application
for further
particulars the Applicant then again requested that the seized
documents be handed over. The Court concluded that he
had no
jurisdiction to make such an order. As far as I am aware, the
Applicant did not take any further steps to enforce the original
court order concerning the seized documents and as far as I was
concerned the original arrangement of controlled access to the
documents was still in place.
[38] The arrangement
between the parties was confirmed on record on 9 October 2002 (see
Record Vol. 1 pages 17-21 and paragraph
10.1 of the Consolidated
Document containing the application for further particulars and reply
thereto). The existence of such
agreement was never disputed by the
Applicant.
[39] During 2003
letters were drafted to Messrs Felix Gay (curator of Hersh
International Consultants (Pty) Ltd, Johan Blignaut
(curator of Louis
Agrella’s insolvent estate) and TJH Potgieter (curator of the
insolvent estate of Slabbert & Visser
Inc). Copies of the letters
attached hereto as “GJN 1”, “GJN 2” and “GJN
3”. Both Messrs Gay
and Blignaut responded in writing (see “GJN
4” and “GJN 5” attached hereto) and both parties
suggested
that the documents be retained at our offices until
finalisation of legal actions and proceedings.
[40] I can state
categorically that I did not peruse, use or copy any of the seized
documents at any stage of the proceedings. The
documents that were
relied on and/or handed in during the trial formed part of the
investigation file (docket) received by me from
the original IDSEO
investigators/prosecutors, namely Desiree Meyer and/or Grant Buchler.
Since the DSO had been disbanded I am
informed that the documents
were stored in containers.
[41] I am of the
view that the issue of the handing back of the original seized
documents is merely ancillary. The essential issue
is that there was
a standing arrangement, from as early as July 2001, that the
Applicant could gain access to the seized documents.
Applicant did
not exercise his right to access the seized documents but appears to
have been only concerned with the return thereof
as per the original
court order.’
[15] The question of
the return of documents is therefore ancillary and has no bearing on
the merits of the trial before the magistrate.
The applicant can have
access to the documents for purposes of preparing his defence, if
such access is required.
[16] I have already
shown that there was no transgression of the order of Roux J because
of the noting of the appeal.
[17] The third
respondent stated under oath that these documents which were ‘handed
in by the various witnesses were in fact
those that would have been
in their possession due to the nature thereof e.g. copies of the
actual contracts, agreements and payments
made (deposit slips).’
[18] It has not been
shown that the documents that were handed in were obtained as a
result of an illegal seizure and which formed
the subject matter of
the order of Roux J. Even if these documents were indeed only
obtained as a result of the seizure (which
it has not been shown) the
order of Roux J was suspended when the application for leave to
appeal was filed. An attack on the use
of the documents is
consequently premature, at least until the appeal against that order
has been disposed of.
[19] The applicant
further states:
‘I have
suffered irreparable harm in that all my files had been taken away by
the prosecuting authority. I have no documentation
left to use in my
defence. I had and have to prepare my defence on the copies of
documentation the prosecuting authority supplied
to me in the copy of
the docket that was supplied to me. The trial court is further
assisting in allowing the prosecuting authority
to ignore and
contravene the order of the High Court.’
This is refuted by
the affidavit of the third respondent who sets out the arrangement
regarding access to the documents as set out
above.
[20] The applicant
further complains in his affidavit that, according to him, the charge
against him was compiled from the contents
of the seized documents in
contravention of the order of Roux J. If such was a contravention,
which it was not, the State showed
that it had a witness available,
one Lynes, who ‘was not only originally part of Hersch
International, but also an agent
in harvesting new clients for their
schemes he therefore had knowledge of the identity of various
clients. The applicant’s
suggestion that the identities of
other clients (complainants) could only have been gleamed from the
seized document does not hold
water.’
When this was
pointed out to Mr Steenkamp, he did not persist in the argument.
[21] A further
ground for review is the fact that the applicant summarises some of
the evidence given by some of the witnesses at
the trial. The
applicant summarises the evidence and attacks the witnesses or, as in
the case of one Swart, it is alleged that
he said that ‘he
found nothing in his investigation that indicated fraud or theft’.
That opinion is, of course, irrelevant
as far as the court is
concerned and the magistrate is obliged to consider all the evidence
before him.
[22] Although it is
trite that a High Court will review a lower court’s decision if
there is an irregularity which vitiates
the lower court’s
decision (see S v Khumalo (110/12) [2012] ZAGPJHC 141 (22 August
2012)), this procedure is not to be followed
where a magistrate makes
a value judgment based on the evidence before him. Such a judgment is
not an irregularity which entitles
an accused to review a decision
not to discharge him. In such a case an accused may take a matter on
appeal at the end of the case
as a whole (S v Lubaxa
2001 (2) SACR
703
(SCA)). The magistrate was of the view that there was some
evidence against the applicant which justified the refusal of the
application
for a discharge (see Ebrahim v Minister of Justice
2000
(2) SACR 173
(W) at 175A-C and G-H).
