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[2012] ZAGPJHC 26
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ABSA Bank Ltd v Studdard and Another (2011/24206) [2012] ZAGPJHC 26 (13 March 2012)
REPORTABLE
SOUTH GAUTENG HIGH COURT, JOHANNESBURG
CASE NO
:
2011/24206
DATE:13/03/2012
In the matte between:
ABSA
BANK
LIMITED
..........................................................
Applicant/
Plaintiff
and
STUDDARD,
THEO EUSTACIUS
........................
First
Respondent/ Defendant
STUDDARD,
MELISSA ANN
.........................
Second
Respondent / Defendant
J U D G M E N T
SUMMARY
Rule 17 (2)
(b) – rule of practice in South Gauteng High Court similar to
Western Cape High Court - Action instituted by way
of simple summons
where cause of action is based on written agreement –
Requirement to attach both written agreement of loan
and mortgage
bond to summons. Original documents to be produced in all matters at
the time when judgment is sought.
WEPENER, J
:
[1] There are a number of
applications before me for default judgment brought by the same
applicant (plaintiff), against home-owners,
for orders for the
payment of sums of money and declaring the homes of the debtors
(defendants / respondents) executable. Each
claim is for a ‘
debt’
or ‘
liquidated
demand’
as set
out in Rule 17(2)(b) and can consequently be brought pursuant to that
Rule. See
Nedbank v
Mortinson
[2005] ZAGPHC 85
;
2005 (6) SA
462
(W) para [19]; Standard
Bank of SA Ltd v Snyders and Eight Similar Cases
2005 (5) SA 610
(C) para [10].
[2] In each matter the plaintiff
issued a simple summons, which contains the claim against the
defendants. The plaintiff duly complied
with the directives contained
in
Saunderson
1
,
Mortinson
2
and
Folscher
3
.
The only issue which I have to determine is, what is required
of a party when
issuing a simple summons against a defaulting debtor when claiming a
money judgment and asking for immoveable property
to be declared
executable having regard to the wording of Rule 17(2)(b) read with
Form 9 or any other requirement, with particular
emphasis on whether
the written agreement of loan should be attached to the summons?
[3] Having agreed to hear full
argument at the instance of the applicant, I requested the
Johannesburg Bar to appoint an
amicus
curiae
to argue the
matter before me and in keeping with this commendable tradition, Mr S
Aucamp obliged to argue the matter as
amicus
.
I am indebted to Mr Aucamp for his assistance on behalf of the
Johannesburg Bar.
[4] The applicant was content to
argue one matter only and to accept that the other matters are all to
follow the outcome of this
matter. The applicant issued a summons
(often referred to as a ‘
simple
summons’
as
distinct from a combined summons) pursuant to Rule 17(2)(b) of the
Rules of Court. Rule 17(2)(b) reads:
‘
In every case where the
claim is for a debt or liquidated demand the summons shall be as near
as may be in accordance with Form
9 of the First Schedule.’
In terms of Form 9, a plaintiff
is required to set out ‘
…
in concise terms plaintiff’s cause of action’
.
However, the applicant went further than setting out its cause of
action in concise terms. After citing the parties the following
is
alleged:
‘
4. The plaintiff and
the defendants entered into written agreements in terms of which
monies were lent and advanced to the defendants
as described in the
agreements. A copy of the agreement securing the abovementioned money
lending agreement being Mortgage Bond
B2/09 is attached hereto as
annexe “A” and should as all other annexes be read as
part of the summons, the contents
whereof the plaintiff prays be
herein incorporated as if specifically recorded.
In terms of the said Mortgage Bond the defendants hypothecated
certain ERF 1633 DAWN PARK EXTENSION 25 TOWNSHIP, REGISTRATION
DIVISION I.R., THE PROVINCE OF GAUTENG, IN EXTENT 1009 (ONE THOUSAND
AND NINE) SQUARE METRES, Held by Deed of Transfer no. T02/09,
in
favour of the plaintiff.
In terms of the written agreements the defendants agreed and
consented:
that if any of one instalment is not paid on due date the whole
amount would immediately become due and payable;
that thereupon the plaintiff shall be entitled to institute
proceedings for the recovery of all such amounts and for a court
order declaring the hypothecated property executable;
that a certificate signed by
any manager of the plaintiff would constitute
prima
facie
proof of the
amount owed by the defendants to the plaintiff and a copy of such
certificate is attached hereto as annexe “B”;
to pay costs on the attorney and client scale.
