Engen Petroleum Ltd v Multi Waste (Pty) Ltd and Others (33410/11) [2011] ZAGPJHC 148; 2012 (5) SA 596 (GSJ) (23 September 2011)

85 Reportability

Brief Summary

Business Rescue — Application for business rescue proceedings — Urgent application by creditor to oppose business rescue — Companies substantially indebted to creditor and in financial distress — Procedural irregularities in application, including improper notice and failure to serve required parties — Court finds application for business rescue not compliant with statutory requirements and sets aside the resolutions for business rescue proceedings.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


The matter concerned an urgent interlocutory application by an intervening creditor, Engen Petroleum Limited (“Engen”), seeking to participate in and oppose the granting of an order placing two companies under supervision and commencing business rescue proceedings in terms of section 131(1) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008.


The respondents were Multi Waste (Pty) Limited (“Multi Waste”) and Multi Fleet Logistics (Pty) Limited (“Multi Fleet”), together with other parties associated with the business rescue application. The underlying business rescue application had been launched by various employees and by Mr PJL Moller, the sole shareholder and director of the companies, in their capacities as affected persons under the Companies Act.


The procedural history reflected that the companies had previously adopted board resolutions under section 129 to commence voluntary business rescue, but those resolutions were later set aside by consent due to non-compliance with statutory procedural requirements. Thereafter, the affected persons launched a fresh section 131(1) court application on an ex parte basis. Engen then brought the present urgent intervention to oppose the business rescue proceedings, relying substantially on alleged procedural irregularities and the alleged insolvency and asset dissipation involving the companies.


The general subject-matter of the dispute was whether the section 131(1) business rescue application was properly before the court and, if not, whether it should be dismissed, in circumstances where Engen asserted that the companies were effectively insolvent and that the statutory notice and service regime for business rescue court proceedings had not been followed.


2. Material Facts


It was largely common cause that Multi Waste’s core business involved purchasing fuel which it supplied to Multi Fleet, enabling Multi Fleet to conduct a cargo haulage business. It was also common cause that the companies were substantially indebted to Engen for fuel purchases, with a joint indebtedness of approximately R8 million.


It was further common cause that Engen had obtained security for its exposure, including a cession of the book debts of both companies and a deed of suretyship from Multi Fleet for Multi Waste’s obligations. The companies executed a written acknowledgement of debt in June 2011, undertaking to repay by instalments, but that arrangement was breached.


Following the breach, Engen took steps to enforce the cession, including terminating Multi Fleet’s mandate to receive debtor payments, and concluding an agreement on 24 June 2011 under which Multi Fleet would institute legal action on Engen’s behalf against certain debtors and would provide debtor contact details while directing debtors to pay Engen’s attorneys. A further meeting occurred on 15 July 2011, at which Multi Fleet again undertook to provide current debtor and creditor details and a plan to address cash flow difficulties.


On 25 July 2011, Engen learned that both companies’ boards had passed section 129 resolutions on 21 July 2011 to commence voluntary business rescue, without prior warning to Engen. Engen launched urgent proceedings to set those resolutions aside on the basis that they had lapsed due to procedural non-compliance. On 16 August 2011, the resolutions were set aside by consent, and a further agreement was entered into for the provision of documents needed for Engen to enforce the cession; Engen’s attorney obtained certain documents, including Multi Fleet bank statements.


The section 131(1) court application to commence business rescue was instituted ex parte on 2 September 2011 by employees and by Mr Moller as affected persons. Engen contended that it was not given proper notice of this business rescue application and only learned of it when its attorney received an incomplete email copy on 6 September 2011. Engen also complained of non-disclosure of matters said to be material to an ex parte application, including Engen’s position as a partially secured affected person, the involvement of a related entity (Multi Crow Logistics (Pty) Limited), and a pending winding-up application by Alondra Trading CC.