[23] The following
passages in Van der Merwe v National Director of Public Prosecutions
and Others
2011 (1) SACR 94
(SCA) at 101G-103C are also of relevance:
‘[31] …
In National Director
of Public Prosecutions v King
[2010 (2) SACR 146
(SCA) para 5] Harms
DP said:
“Fairness is
not a one-way street conferring an unlimited right on an accused to
demand the most favourable possible treatment,
but also requires
fairness to the public as represented by the State. This does not
mean that the accused's right should be subordinated
to the public's
interest in the protection and suppression of crime; however, the
purpose of the fair trial provision is not to
make it impracticable
to conduct a prosecution. The fair trial right does not mean a
predilection for technical niceties and ingenious
legal stratagems,
or to encourage preliminary litigation - a pervasive feature of white
collar crime cases in this country. To
the contrary: courts should
within the confines of fairness actively discourage preliminary
litigation. Courts should further be
aware that persons facing
serious charges - and especially minimum sentences - have little
inclination to co-operate in a process
that may lead to their
conviction and 'any new procedure can offer opportunities capable of
exploitation to obstruct and delay'.[R
v H; R v C
[2004] UKHL 3
([2004]
[2004] UKHL 3
;
2 AC 134
;
[2004] 1 ALL ER 1269
;
[2004] 2 WLR 335
;
[2004] HRLR
20
; [2004] 2 Cr App R 10
[2004] UKHL 3
; ;
16 BHRC 332)
para 22 per Lord Bingham of
Cornhill]. One can add the tendency of such accused, instead of
confronting the charge, of attacking
the prosecution”.
And in Thint (Pty)
Ltd v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others; Zuma v
National Director of Public Prosecutions and
Others
[2008] ZACC 13
;
[2008 (2) SACR
421
(CC)
(2009 (1) SA 1
;
2008 (12) BCLR 1197)
para 65] Langa CJ
said:
“I
nevertheless do agree with the prosecution that this court should
discourage preliminary litigation that appears to have
no purpose
other than to circumvent the application of
s 35(5).
Allowing such
litigation will often place prosecutors between a rock and a hard
place. They must, on the one hand, resist preliminary
challenges to
their investigations and to the institution of proceedings against
accused persons; on the other hand, they are simultaneously
obliged
to ensure the prompt commencement of trials. Generally disallowing
such litigation would ensure that the trial court decides
the
pertinent issues, which it is best placed to do, and would ensure
that trials start sooner rather than later. There can be
no absolute
rule in this regard, however. The courts' doors should never be
completely closed to litigants."
In Key v
Attorney-General, Cape Provincial Division, and Another
[1996] ZACC 25
;
[1996 (4) SA
187
(CC) para 13-14] Kriegler J emphasised that if evidence is
tendered to which the accused objects, it is for the trial court to
decide in light of all the circumstances of the case whether fairness
requires the evidence to be lead or to be excluded.’
This happened in the
matter under consideration and the trial court gave its judgment in
this regard. Bertelsmann AJA continued
in Van Der Merwe:
‘[32] The same
considerations must apply in this case. It was well established
before the present constitutional era that
a criminal trial is not to
be conducted piecemeal, and that continues to apply today. An accused
is not entitled to have the trial
interrupted - or to have it not
even begin - so as to have alleged irregularities reviewed by another
court in the course of the
trial. It is important to bear in mind
that, while the Constitution guarantees to an accused a fair trial,
that does not mean that
the prosecution must satisfy the accused in
advance that the trial will indeed be fair. It is the duty of the
trial court to try
a charge, and to ensure that the trial is fair,
and, if it turns out that it was not, then any conviction that
followed might be
set aside. It might even turn out that the accused
is acquitted, in which case the alleged irregularities will be
irrelevant. Litigation
of the kind that is before us falls squarely
into the category of preliminary litigation that ought to be avoided
and discouraged.
As Davis J said in Sapat and Others v The Director:
Directorate for Organised Crime and Public Safety and Others
[1999
(2) SACR 435
(C) 433 C-F:
“For these
reasons, I find that the essential purpose of applicants' notice of
motion was directed to the constitutionality
and hence admissibility
of certain evidence which has been extracted by way of blood, semen
and other samples. I consider that
these questions should be
determined by the trial court when appraised of the full factual
context within which this evidence is
sought to be admitted. In this
way a correct balance between the right to due process and the
imperative of crime control can be
struck.”’