Notwithstanding demand the defendants have failed to repay the
instalments on the due date as agreed upon and are presently in
arrears.
The arrears on the Defendants’ account currently amounts
to R22 756,33, constituting 9 months in arrears;
7.2 The Defendants’
current monthly instalment amounts to approximately R2 417,84.
’
The summons continues to spell
out a number of additional allegations, mostly in compliance with
Saunderson, Mortinson
and
Folscher
,
but also allegations regarding default by the defendants.
[5] The written loan agreement
is the basis of the claim and the cause of action rather than the
bond, which is an instrument hypothecating
landed property, which
does not constitute the principal debt.
Klerck
NO v Van Zyl and Maritz
1989 (4) SA 263
at 275 and
Standard
Bank of South Africa Ltd v Gordon and Others
[2011] ZAGPJHC 114 (2011/6477) (21 September 2011) at paras 9 and 10.
[6] It has been a rule of
practice in this Division that copies of both the written agreement
of loan as well as the bond document
must be attached to a summons,
including a simple summons, and to produce the original documents at
the time when judgment is requested,
whether the matter is brought by
way of summons or application. In most of the matters coming before
the court for default judgment,
practitioners adhere partially to the
practice by attaching copies of the documents, also where a simple
summons is used, but the
applicant argues that such attachment is not
necessary despite it having attached a copy of the bond document to
the simple summons.
Since 1994 when Rule 31(5) was introduced,
default judgments were largely dealt with by the Registrar and not by
Judges in open
court and it appears that the practice may not have
been strictly adhered to, even to the extent, that it is now argued,
that it
is not necessary to attach the written agreement of loan at
all. However, since the decision in
Jaftha
v Schoeman and Others; Van Rooyen v Stoltz and Others
,
[2004] ZACC 25
;
2005 (2) SA 140
(CC), default judgments are often heard in court,
together with a request to declare immovable property executable.
There is no
suggestion that the practice, to annex true copies of the
documents and then to hand in the original documents when judgment is
sought, has fallen into disuse, and it has not.
[7] Before I set out the correct
position regarding what a simple summons should or must contain, it
is important to note that
Form 9 was cast in its present form by
Government Notice 999 of 12 January 1965 with inception date 15
January 1965. Decisions
prior to this date must consequently be read
with due regard to the requirements of the applicable Form prior to
its amendment.
The previous Rule (Rule 15) referred to Form 8, the
latter which required of a plaintiff to indicate its case in the most
general
terms (
Singh v
Vorkel
1947 (3) SA 400
(C) at 403-405 where the requirements of the former rule are set
out). The decisions, which refer to a Form requiring a plaintiff
to
set out its cause of action ‘
in
concise terms
generally
’,
may consequently not have application to matters since the Form was
amended to require a plaintiff to set out the ‘
concise
terms of plaintiff’s cause of action’
.
This distinction is not referred to in Erasmus
Superior
Courts Practice
B124-B125 and the cases referred to by the author and in particular,
those cases requiring the cause of action to be set out ‘
in
the most general terms
’
are based on a previous wording of the Rule and Form and cases based
on the previous wording thereof, which stated that
the cause of
action should be set out in ‘
generally’
,
albeit concisely. The fact that a distinction should be drawn between
the old and new Forms was recognised in
Landman
Implemente (Edms) Bpk v Leliehoek Motors (Edms) Bpk
1975 (3) SA 347
(O) at 237H.
[8] Mr Swanepoel, appearing for
the applicant, relied on decisions such as
Standard
Bank of SA Ltd v Hunkydory Investments 194 (Pty) Ltd and Another (No
1)
2010 (1) SA 627
(C)
at 630C in support of the argument that a plaintiff only needs to set
out its cause of action generally. Steyn AJ, however,
in stating
that the claim should be set out in the ‘
most
general terms’
relied on
Erasmus
at
B-124 and the cases there cited. I have indicated that the learned
author does not take into account the change of wording since
the
amended Form came into operation since when no further reference was
made to the cause of action to be described ‘
generally
’.