The court recorded that the business rescue application contained significant procedural irregularities, including the use of the short form notice of motion (Form 2) and failures relating to statutory and regulatory service and notification requirements. The court also accepted that there was evidence suggesting Multi Fleet was profoundly insolvent and that assets and funds were being transferred in a manner raising concern, although the dispositive basis for the dismissal of the business rescue application was rooted primarily in procedural non-compliance and misjoinder-type concerns arising from the single application covering two companies.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal questions were whether a court application under section 131(1) of the Companies Act could properly be brought ex parte and/or by use of the short form notice of motion, and whether the applicants had complied with the mandatory service and notification requirements in section 131(2) read with the Companies Regulations, 2011.


A further legal issue was whether it was permissible, in this Division’s practice, to seek relief akin to insolvency-type collective proceedings (here, business rescue) in respect of more than one company in a single application in circumstances where the companies have distinct creditor bodies and affected persons, and where there is not a complete identity of interests.


The dispute concerned primarily questions of law and procedure, including statutory interpretation and procedural compliance, together with the application of those legal requirements to the facts (namely, the manner in which the application was launched and served/notified). To the extent that urgency and the practical prejudice of leaving an irregular application pending were assessed, the court also made evaluative judgments regarding the consequences of procedural irregularity in the business rescue context.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court approached the matter on the basis that a section 131(1) business rescue application is not merely an ordinary motion, but a statutory process that directly affects a defined class of stakeholders and engages regulatory oversight. In that context, the court emphasised the significance of section 131(2), which requires an applicant to serve the application on the company and the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (“the Commission”), and to notify each affected person in the prescribed manner. The court treated these requirements as integral to ensuring participation rights under section 131(3) and related provisions dealing with affected persons’ participation.


In addressing the applicants’ choice of procedure, the court relied on established motion practice: an ex parte application, or the use of the short form notice of motion (Form 2), is generally reserved for circumstances where notice is unnecessary or where the relief sought is not final. The court considered textual and purposive indications within the Companies Act suggesting that section 131(1) contemplates an application brought on notice in a manner consistent with the long form notice of motion (Form 2(a)). The court pointed to the Act’s express references to ex parte applications in other contexts (specifically section 129(5)(b)), drawing the inference that, had the legislature intended section 131(1) applications to be brought ex parte, it would have said so. On this purposive reading, the use of Form 2 and the ex parte format was held to be an irregularity.


On service, the court held that a section 131(1) application initiates proceedings and therefore must be served in accordance with Rule 4(1)(a) of the Uniform Rules of Court. The court accepted that, while the companies purported to waive service and notice requirements, the Commission had not, and thus proper proof of service by the sheriff on the Commission was required. The papers indicated that a copy appeared merely to have been left at the Commission’s office, rather than served by the sheriff as required. This was treated as a further procedural irregularity.


On notification to affected persons, the court applied Regulation 124 (requiring delivery of a copy of the court application to each affected person known to the applicant) read with Regulation 7 (which regulates delivery methods and, where necessary, substituted service). The court stressed that the applicants bore the onus of satisfying the court that all reasonable steps were taken to identify affected persons and to deliver the application to them in compliance with the Regulations, including compliance with the requirements for electronic delivery (such as the information required by Regulation 7(4) when using fax or email). Given that Mr Moller, as sole shareholder and director, was positioned to identify affected persons from company records, the court considered it incumbent on him to place proper compliance material before the court. On the papers as a whole, the court concluded that there had not been compliance, or even substantial compliance, with the notification regime laid down in the Act and Regulations.


Having found the irregularities extensive, the court concluded that the business rescue application fell to be dismissed. The court also addressed the practical and procedural consequences of leaving such an application pending: it recorded that the business rescue application had been postponed sine die on 13 September 2011, and reasoned that allowing a “thoroughly irregular” application to remain pending indefinitely would be confusing and potentially prejudicial to creditors, affected persons, and future counterparties. This was treated as contributing to urgency and to the need for final disposal of the defective application.