[24] This is a
typical matter that must be completed before the magistrate and then,
if the applicant is so disposed, to be taken
on appeal if he is
convicted.
[25] The applicant
further complains (in his affidavit) that the magistrate allowed
hearsay evidence. The rules regarding hearsay
evidence have
substantially changed since the introduction of the
Law of Evidence
Amendment Act no 45 of 1988
and a definitive answer regarding
admissibility of such hearsay evidence, cannot be given in isolation.
This is also so regarding
the complaint that certain leading
questions were asked. These matters should be argued at the end of
the trial. The trial court,
and later an appeal court, will be able
to evaluate the complaints regarding these issues and the weight to
be accorded to the
evidence.
[26] After summing
up the evidence of the witnesses and at p465 of the supplementary
affidavit the applicant contended that his
constitutional rights have
not been respected. He refers to s 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 21, 14, 34, 32,
33, 35(1), (2), (3), (5), 36 and
37 of the Constitution. Mr Steenkamp
narrowed these allegations to an alleged unfair trial, based on the
factors set out hereinbefore.
The alleged contraventions of the
Constitution are based on the selfsame arguments regarding the
seizure of the documents or the
criticism of the witnesses. It is
said that the State did not respect, protect or promote the
fulfilment of the Bill of Rights,
especially, where the accused was
involved. These words are parroted from the Constitution. The
allegations are wide and can be
considered by a court on appeal and I
am of the view, that on the evidence before me, there is no merit in
this submission. The
issues highlighted by the applicant, are in my
view, not of such a nature that there was a fundamental infringement
of the rights
pursuant to the provisions of the Bill of Rights.
[27] The penultimate
issue that Mr Steenlamp asked us to take into account is the fact
that the prosecutor did not oppose the application
for a discharge
before the magistrate. This submission is incorrect. The record
clearly shows that the application was opposed,
save for those
charges on which the State did not lead evidence and on which charges
the magistrate indeed granted the applicant
a discharge. Other than
that, the application was indeed opposed.
[28] Mr Steenkamp
finally relied on the indications of the prosecutor that he did not
intend opposing the review application. I
am not convinced that the
prosecutor’s statement evinced a clear intention not to oppose
the review proceedings. Even if
he did, I am of the view that such
indication to the magistrate does not bind the second respondent nor
was such an indication
an undertaking given to the applicant which
can be said to form any basis upon which the respondents are estopped
from opposing
the review application. Mr Steenkamp could advance no
basis why the respondents would be so estopped other than the fact
that as
officer of the court he is entitled to rely on what the
prosecutor had said. He disavowed reliance on any suggestion that
there
was a binding agreement between the applicant and the State. I
know of no other basis that would disentitle the State to oppose
the
review.
[29] The case before
the magistrate is at such a stage that the applicant is now bound to
present his version, if he so wishes.
The evidence will be evaluated
at the end of the matter. If the magistrate should commit any
misdirection, the route to take is
an appeal of the entire matter,
not a piecemeal hearing at this stage.
‘A court will
only in rare and exceptional circumstances intervene, on review, in
uncompleted matters. Its power to do so
is sparingly exercised
particularly if regard is had to the fact that redress means of
review or appeal will ordinarily be available
to the accused in due
course (Wahlhaus v Additional Magistrate, Johannesburg
1959 (3) SA
113
(A) at 119H-120E)’- see S v Ralo
[2012] JOL 29032
(ECG) at
para 20. This is not such an exceptional case.
[30] The review is
premature and has wasted quite a lot of time since 2006. The matter
should proceed normally and the President
of the Regional Court is
requested to set the matter down in consultation with applicant or
his legal representative, the Presiding
Magistrate and the Prosecutor
for such a period of time that the applicant’s legal
representative may indicate he requires
to complete the case for the
applicant, including argument, and also taking into account the views
of the other parties. To this
end the Registrar is requested to make
a copy this judgment available to the President of the Regional Court
and to draw his attention
to this paragraph.
[31] In the
circumstances, I propose that the review be dismissed with costs.
WEPENER J
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT SOUTH GAUTENG
I agree, and it
is so ordered.
SALDULKER J
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT SOUTH GAUTENG
COUNSEL/ATTORNEY
FOR THE APPLICANT:
APPLICANT’S
ATTORNEYS:
COUNSEL FOR THE
RESPONDENT:
RESPONDENT’S
ATTORNEYS:
DATE/S OF
HEARING: 30 August 2012
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
4 September 2012