In my view the correct statement is to be found in
B
W Kuttle v O’Connell Manthe
1984
(2) SA 665
(C) where Tebbutt J said at 668B-D:
‘
It must be remembered
that under Rule 17, which is the rule dealing with summonses, a
plaintiff can issue a simple summons or a
combined summons where the
particulars of claim are annexed to the summons. It has on many
occasions been laid down that the requirement
that the cause of
action must be set out in the summons in “concise terms”
(the phrase used in Form 9 with which the
simple summons must be in
accordance, in terms of Rule 17), does not mean that it must be done
with the particularity required
of a declaration (or the particulars
of claim annexed to a combined summons). The object of the summons
is not merely to bring
the defendant before court; it must also
inform the defendant of the nature of the claim or demand he is
required to meet. But
it need do no more than that. It need not go
into the minute particulars. It is for this reason that a Supreme
Court summons
has been described as “merely a label” (see
Emdon and Another v Margau
1926 WLD 159
at 162) or a ”general
indication of the claim” (see Singh v Vorkel
1947 (2) SA 400
(C) and 405).’
[9] Although Tebbutt J also
referred to cases dealing with the wording of Form 8, I am of the
view that a court is to determine
what is meant by the words ‘
merely
a label’
or ‘
a
general indication of the claim’
by having regard to the requirements of Form 9, which requires the
concise terms of the cause of action to be set out. The word
‘
concise’
is used in the Rule as an adjective to ‘
terms
of plaintiff’s cause of action’
and means ‘
giving
a lot of information clearly in a few words’
(Concise Oxford Dictionary). I am of the view that the requirement
for information to be given in a simple summons has broadened
since
the amendment of the wording of the relevant Form.
[10] In this regard I refer to
Volkskas Bank Limited v
Wilkinson and Three Similar Cases
1992 (2) SA 388
(C) where the Full Bench held at 397I-398C:
‘
It appears to us
accordingly that where a plaintiff sues for repayment of a loan (or
an overdraft) all that a simple summons need
contain is a statement
setting out the relief claimed and a succinct outline of the cause of
action, ie that an agreement of loan
(or of overdraft) was concluded
between the parties providing for interest on the balance outstanding
from time to time at a specified
(or ascertainable) rate and which
loan (or overdraft) was repayable on demand (or on a fixed or
ascertainable date) and which,
despite demand (or the arrival of that
date), has not been repaid. Where the cause of action is founded on
some document, reference
thereto should be made in the summons and a
copy should be attached to the summons and the original should be
handed in at the
time when application for default judgment is made.
It is unnecessary to set out the terms and conditions of the
agreement relied
on if such was not recorded in writing –
indeed, an allegation that the interest claimed in terms of that
agreement is calculated
daily and capitalised monthly is strictly
superfluous and need not be made.’
How then is this requirement to
attach the document upon which the cause of action is founded
compatible with judgments referring
to ‘
merely
a label’
or
‘
general
indication of the claim’
?
I am of the view that upon a proper construction of the Rule as read
with Form 9 as amended, and the requirement that a lot of
information
be given clearly, in a few words, the older cases which do not deal
with the new words contained in Form 9 cannot be
used as a precedent
to determine what a simple summons should contain. What must the
concise terms of plaintiff’s cause
of action be? What is
required is that the claim must be set out with sufficient clarity
for a court to decide whether judgment
should be granted, and for the
defendant to be made aware of what is being claimed from him. See
Wilkinson
at
395A. Or put differently, the defendant must be informed of ‘
the
nature of the claim or demand he is required to meet’
.
B W Kuttle
at 668C-D. It is against this background that cases, which pre-date
Form 9, must be read. Those cases interpreted the Form and
requirement of the Rule, which stated that a claim should be
‘
generally’
set out. Currently the requirement is that the cause of action must
be set out in concise terms. I have shown what a concise
setting out
of a claim means. The former Form, which required the setting out a
claim in ‘
general
’
terms, require it to set out ‘
only
the main features or elements and disregarding exceptions, overall’.
(Concise Oxford Dictionary).
[11] In
Trans-Africa
Insurance Co Ltd v Maluleka
1956 (2) SA 273
(A), Schreiner JA said at 277C-D:
‘
How general the
indication is appears from many of the examples given in the
schedule, such as those in which a sum of money is
claimed “for
goods sold and delivered”, “for money lent”, “for
board and lodging”, “for
arrears of rent” or “for
damages for defamation”. The defendant is given no information
as to place or time or
who were the persons directly concerned in the
sale of goods, and the like. Where claims of his vague type are
included in the
summons the defendant can hardly gather any
information which would help him to shape his conduct unless, as will
commonly be the
case, he already knows what the action is about. It
is not surprising, accordingly that the claim in a supreme court
summons has
been described as “merely a label” or “a
general indication of claim”.’