The court further stated an additional reason why the business rescue application could not succeed, namely the settled practice in the Division that the liquidation of more than one company is not sought in a single application absent a complete identity of interests, and that analogous concerns apply in insolvency-type proceedings involving more than one entity. The court reasoned that each company had separate share capital, separate creditors, and presumably different affected persons, and that combining them in a single business rescue application would prejudice persons concerned with only one entity.


On intervention, the court recognised Engen’s status as an affected person with a right to participate in a section 131(1) hearing. While the court observed that leave to intervene may not strictly be required to participate substantively, it accepted that leave might nonetheless be needed as a procedural requirement. It therefore granted leave to intervene and, consequent upon the defects identified, dismissed the business rescue application.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court granted Engen’s application for leave to intervene. The section 131(1) business rescue application (Case No 33410/2011) seeking to place Multi Waste and Multi Fleet under supervision and commence business rescue proceedings was dismissed with costs.


No order was granted in respect of prayer 5 of Engen’s intervention application.


Cases Cited


Simross Vintners (Pty) Limited v Vermeulen 1978 (1) SA 779 (T).


Ghomeshi-Bozorg v Yousefi 1998 (1) SA 692 (W).


Breetveldt and Others v Van Zyl 1972 (1) SA 304 (T).


Ferela (Pty) Limited v Craigie 1980 (3) SA 167 (W).


Erich Brack and Another v Front Runner Racks and Others (Case No: 45084/2010) (unreported judgment, referenced).


Fullard v Fullard 1979 (1) SA 368 (T).


Shapiro v South African Recording Rights Association Limited (Galeta Intervening) 2008 (4) SA 145 (W).


Legislation Cited


Companies Act 71 of 2008, including sections 6(10), 6(11), 128(1)(a), 129, 129(5)(b), 130(3)(b), 131(1), 131(2), 131(3), and references to sections 144, 145 and 146.


Companies Regulations, 2011 (published under GN R351 in Government Gazette 34239 of 26 April 2011), including Regulations 7, 124, and references to Table CR3 and Regulation 165(2)–(3).


Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002, section 15 (referred to via section 6(11) of the Companies Act).


Rules of Court Cited


Uniform Rules of Court, Rule 6(5)(a).


Uniform Rules of Court, Rule 4(1)(a).


Uniform Rules of Court, First Schedule, Form 2 and Form 2(a).


Held


The court held that the section 131(1) business rescue application was procedurally defective and could not be entertained because it was brought using an ex parte/short form procedure inconsistent with the statutory scheme, because the applicants failed to prove proper service on the Commission as required by the Uniform Rules, and because there was non-compliance (or at least no substantial compliance) with the notification requirements to affected persons prescribed by the Companies Act and the Companies Regulations.


The court further held that the attempt to seek business rescue for two separate companies in a single application was impermissible in circumstances where each company has separate interests and stakeholder groups, and where the joinder would prejudice persons interested in only one company.


Engen was held entitled to intervene, and the business rescue application was dismissed with costs.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


A court application to commence business rescue under section 131(1) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 is to be brought in a manner consistent with applications on notice, and the use of an ex parte procedure or the short form notice of motion constitutes an irregularity where the statutory scheme requires service and notification to multiple stakeholders.


The service and notification obligations in section 131(2) are integral to affected persons’ participatory rights. Proper service on the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission must comply with the Uniform Rules, including service by the sheriff where the application initiates proceedings, and affected persons must be notified in the prescribed manner as set out in the Companies Regulations, 2011, including delivery requirements and, where necessary, substituted service.


Where there is material non-compliance with the statutory and regulatory procedural framework governing business rescue court applications, the court may dismiss the application rather than permit it to remain pending, particularly where the pendency of a defective application risks confusion or prejudice to creditors, affected persons, or third parties.


Proceedings that collectively affect stakeholder rights (in the business rescue/liquidation context) should not be brought in respect of multiple companies in a single application unless there is a complete identity of interests, given the separateness of corporate entities and the potential prejudice to stakeholders associated with only one entity.