Also see
Vorkel
at p 403.
[12] The judgment’s point
of departure is from the former wording of the Form when the word
‘
general’
was used and not where
the requirement has changed to ‘
concise
terms’
without
the word ‘
general
’
in relation to the cause of action and where the schedule described
the causes of action as ‘
for
goods sold and delivered
’,
etc as set out in
Trans-Africa
.
It would be inconceivable that a summons can today properly describe
a cause of action as ‘
for
damages for defamation
’
as was permitted under the former Form, which highlights the
differences between the former Rule and Rule 17(2)(b).
[13]
Wilkinson
requires that the written agreement of loan should be attached. This
requirement is a long standing rule of practice in the Western
Cape
High Court as can be seen from the judgment of Friedman AJ in
Bantry
Head Investments v Murray & Stewart
(CT)
1974 (2) SA 386
(C) at 392-393. Although the learned judge dealt with
further particulars and the requirements of Rule 18(6), the right to
further
particulars has been abolished and the discussion was
regarding Rule 18(6) prior to its amendment compelling a party
relying on
a document, to attach same. The disclosure of the
document was a requirement despite there being no provision in the
Rule for
its attachment. Thring J said in
Nedbank
Ltd v Jacobs and Another
[2008] JOL 21940
(C) after a discussion of the requirement to attach
a written document:
‘
The plaintiff has
failed, in my judgment, to comply with the provisions
of Rule 17(2)(b)
, inasmuch
as it has not attached to its summons a copy of either the loan
agreement (if it was in writing) or of the mortgage bond.
’
(My emphasis).
[14] In
Moosa
v Hassam
2010 (2) SA
410
(KZP) Swain J, although considering Rule 18, held that it was
necessary to attach the written document relied upon in order for
a
cause of action to be properly pleaded. The learned judge said in
paras [16] to [18] as follows:
‘
[16] The need to annex
a true copy of the written agreement relied upon is obvious. In this
manner the defendant is afforded full
particulars of the written
agreement, which the plaintiff relies upon for its cause of action.
If, however, the plaintiff relies
on only a portion of the written
agreement in the pleading, only that portion need be annexed to the
pleading, in terms of rule
18(6). As stated by Centlivres CJ in the
case of Stern NO v Standard Trading Co (Pty) Ltd
1955 (3) SA 423
(A)
at 429H:
“
When
a plaintiff bases his cause of action on a document and annexes to
his declaration only part of the document, the defendant
is entitled
to assume that the plaintiff will rely only on that portion. The
defendant is under no obligation to call for a copy
of the whole
document.”
[17] This I consider to be
the crux of the present enquiry. Rule 18(6) speaks of a party who in
his pleading “relies”
on a contract or “part”
thereof. A party clearly ‘relies upon a contract’ when
he uses it as a “link
in the chain of his cause of action”.
South African Railways and Harbours v Deal Enterprises (Pty) Ltd
1975 (3) SA 944
(W) at 953A; and Van Tonder v Western Credit Ltd
1966
(1) SA 189
(C) at 193H.
Although both of these cases were decided at a time when rule
18(6) made no provision for a true copy of the written agreements to
be annexed to the pleading, the views of the learned judges, as to
the meaning to be attached to the phrase in question, are still
relevant and instructive.
[18] In the present case the
respondents base their cause of action against the applicants upon
the written agreement. The written
agreement is a vital link in the
chain of the respondents’ cause of action against the
applicants.
In order for the respondents’ cause
of action to be properly pleaded, it is necessary for the written
agreement relied upon
to be annexed
to the particulars of claim. In the absence of the written agreement
the basis of the respondents’ cause of action does not
appear
ex facie the pleadings.’
(My emphasis)
I respectfully agree with these remarks.