About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
>>
2011
>>
[2011] ZAGPJHC 148
|

|

Engen Petroleum Ltd v Multi Waste (Pty) Ltd and Others (33410/11) [2011] ZAGPJHC 148; 2012 (5) SA 596 (GSJ) (23 September 2011)

Links to summary

REPORTABLE
SOUTH GAUTENG HIGH COURT
JOHANNESBURG
CASE NO
:33410/11
DATE
:23/09/2011
In the matter between –
ENGEN PETROLEUM LIMITED Applicant
(Registration Number: 1989/003754/06)
and
MULTI WASTE (PTY) LIMITED
(Registration Number: 1991/005964/07)
and others Respondents
J U D G M E N T
BORUCHOWITZ J
:
[1] This is an urgent application brought by an intervening creditor,
Engen Petroleum Limited (Engen), to oppose the grant of an
order for
the placement of two companies under supervision and to commence
business rescue proceedings in terms of s 131(1) of
the Companies
Act, 71 of 2008 (the Act).
[2] The relevant facts are largely common cause and can be briefly
stated. The two companies concerned in the rescue proceedings
are
Multi Waste (Pty) Limited (Multi Waste) and Multi Fleet Logistics
(Pty) Limited (Multi Fleet). The core business of Multi
Waste is the
purchasing of fuel which it supplies to Multi Fleet in order to
enable it to conduct a cargo haulage business. The
companies are
substantially indebted to Engen in respect of fuel purchases, their
joint indebtedness amounting to approximately
R8 million.
[3] To secure its considerable financial exposure, Engen procured a
cession of the book debts of both companies and a deed of suretyship

from Multi Fleet in respect of the obligations of Multi Waste. In
June 2011 the companies executed a written acknowledgement of
debt in
favour of Engen in which they jointly undertook to discharge their
outstanding indebtedness by means of instalments, but
that
undertaking was breached.
[4] Engen proceeded to enforce the cession of book debts and
terminated Multi Fleet's mandate to receive any funds from its
debtors.
An agreement was concluded on 24 June 2011 whereunder Multi
Fleet was mandated to institute legal action on behalf of Engen
against
certain of its debtors, and undertook to furnish Engen with
the contact details of its debtors. It also undertook to inform its

debtors that payment was to be made to Engen's attorneys.
[5] Because Engen encountered difficulties in collecting the
outstanding debtors book, a meeting was held on 15 July 2011, at
which Multi Fleet again undertook to provide Engen with details of
its current debtors and creditors, and a plan to overcome its
cash
flow problems.
[6] On 25 July 2011, it was brought to Engen’s attention that a
resolution envisaged in s 129 of the Act to voluntarily begin

business rescue proceedings had been passed by the board of directors
of each of Multi Waste and Multi Fleet on 21 July 2011.
Engen was
not forewarned that such resolutions would be taken, and which was in
marked contrast to what had been discussed at the
meeting on 15 July
2011.
[7] Engen then launched an urgent application to set aside the
resolutions on the ground that they had lapsed for want of compliance

with certain procedural requirements laid down in the Act. On 16
August 2011, this Court set aside the resolutions by consent,
and a
written agreement was entered into in terms of which the companies
again undertook to provide Engen with all documents and
information
that was necessary to enforce the cession. Pursuant to that
agreement, Engen's attorney took possession of certain
documents,
which included the bank statements of Multi Fleet.
[8] The application to commence business rescue proceedings in terms
of s 131(1) of the Act was instituted on an
ex parte
basis on
2 September 2011 by various employees and the sole shareholder and
director of the companies, Mr PJL Moller, in their capacities
as
affected persons in terms of s 128(1)(a) of the Act.
[9] The present application is said to be urgent for the following
reasons
:
Multi Fleet and Multi Waste are profoundly
insolvent and fall to be liquidated rather than placed under
supervision. A company,
Multi Crow Logistics (Pty) Limited (Multi
Crow), has effectively taken over the business of Multi Fleet and is
in the process of
disposing of its assets, including vehicles and
collectable debts. Bank statements in Engen’s possession
indicate that Multi
Fleet is in the process of transferring vast sums
from its bank account to the accounts of related companies. A
creditor, Alondra
Trading CC, has also instituted winding-up
proceedings against Multi Fleet.
[10] Engen also states that it was not given proper notice of the
business rescue application and that it only learnt of the existence