[15] If it is correct that it is
necessary for a plaintiff to attach the document to properly plead
its cause of action, such would
be correct not only for the purposes
of Rule 18, but also for the purposes of Rule 17 as, the plaintiff
would disclose no cause
of action pursuant to the provisions of Rule
17 if it fails to attach the written agreement. In
Strathmore
Exploration Co v Pongola Developing Co
1950 (4) SA 350
(T) at 352, it was held regarding Rule 17 that:
‘
In the circumstances,
as a cause of action has been disclosed
,
there is no necessity to add any further particulars thereto and
indeed, if one refers to the petition of the appellant himself,
it is
quite clear that his ignorance of the contract under which the claim
is made is simulated because it is quite clear that
there could be no
possible embarrassment to him as to the contract under which the
claim is made. But as I have already stated,
my decision is based
purely on the fact that a cause of action is set out and, there being
a cause of action, it is clear that
the learned judge in the court
below was correct in his decision.
’
(My emphasis).
That it is essential that the
summons should set out a cause of action was also held in
Credit
Corporation of SA Ltd v Swart
1959 (1) SA 555
(O) at 557;
Landman
Implemente (Edms) Bpk v Leliehoek Motors (Edms) Bpk
1975
(3) SA 347
(O) at 348-349;
Dowson
and Dobson Industrial Ltd v Van der Werf and Others
1981 (4) SA 417
(C) at 425;
Globe
Engineering Works Ltd v Ornelas Fishing Co (Pty) Ltd
1983 (2) SA 95
(C).
[16] As was the case in
Deal
Enterprises
and
Van
Tonder
at a time when
Rule 18 did not require attachment of the agreement relied upon, Rule
17(2)(b) does not require the contract upon
which the plaintiff
relies to be attached in so many words, but, if it is not attached, I
am of the view that the words of Swain
J in para [18] of
Moosa
,
are be applicable.
[17] In
Van
Tonder
, Van Winsen J
(as he then was) held that a written agreement, which is an essential
link in the chain of the cause of action, should
form a part of the
pleadings. Although Van Winsen J dealt with the provisions of Rule
18(6) it concerned the wording of the Rule
prior to the requirement
being introduced, that such a written agreement must be attached to
the pleadings. Van Winsen J found
that the agreement formed part of
the case at the pleading stage. Van Winsen J dealt with the
obligation to supply further particulars,
but since that right has
now been abolished, I am of the view that the agreement relied upon
should form part of the initial document
i.e. the simple summons.
[17] Also in this Division, Botha
J (as he then was) held pre the Rule 18(6) amendment, which requires
the attachment of a contract
upon which a party relies, and before
the right to obtain further particulars was abolished, in
Deal
Enterprises
at 953A:
‘
As a second part of the
argument the suggested narrow interpretation of the expression
“relies upon” appears to me to
be artificial and
unwarranted. A plaintiff clearly “relies upon a contract”
when he uses it as a “link in the
chain of his cause of action”
(Van Tonder’s case, supra at p 193H.) He is accordingly
obliged
to furnish the particulars mentioned in Rule 18(6) whenever the
contract forms part of the cause of action
put
forward by him, irrespective of whether the contract can aptly be
described as the ‘basis’ of the claim or not.
In my judgment, therefore, the principle to be applied may be
formulated as follows:
9. Where a plaintiff relies
upon a contract as part of his cause of action put forward by him,
the defendant is entitled to the
particulars mentioned in Rule 18(6)
as of right and independently of the application of the principles
summarised in paras 1-7
above.
’
(My emphasis).
[18] Mr Swanepoel also referred
to
Trust Bank of Africa
Limited v Hansa and Another
1988 (4) SA 102
(W) where Flemming J (as he then was) said that if a
plaintiff alleges facts in addition to those that constitute his
cause of
action such facts are unnecessarily contained in a summons.
The finding would seem to accord with the law. However the learned
judge said at 105B-C:
‘
An attorney drafting a
simple summons may sometimes justifiably incorporate allegations
making up the “cause of action” by
referring to a copy of the relevant contract which he attaches to the
summons
as an annexure
thereto. That example accentuates the
need to realise
that the plaintiff's success in the action follows because of the
presence of what is in law necessary
for success; it does not become dependent also upon whatever he in
fact alleged. The “cause of action” is not broadened
because the annexure contains terms which go further’. (
My
emphasis
).
This, in my view, is a reference
to a cause of action which is dependent upon a written document or as
Botha J said in
Deal
Enterprises,
that when
a plaintiff relies on a contract which is a link in the chain of the
cause of action, he is obliged to supply particulars
thereof.
[19] It was argued before me
that, in the absence of the attachment of the agreement to the
summons, and only in the event of it
being shown that there is some
prejudice to the defendant, should I conclude that the attachment of
the agreement may be required.