thereof when its attorney received an incomplete email copy on 6
September 2011. It also complains that there has not been
disclosure,
as required in
ex parte
applications, of
Engen's position as a partially secured and affected party, the
involvement of Multi Crow and the pending application
for liquidation
brought by Alondra Trading CC.
[11] The business rescue application is bristling with procedural
irregularities. The most glaring of the irregularities pertains
to
the use of the short form notice of motion (Form 2 of the First
Schedule to the Uniform Rules) and the failure to comply with
the
service and notice requirements laid down in the Act.
[12] Section 131 of the Act, provides, so far as is relevant, as
follows
:
"
131
Court order to begin business rescue
proceedings.
(1) Unless
a company has adopted a resolution contemplated in section 129, an
affected person may apply to a court at any time for
an order placing
the company under supervision and commencing business rescue
proceedings.
(2) An
applicant in terms of subsection (1) must –
(a) Serve
a copy of the application on the company and the Commission; and
(b) Notify
each affected person of the application in the prescribed manner.
(3) Each
affected person has a right to participate in the hearing of an
application in terms of this section.
(4)

"
[13] An
ex parte
application, or and application using the
short form notice of motion (Form 2), is used either because it is
not necessary to give
notice to the respondent, or the relief claimed
is not final in nature (see
Simross Vintners (Pty) Limited v
Vermeulen
1978 (1) SA 779
(T) at 783A;
Ghomeshi-Bozorg v
Yousefi
1998 (1) SA 692
(W) at 696D. Rule 6(5)(a) provides that
every application other than one brought
ex parte
shall
be brought in accordance with Form 2(a) of the First Schedule to the
Uniform Rules.
[14] The following are, in my view, textual indications in the Act
that an application under s131(1) must be brought using the
long form
notice of motion (Form 2(a)).
[15] Section 131(2) provides that an applicant, in terms of ss (1)
must serve a copy of the application on the company and the

Commission, and notify each affected person of the application in the
prescribed manner. As both the company and the Commission
(the
Companies and Intellectual Property Commission) have a direct and
substantial interest in any order that the Court might make
and are
required to be joined as parties to the business rescue application.
The Commission is one of the regulatory agencies
established under
Chapter 8 of the Act. Each affected person has a right to
participate in the hearing of an application in terms
of s 131(1)
(see ss 131(4), 144, 145 and 146), a right that can only properly be
exercised if affected persons are given notice
of the application in
the manner prescribed in the Act and regulations.
[16] The legislature appears to have been cognisant of the
distinction between an
ex parte
application and an application
brought using the long form notice of motion. Although in a
different context, specific reference
is made in s 129(5)(b) to the
use of an
ex parte
application. It is safe to assume that had
an
ex parte
application been intended in respect of
applications brought under section 131(1), the legislature would have
said so.
[17] Adopting a purposive approach to the sections mentioned, I am
satisfied that the word "apply", as it appears in
section
131(1), contemplates an application brought utilising Form 2(a) and
the use by the applicants of the
ex parte
form (Form 2)
constitutes an irregularity.
[18] Section 131(2)(a) requires that an applicant serve a copy of the
application on the company and the Commission. Rule 4(1)(a)
provides
that service of any document initiating application proceedings shall
be effected by the sheriff in one or more of the
manners therein
stipulated. An application to place a company under supervision in
terms of section 131(1) is clearly a document
that initiates
proceedings and is thus required to be served by the sheriff. The
companies have purported to waive the requirements
of service and
notice but the Commission has not. Proof is therefore required that
the application was served on the Commission
by the sheriff as
required in terms of Rule 4. A copy of the application appears
simply to have been left at the office of the
Commission but not
served by the sheriff as required under the Rules. This also
constitutes an irregularity.
[19] Section 131(2)(b) provides that an applicant must “
notify

each affected person of the application “
in the prescribed
manner
”. The Act and Companies Regulations, 2011,
published under GN R351 in
GG
34239
of 26
April 2011, specifically provide how notification is to be given to
affected persons.
[20] Regulation 124 reads
:

124. Notices
to be issued by affected persons concerning court proceedings.
– An applicant in court proceedings who is required, in terms
of either section 130(3)(b) or 131(2)(b), to notify affected
persons
that an application has been made to a court, must deliver a copy of
the court application, in accordance with regulation
7, to each
affected person known to the applicant.

[21] Regulation 7 provides as follows
:

7. Delivery
of documents.
– (1) A notice or document to be delivered for any purpose
contemplated in the Act or these regulations may be delivered
in any
manner –
(a) contemplated
in section 6(10) or (11); or
set
out in Table CR 3.
A
document delivered by a method listed in the second column of Table
CR3 must be regarded as having been delivered to the intended

recipient –
on
the date and at the time shown opposite that method, in the third
column of that table; or
if
the date and time for the delivery of a document referred to in
Table CR 3 to a regulatory agency is outside of the office
hours of
that regulatory agency, as set out in regulation 165(2), that
document will be deemed to have been delivered on the
next business
day, subject to regulation 165(3).
(3) If,
in a particular matter, it proves impossible to deliver a document in
any manner provided for in the Act or these regulations -
if
any person other than the Tribunal is required to deliver the
document, the person may apply to either the Tribunal or the
High
Court for an order of substituted service; or
if
the Tribunal is required to deliver the document, the recording
officer of the Tribunal concerned may apply to the High Court
for an
order of substituted service.
(4) A
document that is delivered by fax must include a cover page, and a
document that is transmitted by electronic mail must be
accompanied
by a cover message, in either case setting out -
(a) the
name, address, and telephone number of the sender;
(b) either
-
(i) the
name of the person to whom it is addressed, and the name of that
person’s attorney, if applicable; or,
(ii) the
name or description of the class of intended recipients, if the
document is being delivered generally to all the members
of a
particular class of persons;
(c) the
date of the transmission; and
(d) in
the case of a fax transmission –
(i) the
total number of pages sent, including the cover page; and
(ii) the
name and telephone number of the person to contact if the
transmission is incomplete or otherwise unsuccessful.

[22] Subsections 6(10) and (11) of the Act stipulate
:

6(10)
If,
in terms of this Act, a notice is required or permitted to be given
or published to any person, it is sufficient if the notice
is
transmitted electronically directly to that person in a manner and
form such that the notice can conveniently be printed by
the
recipient within a reasonable time and at a reasonable cost.
6(11) If,
in terms of this Act, a document, record or statement, other than a
notice contemplated in subsection (10), is required –
to
be retained, it is sufficient if an electronic original or
reproduction of that document is retained as provided for in section

15 of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act; or
to
be published, provided or delivered, it is sufficient if –
an
electronic original or reproduction of that document, record or
statement is published, provided or delivered by electronic

communication in a manner and form such that the document, record
or statement can conveniently be printed by the recipient
within a
reasonable time and at a reasonable cost; or
a
notice of the availability of that document, record or statement,
summarising its content and satisfying any prescribed requirements,

is delivered at each intended recipient of the document, record or
statement, together with instructions for receiving the
complete
document, record or statement.