However, in
Sasol
Industries (Pty) Ltd t/a Sasol 1 v Electrical Repair Engineering
(Pty) Ltd t/a L H Marthinusen
1992 (4) SA 466
(W) it was held that if a pleading does not comply
with the sub-rules of Rule 18, requiring specified particulars of to
be set
out therein, the prejudice required for the setting aside of
the pleading in terms of Rule 30 has
prima
facie
been
established. The failure to attach the written agreement to the
simple summons, in my view, similarly establishes
prima
facie
prejudice for a
defendant.
[20] The additional costs of
attaching a few pages to a summons cannot outweigh the importance of
attaching the documents. It will
not have the consequence of
introducing ‘
novel
and onerous procedural impositions on mortgagees
’
as suggested by Mr Swanepoel with reference to
Bekker
and Another and Four Similar Cases
2011 (1) SA (WCC) at para [20]. The learned judges could not have
had the attachment of the written agreement of loan in mind
when
referring to ‘
onerous
procedural impositions on mortgagees
’
as the practice in that Division requires the attachment of the
written agreement of loan.
[21] Plaintiff’s counsel
referred to a number of cases that condoned the non-compliance with
the obligation to attach documents.
However, those were matters in
which, inter alia, the defendants opposed the proceedings and
condonation was granted in each instance
because the court concluded
that there was no prejudice to the defendants. Those cases are
distinguishable from the matters before
me.
[22] Save for a reference in
Erasmus
at p B1-24 to
Absa Bank
Ltd v C M Klem
(TPD 2
February 1993, unreported) where Joffe J refused to allow costs of
annexures to a simple summons, I could find no authority
which
disallowed the attachment of an agreement which formed the basis of a
claim, nor was I referred to any. The judgment of Joffe
J was also
not available to me to consider the ratio therein. On the other hand,
I have referred to judgments, which require the
attachment of the
written agreements and the circumstances under which it is required.
[23] Mr Swanepoel argued that
Peter AJ was the first court to have the opportunity to deal with the
issue of a simple summons to
which a bond document only was attached
in
Nedbank Ltd v Fraser
2011 (4) SA 363
(GSJ).
However, Peter AJ was not called upon to, and did not, consider the
necessity of the attachment of the written agreement,
which forms the
basis of a cause of action.
[24] I consequently conclude
that the cases requiring the attachment of the written document,
where it forms a link in the chain
of the cause of action or is the
foundation of the plaintiff’s cause of action, are correct and
should be followed. As is
the case in this Division, the practice in
the Western Cape High Court is a salutary one and I find no reason
why I should not
follow what the Full Bench said in
Wilkinson
regarding the attachment of the written contract where it forms a
link in the chain of the cause of action or the cause of action
is
found thereon as well as the allegations, which are required to be
contained in a simple summons.
[25] The plaintiff’s
summons lacks compliance with the requirements set out in the cases
referred to in this judgment and
does not disclose a proper cause of
action and in addition, lacks compliance with the requirements of
Rule 17(2)(b) and the requirement
of practice, that a party who
relies on a written agreement, should attach it to a summons. The
result is that the plaintiff cannot
succeed on the papers as they
stand. The rule of practice of this Division should be adhered to and
the written agreements should
be attached, also to a simple summons.
This is also required when judgment is sought before the Registrar.
The original documents
must be handed in when judgment is sought.
[26] In the circumstances the
matters before me are defective, at least to the extent indicated in
this judgment.
[27] In order to allow the
plaintiff to amend and/or correct the defects, I postpone all the
matters
sine die
and disallow the costs incurred as a result of such defects.
_____________________________
W
L WEPENER
JUDGE OF THE SOUTH GAUTENG
HIGH COURT, JOHANNESBURG
COUNSEL FOR APPLICANT: ADV J N SWANEPOEL
INSTRUCTED BY: SMIT SEWGOOLAM INC
AMICUS CURIAE:
ADV
S AUCAMP
DATE OF HEARING: 2 MARCH 2012
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 13 MARCH
2012
1
Standard Bank of SA
Ltd v Saunderson and Others
2006 (2) SA 264
(SCA).
2
Nedbank Ltd v
Mortinson
[2005] ZAGPHC 85
;
2005 (6) SA
462
(W).
3
Firstrand Bank Ltd v
Folscher and Another
[2011] ZAGPPHC 79 (24 May
2011); 2011 (4) SA 314
(GP).