[23] Table CR3 details the various methods of notification and dates
of times of deemed delivery.
[24] An applicant must satisfy the court that all reasonable steps
have been taken to notify all affected persons known to the

applicant, by delivering a copy of the court application to them in
accordance with regulation 7. Where compliance proves impossible,
an
applicant may apply to the High Court for an order of substituted
service (see regulation 7(3)). At the very least it is incumbent

upon an applicant to demonstrate that all reasonable steps have been
taken to establish the identity of the affected persons and
their
addresses to which the relevant notices are to be delivered. Where
electronic means, such as a fax machine, is used to give
notice,
evidence is required of the information stipulated in regulation
7(4).
[25] The seventh applicant is the sole shareholder and director of
Multi Waste and Multi Fleet. In that capacity he would
have had
control of and access to the companies’ records and was in a
position to properly identify the affected persons
entitled to
notification of the application. He should have provided the Court
with the information contemplated in regulation
7 (including ss 6(10)
and (11) of the Act, and Table CR3).
[26] On a proper conspectus of the papers, it cannot be said that
there has been compliance, or even substantial compliance, with
the
notification requirements laid down in the Act and Regulations.
[27] Given the nature and extent of the irregularities involved, the
business rescue application falls to be dismissed. On 13
September
2011, the application was postponed
sine die
. To permit a
thoroughly irregular application to remain pending before the Court
on an indefinite basis is confusing and potentially
prejudicial to
creditors, affected persons or persons who in the future choose to
deal with the companies. This, in itself, creates
an element of
urgency.
[28] There are other considerations that render the matter urgent.
There is evidence that Multi Fleet, which is profoundly insolvent,
is
disposing of or transferring its assets to other entities, and moneys
received from its book debtors is being paid to entities
other than
Engen. It is, in my view, essential that a winding-up order be
granted so as to enable a liquidator to take control
of the affairs
of both Multi Fleet and Multin Waste.
[29] There is yet a further reason why the business rescue
application cannot succeed. It is settled practice in this Division

that the liquidation of more than one company cannot be sought in a
single application unless there is a complete identity of interests

(see
Breetveldt
and Others v Van Zyl
1972 (1) SA 304
(T)); nor is it
advisable that two or more individuals should be joined in an
application for their sequestration (
Ferela (Pty) Limited v
Craigie
1980 (3) SA 167
(W); see, also, the unreported judgment
of
Erich Brack and Another v Front Runner Racks and Others
,
(Case No: 45084/2010). Each of the companies involved in the
present application has its own separate share capital, creditors and

presumably different affected persons. It would be prejudicial to
persons who are only interested in one of the companies to be
engaged
in business rescue proceedings in respect of the other.
[30] Engen, as an affected person, has a right to participate in the
hearing of an application in terms of s 131(1) of the
Act. It
would not require leave of the Court to intervene. Such leave may,
however, be necessary as a procedural requirement.
See, in this
regard,
Fullard v Fullard
1979 (1) SA 368
(T) and
Shapiro v
South African Recording Rights Association Limited (Galeta
Intervening)
2008 (4) SA 145
(W).
[31] For these reasons I would allow the intervention and dismiss the
business rescue application.
[32] The following order is granted:
(a) The application for leave to intervene is granted.
(b) The application brought under Case No: 33410/2011 to place Multi
Waste (Pty) Limited and Multi Fleet Logistics (Pty) Limited
under
supervision and to commence business rescue proceedings in terms of
Section 131(1) of the Act is dismissed with costs.
(c) No order is granted in respect of prayer 5 of the application to
intervene.
DATED at JOHANNESBURG on this the 25
th
day of OCTOBER 2011
_____________________________
P BORUCHOWITZ
JUDGE OF THE SOUTH GAUTENG
HIGH COURT
Counsel for Applicant : ADVOCATE JP COETZEE SC
Attorneys for Applicant: LANHAM-LOVE ATTORNEYS
Counsel for Respondent: ADVOCATE C VAN DER SPUY
Attorneys for Respondent: LOCKETTS ATTORNEYS